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THE  
H I S T O R Y  
OF THE  
R E I G N  
OF  
PHILIP THE THIRD,  
KING OF SPAIN.

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*A*  
VOL. III.





THE  
HISTORY  
OF THE  
REIGN  
OF  
PHILIP THE THIRD,  
KING OF SPAIN.

By ROBERT WATSON, LL. D.

PRINCIPAL OF THE UNITED COLLEGE, AND  
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC,  
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREW'S.

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## ADVERTISEMENT.

**T**HE first four books of this volume, which contain the progress of the war in the Netherlands, the establishment of the truce with the Dutch, and the expulsion of the Moreiscos from Spain, are printed literally from the manuscript of Dr. Watson: nor has the smallest alteration been made, either in the arrangement of his matter, or in his style. It is, however, but justice to the memory of that author, as well as to the public, to acknowledge, that, in the two last, he had not the least participation. These were written by the editor of Dr. Watson's manuscript, at the desire of the guardians of his children. This was deemed an attention due to the curiosity of the reader; a curiosity which, in the present important æra, may be supposed to be somewhat enlivened by the great events which have lately happened in the world.

It is evident that Dr. Watson has exerted in this work all that care to discover the truth, which distinguishes his History of Philip II. He has consulted the most approved writers on this subject: and by that respectable friend to literature, the Earl of HARDWICKE, he was favoured with manuscripts of equal authority and importance.

VOL. III.

A

THE



## A D V E R T I S E M E N T.

THE continuator of Dr. Watson's narrative has not thought it proper to give a detail of those hostile operations at sea, which were continued, beyond the line, even after the pacification of Antwerp. These operations, in his opinion, enter into the Spanish History, by the most natural connection, at the expiration of the truce; when the Spanish ministers compared the advantages and disadvantages that had resulted from that agreement, and deliberated whether they should prolong the peace, or renew the war.

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T H E  
H I S T O R Y  
OF THE REIGN OF  
P H I L I P T H E T H I R D,  
K I N G O F S P A I N.

B O O K I.

**P**HILIP the Third, King of Spain, son of Philip the Second, and of Anne of Austria, daughter of Maximilian II. Emperor of Germany, was in the 21st year of his age at his accession to the throne. He was a prince of a character extremely opposite to that of the late king, although no pains had been spared to form him to a similarity of manners. From the instructions delivered to those who had the charge of his education, it appears (*a*) to have been a principal object of his father's attention to inspire him with the same bigotted attachment to the superstition of the church of Rome, by which he himself had been actuated; and the means which he employed for this end, were attended with the desired success. But he was not equally successful in his endeavours to overcome that aversion which his son, from the natural indolence of his temper, early discovered to almost every species of manly exertion and activity (*b*).

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WITH

(*a*) Historia de la vida y hechos, del inclito monarca D. Felipe tercero. Por Gil Gonzalez Davila, Cronista de los Seniores Reyes D. Felipe III. y IVto. lib. 1. cap. 6.

(*b*) Addiciones a la Historia del Marquis Virgilio Malvezzi, Yanez Memorias, p. 136.

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WITH this part of the young prince's character, Philip was well acquainted; and foresaw, with much anxiety, the unhappy consequences which it was likely to produce in his future reign. In order to introduce and habituate him to the management of public affairs, he formed a council of his ablest and most experienced ministers, who, in the presence of the prince, debated three times a week, concerning various important matters relating to the administration of the kingdom; and the prince was required to preside in this council, and to report the opinion of the majority to the king (*c*). But neither his, nor any other expedient which Loaisa, the prince's faithful preceptor, could devise, proved effectual for the purpose for which it was intended. Inactivity or indolence still remained the most conspicuous feature in his character; and it early excited in the king, a strong and well grounded apprehension that his son, unable or unwilling himself to hold the reins of government, would surrender them into the hands of the marquis of Denia, or of some other favourite. Against this conduct, which is so commonly attended with the most pernicious consequences, Philip had often put the young prince upon his guard; and it was his last advice to him, which he delivered with great earnestness, a few hours before his death, that he should govern his kingdom by himself. He had likewise requested of him to employ, as his principal counsellors, Don Christopher de Moura, marquis of Castel Rodrigo, and Don John Idiaquez; from whose experience, fidelity, and great abilities, he might derive the highest advantages, especially in the beginning of his reign (*d*).

THE

(*c*) Davila, lib. i. cap. x.

(*d*) Gon. Davila, lib. i. cap. 12. Porreno Dichos y Hechos, passim. It was a saying of Philip's concerning his son, Que era mas para ser mandado, que mandar. Addiciones di Malvezzi.

THE soft and gentle temper of the prince had hitherto rendered him extremely obsequious to his father's will (e): but, conscious of his incapacity, and prompted by his indolence, he no sooner mounted the throne, than, disregarding the counsels which had been given him, he resolved to avoid the perplexity which might attend his having recourse, on any occasion, to different counsellors, and therefore committed the whole administration of affairs to his favourite the marquis of Denia.

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THE marquis del Castel Rodrigo, in whom Philip II. had long reposed the most perfect confidence, was honourably dismissed from court, and appointed viceroy of Portugal (f). Idiaquez had the presidency of the military orders conferred upon him; and being of a less ambitious, and more complying temper than Castel Rodrigo, and willing to act in an inferior or subordinate capacity, he was suffered to remain, and occasionally consulted, on account of his long experience and the high character which he held for prudence and sagacity (g). But all power was lodged

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in

(e) The author of "Addiciones a la Historia de Marquis Virgilio Malvezzi," gives the following singular instance of the truth of this assertion. Philip II. intending that his son should marry one of the daughters of Charles, archduke of Austria, and having sent for the pictures of these princesses, he one day, in presence of his daughter Isabella, and several of his ministers, desired the young prince to examine the pictures, and make his choice of the princess, whom he would prefer for his wife. Philip, with his usual deference and humility, submitted his choice to the king. The king remonstrated with him on the impropriety of requesting any other person to judge for him, in this matter, in which his own taste alone ought to be consulted, and desired him to carry the pictures to his own apartment, where he might carefully examine them and fix his choice. I have no choice, replied the prince, but your majesty's pleasure, and I am certain that that princess will appear to me the best and the most beautiful whom your majesty shall prefer. p. 137.

(f) Davila, p. 36.

(g) Davila, p. 37.

**BOOK I.** <sup>1598.</sup> in the hands of the favourite, who, having been chief equerry to the king, before his accession to the throne, and having in that station had frequent access to his person, had gained his affections, and acquired an entire ascendant over him.

HE was instantly created duke of Lerma, and admitted into the council of state : after which, the king transmitted edicts to all the councils in the kingdom, requiring obedience to whatever orders should be communicated to them in his name by the duke (*b*).

THIS determined partiality, which Philip was at no pains to conceal, occasioned a general discontent. The grandees of the first rank were filled with indignation, when they beheld one whom they had been accustomed to regard as their inferior, invested with such unlimited authority ; and all ranks of men, judging from former instances of the same nature, dreaded an unprosperous and unquiet reign. Their complaints were the louder and the more generally diffused, as the duke of Lerma was utterly unpractised in the affairs of government, and had not yet given any proof of merit or abilities. It was a demonstration, they thought, of extreme weakness in the character of the king, so avowedly, and in contradiction to the advice and example of his father, whose memory they revered, to declare his choice of a favourite ; and they apprehended that, on trial, the character of this favourite would be found, in this respect, too nearly similar to his own (*i*). Their apprehensions were not without foundation. By his courtesousness and affability, the duke imposed on the penetration of many of those

(*b*) Davila, p. 41.

(*i*) Vide Addiciones to Malvezzi, p. 144.



those who approached him; and, by discovering on all occasions the most devoted attachment to the church, he conciliated the favour of the ecclesiastics, but it soon appeared that his views and abilities were extremely limited; and that he neither possessed the œconomy, the firmness, or the capacity requisite for the difficult and important charge with which he was intrusted (*k*).

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It was peculiarly unfortunate for the Spanish monarchy to have the helm of government committed to such weak hands, at the present period. The late king indeed had foreseen, and, in some measure, provided for this event, by the peace which he had concluded with France, and the resignation of his sovereignty in the Netherlands; which he hoped would put an end to the war in that country, and prove the means of recovering the revolted provinces. He had likewise left all his other dominions, not only in Spain, but in Italy, and in the new world, in the enjoyment of peace, and Portugal, now accustomed to the yoke, yielded a ready obedience to his authority.

BUT although Philip II. through the vigilance and vigour of his administration, had left his dominions every where, except the Netherlands, in the enjoyment of internal tranquillity, he had not left them in a flourishing condition. On the contrary, Spain, his place of residence, and his seat of empire, was greatly exhausted, and some of the principal sources of her opulence and prosperity were dried up.

By the war in which he had made so many great exertions, both by sea and land, and, still more, perhaps, by the migration of the people to the new world, the inhabitants of Spain were

B 3

greatly

(*k*) Mayerne Turquet, p. 1295.



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greatly reduced in number. All emoluments and honors which the sovereign could bestow, had, for ages past, been divided between the military and the ecclesiastical professions. By this means, the mechanic arts and agriculture, having come to be regarded as comparatively mean and despicable, were alike abandoned by the indolent or inactive, and by those who were endued with a spirit of ambition and enterprize. This contempt, and the consequent neglect of the more useful arts, the profits arising from which, though sure, are always moderate, was heightened by the frequent instances of enormous fortunes, suddenly acquired by the adventurers in America. That proportion of the riches arising from the American mines, which the sovereign received, was spent either in those countries in which his wars were carried on, or in purchasing naval and military stores from other nations. The greater part of what was imported by merchants and other individuals was laid out in England, Italy, and the Netherlands, for manufactures, which the colonies required, but which Spain was become unable to supply ; and the remainder was drained off by taxes which the king had, from time to time, been necessitated to impose. From this scarcity of money ; from the want of manufactures ; from the neglect of agriculture, joined to the numberless losses sustained at sea, where Philip had been almost always foiled by his enemies, trade of every kind was reduced to the lowest ebb ; and so great was the consequent disorder in the finances, that, besides a debt of 140 millions of ducats which he left upon the crown, he had been obliged to have recourse to the disgraceful expedient of employing ecclesiastics to go from house to house, to receive from his subjects in Spain such assistance as they were willing to afford ; a measure which was not attended with the advantages

advantages which he had expected to derive from it, while it contributed to sink his reputation in Spain, as his refusal to pay the interest of his foreign debt, before related, had already done in the rest of Europe (1).

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THE danger to which the Spanish monarchy was exposed, from that debility to which it was reduced at the present period, was the more to be dreaded, because many parts of this widely extended empire were removed to so great a distance from the seat of government; and nothing, there was ground to believe, could avert the impending ruin, but a vigorous exertion of the highest abilities, joined to the most rigid and judicious œconomy. It was likewise obviously necessary that peace should instantly have been established with the maritime powers; who, having for several years past, held the sovereignty of the seas, seemed to possess sufficient naval force entirely to destroy the Spanish trade, and to cut off all communication between the mother country and her colonies.

BUT the duke of Lerma was equally incapable of discerning this danger, and of providing against it. As he had seen the difficulties in which the late king was involved, through the disorder of his finances, and could not be ignorant of the exhausted condition of the kingdom, it might have been expected, that one of the first objects of his attention would have been to retrench the unnecessary expences of the court, by attempting, if practicable, to reduce the number of superfluous offices, to which, in times of greater prosperity, the vanity of former kings had given birth. But instead of this, he greatly multiplied such  
fort

(1) Gon. Davila, p. 25.

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sort of offices (*m*); and, in the very infancy of his administration, gave other signal proofs of the degree of profusion which would have been unjustifiable, had the kingdom been in the most flourishing condition.

ONE of the first events of this reign was the marriage of the king with Margaret of Austria (*n*), whom the archduke Albert had conducted into Spain. He had gone, for this purpose, from the Netherlands to Germany, about the time of the late king's death; and had soon afterwards set out with her from Gratz, by the way of Italy: but so great were the preparations made for her reception in Spain, and, agreeably to the character of the nation, so slowly were they carried on, that the fleet sent to bring her thither did not arrive at Genoa till several months after. In the marriage solemnity, in the city of Valentia, above a million of ducats were expended, besides a great number of rich presents, which were made to foreign princes and to the church (*o*). By the ecclesiastics, who on this, as on many other occasions, shared amply of the duke of Lerma's munificence, his conduct was extolled as highly liberal and magnificent, but filled the minds of the more impartial and discerning part of men, who were concerned for the true glory and interest of the nation and of the crown, with indignation, mingled with contempt (*p*).

April 1599. ABOUT the same time with the royal nuptials, those of the archduke with the infanta were solemnized (*q*); but not long after, they set out together

(*m*) Gon. Davila, p. 45.  
archduke of Austria.

(*n*) Daughter of Charles,  
(*o*) Gon. Davila, lib. ii.

(*p*) Addiciones a la Historia de Malvezzi, p. 152.

(*q*) Albert had before-hand resigned his dignity of cardinal into the hands of the pope.

gether for the Netherlands, having received full assurance from the king and his minister, that no assistance in money or in troops, which Spain could afford, should be wanting to support them in their new sovereignty, and to enable them to accomplish the reduction of the revolted provinces.

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IN forming this resolution, there was no room for hesitation. From the conditions upon which the late king had transferred the sovereignty of the Netherlands to his daughter, joined to the age of that princess, there was little ground to doubt that it would ere long revert to the Spanish monarchy. It could not be considered, even during the life of the infanta, in any other light, but as a fief of Spain: for she and her successors were expressly required to take an oath of fidelity to the kings of Spain, and, in order to insure the faithful observance of this oath, the liberty was reserved of putting garrisons of Spanish troops into Antwerp, Ghent, Cambray, and other places; besides which, both parties had solemnly engaged to regard the same powers as enemies, or as friends, and promised mutually to assist and defend each other against all the world besides (r).

It would probably have saved the Spanish monarchy from the extreme debility into which it fell in the present and in the following reign, and would have highly contributed to lessen those difficulties which, in his future administration, the duke of Lerma was about to encounter, had the sovereignty yielded been enjoyed, free and independent, by the infanta, and Spain been delivered from the burthen of the war with the United Provinces. But Isabella could not, in this case, have

(r) Thuanus, lib. cxxi. cap. 2.



**BOOK I.** have accepted of the sovereignty conferred on her.  
 1599. Without the assistance of Spain, she must have sunk under her unequal contest with the Dutch, supported by the queen of England; or she must instantly have made peace with these powers, on whatever terms they should be pleased to prescribe. The sovereignty of the United Provinces would thus have been established, and both their religious and civil liberty have been recognised.

To embrace a measure which would be attended with so disagreeable a consequence, Philip was hardly less averse than his father had ever been. With a temper gentle and obsequious to excess, he was devoted with the most bigotted attachment to the Popish faith; and being entirely governed by his minister, who, on all occasions, assiduously courted the favour of the Spanish ecclesiastics, and the sovereign pontiff, he would have believed himself highly criminal in the sight of God, had he not resolved to employ his utmost power to reduce the revolted provinces under obedience to the holy see. He had besides, before his father's death, formally given his consent to the deed of transference, with all the conditions that were annexed to it; and, as he could not, consistently with honour, so, from his affection to the infanta, he was not inclined to retract.

PROMPTED by these motives, which were not likely ever to lose their force, he resolved to consider his sister's, and her husband's interest as his own, and to take the same concern in all the affairs of the Netherlands, as if the sovereignty of that country had never been transferred. Conformably to this resolution, both the money and the troops of Spain continued to be employed in the Low Countries, as in the preceding reign. All the affairs of these provinces were directed as formerly

merly by Spanish councils. The interest of the Spanish monarch was affected as much as ever by what happened there ; and, for these reasons, almost all the important transactions which passed in the provinces, for several years after the present period, make an essential part of the Spanish history.

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THE archduke having, during his absence, committed the government of the Netherlands to his cousin, cardinal Andrew of Austria, bishop of Constance, and the command of the forces to Mendoza, marquis of Gaudalette, and admiral of Arragon, had instructed the latter to secure some convenient passage over the Rhine, which might open an entrance into the northern provinces, and enable him either to support the army at the expence of the enemy, or, if that should be found impracticable, to quarter them in the country of Cleves, and the other neutral adjoining states. Albert gave Mendoza instructions, at the same time, to avoid exposing the army to any unnecessary risk, before his return ; and therefore there is little room for doubt that his principal intention, in ordering him to cross the Rhine, was to furnish the troops with free quarters, in compensation for their pay. To form this extraordinary resolution, it is said, he was determined by necessity ; the southern provinces of the Netherlands having been greatly exhausted by the depredations of the Spanish troops, which had so often mutinied, and his exchequer drained, partly by the sums lately advanced in payment of their arrears, and partly by the preparations for his journey to Spain, which, in honour of the young queen, had been performed with unusual magnificence (s).

BUT

(s) Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. v. p. 473.

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September.

**BUT** whatever were Albert's motives for having recourse to so unjustifiable an expedient, it should seem that he could not have made choice of a person better qualified by the native temper of his mind for carrying his plan into execution. Immediately after the archduke's departure, Mendoza, having collected together all the troops which could be spared from the necessary defence of the country, passed over the Maese near Ruremonde, and directed his march, at the head of twenty thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse (*t*) towards Orsoy, a town on the west side of the Rhine, belonging to the duchy of Cleves. The garrison of this place, being utterly unprepared for defence, were easily induced by promises mingled with threats, to open their gates and receive him. He then applied himself to strengthen the fortifications of the town and citadel, and at the same time employed a great part of his forces for several weeks in fortifying Wassum, a small town on the east side of the river, directly opposite to Orsoy.

**ALTHOUGH** his communication with the country beyond the Rhine was thus secured, he judged it to be of great importance to get possession of some other town upon the Rhine, at a smaller distance from the enemy, and therefore he marched down the river, with all his forces, and laid siege to Rhinberg. This place, belonging to the bishopric of Cologne, was, as above related, in the hands of the United Provinces. It was deemed a place of considerable strength, and was defended by a sufficient garrison. The Spaniards, after battering the walls, attempted to take the town by storm, and were repulsed with great slaughter.

**BUT**

(*t*). This army consisted of seven thousand Spaniards, three thousand Italians, two thousand Burgundians, a thousand Irish, and seven thousand Germans and Walloons, besides the cavalry.

BUT the siege was much sooner brought to a conclusion than the besiegers had reason to expect, through one of those fatal accidents which have often happened since the invention of gun-powder, when the utmost precaution is not employed in preserving it. Having caught fire, from a spark occasioned by the stroke of a cannon-ball against the tower where the magazine was kept, and which the ball had entered by a window, not only the tower, but a great part of the wall of the town was thrown down. Several vessels in the river were, by the violent agitation of the water, overwhelmed and sunk, and the governor, his wife and family, with a considerable number of the inhabitants, were buried in the ruins. The garrison stood aghast at this unforeseen disaster; and, dreading that the town must now be taken by assault, they resolved, without further resistance, to capitulate on terms, to which Mendoza, in order to save time, immediately agreed (*u*).

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1599.

By the success which had attended the Spanish arms in the reduction of Orsoy and Rhinberg, all the other towns in that quarter were filled with anxiety and terror. Burick, a town on the west side of the Rhine, in the duchy of Cleves, having, without hesitation, admitted a Spanish garrison, Mendoza began to make preparations for employing force against Wesel, one of the most flourishing places in the circle of Westphalia, and which had lately received a considerable augmentation of Protestant inhabitants from the neighbouring provinces. Having abolished the exercise of the Catholic religion, and established the Reformed, as taught by Calvin, in its stead, they knew how guilty they must appear in the eyes of a Spaniard, and were at the same time conscious

(*u*) Thuanus, lib. cxxi. cap. 9. Grotius, lib. vii. Bentivoglio, p. 474.



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1599.

conscious of being unable to defend themselves against so great a force. They attempted, by sending the general an embassy with presents for himself, to divert him from his purpose. But Mendoza, laying hold of this opportunity to colour his present expedition with the pretext of zeal for the Popish faith, peremptorily required they should immediately restore the exercise of the Catholic religion. With this condition the inhabitants, in order to avoid a siege, were obliged, though extremely reluctant, to comply (*w*). After which, though he had before rejected their presents, he demanded a large supply of provisions, and of money for his troops; and having obtained his demands, he continued his march down the river, and took possession of the towns of Rees and Emerick.

THE inhabitants of the latter of these places, having been long distinguished by their attachment to Popery, had, from some interested motive, invited the Spanish army to come into that quarter, and had received a promise in writing from Mendoza, that neither their town nor territory should suffer any inconvenience from the neighbourhood of his troops. He insisted however upon their admitting a Spanish garrison; and when they reminded him of his promise, by one of their principal ecclesiastics, he replied, that the service of the king and the interest of religion made it necessary for him to change his views and measures. The priest asked him if, after such a declaration, it was surprising that the revolted provinces should refuse to put trust in the faith of the king of Spain, or of his generals; and warned him of the vengeance threatened by heaven against

(*w*) The Spanish army had no sooner left Germany than the priests were again expelled, and Calvinism re-established.

gainst deceit and falshood. But Mendoza, unmoved by this remonstrance, gave orders for the immediate admission of his troops (x). In order however to appease the people of Emerick, he readily promised that only four hundred should be sent, and he even required the German officer who commanded them to swear that he would not admit a greater number. Notwithstanding which, so little regard did he pay either to his character or his faith, that he afterwards attempted to introduce another cohort, under Barlotta, an Italian; to whom the German refused admittance, saying openly, that though the general had set the example, he would not violate his faith.

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AFTER getting possession of Emerick, the Spanish army was at the distance only of a few miles from the fort of Schenck, and other places belonging to the United Provinces; nor had the states been inattentive to the danger which so nearly threatened them. Having, from the commencement of Mendoza's expedition, suspected that his design must be to make an attack upon their eastern frontier, prince Maurice had hastily assembled together at Arnheim a body of troops, amounting to six thousand foot, and fifteen hundred horse, and had ventured to cross the Issel, and advanced towards the enemy as far as Zevenaer, which lies at little more than a day's march from Emerick.

WITH such unequal forces he could not pretend to cope with the enemy in the open field; but on no occasion had he ever exhibited greater military skill and conduct. By making choice of the most proper stations, which the nature of the country could afford, and the prudence and vigilance

(x) Grotius, lib. vii. p. 351.

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lance which he displayed in strengthening all the approaches to his camp, he rendered it impossible for the Spanish general to attack him with any probability of success; while, at the same time, he prevented him from advancing any farther, or undertaking the siege of any of the frontier towns upon the Issel. The two armies, between which there was so great a disparity of numbers, lay for a considerable time almost in sight of each other; and, from the anxiety which Mendoza discovered on that occasion, it should seem he was deeply impressed with a sense of his inferiority to prince Maurice, in respect of military knowledge and capacity. For ten days and nights, without intermission, his whole army, horse and foot, stood under their arms; and were permitted to take no other rest, though it was the middle of winter, but in their ranks in the open air. It was necessary, mean while, to send out his cavalry, and the retainers of his camp, in search of forage and provisions; and between them and detachments of the prince's army various rencounters happened, in which they were always worsted, and considerable numbers taken prisoners.

BOTH the Spanish infantry and cavalry had begun to suffer so much from the cold, joined to a scarcity of provisions, and were at the same time so much disheartened by that anxiety and dread of which their general's conduct was so expressive, that there was ground to believe, that if Maurice had thought himself at liberty to attack them, he would have acquired a cheap and easy victory.

FINDING it at length impossible, on account of the want of provisions, to remain any longer in their present situation, they directed their march towards Doesburg, which commands an important passage over the Issel, into the territory of Velue.



Value. But Maurice, who lay nearer to that place, easily reached it in time to be fully prepared for their approach. They stopt short therefore at Dotechem, a town on their road to Doesburg; and there deliberated what course they should next pursue.

BOOK I.

1599.  
November.

To a general of such mean capacity as Mendoza, and so little endued with the spirit of laudable ambition or enterprize, there appeared to be no room for hesitation. By the severity of the season, by the sword of the enemy, and by desertion, his army had suffered considerable diminution; and, having been long permitted to plunder the country through which they passed, and to live in the most licentious manner, they were become reluctant to submit to the controul of military discipline. He dreaded, besides, the great abilities of Maurice, and thought it doubtful whether, in case he should succeed in effecting his passage over the Issel, he would find it practicable to support his army during the winter season in the territories of the states, where almost all the towns were fortified, and prepared for their defence. Determined by these considerations, he resolved to turn back, and to take up his winter quarters in the duchy of Cleves, and other neutral states in the territory of Westphalia. He accordingly retired with precipitation, leaving behind him many of his sick and wounded, exposed to the mercy of the inhabitants of the country, who were highly exasperated by the injury and outrage they had received. Maurice pursued him for several miles, and cut off or took prisoners so great a number of his troops, that, including those who had deserted, and those who had fallen or were taken prisoners in former rencounters, it was computed that he had lost above seven thousand men.

Bad conduct of  
Mendoza.

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1599.

Magrani-  
mous poli-  
cy of Mau-  
rice.

The licen-  
tiousness of  
the Spani-  
ards.

HE fixed his head-quarters at Rees, having left a strong garrison in Emerick, which lay nearer to the enemy, under the command of the count de Boucquoi, one of his ablest officers. But the count, having soon after being taken prisoner in a skirmish with count Lewis of Nassau, Maurice conceived the design of making himself master of the town. For this purpose he ordered count Hohenloe to invest it; and, in order to prevent Mendoza from returning to its relief, he cut the dyke of the Rhine, and laid all the country between Rees and Emerick under water. By this device the garrison, having no prospect of assistance from their friends, were intimidated, and, after a feeble resistance, laid down their arms. Maurice was equally successful against the garrison of Zevenaer: but being well pleased with an opportunity of showing his condemnation of the conduct of the Spanish general, who, with so great a contempt of the established laws of nations, had seized on the towns of neutral powers, he retained possession of neither of these places, but delivered Emerick to the citizens, and Zevenaer to the duke of Cleves (y.) After which he put his troops into winter quarters, and went himself to the Hague, where he was employed during the remaining part of the winter in making preparations for the next campaign.

IN the mean time Mendoza, equally inattentive to his character and to the laws of humanity, permitted his troops to exercise the most cruel oppression over the people of Westphalia, from whom he could not pretend that either the king of Spain or the archduke had received the smallest injury. After plundering the inhabitants of the open country, and leaving them neither  
corn

(y) Grotius, p. 353, &c.

corn nor cattle for their support, he allowed his soldiers to employ force against such of the towns as refused them admittance; and the towns being generally unprepared for defence, they got possession of many of them, where they not only lived at free quarters on the citizens, but robbed them of their most valuable effects, which they sold at Cologne, and, by the merchants there, transmitted the price, amounting to very great sums, to Antwerp or other places in the Netherlands. Nor were they satisfied with pillage or plunder, but indulged themselves in every species of licentiousness; and treated the inhabitants, on innumerable occasions, with a degree of barbarous cruelty and outrage, of which the troops under Frederick de Toledo had, in their treatment of the people of Zutphen and Naarden, furnished the only instance which occurs in the annals of Europe for many years (z).

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1599.

In order to compel such of the people as they suspected of being rich, to reveal their treasures, they wounded some, they mutilated others, and, under the pretext of their being heretics, they committed others to the flames. Count Falcostein, lord of Bruck, a Protestant, having refused them admittance into his castle, which for some time he defended against them with great resolution, at length surrendered on condition that he and his domestics should be allowed to depart in safety; but he was no sooner in their power, than they first butchered his domestics before his eyes, and afterwards himself. Mendoza had the effrontery to avow and vindicate some instances of this kind, by alledging, that those who had suffered were heretics; but it was not the Protestants only, but great numbers likewise of the Catholics, who

Their barbarity.

C 2

cx.

(z) Grotius, lib. vii.

Book I.

1599.

experienced the barbarity of his troops; and even many of those who had distinguished themselves by their attachment to the Spanish interest in the Netherlands; among whom were the subjects of the bishops of Munster, Paderborn, Liege, and Cologne, as well as the duchies of Cleves and Juliers, who were all treated with the same violence and inhumanity (*a*).

State of  
Germany.

By these enormities the German princes were affected in the manner which it was natural to expect. They were fired with indignation against their barbarous oppressors, and had early deliberated concerning the measures proper to be pursued. No European nation had been more distinguished than the Germans by their warlike disposition, and their military prowess, as no nation had exerted greater intrepidity and vigour in the defence of their property and liberty when attacked. But, having enjoyed profound tranquillity for near half a century, and all of them, but a few who had entered into the service of foreign states, having been disused to war, their tameness and timidity invited the injuries of the Spanish soldiers; who found not only the inhabitants of the open country, but those likewise of most of the towns, utterly defenceless and unarmed. It was probably Albert's knowledge of this, joined to the consideration of the character of Rodolph, the present emperor, a prince of a tame and indolent disposition, that had induced him to resolve to support his army at the expence of the Germans; and what they suffered affords a striking proof how necessary it is that every people, exposed by their situation to be invaded, should, instead of trusting to their neutrality, or to the faith

(*a*) Grotius, lib. vii. Thuanus, lib. cxxi. Piaſecii Chronica, anno 1598. Gestorum in Europa singularium.



faith of treaties, stand, on all occasions, in a posture of defence.

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1599

THE people who suffered most from the depredations of the Spaniards were the subjects of the duke of Cleves, and of Ernest of Bavaria, who held, at the present period, the four bishoprics of Munster, Paderborn, Liege, and Cologne. Ernest, who had formerly been much indebted to the court of Spain, and was extremely desirous of avoiding a rupture with the archduke, in order to obtain redress, resolved to content himself with making remonstrances and complaints.

THE duke of Cleves was a weak prince, and, being at times disordered in his judgment, was incapable of holding the reins of government. But his place was well supplied, on the present occasion, by his sister, Sibylla, a princess of a masculine spirit, who exerted great activity in rousing the indignation of the neighbouring states and princes, and laboured to convince them of the necessity of uniting together, in order to drive the Spaniards out of Germany. The elector Palatine, the landgrave of Hesse, several imperial cities on the banks of the Rhine, and a great number of counts, and other sovereign princes in Westphalia, readily entered into Sibylla's views, and endeavoured to interest the rest of the empire, or at least the neighbouring circles, in their cause.

Confederacy of German princes against Mendoza.

THEY began with remonstrating to the archduke against the iniquity of his conduct; and they were seconded by an ambassador, sent for that purpose by the emperor, who likewise published a rescript, commanding Mendoza immediately to evacuate the towns and territories of which he had taken possession. But, finding that no regard was paid by Mendoza to the emperor's rescript; and that,

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1599.

that, instead of complying with their requests, Albert only lamented that the necessity of his situation had obliged him to adopt a measure which he said was equally disagreeable to himself as to them, they assembled together at Munster, and resolved all of them, but the bishop, or elector of Cologne, to have recourse to arms. It was agreed that a numerous army should be raised with the utmost expedition. The proportion of money and troops which each prince or state should furnish was ascertained; and the count de La Lippe, lieutenant-general of the circle of Westphalia, was appointed to be commander in chief. From the unanimity, alacrity, and ardour which appeared in this assembly, there was ground to hope for the utmost dispatch and vigour in carrying the plan adopted into execution; yet from the slowness incident to the motions of a league, in which no one member possesses authority sufficient to control the rest, the season, as will be seen in the sequel, was far advanced before the count de la Lippe was in a condition to take the field (*b*).

THE Spanish army, in the mean time, kept possession of all the towns into which they had entered; and, without restraint from their general, continued to exercise over the people the same oppression as before; till the season arrived when the cardinal governor of the Netherlands judged it proper to begin the operations of a new campaign. They were then withdrawn from all the towns in which they were quartered, except Orsoy, Rhinberg, Rees, and Emerick; the last of which places they had again obliged the inhabitants to surrender, after prince Maurice had retired.

THE

(*b*) Bontivoglio, part. iii. lib. v. ab. initio. Grotius, lib. vii, & viii. Thuanus, lib. cxxi, &c.

THE cardinal, having come to Rees, where he held a council of war, to deliberate concerning an expedition against some of the frontier towns of the United Provinces, it was determined to undertake the siege of Bommel, the conquest of which would open an entrance into Holland: but, in order to conceal this intention from the states, and to facilitate the landing of the troops on the isle of Bommel, it was agreed to send a detachment of the army to make a feigned attack on the fort of Schenck, which, as formerly described, is situated on the upper extremity of the Betuwe. This detachment was sent down along the right or north side of the Rhine, while Mendoza, with the main army, marched down on the other; and both divisions began about the same time to play off their batteries against the fort; the former from the banks of the Rhine, and the latter from those of the Waal,

BOOK I.

1599.  
Siege of  
Bommel.

PRINCE Maurice's head-quarters were at Arnheim, only a few leagues distant from Schenck. He had never before experienced so great anxiety or fatigue. Almost all the officers, on whom he chiefly depended for the execution of his orders, were absent: count Hohenloe was in Germany, employed in exciting the princes of the league of Munster to take the field against the Spaniards; colonel Vere was not returned from England, whither he had gone to hasten a body of fresh troops, which had been promised by Elizabeth; and the younger la Noue had not finished some levies which, with the connivance of the king, he had been making among the Protestants in France. All the troops therefore which Maurice had been able to muster, after leaving sufficient garrisons in the fortified towns, amounted only at this time to four thousand men. With this little army he crossed over to the Betuwe; and having reinforced

April.

Beginning  
of May.

**BOOK I.** reinforced the garrison of Schenck, and strengthened the banks opposite to Mendoza, where only he had occasion to suspect that an attack might be designed, he lay prepared to oppose him in case he should attempt to land on the island.

THE Spaniards, having the river between them and the fort, were at too great a distance to do execution with their artillery; and, as this attack was only a feint to amuse prince Maurice, for this reason they had not taken time to employ the usual precautions for their shelter from the enemy's fire, they lost upwards of four hundred men. This expence of blood, which the prince could easily observe from the ramparts, contributed to confirm his belief that their design against the fort was serious, and his attention was therefore wholly engrossed with providing for its defence. In the mean time the count of Berg, with a body of troops, under the command of the colonels Stanley, Zapeau, and Barlotta, was ordered to march down along the left or south side of the Waal; and, in order to cover his intention, a great number of boats had been transported to this river over land from the Maese, on board of which he embarked his troops, and seemed to intend passing over to the Betuwe. Prince Maurice could hardly doubt that this was his design; and, to prevent him from accomplishing it, he carefully watched his motions with a part of his forces, which being put on board of boats collected together at Nimeguen, kept directly opposite to the Spaniards in their progress down the river. In this manner both parties continued to advance, sometimes approaching within reach of each other's fire, and the Spaniards seemingly intending on some occasions to effect a landing on the Betuwe, till they both arrived in the neighbourhood of the Voorn; when the count de Berg, having



having disembarked his troops, drew all his boats on shore, and having put them into carriages which had been prepared for that purpose, he marched with great expedition across the country, from the Waal to the Maese, where having again launched his boats, he sailed down the river till he arrived at Empel, and thus secured a passage into the isle of Bommel.

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1599.

THE fortifications of the town of that name, which stands on the other side of the island, though, on account of its situation, deemed a place of great importance, had, amidst the multiplicity of objects which required the attention of Maurice and the states, been extremely neglected; the old fortifications were ruinous, and new ones, which had been begun, were yet unfinished.

HAD the troops therefore under the count de Berg been sufficiently numerous, or had Mendoza advanced in time to his support, he might without much difficulty have accomplished the object of his expedition. But the army having been detained longer than it ought to have been in the fictitious attack on the fort of Schenck, the count was obliged to rest satisfied with securing his station at Empel, or with making short excursions into the country. Prince Maurice was, in the mean time, every day receiving fresh supplies of troops from France, England, and other places; and his army amounted now to so great a number, that he could afford to leave a part of it for the defence of the Betuwe, and lead the rest to Bommel.

He accordingly no sooner received information of the count of Berg's invasion of that island than he set out with the greater part of his army, and arrived there in time to prevent the inhabitants from

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1599.

from abandoning the town, which they were preparing to do, from their despair of being able to defend it. Mendoza left his camp opposite to the Schenck about the same time, and, having in his march reduced the fort of Creveceur, which would have interrupted his communication with Bois le Duc, he transported his forces into the isle of Bommel, and began to lead them towards the town. He first attempted to make himself master of the dyke of Waal, on which he intended to have erected batteries, in order to straiten the navigation of the river, but was prevented by an incessant fire from a great number of armed vessels, which Maurice had prepared for that purpose. From the delay occasioned by this unnecessary enterprize, and the reduction of Creveceur, a general of so great activity as Maurice had leisure to put the town of Bommel into a proper posture of defence.

His army, at this time, was not inferior to that of the enemy, and amounted to eighteen thousand foot and three thousand horse. Having pitched his camp on the right side of the Waal, opposite to Bommel, and constructed two bridges (c) formed of barks covered with planks, one above and the other below the town, he committed the defence of the place to a select body of four thousand foot and two thousand horse.

BOMMEL was too small a place to admit of so numerous a garrison ; but, in order that he might avail himself of the great number of his troops, his first care had been to give the town an artificial magnitude, by drawing round it at a little distance from the walls, an intrenchment, strengthened with a ditch, and with redoubts at proper distances ;

(c) Each four hundred and fifty paces in length.

distances ; to which he added a covered way ; a new species of fortification, of which he himself was the inventor, and which he first put in practice on the present occasion.


Book I.  
1599.  
Maurice invents a new species of fortification.

MENDOZA was greatly disconcerted by the celerity and dispatch with which these works were executed : and as not only the cannon planted upon them, but a strong battery which Maurice had raised on the dyke of the river, was ready to be played off upon the Spaniards, as soon as they approached, they suffered a considerable loss of men, before they could cover themselves with their trenches. Mendoza might now have seen his error in not advancing sooner to the siege : and, if he reflected on the strength of the place, and the number of the garrison, or on the neighbourhood of the prince's army, and the facility with which, as he was master of the river, he could, at all times, introduce supplies, or reinforcements into the town, it must appear surprising that he did not perceive the impossibility of succeeding in his attempt,

PRINCE Maurice, on the other hand, was blamed by many of his countrymen for resting satisfied with defending a town against an enemy, whom it was alledged, as he was superior to them in numbers, he might have successfully encountered in the open field. It began to be surmised that Maurice did not wish to bring the war to a conclusion ; and the states sent deputies, to represent to him, that, as they could never expect to assemble a more flourishing army than was at present under his command, and the expence which their late preparations had cost them was enormous (*d*), they could not help expressing their desire

Suspensions concerning prince Maurice.

(*d*) Twelve thousand gilders. See Reidan. quoted by Le Clerc, p. 197.

BOOK I.  1599. fire that he would shorten the campaign as much as possible, and must therefore recommend to him, if he could do it with safety, to try the fortune of a general engagement.

MAURICE was the more surpris'd at this remonstrance of the states, as they had hitherto been extremely averse to all adventurous measures; and, on many occasions, had discovered a degree of caution bordering on timidity. He could not account for it, but on the supposition that they had listened to the insinuations of his enemies, who accused him of protracting the war, with the view of perpetuating his own authority: and, in order to wipe off this groundless aspersion, he would not have declined the risk of a battle, in case a favourable opportunity had offered. "But, in the present situation of the Spanish army, in a country so narrow and confined, where his cavalry, in which only he was superior, could be of little use, no such opportunity could reasonably be expected. Should he attempt to transport his army over the Maese into Brabant, Bommel must thereby fall into the hands of the Spaniards; and, although, after the reduction of that place, they should be induced to follow him, and to offer battle, yet, without the greatest probability of success, he should doubt whether it would be expedient to accept; as the fate of battles often depended on accidents, which no human prudence could foresee; and the king of Spain, with such inexhaustible resources, could much more easily sustain the loss of an army than the states. It was for these reasons, not only his opinion, but that of his most experienced officers, that the enemy should be permitted to spend their strength in the siege of Bommel, which, should they persist in it, he was confident would prove their ruin." The states, convinced by these considerations, entered without



without much difficulty into the prince's views, and left him at liberty to pursue the plan of operations which he had laid before them. The cardinal Andrew, in the mean time, having with great activity formed at Bois le Duc, the most ample magazines of every thing necessary for the siege, Mendoza was enabled to make his approaches to the town, with greater expedition than there was reason to expect. His troops were now, in a good measure, covered from the enemy's fire; and he had begun to play off his batteries. But it soon appeared how little reason he had to flatter himself with the hopes of success in his enterprize. The garrison, supported by fresh troops, sent to their assistance by the prince, could not only prevent them from making farther progress in the siege, but sallied out against them, sometimes by day, and sometimes by night, demolishing their works, and putting a considerable number to the sword. The Spanish troops displayed, on every occasion, the most determined intrepidity; and thereby fully justified the caution of prince Maurice, in declining to reduce them to the necessity of a general engagement. They gave the most striking proofs likewise of the excellence of their military discipline, by recovering themselves with a facility which astonished the enemy, from the confusion into which they were sometimes thrown; and they were every where successful in repressing the sallies of the garrison, although these sallies were performed by numerous bodies, amounting to five or six thousand men, of the best of the French and English forces, conducted by la Noue, colonel Vere, and other officers of the most unquestionable bravery. They suffered, however, considerable loss. In the space of three weeks, upwards of two thousand perished; and the cardinal governor, being at last convinced of the absurdity of persisting in his enterprize,

**BOOK I.** terprize, sent orders to Mendoza to raise the  
           siege.

1599.

Invention  
 of the his-  
 torian Co-  
 lonna.

He was determined, however, by the advice of Colonna, the historian, who was, at this time, an officer in the Spanish army, to attempt accomplishing, in another way, the object of the present expedition, by erecting a fort in another part of the island, from which the same advantage might be derived as from the possession of Bom-mel: and, for this purpose, agreeably to the counsel that was given him, he made choice of a narrow neck of land which unites the upper with the lower part of the island, intending to occupy, with a fortification of the strongest kind, the whole space between the Maese and the Waal; and thus, not only to facilitate an invasion of the United Provinces, but to check the enemy's navigation in both rivers.

Beginning  
 of June.

THE construction of this fort was committed to Velasco, general of the artillery. A thousand soldiers, and two thousand pioneers, were employed in the work; and the army was posted about the neighbouring villages of Herwyn and Rossem, to prevent the approach of the enemy.

MAURICE having penetrated this design, led up his troops along the north side of the Waal, and took his station directly opposite to the Spaniards; where, having planted batteries of his largest cannon, he greatly annoyed the workmen, and, though not without some loss, did considerable execution. Velasco, however persevered, and was at length able to cover his men from the enemy's fire.

THE prince finding then that all his efforts in this quarter must be ineffectual, transported his  
 army

army into the adjoining isle of Voorn; and, from thence, sent over a detachment of three thousand men, to the upper part of the isle of Bommel; giving them instructions to entrench themselves at the village of Hervorden, which lies at a little distance from the place where the Spaniards were employed in making the new fort. His orders were executed with the greatest expedition, and the entrenchments almost completed before the Spaniards got notice that the troops had landed on the island.

BOOK I.

1599.

MENDOZA, sensible of the danger and inconveniencies to which he was exposed, from having the enemy so near him, immediately dispatched the count de Berg, to attack their lines, with a numerous body of chosen troops. The count was repulsed with the loss of more than five hundred men, among whom were many officers of distinguished merit: but having stationed the greater part of his army on that side of the fort which lay next to the enemy, he kept the prince at bay, and enabled Velasco, without interruption, to carry on his operations in the construction of the fort.

THE Spanish cavalry, in the mean time, which could neither have proper accommodation, nor be supplied with forage in the isle of Bommel, were quartered in Brabant, in the neighbourhood of Megen. Their communication with the main army was kept open by a bridge over the Maese; but as they lay at the distance of several miles, a fort, called Durango, from the name of the engineer employed in constructing it, and several redoubts, had been erected on that part of the dyke of the river by which the enemy might approach. Notwithstanding these prudent precautions, prince Maurice still resolved to attack the Spanish

BOOK I. Spanish cavalry, and, with this view, having thrown a bridge over the Maese from the isle of Voorn, he kept his own cavalry in readiness to march as soon as orders should be given them. But judging it necessary before-hand to dislodge the Spaniards from their fortifications on the dyke of the river, he sent the sieur de la Noue, and colonel Vere, with a select body of troops, chiefly English and French, to make an attack on fort Durango. Nothing could surpass the spirit and intrepidity which these troops, animated by the example of their leaders, displayed in his attack. Having thrown down their pikes and muskets, they scaled the ramparts in several places, and attacked the garrison, with extraordinary fury, sword in hand. But this garrison, consisting of Spaniards and Walloons, though amounting only to five hundred men, commanded by Ladeiano, an officer of distinguished bravery, in their defence discovered a degree of intrepidity not inferior to that of the assailants. The smallness of their number was compensated by the advantages of their situation; and the combat was thus prolonged for several hours, with mutual slaughter, till la Noue and Vere, being informed that Mendoza was approaching towards them with superior forces, judged it prudent to retire.

July.

No other memorable transactions happened between the contending parties during this campaign. Maurice could not venture now to attack the Spanish cavalry with safety; and, from the precautions which had been taken to cover the workmen employed in erecting the fort in Bommel, joined to the advantageous situation of the Spanish army, he found it impossible to prevent them from carrying that design into execution.

THE



THE fort was accordingly finished in the most regular manner: the ramparts, flanked with bastions, and instantly planted with cannon, in a great measure commanded the navigation of the Maese, on the south, and of the Waal, on the north. On the east and west, they were secured with ditches of extraordinary breadth and depth, which being at all times filled with water from the rivers, served as harbours for twelve armed vessels, stationed in them to cruise against the enemy. And, in imitation of the example which Maurice had exhibited in the fortifications of Bommel, the whole was strengthened with a covered way, which was strongly fortified with redoubts.

Book I.  
1599.  
A fort erected in the  
isle of  
Bommel.

THE cardinal came himself to visit this fort as soon as it was finished; and having marked out a place for a church, of which he laid the first stone with his own hand, he gave both to the church, and to the fort, the name of Saint Andrew. He had been extremely desirous to distinguish his administration by some remarkable achievement; and he was overjoyed to have been able to finish so great a work, which he hoped would be found of great importance towards the reduction of the revolted provinces.

PRINCE Maurice, on the other hand, notwithstanding his successful defence of Bommel, could not fail to be severely mortified; although, as will appear in the sequel, this fort, the erecting of which he had exerted his utmost skill and vigour to prevent, served only to furnish him with one opportunity more than would otherwise have occurred to display his wonted activity and enterprize. In the mean time, he built another fort directly opposite to Saint Andrew, on the right side of the Waal, which rendered

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D

the

**BOOK I.** the country of Betewe secure against the excursions of the enemy. (e).

1599.

Transac-  
tions in Ger-  
many.

**DURING** the course of these transactions in the Netherlands, the Germans in the circle of Westphalia had begun their operations against the Spanish garrisons in Rhinberg, and the other towns upon the Rhine. But as neither the emperor, nor the electors of Cologne, Mentz, and Treves, besides several other Popish princes, were willing to come to an open rupture with the court of Spain, their preparations for war had not been carried on with that alacrity which might have been expected from the strong and just resentment with which they were inflamed; and the season of action was far spent before they were ready to open the campaign. The elector Palatine had withdrawn his contingent of troops, under the pretext that the league had been violated by the other electors; and the bishop of Cologne, though his subjects had suffered greatly from the depredations of the Spaniards, had carried his complaisance to them to so great a length, as to permit them to make levies in his dominions, and to furnish them with provisions and military stores. It was therefore with the utmost difficulty that the count de la Lippe could muster twelve thousand foot and two thousand horse (f), and the greatest part of these were raw troops, entirely unaccustomed to military discipline.

**WITH** such an army it is probable that no general could have fulfilled the expectations of those by whom it had been assembled, and the count de la Lippe possessed neither experience nor capacity sufficient to entitle him to the supreme command. The counts Hohenloe and Solmes had been

(e) Grotius, lib. viii. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. v. Thuanus, lib. cxxii. (f) Grotius.

been sent to his assistance by the United States ; Book I.  
1599.  
and these men were neither deficient in courage nor in activity and enterprize ; but they discovered a jealousy of each other, which proved pernicious to the cause in which they were engaged, and when they differed in their opinions, the general was incapable of determining aright to which of their counsels the preference was due.

August.  
The first enterprize in which he was engaged was the siege of Rhinberg ; but having no part of the apparatus necessary for carrying it on, except what he received from Holland, and the inhabitants of the adjacent country, whose resentment the governor of the Netherlands had found means to appease, being unwilling to supply his troops with provisions, he soon abandoned his attempt, and directed his march towards Rees, where he expected the Dutch could more easily convey to him such assistance as his exigencies should require.

September.  
Siege of  
Rees.  
The garrison of Rees was ill prepared for their defence, and if la Lippe had listened to the counsel of count Hohenloe, who advised him to station a part of his army on the other side of the river, to prevent them from receiving any reinforcement or supplies, they would soon have found it necessary to lay down their arms : but he neglected this necessary precaution. The garrison were several times reinforced by detachments from the army in Bommel ; and at length, finding themselves possessed of sufficient strength, and observing that the siege was carried on in the most remiss and negligent manner, they made a vigorous attack upon his trenches, put a great number of his men to the sword, nailed up several of his cannon, and even carried off some of them in triumph to the town.

BOOK I.

1599.

THIS disaster increased the division which from the beginning had subsisted among the leaders. The troops were disheartened, and became more disobedient and refractory than ever; and in two days after the count gave orders to raise the siege.

THE retreat of this army was still more disgraceful than their conduct during the siege. Dreading that the garrison would renew their attack upon the trenches, they fled in the most precipitate manner, leaving behind them a great part of their baggage and provisions. The Spaniards hung in their rear for several miles, put many to the sword, and threw the whole army into confusion. Not long after, a party of them mutinied against their officers, left their standards, and, in their way home, indulged themselves in the same rapine and depredation against their countrymen, as had formerly been exercised by the Spanish troops.

November.  
German  
army dis-  
banded.

THE Dutch had, in the beginning, entertained the hopes of finding useful allies in the Germans. With this view they had exerted all their influence in rousing them to arms, and had several times supplied them with stores and provisions. On the present occasion they sent William de Nassau, a near relation of prince Maurice, an experienced officer, and a person of distinguished prudence, to attempt to re-establish discipline among the troops, and a good understanding among the leaders; but all his endeavours having proved ineffectual for these ends, and the winter season approaching, it was judged necessary to disband the army, and put an end to this inglorious campaign.

SUCH is frequently the fate of confederacies formed by the union of independent princes,  
even



even when there is one common interest to unite them, unless the supreme command be devolved on some person of extraordinary abilities, whose want of power may be supplied by the confidence inspired by his superior merit.

BOOK I.

1599.

NOTWITHSTANDING the feeble efforts of this confederacy, the archduke having only intended, by seizing the German towns, to accommodate his troops for a season, ordered most of them to be evacuated. He likewise promised to indemnify the several states for the injuries and damages which they had sustained; and two commissioners were appointed by the emperor to estimate their losses; but it does not appear that any thing effectual was ever done in consequence of this appointment (g).

IN Spain the duke of Lerma, desirous to give some proof of vigour in the beginning of his administration, fitted out a fleet of fifty ships of war, which he put under the command of Don Martin de Padilla, and sent to cruise against the English; but this enterprize proved equally unfortunate as most of the former ones which the Spaniards had undertaken against their northern enemies. Padilla had not been many days at sea when a violent storm arose, which obliged him, without having seen the English fleet, to return to Spain.

A fleet sent to cruise against the English.

THE duke of Lerma was more successful in the measure which at this time he suggested to the king, for conciliating the affections of his subjects in Arragon, who had been disgusted by the treatment which they had received in the former

Lenity and moderation of the duke of Lerma.

(g) Grotius, lib. viii. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. v. Piaf-  
ecii Chronica Gestorum in Europa Singularium, an. 1599.  
Gonzalez Davila, & lib. ii. cap. 4. Thuan. Hist. lib. cxxii.  
cap. 6, 8, &c.

Book I.  
1599.

mer reign. Philip and his young queen, accompanied by the duke and many other courtiers, having set out to visit the city of Saragossa, notice was sent to the inhabitants, by order of the king, that he could not enter their town with pleasure till the heads of those citizens, who had suffered in the unfortunate affair of Antonio Perez, were taken down from the gates, and that inscription erased which recorded their pretended crime. This order, so agreeable to the people, and which was instantly obeyed, was accompanied with the royal pardon to all those who had been concerned in the insurrection, and a declaration, that the king could not be happy while any of his faithful subjects had cause of grief. He then made a magnificent entry into the town, amidst the strongest demonstrations of affection and joy on the part of the inhabitants; and soon after he solemnly confirmed all their rights and privileges (*b*).

AMONG the entertainments which the people of Saragossa presented to their king on this occasion, there was one, which, at the present period, will appear somewhat extraordinary; a dispute held at the university, at the conferring the degree of doctor, the subject of which was, whether the emperor be the lord or sovereign of the whole world (*i*).

September.

The arch-  
duke's arri-  
val in the  
Nether-  
lands.

DURING the course of the transactions that have been related, Albert and Isabella arrived in the Netherlands (*k*). They entered Brussels with a splendid court and retinue, and were received with extraordinary magnificence. There was considerable difficulty in adjusting the form of the

(*b*) Gon. Davila, lib. ii. cap. 8.

(*i*) Davila.

(*k*) He had tarried much longer than his new subjects had reason to expect, but no contemporary historian has informed us of the reason of his delay.

the oath of allegiance which they administered BOOK I.  
to their new subjects; and the states of Brabant 1599.  
demanded that, beforehand, certain forts and citadels should be demolished, and the ancient rights and privileges of the province ratified; but, finding that the archdukes, (this was the title which Albert and Isabella now assumed) were utterly averse to comply with their requests, they were persuaded to desist from their purpose, and agreed, though with much reluctance, to take the oath required. It was likewise a matter of great offence to the Flemings that Albert, besides assuming the Spanish dress, and requiring to be served upon the knee, had formed his court according to the model of that of Spain, and in every thing adopted the Spanish manners and customs, in preference to those of the Netherlands. This conduct was probably intended to gratify the Spaniards, on whom Albert saw he must principally depend during the continuance of the war; but it contributed to alienate the affections of his Flemish subjects, and to prevent them from exerting themselves with active zeal in his behalf (*1*).

He stood however much in need, at the present juncture, of all the assistance which they were able to afford. Although he had received a considerable supply from the duke of Lerma, before his departure from Spain, yet having, in conformity to the practice of the age, expended large sums in idle pomp and show in his marriage solemnity, and his magnificent entrance into Brussels, and other towns which he and Isabella visited on their accession, he found himself utterly unable to discharge the arrears due to his troops, who no sooner entered their winter quarters than they began to mutiny against their officers. The Spanish A mutiny among the Spanish troops.  
forces,

(1) Grotius, lib. viii. p. 379, & Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. v.

Book I.

1599.

forces, to the number of two thousand foot, and eight hundred horse, having abandoned their commanders, took possession of the town of Hamont, in the bishoprick of Liege, where, having first strengthened the fortifications, they lived at free quarters on the inhabitants, and laid all the adjacent country under contribution. Their example was quickly followed by sixteen hundred Italians, and soon afterwards the garrisons of Creveceur and St. Andrew, consisting of Germans and Walloons, expelled their officers and elected others from their own number in their room (*m*).

1600.

January.

In March.

Siege of St.  
Andrew.

PRINCE Maurice, having received information of these disorders, did not suffer so favourable an opportunity of action to escape. After reducing the town of Wachtendonc, and the fort of Creveceur, and making a successful attack on the Spanish cavalry, in the neighbourhood of Bois le Duc, where he put near five hundred of them to the sword, he laid siege to St. Andrew. This fort, the only fruit of the operations of a whole campaign, the archduke justly considered as a place of the first importance, both on account of the strength of the fortifications, and the great advantage which it afforded him for invading the revolted provinces. He was therefore extremely solicitous to preserve it, and for this purpose assembled together at Bois le Duc such a body of troops as were deemed sufficient to raise the siege. Of these troops he gave the command to Velasco, by whom the fort had been erected; and on the part of this officer no time was unnecessarily lost. But all his attempts were rendered ineffectual by the vigilance and foresight of Maurice, who, besides fortifying his camp and all the approaches to it, had cut the dyke of the Maese, and laid all the

(*m*) See Metern, fol. 451.



the low grounds betwixt it and Bois le Duc under water. The garrison consisted of twelve hundred men, who, although they had mutinied against their officers, yet regarding the fort as their only pledge for the payment of their arrears, strenuously exerted themselves in its defence.

Book I.  
1600.

BUT perceiving that, notwithstanding their most vigorous efforts, Maurice was making daily progress in the siege, and having no prospect of deliverance, they listened to a proposal which was made to them by the prince, in order to save time, and agreed to surrender the fort for a sum of money equal to their arrears (*n*). Immediately after which, conscious that they had committed an unpardonable crime against the Spaniards, they enlisted in the army of the United States; and as they knew that they could not expect quarter in case they should fall into the hands of their former masters, they were on many occasions of singular use, by the desperate intrepidity which they displayed (*o*). May.

By these disasters the archdukes were afflicted in the most sensible manner. They received information at the same time that prince Maurice, having on no former occasion exerted greater diligence in his military preparations, was resolved to prosecute the approaching campaign with extraordinary vigour, in the hopes of making some important conquests before the mutineers were persuaded to return to their duty. All their endeavours for this end had hitherto proved ineffectual. They had some ground to suspect that the rest of the troops were infected with the same mutinous spirit, and dreaded that many of them might

(*n*) A hundred and twenty-five thousand guilders.

(*o*) Triumphs of Nassau, printed 1613. Grotius, Hist. lib. ix. and Bentivoglio.

**BOOK I.** might be induced to imitate the treacherous example of the garrison of St. Andrew.  
1600.

Convention  
of the states  
at Brussels.

THE states of the provinces subject to their authority, having been lately convened at Brussels, Albert represented to that assembly that, as the source of all the disorders which prevailed was his inability to discharge the arrears due to his troops, it was necessary they should grant him an extraordinary supply. He had reason to expect that ere long he should receive remittances from Spain; but the demands of the mutineers must be immediately satisfied, otherwise there was ground to dread that the most pernicious consequences would ensue.

Advise an  
accommodation  
with  
the revolted  
states.

THE states replied, by expressing their apprehension of these consequences, and by giving him the strongest assurances of their attachment and fidelity; but insinuated that, considering the exhausted state of the provinces, and the difficulty which the court of Spain had ever found in supporting so great a number of forces, no other effectual remedy could be applied to the present disorders but an accommodation with the revolted states.

THEY had conceived hopes at this time that an accommodation might be brought about by the mediation of ambassadors, whom the emperor had sent into the Netherlands, in order to procure a restitution of some towns on the German frontier, of which the contending parties still retained the possession. The ambassadors found no difficulty in accomplishing the object of their commission; and having passed over into Holland, they prevailed on the United States to send deputies to Bergen op Zoom, to negotiate a treaty with deputies sent thither by the archdukes. But the Dutch being unalterably determined to maintain

tain their independence, and discovering the same distrust of the archdukes, with which they had long been actuated towards the Spaniards, the conferences were no sooner begun than they were broken off; and both parties retired, extremely dissatisfied with each other.

BOOK I.  
1600.

WHILE a reconciliation was thus, in vain, attempted between the archdukes and the United Provinces, a negociation was begun for restoring peace between the queen of England and the king of Spain. Some advances had been made for this purpose to the English ministers by the cardinal Andrew, while he was governor of the Netherlands, and neither of the courts at variance seemed at this time to have been inclined to prolong the war. It was agreed that a congress should be held at Boulogne; and ministers were sent thither by the contending powers. But this negociation likewise proved abortive, as the plenipotentiaries found it impossible to adjust the ceremonial among them to the satisfaction of their respective courts. The precedence had, from time immemorial, been yielded to the crown of England, by the kings of Castile and Arragon; and Elizabeth maintained that it still belonged to her, notwithstanding the union of these crowns, and the conquest of Granada, since Spain, considered as one kingdom, was greatly inferior to England in respect of antiquity, which was the only ground on which a point of this nature could properly be decided. But the Spanish ministers could not perceive the force of this reasoning. They claimed the precedence on account of the superior extent and power of the Spanish monarchy; and, even when Elizabeth, in order to prove the sincerity of her pacific disposition, offered to agree to an equality, they rejected this offer, and insisted that the superior dignity of the catholic king should be recognised.

A negociation for peace between Spain and England,

abortive.

To

**Book I.** To this the queen as peremptorily refused her consent; and, soon afterwards, the plenipotentiaries left Boulogne.  
 1600.

United  
States re-  
solve to in-  
vade Flan-  
ders.

THIS unexpected issue of the congress was matter of great joy to the United States. They had suffered much anxiety from the apprehension of losing so powerful an ally as queen Elizabeth; and now, when they were delivered from this apprehension, they resolved to improve to the utmost the advantages which they derived from her alliance, by employing the English forces, and as many of their own, as could be spared from the defence of the frontier towns, in an invasion of Flanders. To form this resolution, they were encouraged by the mutiny of the Spanish troops; and they were, at the same time, earnestly solicited to carry it into execution by the merchants of Zealand, who were extremely desirous of dispossessing the archdukes of the sea-ports in Flanders, which afforded shelter to some Spanish ships of war, by which their trade had lately received considerable interruption. In compliance with their request, it was agreed to undertake the reduction of Nieuport; and about the middle of June, the army, amounting to fifteen thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse, set sail from Ramekins in Walcheren, the place of rendezvous, and landed in Flanders near Ghent. After reducing some small forts, prince Maurice led them towards Bruges, and passed almost within reach of the cannon of that place, not without hopes, which proved fallacious, that by the sight of so flourishing an army, and the late disasters which had befallen the archdukes, the inhabitants might have been induced to throw off the Spanish yoke, and return to their former connection with the United Provinces.

FROM



FROM Bruges he marched towards Nieuport, and, by the way thither, made himself master, with little difficulty, of certain forts called St. Albert, Snaerfeerck, Bredene, and Oudenbourg, in which he left garrisons, with the view of retarding the progress of the enemy, in case they should venture to approach (p). He then invested Nieuport by land, while his fleet blocked up the harbour; and, as the town was neither very strong nor well prepared for a vigorous defence, he hoped in a few weeks to be able to compel the garrison to surrender.

BOOK I.  
1600.

Siege of  
Nieuport.

THE archduke, in the mean time, exerted himself with great activity in his preparations for an attempt to make him raise the siege; and, having had the good fortune to persuade a considerable number of the Spanish mutineers to return to their duty, his army soon amounted to twelve thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse. Both he and Isabella, upon the first news of the enemy's arrival in Flanders, had repaired to Ghent, in order to provide for the security of that important place, and the other towns of the province. The troops were ordered to assemble together at Bruges; and as in their march thither they passed near Ghent, Isabella, mounted on horseback, went out to meet them, and rode along the lines animating and exhorting them, giving them repeated assurances that, in future, they should not have the same ground as hitherto to complain of the irregularity of their pay; and declaring that, rather than their demands should not be satisfied, she would expose to sale her plate and jewels, and deliver up to them the funds appropriated to the support of her court and servants. This speech, joined to her majestic air and

(p) Maurice was attended by a number of the deputies of the states.

**BOOK I.** and manner, produced a powerful effect upon the  
 1600. minds of the soldiers, who received it with shouts  
 of high applause, and called out to her that they  
 were ready to expose their lives to every danger  
 in her defence. Albert, on this occasion, omitted  
 nothing in his power to confirm them in their  
 present disposition, and acquainted them that he  
 was determined to fight at their head, and to  
 share their fortune.

AGREEABLY to this resolution, having joined  
 his army at Bruges, he set out with it from thence  
 about the end of June. His first object was the  
 reduction of the forts above mentioned, in which  
 his success corresponded with his most sanguine  
 hopes. The garrisons which Maurice had left in  
 these forts, were intimidated by the sight of so  
 great a force, and after a feeble resistance  
 surrendered them, on condition, that they should  
 be suffered to depart with their arms and baggage.  
 The archduke himself subscribed the capitulation;  
 but, though his intention was sincere, he  
 could not protect the garrison of Snaerfeerck,  
 consisting of two companies of soldiers, from the  
 fury of the Spanish mutineers, who fell upon  
 them, notwithstanding their officers prohibition,  
 and put them all to the sword.

PRINCE Maurice being at the same time informed  
 of the surrender of the forts, which he  
 had expected would have held out much longer,  
 and of the near approach of the enemy, was  
 thrown into great perplexity. From his confidence  
 of bringing the siege to a speedy conclusion,  
 he had neglected to fortify his camp; the  
 number of his troops was not sufficient to enable  
 him both to continue the siege, and to oppose the  
 enemy in the open field; and he had even reason  
 to dread, from the rapidity of their march, that  
 he

he should not have leisure before their arrival, to put himself into a proper posture of defence.

BOOK I.

1600.

IN order to retard their progress, and to gain as much time as possible, he immediately dispatched his kinsman, count Ernest of Nassau, with two regiments of foot, consisting of Zealanders and Scots, and four troops of horse, to seize on the bridge of Lessingen, by which the enemy must pass in their way to Nieuport. But before count Ernest could reach this place, they had advanced, and taken possession of it. Ernest however, knowing how necessary it was to afford time to Maurice to prepare for their reception, resolved, how fatal so ever the consequences should prove to himself and his detachment, that he would not retire without fighting: and this generous resolution was happily attended with the desired effect. Albert, believing that Maurice's whole army must surely be at hand, spent a considerable time in making the proper dispositions for a general engagement. At length, being informed that Ernest's troops had received no augmentation since their first appearance, and that no other part of the enemy's army was in sight, he gave orders for an attack. The troops under Ernest kept their ground for some time; but, the horse having quickly given way, they were overpowered by numbers, and obliged to retire. In this action, upwards of five hundred of the Scots were slain, with many officers of distinguished reputation (g).

July 2.

THE archduke's hopes were greatly heightened by this success, and he wrote to Isabella that having with so great facility discomfited the van-guard of the enemy's army, he expected soon to inform

(g) Piascius, p. 182.

BOOK I.  
1600.

form her of the defeat of the whole. He judged, however, that there was ground to hesitate with regard to the conduct which it was proper to pursue; and, in order to assist him in forming his resolution, he called a council of his most experienced officers. Gaspard Zapena, a Spaniard of great experience, was of opinion that it was altogether unnecessary, and would therefore, in the present circumstances, be extremely imprudent to risk a battle. The enemy's general, through his confidence of being able to reduce Nieuport before an army could be assembled to oppose him, had brought himself into the most dangerous situation in which he had been ever placed. He durst not, now, in the face of so powerful an army, continue his operations against the town. His communication with Ostend was intercepted, since the archduke was fortunately situated between him and that place; and, should he attempt to make his escape by sea, when his highness was ready to fall upon him, in the hurry of embarkation, the greatest part of his troops must be cut to pieces. He therefore thought that the archduke ought not immediately to advance, with a design to attack the enemy; but ought rather to take the proper measures for reducing them, without exposing himself to the chance of a battle; and if he did, he believed, that ere long he would be able to oblige the enemy to lay down their arms. But whether his opinion on this head should be rejected or embraced, it was at least necessary that, before he advanced any further, he should procure information of the situation of the enemy, of which he was entirely ignorant; and, before adventuring to attack them, should wait for the arrival of Velasco, who in a few days would join him with a reinforcement of three thousand troops.

THIS



THIS prudent council was warmly opposed by the sieur la Barlotte, an old Flemish commander, of no less experience than Zapena, but whose courage, notwithstanding his advanced age, still bordered on temerity. He maintained that the present favourable opportunity of attacking the enemy ought not to be suffered to escape; that the archduke would find them entirely unprepared for their defence, intimidated by the rapidity of his approach, and disheartened by the defeat which their troops, under Ernest of Nassau, had so recently sustained; that, as the advantages he must derive from these circumstances, were more than sufficient to compensate for the want of the troops under Velasco, so his inferiority in number to the enemy was more than counterbalanced, by the superior discipline and bravery of his troops; that his troops were at present animated with the highest degree of ardor; and that the delaying to lead them forward, when they were so eager to engage, would only serve to damp their alacrity, while it would afford leisure to the enemy, either to fortify their entrenchments, or to secure their retreat.

THIS reasoning was received with high applause by a great majority of the council; and the soldiers, especially the Spanish mutineers, impatient to advance, could hardly be restrained.

ALBERT, however, being strongly impressed with a sense of the solidity of Zapena's reasons for delay, still hesitated as to which of the councils given him, he should embrace; when chance, which often directs the most important events, contributed to fix his resolution. The army having a view from their present situation of the sea-coast, a great number of ships were seen in their course from Nieuport to Ostend. The Spaniards

B o o k I.

1600.

prepossessed with the idea that the enemy durst not wait for their approach, concluded that they had already begun their flight, and that, at least, a part of them were on board the ships which they observed. Albert himself too readily yielded to this delusion; and instantly gave orders to his troops to begin their march. He was, at this time, only at the distance of a few miles from Nieuport, and, as he advanced with great rapidity, his cavalry arrived within sight of the enemy about mid-day, and his whole army about four or five hours before sun-set.

HE soon discovered how greatly he and his officers had erred in their conjectures with regard to the conduct and situation of the enemy. Far from meditating flight, prince Maurice had ordered his fleet to quit the coast, and retire to Ostend; by which prudent measure, he at once gave his army proof of the confidence which he reposed in them, and reduced them to the alternative of death or victory. He had withdrawn all his troops from the siege, except a number which he judged sufficient to restrain the sallies of the garrison. He had advanced to a little distance from the town, partly to encourage his troops, by shewing that it was not with reluctance that he had resolved to accept of battle; and partly because the situation of the ground was more convenient for drawing them up in the order which he most approved.

BESIDES his Dutch forces, he had several regiments of British, French, and Swiss, commanded by officers of distinguished merit, who had acquired the most consummate knowledge of the military art in the civil wars of France, and in the Netherlands; and these men, he well knew, from long experience, would execute his orders with equal skill and valor.

HE

HE thought it necessary, however, to encourage and animate the troops, and for this purpose, he rode from rank to rank, reminding them that they were about to engage with an enemy who were only inferior in numbers, and fatigued with their march; but, who, in the manner of their approach, had given proof of extreme temerity: that it entirely depended on themselves whether they should return to their country and their friends, crowned with glory and victory, or be cut to pieces by an enemy over whom they had often triumphed, and have their names for ever covered with infamy. From his confidence in their bravery, he had ordered the transports to leave the coast; and he now lead them on to battle, under a conviction that they would follow the example which he would set before them, and resolve either to die or conquer. These exhortations were every where received with the most joyful acclamations; and the whole army seemed to be animated with that intrepid spirit which he wished to inspire.

HE gave the command of his van-guard to sir Francis Vere, that of his main body to the count of Solms, and of the rear-guard to Oliver Vander Tempel, lord of Corbeck. He distributed his cavalry, commanded by count Lewis of Nassau, partly in the front, and partly on the flanks; and having taken no particular station to himself, he was at liberty to go from place to place, where-soever he found his presence necessary. He was accompanied by his brother the celebrated prince Frederick Henry, who was only sixteen years of age (*r*); and by the duke of Holstein, the prince of Anhalt, the count of Coligni, lord Gray, and sir  
E 2 Robert

(*r*) Maurice urged his brother to go by sea to Ostend, but Henry insisted that he should be permitted to remain and to share his brother's fate.

**BOOK I.** Robert Drury, grandson of the famous admiral of that name, and by several other noblemen of the first rank, in the different protestant states in Europe, who had lately come into the Netherlands to improve themselves, by his lessons and example, in the art of war.

1600.

HAVING drawn up his army upon the downs by the sea-shore, and planted his artillery on some of the highest of the little hills of sand of which the downs are formed, he resolved, in that posture, to wait for the enemy's approach. Albert was greatly disappointed, when he found him so well prepared for his defence; and he was somewhat discouraged when he observed, that from the position he had made choice of, the Spanish army would have both the sun and the wind in their face: the latter of which circumstances he dreaded would prove particularly inconvenient, from the light sandy soil on which they were about to engage. It was now, however, too late to entertain the thoughts of a retreat; and his troops were as confident and as eager and impatient for the combat as before. They had long cherished a contempt of the enemy; and they were now heard in all the ranks uttering threats, that they would give no quarter to any of the heretics, except prince Maurice and his brother, whom they would reserve to adorn the triumph of their general.

Battle of  
Nieuport.

THE battle was begun by the Spanish cavalry, under Mendoza, admiral of Arragon, who endeavoured to gain the flank of the Dutch army, by advancing along the sands between the sea and the downs; but Maurice, having foreseen that this might be attempted, had made provision against it, by planting cannon on the sands, and ordering some of his ships of war to approach the shore as near as possible. Mendoza was therefore  
unable



unable to effectuate his purpose, and was obliged to retire, after having sustained considerable slaughter.

BOOK I.

1600.

IN the mean time, the two armies, after a discharge of their artillery, having advanced within musket-shot of each other, the English forces in the van, under sir Francis Vere, were attacked by the Spanish mutineers, who, in order to retrieve their honour, displayed on this occasion the most desperate intrepidity. The British troops received their assault undaunted, and for some time withstood their fury; their general had his horse shot under him, and was twice wounded. Still, however, he maintained his ground, refusing to give any attention to his wounds, till his brother, sir Horatio Vere, arrived with fresh troops to his relief. These troops, while engaged in combat, with the mutineers, having been vigorously attacked in flank by the Spanish cavalry, were thrown into disorder, and many of them began to fly towards the shore.

BUT the battle was instantly restored. Prince Maurice, having divided his army into battalions, ordered two of those which composed his main body to advance; and by them, the Spaniards were in their turn compelled to retreat, and time afforded to the British troops to rally. In support of the Spaniards, the archduke brought forward his Walloons and the Irish, and with their assistance, the mutineers would once more have regained their superiority, had not Maurice, without delay, led on another fresh battalion, consisting of Swiss, and of those Walloons who had surrendered to him the fort of Saint Andrew. The British forces likewise returned to the charge; and soon after, the whole of both armies, horse and foot, were engaged from one wing to the other.

THE

BOOK I.

1600.

THE Dutch cavalry, commanded by count Lewis of Nassau, who, in this battle highly distinguished himself by his activity and valour, proved in every rencounter an overmatch for that of the enemy, and having broken their ranks, drove them with great slaughter from the field of battle.

THE combat was better supported by the Spanish infantry; where Albert himself was present, exposing himself to every danger, and sometimes mingling with the foremost combatants. His troops, in every quarter, gave proof of the most determined bravery. The battle had lasted for more than three hours; during which time, notwithstanding the fatigue of their rapid march from Liffinguen, they had fought without intermission, and often repulsed the fresh battalions of the enemy. From the beginning, they had been extremely incommoded with the sun and wind in their face, and still more with the dust or sand. The Dutch artillery too had kept up a constant fire upon them during the whole engagement, and having been not only planted on higher and firmer ground with planks under it to prevent it from sinking in the sand, but better served and more skilfully directed, it had made great havock among the Spanish troops. Still, however, they preserved their ranks, and seemed determined sooner to lay down their lives, than yield to an enemy, whom they had been so much accustomed to despise. Albert had made several attempts to get to the windward of the enemy, but had been as often prevented by the prudent precautions and vigilance of prince Maurice. At length, having thrown off his helmet, that he might be the more easily distinguished by his men, he received a wound in the ear with a pike, and was obliged to retire. Through some accident, his horse, which

which was conspicuous, fell into the hands of the enemy. His troops observed this, and believing that he himself had been taken prisoner, or killed, were greatly disheartened. They still kept their ranks; but in the langour of their exertions, they gave manifest symptoms that both their strength and courage had begun to fail.

BOOK I.

1600.

THIS abatement of their vigour did not escape the vigilant eye of Maurice, who instantly resolved to improve the advantage which it afforded him; and for this purpose, having collected his whole force, he renewed the assault upon the enemy in front, with his infantry, and with his cavalry in flank. It happened, at the same time, that the Spanish magazine of gun-powder, designed for the use of the artillery, took fire. The Dutch cavalry availed themselves of the confusion which this accident occasioned, and pushed forward with irresistible force, crying out, Victory, victory! This cry being instantly communicated to the rest of the army, animated them with redoubled ardor. The Spaniards, unable any longer to resist their fury, gave way on every side, and falling soon after into confusion, betook themselves to flight. The victors pursued for some time, and put great numbers to the sword; but the night coming on, the prince gave orders for sounding a retreat. His troops, he knew, must be exceedingly exhausted and fatigued, as they had taken no food since the morning, and, almost the whole day, had either stood under arms, or been engaged in battle: besides that, he was well acquainted with the intrepid spirit of the enemy, who might rally and return when he was unprepared for resistance, and most of his troops employed in the pursuit. For this reason, he selected such of them as had suffered least from the fatigue which they had undergone, and stationed them as  
a guard

BOOK I. a guard to the rest of the army, who remained  
 1600. all night on the field of battle.

THE contemporary historians differ widely in their accounts of the number of the slain. On the part of the Spaniards, Reidan, an historian who is generally well informed, says that it amounted to five thousand, but Grotius makes it only three thousand; while the loss on the side of the victors did not exceed one thousand: and the greatest part of these, he says, were of the English troops, who distinguished themselves by their intrepidity in this engagement, and had eight of their captains killed, and all the rest wounded, except two.

THE British officers were almost the only persons of distinction who fell in the army of the states; but in that of the army of the archduke, besides so great a number of his best troops, Zapena, and colonels Bastock, de Lasso, D'Avalos, and many other officers of great merit, were either killed in the field of battle, or died afterwards of their wounds. The admiral of Arragon and De Vigliar were taken prisoners; and the count de Boucquoi, Barlotta, and many others wounded, and rendered long unfit for service. All the Spanish artillery, baggage, and provisions, with more than a hundred standards, fell into the hands of the victorious army (s). Such was the battle of Nieuport, or, as it is sometimes called, the battle of the Downs, the event of which proved so extremely different from what the confidence of the Spaniards and their generals had prompted them to

(s) Among the Italians who fell in this battle the cardinal Bentivoglio mentions his brother and his nephew, two young noblemen, about twenty years of age, who had lately entered into the service of Spain, and were much regretted on account of their youth and bravery.



to expect. Their defeat was, no doubt, partly owing to the disadvantages under which they fought; although it was acknowledged by all parties that nothing could surpass the prudence, vigour, and intrepidity, which prince Maurice displayed from the beginning to the end of the engagement. His skill in the siege of fortified towns had long been highly celebrated; but it now appeared that he was equally possessed of all the other talents which form a consummate general, and all Europe at this time resounded with his praise (1).

BOOK I.  
1600.

ALLBERT, having left the field of battle immediately after seeing his troops give way, arrived on the same night at Bruges, where he soon after set out for Ghent, and was there received by Isabella, with the same firm and masculine spirit which she had discovered upon the various reports that had reached her, first of his being killed, and afterwards of his being wounded and taken prisoner. He returned next day to Bruges, and there employed himself in collecting his scattered troops.

PRINCE Maurice, in the mean time had retired on the next day after the battle to Ostend, to recruit his army in a place of safety, and to consult with the deputies whom the states general had sent thither to assist him with their advice. His enterprize against Nieupoort was a measure which the states themselves had first suggested, and which Maurice had undertaken at their desire. It does not appear that he himself had approved of this measure; and it was strongly condemned by his kinsman, count William of Nassau, whom the Dutch

(1) Grotius, lib. ix. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vi. The heroic Acts of Prince Maurice, printed in the year 1613. Piafecii Chronica Gest. in Europa singularium, an. 1600.

**BOOK I.** Dutch historians celebrate as a person of the most consummate prudence.

1690.

To lead the army so far into the enemy's country as Nieupoort, trusting to an event so extremely uncertain as the continuance of the mutinous spirit of the Spanish troops, William had represented as a rash and dangerous enterprize, by which the existence of the commonwealth would be exposed to imminent danger for the sake of acquiring a single town. That, even although they should conquer Nieupoort, yet the great expence of defending a place at so great a distance from them would more than counterbalance all the advantages they could derive from the possession of it; and that, if the archduke should be able to appease the mutineers, the army of the states might suffer a defeat, or, they might be reduced by famine, as the supplying them with provisions would entirely depend on the winds and waves.

THESE apprehensions had hitherto been happily disappointed; but from the events which had fallen out, it manifestly appeared how much reason there had been for entertaining them. The mutineers had easily been persuaded to return to their duty. The archduke had in due time collected a sufficient force; and if he had listened to the counsel that was given him by Zapena, and waited for the arrival of Velasco, without precipitating an engagement, the army of the states would probably have either been obliged to lay down their arms without fighting, or in the hurry of attempting to get on board their ships, the greater part of them would have been destroyed.

THE deputies, after the defeat of their troops at Lessinguen, had come to be, in some measure, sensible of the error into which the states had been betrayed;

betrayed; and, from that time till the victory was fully decided, they had been disquieted with the most dreadful apprehensions. From these apprehensions they were now happily delivered; but being still impressed with a sense of the danger which they had so narrowly escaped, they thought that, notwithstanding the great advantage they had obtained, there was ground for hesitating whether it was expedient to persevere in the plan of operations that had been begun.

THEY gave proof on this occasion, by the slowness of their deliberations, how much wiser it had been on the part of the states to have left prince Maurice at perfect liberty with regard to the conduct of the war, than to require him, as they had done, to follow the opinion of men who, from their ignorance of military affairs, were so extremely ill qualified to advise. They differed widely in their opinions from each other; and while some thought that the army ought immediately to return to Nieuport, others were of opinion that it ought rather to penetrate into the interior parts of Flanders. The former of these opinions at length prevailed; and on the fourth or fifth day after the battle, the siege of Nieuport was resumed.

THIS measure ought either not to have been adopted, or carried sooner into execution. The archduke, having exerted great activity in repairing the faults which he had committed, had sent Velasco (u), with a reinforcement to the garrison of Nieuport of two thousand five hundred men, who having marched with great expedition, had entered the town before prince Maurice had invested it. The operations however of the siege were

Siege of  
Nieuport  
resumed.

(u) Bentivoglio, Grotius. Thuanus says it was Barlotii and not Velasco.

BOOK I.

1600.

were renewed ; but the garrison, after making some vigorous sallies on the besiegers, soon convinced prince Maurice that he could not justly expect to reduce them before the archduke would arrive with another army, which he was collecting together for their relief.

July 18.

MOVED by this consideration, and dreading that he might soon be again involved in the same danger, from which he had so recently escaped, he raised the siege, and having led back his troops to Ostend, he put them on board the transports which the states had provided for that purpose, and returned to Holland ; judging it impracticable, on account of the difficulty of his situation, in the heart of the enemy's country, to derive any advantage whatever from the decisive victory he had obtained (*w*).

THE greatest part of the season fit for action still remained ; but both parties were greatly exhausted with the exertions which they had already made

(*w*) Bentivoglio. Thuanus, lib. cxxiv, &c.

Before he embarked, Maurice made an attempt to reduce a Spanish fort in the neighbourhood of Ostend, called St. Catherine ; but in this too he was disappointed by the vigour and activity of Barlotta, who by forced marches arrived with a considerable body of forces before the prince had time to make any progress in the siege. Barlotta himself however lost his life on this occasion. He was a native of Luxemburg, and had practised surgery in Paris, where, having been employed in his profession by count Charles of Mansfeldt, when he commanded the Spanish troops in France, the count took an attachment to him, and gave him a commission among his troops. He soon distinguished himself by his activity and enterprize, obtained the highest military honours, and was considered as one of the ablest officers in the service of Spain. His low birth, joined to his native arrogance and presumption, procured him many enemies among his inferiors and equals : but the archduke was sincerely sorry for his death.



made, and no other memorable transactions passed during the course of the present year (x).

BOOK I.  
1600.

IN Spain, the operation of the several causes of decline, above mentioned, was at this time sensible felt in every department of the state. Complaints were heard all over the kingdom of the neglect of agriculture and the decay of manufactures; and great numbers of the people, being without employment, were reduced to a state of indigence, which rendered it impossible for them to contribute their proportion of the taxes and supplies.

Decline of  
agriculture  
and manu-  
factures.

SEVERAL councils were held to consider of the proper remedies for those evils; but the duke of Lerma, and the other Spanish ministers, appear to have been extremely ignorant of the causes from which they proceed. They supposed them to have risen principally from the scarcity of money: and this they ascribed partly to the great quantities of plate that were employed in the churches, and in the houses of the rich, and partly to the exportation of gold and silver for the purchase of foreign manufactures.

Expedients  
for remedy-  
ing those  
evils.

BUT as no expedient occurred at present to prevent the latter of these practices, while the manufactures of Spain were at so low an ebb, they resolved immediately, if possible, to put a stop to the progress of the former; and, with this view, a royal edict was published, requiring all churches, corporations, and individuals of whatever rank within the kingdom, to deliver upon oath, to certain magistrates who were named, an exact inventory of all the plate, whether gold or silver, in their possession. In the body of the edict this

reason

(x) Davila, &c. p. 77. ch. ix.

BOOK I.

1600.

reason for the publication was assigned, that from the information which his majesty had received, there was ground to believe the quantity of the precious metals in plate and in church utensils to be so enormous, that, if it were converted into coin, and circulated throughout the kingdom, it would be found sufficient to restore the nation to that happy state of wealth and prosperity which it had formerly enjoyed; and that, for this reason, the king had, with the advice of his present counsellors, resolved, not only to prevent the farther encrease of plate, but afterwards, under the severest penalties, to prohibit the exportation of it to foreign states.

BUT it was soon found impracticable to carry this edict, which would not probably have been in any degree productive of the advantages proposed by it, into execution. The clergy were highly incensed because the sacred utensils were comprehended in it; and, both in writings and harangues from the pulpit, they represented the edict as an attack upon the privileges of the church. Neither Philip, nor his minister, the duke of Lerma, had resolution to contend against an order of men whom they dreaded, and whose favour they had been above all things solicitous to conciliate. Their design was therefore suddenly relinquished, and no other attempt made, on the present occasion, to remedy the disorders which prevailed.

It was not probable that any effectual remedy could be applied to them, till peace should be established with England and the United Provinces. Notwithstanding which it was judged necessary, for the reasons formerly mentioned, to continue the prosecution of the war against both these powers, without regard to the prejudice which from  
thence

thence the monarchy was likely to sustain (y). BOOK I.  
1601.  
Orders were given for the equipment of a fleet to support the Catholics of Ireland in their rebellion against Elizabeth; and both money and a reinforcement of Italian and Spanish troops were sent into the Netherlands.

THE archduke had at the same time prevailed upon the states assembled at Brussels to grant him much greater supplies than formerly; and these he employed in making numerous levies in Germany, and the Walloon or southern provinces. The enemy however was sooner prepared to take the field. Prince Maurice, having drawn his army out of winter quarters, early in the spring, and ordered them to rendezvous in the neighbourhood of the fort of Schenck, seemed for some time to intend an attack on Bois le Duc; but it soon appeared that his real design was to attempt the reduction of Rhinberg; the possession of this important place being necessary in order to facilitate the expulsion of the Spaniards from Guelderland, a part of which was still subject to their authority.

THE archduke no sooner received intelligence of his design, than he ordered count Herman of Berg to set out with a body of troops to reinforce the garrison; but before the count had time to execute his commission, Maurice had drawn lines of circumvallation round the place, and fortified the approaches to his camp in such a manner, as rendered all access impracticable. Albert had therefore no other expedient for saving Rhinberg left, but to make a diversion, by attacking some important place belonging to the United States, in the hopes that Maurice might be thus induced to abandon his present enterprize.

AT

(y) Gonzalez Davila, lib. ii. cap. 9.

BOOK I.



1601.

AT the earnest request of the people of Flanders, he resolved to lay siege to Ostend; the garrison of which place, though somewhat checked by adjacent forts, had been able to make incursions into the heart of the province, and often laid the inhabitants of the open country under the most burthensome contributions.

THE states of this province, notwithstanding the peculiar hardships under which they laboured, had discovered great alacrity in raising their proportion of the supplies lately granted to the archduke; and they now promised strenuously to exert themselves in furnishing him with every thing necessary for carrying on the siege with vigour.

SUCH were the motives by which Albert was influenced in forming his resolution to undertake the siege of Ostend; the most hazardous enterprise in which he had ever been engaged, and which was attended with more important consequences, than any other which occurs in the history of the Netherlands.

Description  
of Ostend.

OSTEND stands on the sea coast, in a marshy soil, and almost surrounded with canals; two of which being much larger than the rest, and communicating with the sea, receive smaller vessels at all times, and at high-water, admit of ships of a considerable magnitude. It was an open fishing town, till the year 1572, when it was first fortified with a palisade by the duke of Alva. At the pacification of Ghent, the inhabitants having thrown off the Spanish yoke, the fortifications were so much strengthened and augmented by the United States, that the duke of Parma, who invested it in the year 1583, despairing of success, abandoned



done his enterprize, and could never afterwards be persuaded to resume the siege.

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1601.

OSTEND is divided into two parts, called the Old and the New Town. The former of these is washed by the sea, against the ravages of which it was secured by a strong fortification, formed of huge and well compacted beams or palisades; and the latter was defended by a wall flanked with bastions, and the canals already mentioned, to which there had lately been added a covered way, fortified with numerous redoubts. As, from the situation of Ostend, on the coast of Flanders, it afforded a convenient shelter to the ships of the United Provinces, the states had ever been extremely solicitous for its preservation. They had spared no expence in rendering the fortifications as compleat as possible, and besides a numerous garrison under the command of an experienced officer, they had always kept it richly furnished with provisions and military stores. Nor were these the only circumstances which had deterred the duke of Parma from renewing his attempt against it. He considered, what was of much greater importance than even the strength of the place, that while the Dutch preserved their superiority at sea, the garrison might continue to receive whatever supplies and reinforcements they should stand in need of, till his strength and resources being exhausted, he should be compelled to raise the siege. To this consideration, the archduke seems not to have paid that attention which it merited. He did not possess the same military skill as the duke of Parma, and could not therefore so clearly perceive the difficulties he must encounter in his intended enterprize. He was not by nature bold or rash; yet, from the facility of his temper, he was apt too readily to

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F

adopt

**BOOK I.** adopt the rash imprudent measures that were recommended by his counsellors (y).  
 1601.

Rhinberg  
capitulates.

HAVING set out with his numerous army about the end of June, he began his operations against Ostend on the 4th or 5th of July. Prince Maurice, in the mean time, who secretly rejoiced to observe his enemy engage in so dangerous an undertaking, persisted in the siege of Rhinberg; and in a few weeks, notwithstanding the most vigorous defence on the part of the garrison, he compelled them to capitulate.

Siege of  
Ostend.

BUT the attention of both parties was now almost totally engrossed by the siege of Ostend; where Charles Vander Noot the governor, before the besiegers had time to compleat their intrenchments, had sallied out upon them, and killed upwards of five hundred men. This unfortunate beginning, however, did not deter the archduke from the prosecution of his enterprize.

HAVING taken the necessary precautions to prevent the future sallies of the garrison, and stationed one part of his troops in the downs to the westward of the town, and the rest of them on the south and east, he soon opened his batteries, and began a furious cannonade in every quarter. But his distance from the body of the place, occasioned by the canals, ditches, and other outworks, which the industry of the besiegers had greatly multiplied, rendered his fire of small effect; and showed him that it must long remain impossible to compel the garrison to surrender, unless he  
 could

(y) Vide Bentivoglio, Le Clerc, and Grotius. Thuanus, lib. vi. p. 76, &c.

could prevent them from receiving reinforcements and supplies by sea.

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1601.

IN this opinion he might have been confirmed by the proof which the United States had lately given, how much they were determined to exert themselves with vigour in the defence of the place. Though Vander Noot was an officer whom they highly esteemed, yet they had taken from him the chief command, and given it to sir Francis Vere, who, next to prince Maurice, was the most renowned of all their generals; for his military prudence and capacity; and to engage Vere to accept of this command, they had consented to his selecting the flower of the English forces, for a reinforcement to the garrison. They had, at the same time, sent to Ostend a copious supply of military stores and provisions; and were unanimous in resolving that whatever it should cost them, they would defend the town to the last extremity.

THIS resolution, and the vigour which the states had begun to display, drew the attention of all Europe to the operations of this important siege; and with the permission of the states, the town was visited by many illustrious foreigners, from Germany, Denmark, France, and England (z), who were led there by curiosity to view so interesting a scene of action, and the desire of being thereby enabled more clearly to comprehend the relations of those military achievements which they expected to be performed by the contending parties.

THE archduke had ground for much solicitude with regard to the final issue of his enterprize;

F 2

but

(z) As the duke of Holstace, the king of Denmark's brother, the earl of Northumberland, and others.

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1601.

but he could not now desist, without exposing himself to reproach and ridicule; and therefore he applied himself with redoubled ardor to the prosecution of the siege.

It might be brought to a period, he imagined, either by carrying it on in the ordinary form, by mines, batteries, and assaults, or by rendering himself master of the entrance of the canals, and thereby intercepting the communication of the garrison by sea, with the United Provinces. He ought maturely to have considered which of these two methods of procedure was the most likely to prove effectual, and to have confined his attention to one of them, without suffering it to be diverted by the other. But, instead of this, he employed his forces, sometimes in carrying on attacks upon the enemy's entrenchments, and sometimes in attempting to block up the canals; and, by this division of his strength, as the siege was protracted to an enormous length, so it was attended with an immense expence of blood and treasure.

For several weeks his principal object was to approach still nearer than where his batteries were first opened to the fortifications of the town. The garrison, on the other hand, omitted nothing in their power that could obstruct his approach. They adventured, on some occasions, to sally out, and to attack the besiegers sword in hand: and in the mean time, they laboured indefatigably in casting trenches, and raising new redoubts, wherever they apprehended there was danger of the enemy's attempting an assault. An incessant fire was all the while kept up from the Spanish batteries, on the one hand, and the fortifications on the other; and great numbers were killed on either side.

At



AT length, the archduke, perceiving that his operations were not attended with the success which he expected, had recourse to the other expedient above-mentioned, and employed a great part of his forces in attempting to obstruct the entrance to the canals. One of them was the entrance of the harbour, and here he began his operations. But, as all the ground to a considerable distance from the shore was sand, no mound which he formed of it, could sustain a battery, or resist the violence of the waves. He was therefore obliged to collect together from the neighbouring towns, a great quantity of huge beams, of which and bricks he resolved to form a dyke at the mouth of the canal. The beams were driven deep into the ground, then bound together, and the intermediate spaces filled with bricks. Of this sort of building, one was piled upon another, till the whole was raised to a sufficient height; after which, being planted with a numerous battery of cannon, the enemy's ships found all access to the harbour utterly impracticable.

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1601.

BUT the hopes which Albert had from thence conceived, of being able to reduce the town by famine, were quickly frustrated by the ingenuity and great exertion of the governor and garrison. They instantly applied themselves to enlarge the mouth of the other canal, which passed through the heart of the town, and soon rendered it capable of receiving the largest ships.

The archduke however did not despair of being able to deprive them of this resource; and he immediately began the same sort of operations at the entrance of this canal, as those by which he had made himself master of the other. At first, his troops and pioneers proceeded with great

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1691.

great alacrity, as they were sheltered from the fire of the besiegers, by a dyke which had been raised to defend the town against the encroachments of the sea. But the garrison resolved to forego the advantage which they derived from this defence; and having strengthened their fortifications, as well as they could, by stakes, huge stones, and other materials fitted to repel the fury of the waves, they demolished the dyke, and, as by this expedient, the Spanish works were exposed to the artillery of the town, and a great part of the adjacent country laid under water, the archduke was obliged to draw off his troops to a greater distance, and to have recourse to other measures which required greater experience and time to carry into execution.

In the mean time, the states general of the United Provinces held frequent conferences to consider how they might best improve the leisure which they enjoyed, while the Spanish army was detained before Ostend. They wished to have made an attack on the island of Cadfant, and afterwards to have undertaken the reduction of Sluys. But, at the present juncture, they had neither the money nor the troops which prince Maurice thought necessary for so difficult an enterprize. The flower of their army had, after the taking of Rhinberg, been sent to Ostend; and the great expence which attended the defence of that place, had almost exhausted their finances. Much time was spent in deliberating, and various expeditions were proposed. At length, towards the end of October, when the season of action was nearly elapsed, they formed the resolution of undertaking the siege of Bois le Duc, the garrison of which important place, they understood, amounted only to three hundred men.

IN obedience to their commands, though extremely diffident of success, prince Maurice immediately began his march, and having arrived before the place on the first of November, he judged, that, considering the great extent of the fortifications, the garrison must soon find it necessary to capitulate, provided he could prevent the entrance of more troops. With this view, he instantly began to draw lines of circumvallation round the town, and at first, this work was carried on with great rapidity. But soon afterwards, it was retarded by a violent frost, which happened, this year, much sooner than usual: and the archduke had time to send a large detachment of his army, above a thousand of which forced their way into the town, before the entrenchments were compleat; while the rest lay at a little distance from the prince's camp, with the design of embracing any opportunity that might offer of annoying him. Still, however, he persisted in his design: but as the frost continued daily encreasing in violence, and put an entire stop to his operations, he complied with the desire of the deputies of the states, who as usual, attended him in the camp, and raised the siege (a).

End of November.

MAURICE had no sooner retired from Bois le Duc, than Albert, having recalled his troops, resumed his operations, which had been suspended during their absence, against Ostend: and in a few days after, he had ground to entertain the hope of being able to terminate the siege. The fortifications of the town next the sea, had lately suffered considerable prejudice from the fury of the waves; and the garrison, through sickness and desertion, and the great numbers killed by fatigue and the incessant fire of the besiegers, was reduced

(a) Metern, lib. xxii. Grotius, lib. x. Bentivoglio, &c.



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1601.

duced from eight thousand to between two and three thousand men. Sir Francis Vere had given repeated notice of his distressful situation to the United States: but, till the raising of the siege of Bois le Duc, they had no troops which they could spare; and after troops were procured, and put on board the transports, they were prevented from sailing by contrary winds. About the same time, the archduke had ordered a select body of forces to pass over the harbour at low-water, in the middle of the night, who set fire to a temporary defence, composed of huge piles of faggots and other combustible materials, which had been placed at the foot of the rampart, on the north side of the town, to prevent the further encroachments of the sea. The fire burnt furiously for three days and nights, baffling all the attempts of the garrison to extinguish it. The rampart was thus much weakened, and a greater number of men were necessary for its defence. In the midst of this distress, the governor received notice that the archduke had been assiduously employed in preparing for a general assault, and would certainly carry his design into execution on the next day, or, at farthest, on the day immediately following. Vere, though possessed of the most unquestionable courage, was too sensible of the present weakness of his garrison and fortifications, and too well acquainted with the persevering and intrepid spirit of the Spanish troops, not to be alarmed with the danger which threatened him; and, in order to avert it, he made use of an expedient to which a brave man will hardly, even when necessity requires it, have recourse. Without any serious intention of capitulating, he secretly sent over to the archduke an officer, to signify that he was ready to treat with him for the surrender of the town. Albert, suspecting no dissimulation, gladly listened to this



this proposal, and hostages were instantly exchanged. He came soon, however, to entertain some doubt of the governor's sincerity, and urged him, without delay, to propose his terms. This, the governor, by employing different pretexts, found means to defer from day to day, till a reinforcement of troops which he had expected, arrived from Zealand. This reinforcement consisted only of five companies, amounting to four hundred men. But finding that the archduke could not be any longer deceived, and having already gained sufficient time to repair the breaches in the rampart, he sent him word, that since his masters the states had augmented his garrison, he could not now, consistently with his honour, consent to give up the town.

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1601.

As Vere had begun this transaction without communicating it to his officers, some suspicions were at first entertained of his fidelity by all such persons as were averse to a surrender; and the states general were not entirely satisfied, either with the duplicity he had employed, or the example which he had given of entering into a treaty with the enemy, without the knowledge of his council of war. But no person had so much reason to be offended as the archduke, who though he did not hesitate to send back the hostages, was both incensed and mortified when he considered how he had been deceived by an enemy, whom he might probably have compelled to lay down his arms (b).

THE fortifications of the place were now more secure than formerly, and the garrison had been reinforced. Still however, being moved by passion, more than the probability of success, he resolved

(b) If he had improved the opportunity which he had lost.

**BOOK I.**  
1601. solved to execute the design which the hopes of a capitulation had induced him to lay aside, and gave orders for a general assault. He intended to make his principal attack on the west, near the harbour, which had been for some time in his possession; but, in order to divert the enemies attention and divide their forces, he resolved at the same time to make attacks in other quarters, and gave the command of a body of troops, destined to act on the east side, to the celebrated count de Boucquoi; having committed the execution of his principal design to Augustin Mescia, an experienced officer, and governor of the citadel of Antwerp.

January  
7th, 1602.

EARLY in the morning he began to play off his batteries, and kept up a furious cannonading in every quarter till midnight, when, the tide having gone back, Mescia led forward the Spanish troops. They were drawn up in a compact body, forty men in front, and the foremost ranks clothed in complete armour, followed by the musketeers and by others, who were provided with scaling ladders, and whatever else was judged necessary, either for acquiring or securing possession of the rampart. They advanced across the old harbour, in which there was between three and four feet water, with great ardour and the most determined intrepidity; but the garrison were well prepared for their defence. The governor had beforehand ordered the cannon to be removed from that part of the fortifications where he expected their principal attack, and in their place had planted seven large mortars, which were loaded with stones, flints, bullets, and other instruments of mischief. He had likewise instructed those to whom he had committed the charge of these mortars to keep up their fire till the enemy should approach. This order was well obeyed, and the Spaniards had

had almost reached the foot of the rampart, when the mortars were discharged, and made dreadful havock among the foremost ranks: a great number was killed and wounded, and the ranks were thrown into confusion. Still however they continued to advance, those who were behind pushing forward those who were before, till the greater part of them were so near that every stroke and shot of the besiegers did certain execution. The night came on, yet the Spaniards seemed still determined to persist. To prevent a surprize, the governor ordered a great number of fires to be lighted up within the rampart, and the battle continued to be as bloody and desperate as before.

THE Spanish troops at the same time crowded together in the harbour, ready to advance to fill up the places of those who fell; when the governor had recourse to an expedient which he had meditated from the beginning. There were two sluices within the fortification, one of which served in the time of ebb to keep the water in that part of the canal which lay within the town, and the other to restrain it in that part which ran up into the country. Having ordered both these sluices to be opened, so great a quantity of water was poured into the harbour, that many of the Spaniards were carried down by the violence of the stream, and drowned; while many others, attempting to save themselves by laying hold of the pallisades on the rampart, were slaughtered by the enemy. The archduke had commanded his cavalry to keep close in the rear of the infantry to prevent them from having recourse to flight. It was thus rendered impossible for the latter to make their retreat so soon as necessity required; and by this means they were obliged to stand exposed to the fire of the besiegers, long after it was manifest that their most vigorous efforts could be



**BOOK I.** <sup>1602.</sup> be of no avail. A part of the cavalry having entered the water, with a design to obstruct the violence of the current, several horses with their riders were likewise drowned, and Mescia at length found it necessary to give the signal of retreat. The assailants having been equally unsuccessful in every other quarter, were obliged to abandon the assault. In this rash and desperate enterprize about fourteen hundred of the Spaniards and Italians were either killed or drowned, among whom were several persons of the first rank, while the loss of the besiegers amounted only to forty killed, and a small number wounded (c).

THE archduke would have renewed the assault on the second day after his repulse, but was prevented by a mutiny of his Italian and Spanish troops, who were highly exasperated at the barbarous, and what they deemed disgraceful manner in which they had been used. They bitterly complained that they had been treated like slaves or brutes, and not like soldiers of unquestionable bravery, when they were compelled by the cavalry to stand exposed to the enemy's fire, after the sluices being opened, it was rendered impossible for them to advance. They complained that this measure, which had been adopted without consent of the council of general officers, was contrary to every rule of war, and they declared, that since they had not been treated as soldiers, they would no longer act as such. Albert, soured with his ill success, was equally alarmed and provoked at this behaviour, and in order to prevent the infection of their example from spreading through the rest of his army, he instantly caused  
between

(c) Meteren, liv. xxiii. Grotius, lib. xi. ab initio. Ben-  
nyog. part. iii. lib. vi.



between forty and fifty of the most seditious to be executed, and sent a hundred and fifty to the gallees. By this prompt severity he quelled the mutiny; but, finding it necessary to relinquish his design of renewing the assault, he now bent his whole attention to the blocking up of the canal.

Book I.  
1601.

DURING the course of these transactions the court of Spain, notwithstanding their inability to furnish the archduke either with the troops or money necessary to insure success in his contest with the United States, was engaged in other expensive enterprizes. By their order the count de Fuentes, governor of Milan, had some time before made such numerous levies of troops, as excited in the minds of the Italian states and princes an apprehension, which at the present period seems to have been without foundation, that some ambitious design had been conceived of reducing Italy under the Spanish yoke. Of these troops a part was sent to the archduke Ferdinand, to assist him in his operations at Canissa against the Turks; another part of them to the Netherlands; and the rest were intended for an expedition against Algiers, which was still the principal seat of those numerous pirates, by whom the coast and the ships of Spain continued to be no less molested than in the former reign. About ten thousand troops were employed in seventy gallees, partly Genoese and partly Spanish, commanded by the celebrated Doria, and they had a prosperous voyage till they were within a few days sailing of the destined port. Had they immediately landed, it is probable they would have succeeded in their enterprize, as the greater part of the pirates, agreeably to information which Doria had received, were absent, and such of them as had been left behind, were unprepared for their defence: but, unfortunately, one of

Spanish levies in Italy excite jealousies.

**BOOK I.** of the capital ships had been separated from the  
 1602. rest of the fleet, on which account the debarkation was delayed till next day; and in the intervening night a dreadful storm arose, which not only rendered all attempts to land impracticable, but obliged the fleet to leave the coast and return to Sicily (*d*).

Invasion of  
Ireland.

THE court of Spain was not discouraged by the failure of their attempt against Algiers, from engaging in another enterprize, which was still more difficult to be carried into execution. The war with England had not for several years been vigorously prosecuted by either of the two contending powers; and no event had happened which deserves to be recorded: but Philip, or more properly the duke of Lerma, had, about this time, conceived the hopes of being able to give a mortal wound to the power of Elizabeth, by an invasion of Ireland, where a great number of the natives were in open rebellion against her, under the earl of Tyrone.

PHILIP the Second, by various intrigues carried on by ecclesiastics, had fomented the discontents of the Irish, and on different occasions had sent them supplies of arms and military stores. Many of them had been engaged, by the kind treatment which he ordered to be given them, to enter into his service in the Netherlands: and of these, many having returned to their native country, had, through the knowledge which they had acquired, in some measure contributed to teach their countrymen the rules of military discipline, thereby rendering them a much more formidable enemy than they had hitherto been to the English troops.

TYRONE

(*d*) Thuanus, lib. cxxvi. Piaſecii Chronica, an. 1602.

TYRONE, whose affections Elizabeth had in vain endeavoured to conciliate, though noted for his treachery and cruelty, vices which generally attend on barbarous manners, yet, being brave and active, had persuaded many of his countrymen to enlist themselves under his banners, by flatteringly inspiring them with the hopes of deliverance from the English yoke. He had applied for assistance to the court of Spain, and being seconded in his application by several seminaries of English priests and Jesuits, solicitors the most likely to succeed with Philip and his minister, he had obtained a promise both of arms and troops.

A BULL of excommunication having been published by three succeeding popes (e) against Elizabeth, absolving her subjects from their allegiance, and inviting all catholic princes to take possession of her dominions, the superstitious mind of Philip was easily impressed with a persuasion that, by supporting the rebels, and abolishing Elizabeth's authority in Ireland, he would act the meritorious part of a faithful son of the church, and serve the cause of God and of the catholic religion. And, although he had too much indolence to be capable of being principally actuated by ambition, yet he could not but desire to add Ireland to his dominions, as, besides the great extent and fertility of that island, its commodious harbours would occasionally afford a retreat and shelter to his ships, and better enable him to dispute the empire of the sea with England and the United Provinces.

DETERMINED by these considerations, he gave orders for the equipment of a fleet of transports and ships of war, sufficient for carrying six thousand

(e) Pius V. Gregory XIII. Clement VIII. the present pope.

Book I.  
1602.

land troops; and so confident was he and his minister of the success of their intended enterprize, that, besides the troops, a great number of families, including women and children, were put on board, with the design of establishing a Spanish colony in the kingdom which they expected to subdue. They had lent too easy faith to the exaggerated accounts which Tyrone had given them of his strength: and they were not sufficiently acquainted with the character and abilities of lord Mountjoy, whom Elizabeth had appointed viceroy and commander in chief of the English forces.

THE command of the Spanish troops, and the conduct of the expedition, were committed to Don John D'Aguilar, who had learnt the rudiments of war under the duke of Alva, and had afterwards acquired some military reputation from a successful enterprize, in which he had the chief command, against the town of Blavet in Bretagne.

HE set sail from Spain in the end of August, accompanied by some ships of war, under Don John Guevara, and arrived at Kinsale, in the south of Ireland, on the 8th of October: but a part of his transports having been separated from the rest of the fleet, he found, on his arrival at Kinsale, that he could muster only four thousand men. With this little army, he applied himself to strengthen the fortifications of the place, resolving to remain there, till he should be joined by Tyrone, or till the rest of his forces should arrive. The ships of war under Guevara returned immediately after the troops were landed; and, soon after, the harbour of Kinsale was blocked up by a squadron of English men of war, commanded by sir Richard Levison. Agreeably to his instructions



instructions from the court of Spain, D'Aguilar dispersed a manifesto over the adjacent country, in which he assumed the title of general in the holy war, undertaken for the preservation of the catholic faith in Ireland; and whilst he invited people to come into his assistance, he declared, that he was sent by his master the king of Spain, with no other intention but to deliver them from the dominion of the devil and the heretical queen of England.

BOOK I.

1602.

THE Irish had formerly, on different occasions, received the justest grounds of complaint against the English government; and at this time they were highly incensed on account of the introduction of what the English, with good reason, regard as one of their most valuable privileges, the institution of trials by jury; they were therefore generally animated with a spirit of discontent against their ancient masters. The greater part of them were likewise strongly attached to the popish faith; and their priests, who were wholly in the interest of Spain, possessed an entire ascendant over them, having persuaded them that their ancestors had originally sprung from Spain, had thereby created in their minds a strong predilection in favour of the Spaniards.

THEY were discouraged, however, from complying with D'Aguilar's invitation to have recourse to arms, by considering the small number of troops which he had brought to their assistance; and they resolved to remain quiet till the arrival of the rest, which he had assured them would quickly follow.

THE viceroy was, at this time, engaged in the prosecution of the war against Tyrone, in the northern parts of the island. His arms had been

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attended

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1602.

attended with great success; he had defeated several parties of the rebels, and had made prisoners of many of their leaders, some of whom he had sent to England. Tyrone himself, with his adherents, had fled before him, and taken shelter in those fastnesses in the northern Provinces, where the marshy ground rendered it difficult for the English general to advance. Here, however, the rebel chief was in a manner besieged, and as the country was but little cultivated, he must ere long have been obliged, through the want of subsistence, to submit to the conqueror. In this critical situation were the affairs of the insurgents when the Spanish troops arrived. Upon receiving information of their arrival, the viceroy, justly dreading that the insurrection would soon become more general, resolved, without delay, to exert his utmost vigour against the invaders. With this intention, having left a part of his cavalry to watch the motions of Tyrone, he set out for Kinsale, and having marched with great rapidity, he soon arrived before the place, and began the siege with between eight and nine thousand men. But before he had time to make any considerable progress, he received notice that the Spanish transports above mentioned, which had been separated from the rest of the fleet, had arrived at Baltimore, with two thousand soldiers on board, under the command of an officer named Ocampo; and soon after he was informed, that the frost having set in with great violence in the marshy country where he had left Tyrone, that leader and his followers had made their escape over the ice, had joined Ocampo with upwards of four thousand men, who together with the Spaniards, were on their march to raise the siege of Kinsale. This alarming intelligence he procured by intercepted letters from Ocampo and Tyrone to Aguilar; and from these letters too he understood their plan of opera-

operations, the time of their approach, and the route which they intended to pursue. He therefore prepared himself for his defence; and, having drawn off the greater part of his army to an advantageous situation, at some distance from the town, he left no more forces than were sufficient to restrain the eruption of the Spaniards under Aguilar.

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WHEN Tyrone saw the English army so advantageously posted, and prepared for his attack, his courage failed; and notwithstanding the remonstrances of Ocampo, who reproached him with cowardice, he gave orders to his men to change the direction of their march, hoping to reach a march which lay near, and thus to avoid the necessity of fighting. But the viceroy, perceiving his intention, hastened forward with all his forces, and attacked him in the rear. Finding then that an engagement was unavoidable, he resumed his courage, and faced about to the enemy. But the rebels were no match in the open field for the English forces. They were quickly thrown into confusion, and put to flight. The Spaniards, who fought desperately for some time, being forsaken by their dastardly associates, were overpowered by numbers, and Ocampo himself with several officers, made prisoners. In this battle, above twelve hundred men were killed upon the spot, a great proportion of whom were Spaniards. The rest of that nation fled to Baltimore and other places on the coast, in which they had left garrisons. Such of the Irish as were taken, were hanged as rebels; the greater part of them, among whom was Tyrone, escaped through their knowledge of the country; but were totally dispersed.

It was easy for D'Aguilar, when he received intelligence of this defeat, and the cowardly behaviour of the Irish, to perceive how much the

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court of Spain had been mistaken in their judgment of the facility of establishing their authority in Ireland. There could be no secure dependence, he saw, on assistance from the natives ; and no army, which in the present state of the finances could be sent from Spain, could be able to contend alone with the English forces. He resolved, therefore, to employ all his influence to dissuade the king from persisting in so desperate an attempt : and, being at the same time conscious, that with so small a number of troops as were under his command in Kinsale, he could not justly expect to be able, above a few weeks, to defend the town against a general of so much skill and vigour as the viceroy, he resolved to save the lives of his soldiers, and to deliver the place into the hands of the English, provided he could obtain from them such terms as his honour would permit him to accept.

IN a few days after the battle, he gave the viceroy notice of his intention, and explained to him the motives of his conduct, and the sentiments which he had come to entertain of the Irish rebels, and of the folly of the enterprize, into which the court of Spain, through misinformation, had been betrayed.

BUT he accompanied his offer with a declaration expressed in the strongest terms, that, in case the viceroy should refuse to grant him the conditions which he required, the honours of war to his troops, with a promise of transporting them and their cannon and ammunition to Spain, in English ships ; and an act of indemnity to the inhabitants of Kinsale, by whom he had been so kindly received and entertained, he and his soldiers were unalterably determined to defend the town to the last extremity.

LORD Mountjoy could not but respect the spirit by which this declaration was dictated. He  
was



was prompted by the native generosity of his disposition to comply with the terms proposed, and he thought himself justifiable in point of prudence for complying with them, when he considered how much his army was likely to suffer in the operations of a siege, carried on in the middle of winter, against so brave and so determined an enemy.

WITHOUT hesitation, therefore, he agreed to D'Aguilar's demands. Kinsale, Baltimore, and some other forts, in the possession of the Spaniards, were delivered into the hands of the viceroy; and D'Aguilar with his troops, cannon, and ammunition, were soon after transported to Spain in an English fleet.

PHILIP, after hearing of the issue of the battle, having despaired of their preservation, greatly rejoiced at their arrival. He highly approved of the capitulation, and, with the advice of his counsellors, resolved, in consequence of the information which he received from D'Aguilar, to abandon the Irish rebels to their fate; and henceforth to apply himself with more undivided attention to his affairs in the Netherlands (*f*).

(*f*) Van Meteran, lib. xxiii. Carte's Hist. of England, book xix. Thuanus, &c.



T H E  
H I S T O R Y  
OF THE REIGN OF  
P H I L I P T H E T H I R D,  
K I N G O F S P A I N.

B O O K II.

**T**HE archduke, after the repulse of his army, as above related, by the garrison of Ostend, was advised by some of his principal officers to raise the siege. He was himself extremely reluctant to comply with this advice, but thought it necessary, before rejecting it, to know the sentiments of the court of Spain. Philip's ministers could judge of the propriety of his persisting in his enterprize, only by the information which he transmitted to them; and there is ground to believe that, having conceived an opinion that it would be inconsistent with his honour to relinquish it, his representation was calculated to make them think too lightly of the obstacles which it was necessary to surmount, and too highly of the importance of the place. They believed it to be impossible for the garrison to defend it much longer against so great a force, and they imagined that by the reduction of it they might ruin the trade of the United Provinces, and thus insure success in the future operations of the war. It was therefore determined that the archduke should continue the siege, and that.

Book II:  
1602.

BOOK II. that no assistance should be with-held which could enable him to bring it to the desired conclusion.

1602.

Siege of Ostend continued.

THEIR assistance on the present occasion was the more necessary, as his own finances were almost entirely exhausted, and he had little prospect of receiving any considerable support from the assembly of the states. He convened this assembly however, and urged them, on account of the necessity of his affairs, to grant him an immediate supply. The deputies were liberal in their professions of loyalty; but, in return to his application, they represented that, in their present circumstances, it was impossible for them to comply with his request, as the province of Brabant had, almost every season, been obliged to pay the most exorbitant contributions to the enemy, and not only that province but several others had long been cruelly robbed and plundered by the mutineers.

CONSCIOUS of the truth of this representation, he could not persist in his demand, but was obliged to rest satisfied with what he received from the states of Flanders, who, being more deeply interested than the rest in the conquest of Ostend, contributed to the utmost of their power to assist him in carrying on the siege.

HAVING, since the failure of his late attempt, despaired of being able to reduce the garrison by storm, his principal object now was to intercept the communication with the United Provinces, by blocking up the entrance of the canal. For this purpose he brought engineers from Italy and other places, and, by their direction, various works were undertaken at an immense expence. But at the mouth of the canal their labour was rendered fruitless by the fury of the waves; and when



when they attempted to raise a dyke and batteries on the banks of the canal, some nearer to the town, they were not only exposed to the enemy's artillery, but were often interrupted by the garrison, who on different occasions sallied out upon them, destroyed their works, and put great numbers to the sword. In order to avoid the farther repetition of these disasters, they began at a distance from the canal, and out of the reach of the besieged, to construct huge machines, formed of beams strongly bound together, which, when finished, they intended to push forward to the banks of the canal, and on these, after covering them with turf, straw, and other materials, to erect their batteries. But the finishing of this, and other works which they attempted, required a considerable length of time; a great part of the present year was spent in preparing them, all the other operations of the siege were thus relaxed. In the mean time abundant supplies of stores and provisions were introduced into the town. The garrison, many of whom were sickly and wounded, was entirely changed. By the new garrison, consisting of select troops, partly British and partly French and Dutch, all the damage which the fortifications had sustained were repaired; and so little dread was entertained of the success of the besiegers, that general Vere, with the consent of the states, went over to England, devolving the command, during his absence, upon the sieur Frederick de Dorp.

BOOK II.

1602.

THE defence of Ostend had cost the United Provinces about a hundred thousand florins each month, besides the pay of between six and eight thousand troops; yet, from the great increase of their commerce, joined to the frugality of their manners, they were not only able to bear the burthen of this expence, but to maintain a considerable

BOOK II. <sup>1602.</sup> siderable fleet, and at the same time to make so great an augmentation of their land forces, that prince Maurice began his operations this campaign with twenty-four thousand foot and six thousand horse, a more powerful army than any former one which he had commanded since the commencement of the war.

The United States assisted by Henry IV. of France, and the queen of England.

IN raising this army they were secretly favoured by Henry IV. who permitted the sieur de Bethune, of the house of Melun, to levy troops for them in France; and in Germany, where they were befriended by some princes of the Protestant religion, they raised a body of two thousand four hundred horse. But their most useful ally was the queen of England, who furnished them with three thousand men to fill up the vacancies in the English regiments already in their service, and soon after sent them three thousand more. The obtaining of this reinforcement had been Sir F. Vere's principal object in going over to England, and he now returned from thence, and was appointed to the command of all the English forces.

THE Spanish army, on the other hand, had not for many years been so much reduced in number as at the present period. Many had been killed, or had died of a pestilential disease, and of the hardships which they had undergone before Ostend; and the Italian and Spanish mutineers amounted to a considerable number; notwithstanding which, the court of Spain and the archduke were as obstinately as ever resolved to prosecute the siege. The United States rejoiced at their obstinacy, and hoped it might ere long prove fatal to their power in the Netherlands. They considered the present juncture as the most favourable for action which could occur, and therefore had resolved strenuously to exert themselves in

in attempting to make some important conquest in the southern provinces, which, in case the garrison of Ostend should be obliged to capitulate, might fully compensate for the loss.

BOOK II.

1602.

THEY had conceived an expectation at this time that the people in the southern provinces, who had lately suffered great oppression from the rapacity of the mutineers, might be induced to shake off the Spanish yoke; and in this expectation they published a memorial addressed to the states of these provinces, enumerating the grievances which they must be conscious of having so long suffered; representing how much they had been abused in the late king's transference of the sovereignty over them to the archdukes, notwithstanding which they were still as much as ever subject to the tyranny of Spain; and calling upon them, in remembrance of their first engagements, to return into their former connection and alliance with their kinsmen in the United Provinces. In order to procure attention to this memorial, they resolved that their army should march into the heart of Brabant, to be ready to afford support to such of the inhabitants as should be willing to vindicate their liberty: and this measure, it is said, received the approbation both of the French monarch and the queen of England.

BUT prince Maurice could not be satisfied that it was either expedient or practicable. The people, he thought, were too much inured to the Spanish government, and too much overawed by citadels and garrisons, to listen to the invitation of the states; and he dreaded the difficulty of being able to support so numerous an army in an enemy's country for so long a time as would be necessary for the end in view. The Spanish army, indeed, could not at present contend with him

**BOOK II.** him in the open field; but they could harrafs  
 1602. him in his march, and intercept his convoys of provisions; besides, that the archduke was in daily expectation of receiving a reinforcement of troops from Spain and Italy (*a*).

MOVED by these considerations, the states consented that, till it should appear whether their memorial was likely to produce the desired effect, he should lead his army along the east side of Brabant; that, by keeping it near the Maese, he might more easily receive supplies from the neutral powers in that neighbourhood. Having assembled his army at Nimeguen, he passed the Maese near Marck, and towards the end of June he had advanced as far as Masfryc, when he was obliged to stop for several days, through an unjustifiable action of his English troops, who having on their march sold a great part of the bread with which he had furnished them, could not procure any in the country where they now were, and were obliged to bring it from a considerable distance. This delay was, in the issue, attended with important consequences.

THE archduke, having heard with much anxiety that Maurice had begun his march, had dispatched Mendoza, admiral of Arragon, who had lately been set at liberty, with six thousand foot and four thousand horse, to watch his motions, and, if possible, to obstruct his progress. Mendoza was come as far as Tienen, a fortified town in the center of Brabant, and was there employed in casting up entrenchments to secure his troops. Could prince Maurice have immediately advanced, he might have attacked him with the highest probability

(*a*) Siri says that Maurice intended marching through Brabant to lay siege to Nieuport, or some other sea-coast town. Vide vol. i. p. 126. Mem. recondite.



bability of success. But through the delay occasioned by the improvident conduct of the English troops, Mendoza had not only full leisure to complete his intrenchments, but received a reinforcement of eight thousand men, under the marquis of Spinola, who at this time arrived from Italy, and, if the prince could have hastened forward, might easily have been intercepted before he reached the Spanish camp. Maurice still however continued to advance, till he arrived within a little distance of the enemy, and once and again offered battle; but, finding that Mendoza was unalterably resolved to decline it, and was now too strong to be compelled, and considering how dangerous it must be, in the face of so great a force, to remain much longer in a country where it was so difficult to procure provisions, he returned hastily towards the Maese; and, about the middle of July, began to put in execution the only part of the general plan of his operations which he himself had judged practicable, by laying siege to the town of Grave.

THIS place, one of the strongest in the Netherlands, and deemed of great importance, on account of its situation on the banks of the Maese, and its neighbourhood to the dominions of the states, had remained in the hands of the Spaniards, since the year 1586, when, as above related, the young baron de Harmont, involved himself in ruin and infamy, by surrendering it, without necessity, to the duke of Parma. It was defended, at this time, by Antonio Gonzalez, a Spanish officer of distinguished merit; and, as the archduke had before-hand dreaded the danger which impended over this important place, he had sent a body of select troops to reinforce the garrison, which, after their arrival, amounted to fifteen hundred men. From such a governor and garrison

Siege of Grave.

**BOOK II.** <sup>1602.</sup> son Prince Maurice expected to meet with the most vigorous resistance; and he could not doubt that Mendoza would quickly follow him, and attempt to compel him to raise the siege. But he did not despair of bringing his enterprize to a happy issue before the approach of winter, provided he could prevent the entrance into the town of any farther reinforcement and supply. With this view, he drew lines of circumvallation round his camp, extending from that part of the river which is above the town to that other part of it which is below. These lines were more than half a German league in length, of an extraordinary height and depth, and strengthened by a great number of redoubts planted with cannon. While this laborious work was going on, he reduced a fort belonging to the garrison, on the other side of the river, directly opposite to the town, and having stationed a part of his troops there, he next threw two temporary bridges over the Maese, one above, and the other below the town. When these works were finished, the town was completely invested on every side, and the garrison must, ere long, have found it necessary to capitulate: but, as he knew not what quantity of stores they possessed, and consequently was ignorant how long they might be able to sustain the blockade, he resolved, in order to save time, to carry on the siege in the usual form, and immediately began by opening trenches in different quarters, to make regular approaches to the town.

A COTEMPORARY historian (*b*), who upon the spot examined the various works which prince Maurice executed on this occasion, speaks of them as the most masterly which had ever been exhibited in any siege. In order the more effectually

(*b*) Van Meteren.

tually to save his men from the enemy's fire, the trenches were made of a greater depth than usual; both the workmen and soldiers were, at every approach, secured against the sallies of the garrison, by mounds and batteries; and when the trenches were advanced within a certain distance of the fortifications, spacious covered ways, of sufficient breadth to admit of carriages, were formed, which led from the trenches to the ditch. The garrison made frequent sallies, in which they displayed the most unquestionable bravery; but, through the precautions mentioned, they were as often repulsed with loss, while few of the besiegers were killed either in these sallies, or by the artillery of the place.

MENDOZA had, in the mean time, advanced from Tienen as far as Venlo, which stands on the banks of the Maese, about twelve German miles higher than Grave, and there deliberated with his council of war, whether it was practicable to compel prince Maurice to raise the siege. But he quickly perceived how vain and ruinous it must prove to attack a numerous enemy in such strong entrenchments, for whom he was not an equal match in the open field; and therefore he resolved to rest satisfied with introducing a reinforcement of select troops into the place. Had this measure been attended with success, it must have rather served to hasten than to retard the surrender, as the stock of provisions in the town must thereby have been sooner consumed. It was adopted, however, by Mendoza, who was probably more influenced by the dread of the reproach which he would incur, if he made no attempt, than by the prospect of any advantage that could accrue from it.

THE execution of this enterprize was committed to an Italian general of the name of Spina; who

**Book II.** **1602.** who was ordered, with a thousand chosen troops, to attack the enemy's entrenchments in the night, at a place where they appeared to be the weakest, and to attempt to force his way across their camp into the town.

ANOTHER party, equal in number, was appointed to support him, and, in case of a repulse, to secure his retreat; while a third detachment was sent to make a feigned attack in another quarter, in the hopes of dividing the attention of the besiegers, and thereby rendering it easier for Spina to execute his design. But prince Maurice was every where upon his guard. The Spaniards were repulsed; and, leaving behind them their carriages, with their scaling ladders, and other apparatus, they fled precipitately to their camp.

**Sept. 20.** MENDOZA, now despairing of success, retired with his whole army towards Maestricht; and, a few days after, the garrison capitulated upon honourable terms (c).

Naval affairs.

DURING the course of these transactions the contending parties exerted themselves at sea, with somewhat greater vigour, than for several years preceding. The court of Spain had, before the present period, sent a squadron of gallies to cruize on the coast of Flanders, under the command of Frederick Spinola, a Genoese nobleman, who had served under the duke of Parma, and given some distinguished proofs of vigour and abilities. From this squadron the Dutch trade had sustained considerable prejudice: and Spinola, encouraged by his success, having gone himself to Madrid to solicit an augmentation of his fleet, had obtained six gallies more, which he had conducted in safety


(c) Van Metern, l. xxiv. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vii. Grotius, lib. undecimo. Heroic Acts of Prince Maurice, &c.



ty into the harbour of Sluys. This harbour afforded him the most commodious shelter and retreat. His gallees lying at anchor in the canal which leads to it, issued forth against the enemy when they were least prepared to oppose them, and either took or sunk a great number of their trading vessels. With a more numerous squadron, and a greater number of soldiers on board, he would have ventured to a greater distance from the coast, and thus have in some measure intercepted the communication of Ostend with Holland and Zealand. He could likewise have sometimes ventured to make a descent upon their coasts; or have entered their harbours and canals, and seized or burnt their shipping.

IMPRESSED with a conviction that from such spirited naval enterprizes the enemy must suffer more essentially than from the siege of their towns, or the operations of the Spanish army in the field, he this year made a second journey into Spain, after having communicated his intention to his elder brother Ambrose, the celebrated marquis of Spinola. This nobleman, so justly renowned on account of the military talents which he afterwards displayed, had not yet entered into public life, though he was at this time about thirty years of age. But his ambition was now roused by his brother's success, and being conscious of great abilities, he resolved henceforth to avail himself of his fortune, which was one of the greatest in Genoa, in order to render himself illustrious.

HAVING, from the information communicated to him by his brother, conceived an opinion that the war in the Netherlands might be successfully carried on at sea, he empowered his brother to propose to the court of Spain that, in case they would grant an augmentation of the number of

BOOK II.  1602. their gallies at Sluys, he would raise at his own expence a body of eight thousand troops, to be commanded by himself, and to serve occasionally on board his brother's fleet.

THE Spanish minister readily consented to this proposal, and gave the marquis a commission for levying the troops, while orders were at the same time issued for the equipment of the gallies. The marquis, with the assistance of his numerous friends, and of the count de Fuentes, governor of Milan, punctually fulfilled his part of the agreement, and, as above related, arrived with his troops in the Netherlands at a fortunate juncture, when, without his aid, the admiral of Aragon must have abandoned the province of Brabant to the army of the United Provinces.

HIS brother was not so fortunate in conducting from Spain the gallies with which the king had furnished him. They were eight in number, with above a thousand soldiers on board, and fifteen hundred slaves, who served as rowers. But two of these gallies were, before their departure, burnt by some English ships of war on the coast of Portugal; and other three, having been intercepted by an English and Dutch squadron, which lay in wait for them in the narrow seas, and either taken or destroyed, Frederick arrived in Flanders only with the remaining three.

HE was deeply affected by this disaster. His force, which he had been at so great pains in soliciting, was still too small for carrying the designs which he had formed into execution, and for several months he could not engage in any memorable enterprize. But, having become impatient under this inactivity which necessity imposed on him, he ventured with eight gallies, having a great number of  
soldiers

soldiers on board, and some frigates, to attack a squadron of Dutch ships of war, which had for some time been stationed on the coast. The contest was bloody and obstinate on both sides; but as the Dutch were favoured by the wind, and could navigate their ships with greater dexterity, they were enabled to avoid grappling with the Spaniards, and had thus a much smaller number killed. At length Frederick himself received a mortal wound, of which he died soon after, and his fleet, disheartened by this calamity, and perceiving that their utmost efforts to come to close fight were ineffectual, retired into the canal of Sluys (*d*). Book II.  
1602.  
May, 1603.

THE marquis of Spinola was at this time employed in raising troops in Italy, and still entertained the hopes of being able to carry his first design into execution; but his brother's death, joined to the weakness of the Spanish fleet at Sluys, obliging him to abandon it, he now resolved to turn his attention from the sea to the land service, and with this intention he returned to the Netherlands, where the archduke was disposed to give him every mark of esteem and confidence.

THIS prince had never before stood so much in need of the counsel and assistance of his friends. The promises of money made him by the court of Spain had been only in part fulfilled, and the mutinous spirit of his troops, occasioned by his inability to pay their arrears, had risen to the greatest height.

THEY had no sooner retreated after their repulse in attempting to raise the siege of Grave, than almost all the Italians, except those who were commanded by the marquis of Spinola, refused to obey the order which the admiral of Arragon had Mutiny and  
desertion.

H 2

(*d*) Meteren, Bentivoglio, &c,

**BOOK II.** <sup>1603.</sup> had issued for their marching towards Maestricht, and withdrew themselves in a body from the camp. They were accompanied by several officers of experience and abilities, and by these men were conducted towards Hochstrate, a fortified town in Brabant, of which, as they came upon the garrison by surprise, they easily acquired possession. Their number having been augmented by other mutineers, who flocked to them from every quarter, soon amounted to three thousand foot and two thousand horse, and almost the whole of them were veteran soldiers, distinguished for their knowledge of military discipline. Having chosen an elect, or leader, and filled up from among themselves the places of all such officers as had not joined in the mutiny, they established, with general consent, a system of regulations which they judged necessary for their safety and preservation, after which they applied themselves to strengthen the fortifications of the town, and then sent out parties to lay the inhabitants of the adjacent country under contributions. Emboldened by their numbers, they made incursions into the interior and more distant parts of the province, and when the people refused to comply with their exorbitant demands, they laid waste the country, and indulged themselves in every species of injury and outrage. This populous and fertile province had long been exposed to the inroads of the troops of the United States; but they had never been treated with so great cruelty by the enemy as on this occasion, by the troops which had been hired for their defence.

THE archduke having convened the states to deliberate concerning a proper remedy for these disorders, he was urged by that assembly to employ whatever money could be raised to give the soldiers immediate satisfaction with regard to their arrears,



arrears, because without this they represented the country must be involved in utter ruin.

BOOK II.  
1603.

BUT Albert, conscious that he had not funds sufficient at once to satisfy the mutineers, and to pay the arrears due to his other troops; and judging, from past experience, that unless he could satisfy them all, the example of those who had mutinied would be quickly followed by their companions, for this reason he entertained some doubt of the prudence of the advice which the states had given him, and declined complying with it, till he should know the sentiments of the court of Spain.

THAT court ought to have been sensible of the folly of expecting that discipline could be maintained among troops, especially foreign troops, uninterested in the issue of the war, when their pay was withheld from them. They ought, long before this time, to have perceived the absurdity of keeping an army on foot, which they were unable to support. They ought, on the present occasion, to have resolved to reduce the number of their troops, and to rest satisfied with a defensive war, or, by greater œconomy at home, to enable themselves to make more liberal remittances to the archduke, or to have put an end to the war, by empowering him to grant to the United States such terms of peace as they were willing to accept. But, instead of adopting any of these measures, which prudence and necessity required, they resolved that, for an example to the rest of the army, the mutineers ought to be reduced to obedience by force, and for this end they gave orders for levying several new regiments with the utmost possible expedition. It does not appear that the archduke was dissatisfied with this resolution of the Spanish council, and he instantly

Misconduct  
of the Spa-  
nish court.

BOOK II. instantly applied himself to carry it into execution.

1603.

More than half a year was spent in raising the troops, and making the other necessary preparations; and during all that time, the people of Brabant were exposed to the violence and depredations of the mutineers. In order to intimidate them Albert published an edict of proscription, in which he declared, if they did not return to their duty in three days after receiving the copy of the edict which he sent them, they should be considered as rebels to his government, and be all put to the sword without mercy. To this edict the mutineers published an answer, expressed in the most contemptuous terms. They were more than ever exasperated, and they resolved that, rather than submit to a prince, by whom they thought their services were so ungratefully requited, they would enter into the service of the United States, and make him feel the weight of their resentment.

January 2. AGREEABLY to this resolution they sent a deputation of their number to prince Maurice, to enquire whether, in case they were attacked by the archduke's forces, he would afford them his protection. Maurice, conformably to his conduct on a former occasion, gave them the most gracious reception, and agreed that, in case they should be obliged to abandon Hochstrate, they might retire with safety under the walls of Breda. Bergen op Zoom, or Swenberg. He likewise permitted them to purchase provisions in these towns, and left them ground to hope that, if Albert should not be induced to treat them with greater lenity, he would exert himself to the utmost in their behalf.

Spanish  
mutineers  
protected  
by Maurice

THE United States considered this mutiny as the most fortunate event that could have happened, because it would greatly retard the archduke's operations

operations in the siege of Ostend, and prevent him from engaging in any new enterprize during the present campaign. They highly approved therefore of the prince's conduct with regard to the mutineers, and empowered him to enter into a formal treaty with them, of which the following were the principal conditions; that, in return for his assistance against the Spaniards, they would serve in his army for the rest of the campaign; and farther, that in the case of an accommodation with the archduke, they would not carry arms for four months against the United Provinces. The states believed that this treaty could not expose them to the imputation of acting ungenerously towards an enemy, whose whole conduct in the war they regarded as tyrannical and unjust; and they thought themselves justified for fomenting the mutiny, by the practice of most nations, and particularly of the Spaniards themselves, who on all occasions encouraged desertion from the armies of their enemy.

BOOK II.  
1603.

THE archduke was greatly alarmed when he received intelligence of this transaction, and, being at the same time more than ever incensed against the mutineers, he collected his troops with the greatest expedition which the state of his affairs would permit, and sent them, under the command of Frederick, count of Berg, to lay siege to Hochstrate. These troops amounted to seven thousand foot, and three thousand horse; and, as Hochstrate was but indifferently fortified, he must have soon compelled the mutineers to lay down their arms; but prince Maurice, already prepared to fulfill his agreement with the mutineers, advanced towards him with a superior army, which he had assembled at Gertrudenberg, and before the count had time to make any progress

July 10.

gress in the siege, obliged him to retire into the interior parts of the province.

1603.

MAURICE followed him for some time, but finding it impossible to overtake him, without entering too far into the enemy's country, he suddenly returned and laid siege to Bois le Duc. He had lately given the mutineers a proof of the trust which he reposed in them, by entering their camp with only seven or eight of his attendants; and, on the present occasion, he gave them a farther proof of confidence, by employing them equally with his own troops in the operations of the siege.

Bois le Duc  
besieged by  
prince  
Maurice.

THE archduke, extremely anxious for the preservation of Bois le Duc, which he considered as one of the most important frontier towns, sent a reinforcement of troops to the count of Berg, and ordered him to march without delay to its relief. The count's army was now nearly equal to that of the enemy, and he arrived in time to seize an important station adjacent to the town, which prince Maurice had not found leisure to secure. From this station he could easily introduce whatever reinforcements or supplies were necessary. But the inhabitants, having hitherto successfully defended the place without the assistance of the Spaniards, were utterly averse to the admission of regular forces. The count laboured to persuade them that their preservation entirely depended on admitting them, but they refused to listen to his request; and prince Maurice still entertained the hopes of being able to bring the siege to the desired conclusion.

At length the archduke, having come himself to Bois le Duc, endeavoured, but in vain, to overcome the obstinacy of the citizens, till having

ing



ing obtained their permission to suffer a body of Walloons to pass through the town, under the pretext of their being necessary to oppose the enemy on the other side, he called them together, while the Walloons were within the walls, and once more represented to them the necessity of yielding to his desire, if they meant to preserve their religion and their liberty. They remained still as averse as ever to his proposal; but believing that, while so great a number of his troops were within the town, it would be in vain to refuse their consent, they agreed with much reluctance to admit a garrison of three thousand regular forces; and at the same time a large supply of stores and provisions were introduced.

THE two armies continued for some time longer in sight of each other, and several skirmishes past between them with various success. At length prince Maurice despairing, on account of the approach of winter, to bring the siege to the desired issue, abandoned his entrenchments, and retired in good order to some distance from the town. There he remained a whole day, in expectation that the enemy might now be induced to risk a battle; but being informed, that so far from intending this, they had, as soon as he left his entrenchments, directed their march towards the interior parts of the province, he broke up his camp, and put his troops into winter-quarters.

To the mutineers, who represented to him that Hochstrate was too small for their accommodation, he assigned the town of Gram, of which he himself was lord paramount, retaining the citadel in his own hands, and requiring that Hochstrate should be put into his possession. He likewise entered on this occasion into a new agreement with them; the conditions of which they continued

**BOOK II.** continued religiously to fulfil till the following year, when the archduke, standing much in need of their assistance, and dreading that many of his other troops were about to join them, found it necessary to grant them an act of indemnity for all past offences, together with full and immediate payment of their arrears (*e*).

Death and  
character of  
Elizabeth,  
queen of  
England.

IN the course of the transactions related in this book an important event happened, in which both the contending powers were equally interested, the death of Elizabeth, queen of England. This great princess, whose reign was so long and prosperous, had through her whole life enjoyed uninterrupted health, which she had been careful to preserve by regular exercise, and the strictest temperance. But towards the end of the preceding year, having been seized with a cold, which confined her for several days, she found her strength considerably impaired; and, in the hopes of deriving benefit from a change of air, she removed from Westminster to Richmond; but there she grew daily worse, could neither sleep nor eat as usual, and though her pulse was regular, she complained of a burning heat in her stomach, and a perpetual thirst. Both her looks and spirits had from the beginning been greatly affected; business of every kind had become an intolerable burthen to her; and at length she sunk into a deep melancholy, expressing the anguish of her mind by tears and groans, and obstinately refusing nourishment, as well as all the medicines which the physicians prescribed for her recovery. This melancholy might have entirely proceeded from her bodily indisposition, although, from some late discoveries, there is ground to believe that it was greatly heightened, if not principally

Hume's  
History.

(*e*) Van Meteren, lib. xxv. xxvi. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vii. Piafecii Chronica an. 1603.

cipally occasioned, by remorse and grief conceived BOOK II.  
on account of her having ordered the execution 1603.  
of her favourite, the earl of Essex. But to what-  
ever cause her dejection of mind was owing, it  
preyed upon her exhausted frame, and in a few  
weeks put a period to her life, in the seventieth  
year of her age, and the forty-fifth of her reign.

It is not surprising that we meet with such contradictory descriptions of the character of this princess in the cotemporary historians, whose passions were too much inflamed to suffer them to judge impartially of her character: but it should seem impossible for any person, who is not blinded by prejudice, to refuse her a place among the most illustrious princes of whom we read either in ancient or in modern times.

SHE was not indeed exempt from the imperfections that are incident to humanity, and she was subject to several of those weaknesses which characterise her sex. She cannot be vindicated from the imputation of female vanity, and the love of admiration on account of her exterior accomplishments. We should have loved her more if she had been more gentle and indulgent, less imperious and violent, or more candid and sincere. From natural temper, her passions of every kind were strong and vehement, and, among her courtiers, they sometimes betrayed her into improprieties; but they were almost never permitted to influence her public conduct, which was uniformly regulated by the principles of prudence, and a regard for the public good; even her ambition was controuled and governed by these principles, of which she gave a rare and signal proof, when she refused to accept of the sovereignty of the United Provinces. Her penetration and sagacity, her prudence and foresight,  
her

**BOOK II.** <sup>1603.</sup> her intrepidity in the midst of danger, her activity and vigour, her steadiness and perseverance, and her wise œconomy, which prompted her to save every unnecessary expence, however small, while it permitted and enabled her to undergo the greatest, when necessity required ; these qualities in her character, which are acknowledged by her enemies, as well as her admirers, no prince, of whom we read in history, appears to have possessed in a more eminent degree.

Few princes have been placed in so difficult circumstances, or have had so many, and such formidable enemies to oppose ; yet almost no prince ever enjoyed a reign so long and prosperous. While the neighbouring nations were almost continually involved in the calamities of war, she was able, notwithstanding the unremitted attempts of her foreign enemies, and her popish subjects, to preserve her dominions in almost uninterrupted peace. Nor did her own subjects only reap the fruits of her great abilities, but her friends were every where supported and protected by her power ; while her enemies, though possessed of much greater resources, were either checked and restrained, or humbled and overcome : without her judicious interposition, the reformation in Scotland must have been extinguished ; a race of popish princes must have inherited the crown of that kingdom ; and the difference of religion there, and in England, joined to the hereditary right of the Scottish princes to the English throne, whilst it must have proved a copious source of discord, would long have prevented the union of two nations, which must have often been unhappy while they remained divided, and were, by nature, destined to be one. Nor were the benefits which mankind derived from her wise and active reign confined to Britain ; but it is likewise probable, that



that without her aid and her exertions, the protestants in France must have been extirpated; the best and greatest of the French monarchs must have been excluded from the throne; France itself must have sunk under the Spanish yoke; the republic of the United Provinces must have been crushed in its infancy; and an overgrown and enormous power established, which must have overwhelmed the liberties of Europe, and prolonged the reign of ignorance, bigotry, and superstition.

BOOK II.

1603.

HER death gave equal sorrow to the Dutch as it afforded joy to the archdukes and the court of Spain. The former were thereby deprived of a powerful friend, who had often supported them in the time of their distress; whereas the latter were delivered from a determined enemy, by whom they had been long controuled in all their enterprizes.

THE affliction of the former was the more sincere, because they had ground to suspect that Elizabeth's successor had not the same favourable sentiments of their cause, nor the same affection for their republic, as the queen had entertained. James, though of a gentle and indulgent temper, averse to the exercise of despotic power, had conceived the most extravagant notions of the measure of obedience due from subjects to their prince; and, being naturally open and unreserved, had, on some occasions, condemned the conduct of the United States, and given them the name of rebels to their rightful sovereign. The court of Spain, desirous to conciliate his favour, had before the death of Elizabeth, made him an offer of their assistance to vindicate his right to the English crown, in case he should meet with opposition. Intelligence of the queen's death had

James I.  
King of  
England.

BOOK II. <sup>1603.</sup> no sooner reached the Netherlands than the archduke, considering the war with England as at an end, had issued a proclamation, forbidding all hostilities against the subjects of the king of England, and ordering all the Scotch and English prisoners to be set at liberty (g). The like orders were issued by the court of Spain. And, in return to these advances, James, by proclamation, recalled the letters of marque which had been granted against the Spaniards by Elizabeth.

FROM these concurring circumstances, the states perceived how little ground they had to hope for the friendship of the English monarch. They resolved, however, that nothing should be wanting on their part, which might induce him to change his sentiments, and, for this end, they sent a solemn embassy, at the head of which were the celebrated Barnevelt, Lord of Tempel, and prince Henry Frederic, brother to prince Maurice, to congratulate him on his accession, and to solicit his renewing the alliance which had subsisted between them and Elizabeth.

Ambassadors from Holland, France, and Spain, to the king of Great Britain.

THESE ambassadors, on their arrival in London, found that the suspicions which the states had entertained of the king's prejudice against them, were but too well founded. James still continued to employ the same disrespectful language, when he spoke of their republic as formerly; nor could they at first obtain an audience. After some delay, they were at length admitted into his presence, through the persuasion of his English counsellors. But though Barnevelt exerted all his eloquence, which he possessed in so eminent a degree, to make him sensible of the danger to which Britain would be exposed, if, by

(g) See Gonzalez Davila.

by with-holding his assistance, he should suffer BOOK II.  
the United Provinces to fall back again under the 1603.  
dominion of Spain, he could only draw from  
him a general and vague reply: "That he had  
not, at present, leisure to consider fully of the  
subject which had been proposed to his considera-  
tion, and would not, therefore, now declare what  
resolution he should form; but he was himself  
desirous to live at peace with them, and all his  
neighbours; and, in case they would imitate his  
example, he would cheerfully employ his good  
offices to procure them peace with Spain, upon  
reasonable terms."

It sufficiently appeared from this reply, that  
the plan of conduct which the king had formed,  
was extremely different from that which had  
been pursued by his predecessor; and the ambas-  
sadors would have immediately returned home,  
in despair of being able to interest him in their  
behalf, had not they been in daily expectation of  
the arrival of the French ambassador; through  
whose intercession they hoped that James might  
be induced to lend a more favourable ear to their  
request.

HENRY had appointed for his ambassador to  
England, on this occasion, the marquis of Ros-  
ni (*b*), whom, on account of his superior talents  
and fidelity, he esteemed the most of all his mi-  
nisters. No subject had ever performed more im-  
portant services to his prince; and Henry could  
not, without great inconvenience, spare a minis-  
ter so necessary to him in the administration of  
his kingdom. But from various reports, which  
were propagated at this time, he had conceived a  
suspicion that James might be persuaded to enter  
into

(*b*) Afterwards duke of Sully.

BOOK II.

1603.

into an alliance with the court of Spain, and no person he believed was more likely to engage him to alter his intention than Rosni, whom he highly respected on account of his inviolable attachment to the protestant religion, and used to celebrate as the greatest statesman in Europe.

JAMES was highly pleased with Henry's choice of his ambassador, and received him with more than ordinary marks of distinction and regard. It had been reported to him by some of the partizans of Spain, that Henry, and even Rosni himself, had spoken disrespectfully of his character (*i*); and James so far descended from his dignity as to mention what he had heard to the marquis; but the impression which it had made upon him was easily effaced; and Rosni, from his first audience, conceived the hopes of being able to accomplish the object of his embassy.

A party among the English ministers were, not without reason, suspected to be attached to the interests of Spain, and others, dreading the difficulties which they must encounter in providing funds for carrying on the war, were averse to all engagements either to France or the states general. From these men, the proposals of the French monarch met with considerable opposition. But the ambassador, having been admitted by the king to a private audience, and having explained to him at full length his master's views, which he showed were all calculated to promote the general interest of Europe, and the security of the protestant religion, whereas the court of Spain were daily giving fresh proofs of the most inordinate and turbulent ambition; he had the address to convince him, that a regard to the safety of his dominions,

(*i*) It was reported to him, that Henry had called him captain of arts, and clerk of arms.



dominions, as well as the interest of his religion, required that he should join himself with France, and resolve to support the United Provinces. A treaty of alliance to this purpose, was accordingly drawn up, and soon after signed and ratified; of which the following were the principal articles.

BOOK II.

1603.

THAT the two kings should mutually contribute their assistance to prevent the Dutch from being overpowered by the Spaniards; that, for this purpose, a sufficient number of troops should be levied within the dominions of the king of England, and sent from thence to the Netherlands as soon as possible; that the whole expence of these troops should be defrayed by the king of France, but that the half (*k*) of what he advanced, should be deducted from the debt which he owed to Elizabeth. It was resolved, that in order to avoid an open rupture with the court of Spain the utmost secrecy should be observed in levying the troops, and in transporting them to the continent; but it was agreed, that in case these transactions could not be concealed, and the Spaniards, in revenge for the assistance afforded to the Dutch, should attack either, or both of the contracting princes, they should mutually assist each other, and furnish such a number of troops, to be employed by sea or land, as should be judged sufficient for their mutual defence, and the preservation of the United Provinces (*l*).

JAMES immediately fulfilled his part of this agreement, by giving secret orders to the lord Buecleugh to raise a body of two thousand men

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I

in

(*k*) Grotius says two thirds.

(*l*) Sully's Memoirs, book xvi. Carte's History of England.

BOOK II. in Scotland; who, some months after, were sent  
 over to join the army of the states (*m*).  
 1603.

THE archdukes and the court of Spain were greatly alarmed, when they heard of the kind reception which the king had given to the French ambassador, and they suspected that some treaty had been concluded between them. It does not, however, appear that they received particular intelligence of the purport of it; and they still entertained the hopes of being able to fix James in their interest.

THE archdukes had early sent over the count D'Arenberg, as their ambassador, to congratulate him on his accession; and soon after Don John de Taxis, count of Villa Mediana, arrived in the same capacity from Spain. It was commonly believed that the former of these noblemen, who was esteemed as a soldier, but was extremely ill qualified for his present employment, had, soon after his arrival in England, given his countenance to a conspiracy, formed by the lords Grey, Cobham, Sir Walter Raleigh, and others, for subverting the present government, and raising Arabella Stuart to the throne. It should seem that he had, at least, lent an ear to the conspirators, without thinking it incumbent on him to communicate their intention to the king's ministers; and by this imprudent conduct he rendered himself so obnoxious to James, that, in his hands, no treaty of agreement with his master could have succeeded. But James was still as much as ever bent on peace with Spain, nor had he meant to preclude himself from concluding it by

(*m*) Carte and Meteren, Vittorio Siri, tom. i. p. 248. For the precise sum due to Elizabeth, vide Sully, book xxi. near the beginning.

by his treaty of alliance with the French monarch. BOOK II.

1604.

Taxis left no art untried to confirm him in this pacific disposition ; and, at the same time, laboured to remove those prejudices against the Spaniards which he had long entertained, and had been lately awakened by count D'Aremberg's concern in the conspiracy. He was warmly seconded by the queen, who, being attached to the Spanish interest, had conceived the desire of having the young prince, her son, married to the infanta ; and, by bribes and promises, it was believed, he had gained over a considerable party of the English counsellors.

THE French king and the states general, thought they had much reason to dread the influence of such powerful agents, and they employed all their interest to counteract them, and to divert the king from his intention. James gave them repeated assurances that Henry should have no ground to complain of him for any breach of the alliance into which he had so lately entered, nor the states for being inattentive to their interest ; but the present situation of his affairs, he told them, rendered it necessary for him to put an end to the Spanish war.

HE accordingly gave orders to his ministers for holding conferences for this purpose, with the Spanish and Flemish ambassadors, and in the mean time caused an entire stop to be put to all hostilities.

THOSE appointed by the archdukes were D'Aremberg, and Richard of Verreicken ; and Rouda, a senator of Milan, had come over to the assistance of Taxis.

BOOK II.

1604. THE letter which Taxis brought to James from the king of Spain was addressed to him not in the usual style, To our Brother, but to our Cousin; and, in enumerating James's titles, though France was mentioned, Ireland was omitted. James laughed at the latter of these absurdities, into which he supposed the Spanish court had been led, by their complaisance to the pope, who had published a bull, declaring Ireland to be a fief of the holy-see; but he sharply expressed his resentment at the term Cousin.

It soon appeared that the claims of the two nations on each other, were but few in number. No conquests had been made by either of the two parties, which the other could insist to have restored; and neither of them claimed an indemnification for the expences of the war; but there were two points which were difficult to be adjusted, and occasioned the holding of many conferences. The Spaniards, on the one hand, insisted that James should engage to prevent his subjects from entering for the future into the service of the United States; and he, on the other, required that they should enjoy the liberty of trade to the Indies.

THE Spanish ambassador represented, that his master had expected to find in his Britannic majesty, a good and faithful ally; and hoped to have formed an offensive and defensive alliance with him; but if he was still determined, in imitation of his predecessor, to give assistance to the rebels in the Netherlands, it was impossible but the catholic king must consider him rather as an enemy than a friend. The English commissioners replied, that their master could not now regard the Dutch in the light of rebels; their sovereignty had been acknowledged by some of the greatest  
princes



princes in Europe, and the king had, on his accession, found so close a connection subsisting between them and his English subjects as could not be dissolved without considerable prejudice to his kingdom: he was therefore resolved to permit them to make levies within his dominions as formerly; but as he intended to observe a strict neutrality, he was ready to grant the same permission to the archdukes and the king of Spain, and farther to engage that he should not send any of his own troops to the assistance of the states, nor furnish them either with money or with military stores. The Spanish commissioners finding, after several conferences, that all their remonstrances on this head proved ineffectual, were obliged to acquiesce in the king's proposal.

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1604.

Peace between Spain and England.

THE other article above mentioned, which related to the India trade, was the subject of several conferences, and of great altercation between the commissioners. The Spaniards maintained that, as they were the first discoverers of the Indies, and their right to these countries had been confirmed by the sovereign pontiff, no other nation was entitled to trade there without their permission; that for weighty reasons they had refused to grant this permission, not only to the king of France in the treaty of Vervins, but likewise to the emperor, and to the archdukes; that these reasons still subsisted, and therefore they must not only decline granting it to the English, but insist that the king of England shall, by proclamation, prohibit all his subjects from continuing to trade in India, as they had done for some years past.

THIS chimerical pretension was treated by the English commissioners with the contempt which it merited; the Spaniards themselves had traded to many parts of India, besides those where they

**BOOK II.** <sup>1604.</sup> they had established their dominion; and no reason could be given why the English should not enjoy the same liberty. James peremptorily refused to publish the prohibition which was requested of him. His subjects had for many years been in possession of the India trade, and he resolved that they should not be deprived of it by any article in the present treaty.

THE disputes on this subject rose to so great a height as to give ground to apprehend that the conferences would have proved abortive; but, as both parties were eagerly bent on peace, it was at length proposed that no mention whatever should be made of the Indies in this treaty, and to this proposal they both yielded their consent.

ALL the other articles were easily adjusted; but as Taxis had not plenipotentiary powers, the signing of it was delayed for some time longer. This however had been reserved for Don John de Velasco, duke of Frias, and constable of Castile, who, several months before had come to Brussels, in his way to England, but had remained till now in Flanders, either on account of his health, which was the excuse he offered for his delay, or, as was suspected by the English, because he judged it to be incompatible with his dignity to come over to England till he knew that peace would certainly be concluded. He had requested the English monarch to send his commissioners to treat with him in the Netherlands; but James declined complying with this request, because the catholic king, he said, had first offered to send his ambassador to England, and he chose to have the treaty carried on under his own eye (*n*).

VELASCO

(*n*) Carte, Sully, Beaumont, Meteren, and Siri Mem. recondite, tom. i. p. 200, &c.

VELASCO arrived at Dover on the 5th of August, and was from thence conducted by some English noblemen sent to receive him, with great pomp to London. The treaty was signed on the 19th of August, and next day was ratified by the king (o). The publication of it gave general satisfaction both to the Spanish and English nations; but was unacceptable to the English sailors, because they alone, by the numerous captures they had made, had derived any advantage from the war.

BOOK II.  
1604.

DURING the course of these negotiations, the war in the Netherlands was carried on with more than ordinary vigour. The siege of Ostend had lasted for more than two years and a half, and the besiegers, during all that time, had exerted their utmost strength and skill, yet so vigorous was the opposition which they received from the garrison, that they had not been able to make any considerable impression on the place. Those huge machines, above mentioned, which were intended for blocking up the canal, were no sooner brought within reach of the artillery of the town, than, by the well directed shot of the besiegers, they were either demolished or set on fire. The besiegers too made innumerable sallies, in which they displayed the most determined intrepidity, and completed the destruction of such parts of the Spanish works as could not be reached by the artillery.

THE principal engineer employed in constructing these works was Pompeo Targone, an Italian, who possessed an inventive genius, but had never till now enjoyed an opportunity of reducing his theories

(o) It was not till the following year that the earl of Nottingham, lord high admiral, was sent to Madrid to witness the notification of this treaty, by the king of Spain.

**BOOK IV**  
 1604. theories to practice. Of this man's ingenuity the archduke unfortunately entertained too favourable an opinion, and was thus too easily induced to approve of projects, which, on trial, were found impracticable, but were attended in the execution with immense expence. His machines were all constructed at some distance from the town, but when they were brought forward to the places where they were to be used, they were exposed, either to the violence of the tide, or to the fire of the besiegers; and it often happened that works were in a few hours destroyed, or rendered useless, on which the labour of many weeks had been employed.

THE archduke came at length to be undeceived in the expectations which he had formed of the success of these works. His patience was now greatly exhausted; and he began to suspect that the repeated disappointments which he had met with must be in a great measure owing to the want of skill or vigour on the part of those to whom he had committed the conduct of the siege.

The command of the Spanish army given to the marquis of Spinola.

THE marquis of Spinola had been only a few months in the Netherlands, and, till his arrival there, had never witnessed any military operations; yet Albert, with the consent of the court of Spain, resolved to devolve on him the command of the army, and the prosecution of this siege, in which the strenuous efforts of his most experienced commanders had been of so little avail. In forming this resolution it was generally believed that, in the issue, he should find he had been betrayed into still greater imprudence than when he reposed such undeserved confidence in the abilities of Targoné, and many of his officers were greatly incensed at a choice so expressive of his distrust in their abilities; but having conceived a high



high admiration of Spinola, partly on account of his spirited conduct in some enterprizes of small importance in which he had been engaged, and partly from the prudence and sagacity, of which he had given proof as often as he had consulted him on the conduct of the war, Albert persisted in his resolution, and was justified by the event.

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1604.

SPINOLA was highly pleased with so flattering a distinction, but could not avoid feeling much anxiety when the archduke communicated to him his intention. He hesitated for some time whether to accept, at so critical a juncture, of so important a command, in which, instead of acquiring fame, he might, at his very entrance upon the military life, expose himself to so great a risk of incurring censure and reproach: and therefore, before he agreed to the archduke's proposal, he convened together such of the officers as he confided in, and desired them deliberately to consider whether it was practicable to bring the siege of Ostend to the desired conclusion.

THESE men differed widely from each other in their sentiments on the subject, and only contributed to increase his perplexity. But, being conscious of resources within himself, of which those who attempted to dissuade him could form no conception, his hopes and his ambition at length prevailed over his doubts and fears, and determined him to accept of the command.

THE failure of many enterprizes, he believed, had been greatly owing to the mutinous spirit of the troops, occasioned by the irregularity of their pay; and to remedy this evil was the first object to which he applied his attention. Upon enquiry, he found that large sums of money had been misapplied,

Book II.

1604.

applied, or embezzled by those who had the care of the military chest. These persons he dismissed from their employments, and substituted others, upon a plan of greater œconomy, in their room. But he still perceived that the military funds were too small to enable him to keep the troops in good humour, and at the same time to carry on successfully all the expensive operations of the siege. Of the truth of this he spared no pains to convince the archduke and the Spanish ministers; and, in the mean time, till they should devise expedients for furnishing him with more ample supplies, he pledged his private fortune for such considerable sums, as put it in his power to give instant satisfaction to the troops.

IN conducting the operations of the siege, his deference for the judgment of the archduke determined him to persist for some time longer in the attempt, which had cost so much expence of blood and labour, to intercept the navigation of the canal; and, in order to form the intended dyke, and batteries on the banks of it, great quantities of stones and earth and other materials were brought from a distance, on floats or rafts constructed by Targoné. But this work, being exposed both to the fire and the sallies of the besieged, advanced slowly. It could not be finished, he perceived, for many months; and, even when it should be finished, though it would render the navigation of the canal more difficult to the Dutch ships, yet many of them, he foresaw, by taking advantage of the night, and winds and tides, might elude his batteries, and the garrison still continue to receive supplies. In order to prevent this, Targoné had, with the archduke's approbation, begun to erect, on large boats strongly bound together, a huge floating castle, which he proposed to station in the mouth of the canal, and to plant it with cannon.

cannon. But Spinola considered this project as chimerical. A pile so huge and unwieldy could not, he suspected, be brought from the place where the engineer was employed in building it to the mouth of the canal; although it should be found practicable to do this, yet the machine would not long resist the violence of the tide; and, unless a dyke of an extraordinary height and strength could be raised to shelter it, it would soon be demolished by the artillery of the town.

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1604.

DETERMINED by these motives, Spinola abandoned the design of blocking up the canal, and resolved, henceforth, to employ his whole strength in carrying on the siege by mines, batteries, and assaults. The archduke, notwithstanding the repulse which he had met with in the assault above related, would, on the second day after, have resumed his attempt, if the troops, discontented with his treatment of them on that occasion, had not refused to obey. But the whole army was now under the most perfect discipline, and having no longer any ground to complain of their want of pay, they were ready to give every proof of their attachment to their general, from whom they had received so much greater attention than had formerly been shown them. Encouraged by this disposition of his army, Spinola issued his orders for a general assault, in the same quarter where the former one had failed, at the small canal which encompassed the fortifications on the west. In order to inspire his troops with emulation, he divided them into four battalions, one of which was entirely composed of Germans, the second of Spaniards, the third of Italians, and the fourth of Walloons, and other soldiers raised in the county of Burgundy. Great quantities of materials had been provided for forming dykes across the canal, at those parts where he intended the troops should pass ;

**BOOK II.** pass; and the foremost ranks were ordered to  
 1604. carry before them a sort of rampart formed of  
 twigs and faggots, to screen them from the fire  
 of the enemy's small arms in their approach.

THE garrison, having received intelligence of his design, were well prepared for their defence; and the assailants had no sooner entered the canal than they began a dreadful fire upon them, both with their small arms and their artillery. Great numbers fell, notwithstanding the precautions which had been taken: still however they continued to advance. The Walloons having been stationed farthest from the sea, where the canal was of the smallest depth, were the first who arrived on the other side, and the rest of the army quickly followed. The garrison still maintained their ground, and kept up an incessant fire, by which the bravest of the assailants fell in heaps above one another. Spinola was in the midst of his troops, giving orders, and exhorting them to persevere. They were animated by his example, as well as his exhortations, and it being now become more dangerous to retreat than to advance, they hastened forward with the most desperate intrepidity, and attacked the ravelins and half-moons which defended the counterscarp. The garrison withstood their fury for some time; but at length, after great numbers had fallen on both sides, they were compelled to abandon their out-works, and retire within the ditch.

SPINOLA could not at this time attempt with safety to proceed any farther in the attack; but, having covered his men from the enemy's fire, he immediately began, by working trenches, to make still nearer approaches to the place (p).

THE

(p) Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vii.



THE states general were in the mean time deliberating whether to attempt to raise the siege, by marching the army to Ostend; or to undertake some new conquest on the coast of Flanders, by which the loss of Ostend, which they had now more reason to dread than ever, might be compensated. After mature deliberation, the latter of these measures was adopted, as the easiest to be carried into execution; and it was agreed to undertake the reduction of Sluys (*q*), which, as it lay nearer to the United Provinces, would prove in every respect a more valuable possession than Ostend.

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THE troops were ordered to rendezvous at Williamstadt, where prince Maurice, attended by the deputies of the states, arrived on the 24th of April, and next day he set sail with upwards of twelve thousand men for the isle of Cadfant, which is separated from Sluys by the great canal. Having disembarked without opposition, he soon reduced all the forts upon the island. From Cadfant he passed over into that part of Flanders which lies to the eastward of Sluys, and laid siege to a strong fort called St. Catherine. The garrison of this fort, having made a more vigorous resistance than he expected, he resolved, rather than be detained before it any longer, to leave it behind him in the enemy's possession, and gave orders for having his artillery drawn off in the middle of the night; but one of his cannon having sunk in a marsh, a great number of sailors were employed in raising it, who made so great a bustle and noise, that the garrison, believing the whole Dutch army to be at hand, and that they were removing their artillery to a more advantageous situation, in order to renew the attack, were seized

(*q*) See volume ii. p. 237. of Philip II.

**BOOK II.** seized with a panic, and fled precipitately towards Iſendyck. Of this unexpected event the prince received intelligence next morning, when he took poſſeſſion of the fort: and from thence he proceeded to Iſyndyck, Ardenbourg, and other places, all of which he eaſily compelled to ſurrender.

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IN the mean time Spinola, having been informed by Serrano, the governor of Sluys, of the danger which threatened him, ſent him a reinforcement of three hundred men. With this reinforcement, joined to as great a number of the garrison as could be ſpared, Serrano, who was an officer diſtinguiſhed for his activity and enterprize, reſolved to embrace the opportunity which the preſent diſtance of prince Maurice's army afforded him, to make an attack on the iſle of Cadſant.

HAD his deſign ſucceeded, he muſt have got poſſeſſion of all the Dutch transports, together with their military ſtores, and thus have rendered it impracticable for Maurice to proceed in his intended enterprize againſt Sluys. Some companies of Scots troops, which had been ſtationed in Cadſant, having no apprehenſion of danger, were off their guard, and Serrano had time to land fix hundred of his men without oppoſition; but the Scots, having ſoon received intelligence of their landing, ſet out inſtantly to oppoſe them; and having come upon them, before they were completely formed, attacked them with uncommon fury, and drove them back in great confuſion to their boats.

THE prince had now ſubdued all the fortified places which lay to the eaſt of Sluys, and was advancing weſtward, when he was met by Velasco, general of the archduke's cavalry, who had been ſent to obſtruct his progreſs. Velasco had poſted his

his troops in a strong situation, near Dam, which stands on the canal of Bruges. He had the good fortune in the beginning to repulse a party of the Dutch horse, who were sent before the rest of the army to attack his intrenchments; but the infantry coming up, he was overpowered by numbers. About eight hundred of his men were killed and taken prisoners, and he himself with the rest was obliged to retire precipitately towards Dam.

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1604.

AFTER this success Maurice, judging it unnecessary to lose time in laying siege to this fort, proceeded in his march, and, with little difficulty, made himself master of all the forts on the great canal, by which Sluys communicates with the sea; immediately after which he assigned their several stations to his troops in the neighbourhood of the town; and began to form a line of circumvallation round the place, by working deep intrenchments, where the soil permitted, casting bridges over the numberless little canals and rivulets, by which the ground is almost every where intersected, and fortifying the whole at certain distances with redoubts (*r*).

IN these laborious operations, several weeks were employed, and before the works were finished, the archduke found means, at different times, to reinforce the garrison with fifteen hundred men. Prince Maurice was not sorry for the introduction of these troops into the town. He had received certain intelligence that the stock of provisions in the place, was not sufficient long to support so great a number; he had no intention to carry on the

Siege of  
Sluys.

(*r*) In order more deeply to impress the minds of his soldiers with a sense of the importance of their present enterprize, Maurice appointed the 21st of May to be observed as a day of fasting and of prayer to the Almighty, for his blessing upon their arms.

**BOOK II.** the siege by batteries or assaults, and he hoped soon to be able to render the blockade so complete, as to prevent the entrance of supplies.

1604.

THE archduke, on the other hand, expected ere long to be able to raise the siege, and dreaded no danger but from the weakness of the garrison. He was deeply sensible of the great importance of Sluys, which, besides affording the most commodious retreat to the Spanish gallies, was conveniently situated for an invasion of the United Provinces, and enabled him to give great annoyance to their trade. He could not, however, persuade himself to forego the fruits of his long continued labours before Ostend, by raising the siege of that place; but he resolved, for some time, to suspend his operations there, and signified to Spinola, his desire that he should immediately march to the relief of Sluys, leaving no more troops behind him, than were sufficient to restrain the sallies of the garrison.

SPINOLA, who was well acquainted with the character of prince Maurice, had a just sense of the difficulty of carrying the archduke's design into execution, and remonstrated against it as impracticable; but finding that Albert could not be prevailed on to alter his resolution, he agreed to accept of the command, upon condition that the officers of greatest experience should accompany him in the expedition. He could hardly flatter himself with the hopes of success, and he wished that others should partake in the censure which he was likely to incur. The archduke readily consented to this proposal; and, being joined on this occasion by a great number of the mutineers, who had been persuaded to return to their duty, he began his march with six thousand foot, and two



two thousand horse, besides a train of artillery, and a large convoy of provisions.

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1604.

THE garrison of Sluys had already begun to suffer greatly from the want of wholesome food ; and Serrano had repeatedly sent notice, that without a supply, he could not possibly hold out for many days longer. Spinola therefore advanced towards Sluys with the utmost expedition ; and, having received intelligence that the weakest part of the enemy's lines was at a village called Tervarde, he made an attack upon them in that quarter, in the middle of the night. But the Dutch troops were prepared for his reception ; and though he had taken every precaution to insure success, he was obliged, after repeated attempts, to retire with considerable loss.

HE then fetched a compass round by Ardenborough, and directed his march towards the isle of Cadfant, in the hopes of making himself master of that island, from whence he might by water introduce provisions into Sluys. He expected to have come upon the enemy in surprize, by fording the canal which separates Cadfant from Flanders on the east. But prince Maurice, having suspected his design, had planted a half moon battery there, and stationed some select troops to dispute his passage, under count William of Nassau. Over these troops, Spinola at first gained some advantage, and drew them from the battery : but Maurice himself, coming up with fresh troops to their assistance, Spinola was, at length, obliged to abandon his attempt, after an obstinate contest, in which he suffered the loss of five hundred killed, and as many wounded.

August.

HAD not Spinola entered with reluctance on his present enterprize, his prudence might justly

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have

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1604.

have been impeached; but as his disapprobation of it, and his diffidence of success were known to the enemy by intercepted letters, as it had been known from the beginning to his friends, and nothing had been wanting on his part to carry it into successful execution; it served, notwithstanding his repulse, to heighten his character for military skill, and confirmed the archduke in the high opinion which he entertained of his abilities.

August 19.

Capitulation of Sluys.

He returned without delay to Ostend; and, on the second day after his retreat, Serrano, the governor of Sluys, capitulated upon honourable terms. His garrison amounted to four thousand men, besides a great number of slaves, who had formerly been employed on board the gallies; but his stock of provisions had, several days before, been entirely consumed, and the strength of the soldiers was so much impaired, that more than sixty of them died on the road to Dum, which is only two hours march from Sluys,

By one article of the capitulation, all the artillery and military stores, and by another, all the ships and ten Spanish gallies, which had so long infested the Dutch trade, were delivered into the hands of the conqueror.

FOURTEEN hundred slaves, the greater part of whom were Turks, were set at liberty; and as many of them chose to return to their native country, the United States, in order to conciliate the friendship of the Corsairs, treated them with great humanity while they remained in Holland, and afterwards sent them in Dutch ships to Barbary (/).

THE

(/) Grotius, lib. xiii. Meteren, and the triumphs of Nassau. Bentivoglio, p. 3. cap. vii.

THE glory which prince Maurice acquired from so important a conquest, was greatly heightened by the comparison which men generally instituted between the rapidity of his progress, and the slowness of that of the Spaniards before Ostend. Judicious observers thought there was hardly room for this comparison, the two cases being extremely different in the most important respects from each other; but it was universally acknowledged that Maurice had, on no former occasion, discovered greater vigour and vigilance, or greater military skill.

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THE archduke, on the other hand, was severely mortified; nor was he entirely free from apprehension of being ere long subjected to a still greater mortification, as a considerable part of the season fit for action still remained, and he expected that Maurice, whose army had suffered almost no diminution, would next attempt to compel him to raise the siege of Ostend. In order to prevent this, which he would have considered as the greatest calamity that could befall him, he gave immediate orders for strengthening the fortifications of Dum, Blackenberg, and other places, by which the prince's army could approach.

BUT Maurice had no intention of entering so far into an enemy's country, whose forces were superior in number to his own; and the states general, highly satisfied with the success which had already attended their arms, resolved to employ the remainder of the season in securing their new conquests. No expence was spared to render Sluys impregnable, and Cadfant, Isyndyck, and several other places in the neighbourhood of Sluys, were strongly fortified.

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1604.

THE marquis of Spinola had, in the mean time, resumed his operations before Ostend, and was daily making nearer approaches to the town. He had already crossed the ditch, and compelled the garrison to retire from all that part of the place called the Old Town, but one redoubt (*t*), from which, as it was considerably elevated above the other fortifications, the besiegers made dreadful havoc among his troops. He resolved, whatever it should cost him, to make himself master of this redoubt. His Spanish and Italian troops, having been again and again repulsed with great slaughter, could not be persuaded to renew the attack: and this arduous undertaking was therefore committed to two regiments of Germans, who, allured by promises, and pushed on by emulation to execute what the Italians and Spaniards had abandoned in despair, advanced towards the fort with the most determined intrepidity. The garrison sprung a mine upon the foremost of these regiments, and blew up a great number of them in the air. The rest, however, supported by the second regiment, still continued to advance, and having attacked the garrison sword in hand, they drove them with irresistible fury from the place.

THE garrison, by the advice of a Scotch engineer of the name of Dixter, had provided against this disaster, by drawing a strong intrenchment flanked with bastions, and fortified with artillery betwixt the Old and the New part of the Town; and behind this, they had likewise drawn another intrenchment of the same kind, across the middle of the New Town; being determined to dispute every inch of ground, and to maintain their defence till the last extremity.

FROM

(*t*) Called the sand-hill.



FROM the progress however which Spinola had already made, and the skill and vigour with which his operations were conducted, it could not be doubted, that he must ere long get possession of the place. The garrison still continued to make the most vigorous sallies upon his miners and his troops; but since they had lost the fort of Sand-hill, these sallies were made at a much greater expence of blood, on their part, than formerly: their new works had not yet acquired the same solidity and strength as those from which they had been expelled; and, being now confined within such narrow limits as could not admit of any considerable reinforcement of fresh troops, they were exposed to much greater danger than before, of being overpowered in every assault, by the superior numbers of the enemy.

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1604.

THE states general, influenced by these considerations, and thinking it extremely doubtful whether the preservation of Ostend, since the conquest of Sluys, was an object worthy of the expence and attention it must cost, resolved to persist no longer in the defence, and sent instructions to the sieur de Marquette the governor, to prepare himself for capitulating upon honourable terms.

ON receiving these instructions, Marquette immediately conveyed to Flushing, by the ships which were then lying in the harbour, all deserters, and other persons, who had any particular reasons for dreading the enemy's resentment, together with a part of the artillery and stores; after which he sent two of his principal officers to treat with Spinola of the surrender of the place.

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1604.

Ostend capitulates.

THIS general, whether from admiration of that intrepid bravery which the garrison had displayed, or because he was still diffident of success, and desirous to avoid the further effusion of blood, readily agreed that the garrison should march out with all the honours of war, and be safely conducted by land to Sluys; that waggons should be furnished to the sick and wounded; that the inhabitants should be at liberty to quit the town without molestation; and that all prisoners on both sides should be released. This agreement was made on the 20th of September, in the beginning of the fourth year since the commencement of the siege; and on the second day after, Spinola was put in possession of the town. He religiously fulfilled all the articles of the capitulation, and while the garrison was preparing to set out, he gave proof of a generosity of spirit, of which no other instance has occurred in the history of the present war, by inviting the governor, and all the colonels and captains in the place, to a magnificent entertainment, where he treated them with every mark of distinction and respect.

FROM Ostend, the governor marched at the head of his garrison, amounting to near four thousand men, with a small train of artillery, along the sea coast, till they arrived in the neighbourhood of Sluys, where they were met by prince Maurice, who received them in the most gracious manner, and gave them every testimony of applause and gratitude. They were soon after followed by almost the whole body of inhabitants, who chose rather to reside at Sluys than Ostend; and the chief magistrate of Ostend was appointed chief magistrate of Sluys.

SUCH was the termination of this celebrated siege, which, besides an enormous expence of labour

labour and military stores, had cost the contending parties the lives of near a hundred thousand men. Ostend could not, on any account, be deemed worthy of this expence; yet the Dutch seemed to have acted wisely in defending it with so great obstinacy. They could, no where else, have encountered the enemy on more advantageous terms: and, while the siege continued, they not only enjoyed profound tranquillity at home, but were at liberty to secure and extend their frontier, by the acquisition of Rhinberg, Grave, Cadfant, Ilyndyck and Sluys.

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1604.

THE conduct of the archduke does not admit of any such apology. Hardly any of the places which he had lost was of less importance than Ostend; and Sluys, from its excellent harbour, and its neighbourhood to Zealand, was of much greater importance. His arms, at a juncture, when his finances were low, and his troops mutinous, ought rather to have been employed in defending his own dominions, than in attacking those of the enemy: and if he had found leisure for acting offensively, he ought to have made his attack on some place of easier conquest, in the preservation of which the United Provinces were more deeply interested.

BUT if he ever came to be sensible of his error, it was not till he thought that it could not be retrieved with honour; and he was encouraged to persist in it by the Spanish ministers, who were at too great a distance from the scene of action to judge of the conduct which it was proper to pursue.

BUT there was reason now to expect that neither the archduke, nor the court of Spain, would for the future be guilty of the same sort of imprudent

**BOOK II.** prudent conduct, as that into which, on different occasions, they had been hitherto betrayed; as both he and they were impressed with a just esteem of the prudence and great abilities of the marquis of Spinola, and had resolved to devolve on him the entire direction of the war. He had already given striking proofs of superior capacity; and no person doubted that he would still be found deserving of that extraordinary confidence that was reposed in him.

1604.

A CHIEF source, Spinola knew, of those disappointments and losses which Albert had sustained, was his irregularity in the pay of his troops, and in order to remedy this evil, the marquis resolved either to reduce their number, or to be well assured of procuring more ample funds for their support. But no sufficient funds could be procured, unless they were furnished by the court of Spain, and therefore, as soon as he put his army into winter quarters, he set out for Madrid, in the hopes of being able to convince the Spanish ministers of the necessity of either making greater exertions, and furnishing more liberal supplies, or of resolving as soon as possible to put a period to the war.

Scarcity of  
the precious  
metals in  
Spain.

THE Spanish finances were in no better order at this time than at any former period. From that decay of industry, of which the causes have been already mentioned, Spain was no longer able to furnish either her colonies or herself with manufactures of her own production. The gold and silver which she imported from America no sooner arrived, than it was transmitted, for the purchase of manufactures, to other nations that were more industrious; and the scarcity of the precious metals in Spain, had risen to so great a height, that the duke of Lerma had, last year, raised



raised the nominal value of the copper coin, which by a royal edict was made nearly equal to that of silver. But this absurd expedient served only to encrease the evil which it was intended to prevent or remedy (u). BOOK II.  
1604.

COUNTERFEIT copper money, of equal intrinsic value to the current coin in Spain, was poured into that kingdom by the neighbouring nations; these nations, at the same time, received gold and silver in return; they still continued likewise to receive the price of their manufactures in gold and silver. And thus was Spain more than ever drained of these precious metals. The distress arising from thence was sensibly felt from one end of the kingdom to the other, and the ministers often found it difficult to procure money sufficient for the necessary purposes of government. But, being now delivered from the burthen of the war with England, and hoping that henceforth the returns of treasure from America would be greater and more certain than they had hitherto been, they resolved, in conformity to the king's inclination, to spare no expence to enable the archduke to carry on the war in the Netherlands with vigour. The court of Madrid resolves to carry on the war.

AGREEABLY to this resolution, the marquis of Spinola, to whom Philip, on this occasion, gave every proof of esteem and confidence, was immediately furnished with a considerable sum of money. The strongest assurances were likewise given him, by the ministers of greater punctuality in their future remittances; and there was at the same time conferred upon him, full power to employ all the money which he received, or was afterwards to receive, in the manner which he should

(u) Gonzalez Davila, lib. ii. cap. xiv.

**BOOK II.** <sup>1604.</sup> should judge to be most expedient. The conduct of the archduke, it seems, and that of those to whom he had committed the administration of his finances, had rendered this precaution necessary; he had never observed that strict œconomy which the exigencies of his affairs required; and it should appear, that being sensible of this defect in his character, and conscious of his inability to correct it, he was well pleased to have the disposal of the money sent from Spain, devolved upon Spinola.

THE marquis having thus accomplished the design of his journey to Madrid, and obtained from Philip and his ministers their approbation of his plan of operations for the next campaign, returned without delay to Brussels. The first object of his attention was to remove every ground of discontent among his troops, by applying a part of the money which he had brought along with him to the discharge of their arrears; immediately after which, he gave orders for making numerous levies in Germany and in the Southern Provinces of the Netherlands. The Spanish ministers had promised to send him a veteran regiment from Spain by sea; and they had given instructions to the governors of Naples and Milan, to provide for him a strong reinforcement of Italians (v).

THE United Provinces on the other hand, being already well acquainted with the activity and enterprize of Spinola, had strenuously exerted themselves in their military preparations, and were sooner ready to take the field. They had formed the design of laying siege to Antwerp, where they had learnt that the number of the garrison was  
neither

(v) Some officers were sent over to recruit in Britain, but James discouraged his subjects from entering into the Spanish service. Vide Carte. Yet soldiers were raised among the catholics, as appears from the sequel.

neither adequate to the extent of the fortifications, BOOK II.  
 or the great importance of the place. Prince 1605.  
 Maurice did not approve of this expedition, but  
 engaged in it at the request of the states. Having  
 put a part of his army on board transports, under  
 count Ernest of Nassau, he himself marched over  
 land with the rest from Bergen op Zoom, and  
 joined Ernest, at the fort of Lillo, which stands  
 on the north side of the Scheld, about two leagues  
 distant from Antwerp, and was still in possession  
 of the Dutch.

His intention was to lay all the low grounds between Lillo and Antwerp under water, by cutting the dyke of the Scheld, together with the counter-dyke at Courvestain, and then to cross over the inundation, and to pitch his camp on the higher grounds which lie near the town. He would thus have had a much smaller space to inclose with his entrenchments, while his army would have been entirely secure on one side against the approach of the enemy. His design had been carefully concealed, and if his transports had not been detained by contrary winds, his enterprize would probably have been attended with success. But Spinola, conjecturing from the embarkation of a part of his forces, and his choice of Bergen for the rendezvous of the rest, that he could not have any other object in view but the siege of Antwerp, had time to take every precaution to prevent him from carrying his plan into execution. He had greatly augmented the garrisons of the town and of the forts upon the counterdyke; and at the same time had lined the banks of the Scheld on both sides with a sufficient number of troops to oppose his landing (w).

MAURICE

(w) He had likewise come himself to Antwerp, with all the forces which he could collect together, and having thrown a bridge

BOOK II.  MAURICE attempted however, to make a descent on the Flanders side near Caloo, but finding his utmost efforts ineffectual, and that Spinola was every where upon his guard, he abandoned his first attempt; and after reducing the castle of Woude, a strong fort in the neighbourhood of Bergen, he embarked his army, and made a descent in Flanders, near Isyndyck, with an intention of laying siege either to the Sas of Ghent or Hulst.

1605.

MAURICE himself had disapproved of this expedition, as well as of his attempt on Antwerp, and had advised to employ the army on the banks of the Rhine, where he thought there was reason to dread an irruption of the enemy; but he had yielded to the judgment of the states, who being anxious for the preservation of Sluys, were desirous of getting possession of as many fortified towns as possible, in the neighbourhood of that important place. They had formerly had repeated proofs, how ill qualified they were to judge of the proper conduct of the war; and from the sequel, it will appear, how much wiser it had been, if, on the present occasion, they had listened to the opinion of their general,

MAURICE had not time to begin his operations, either against the Sas of Ghent or Hulst, when Spinola, who on this occasion derived great advantage from his bridge over the Scheld, arrived in sight with all his forces: but, as neither of the two generals were inclined to try the fortune of a battle, they immediately applied themselves to fortify their respective camps; resolving, each of them,

bridge over the Scheld, a little above the town, he stood prepared to march whenever the enemy should adventure to begin their attack.



them, to await till some favourable opportunity should offer of annoying his enemy, without exposing himself to danger. Several skirmishes were fought by foraging parties, with various success, but neither party was able to gain any considerable advantage over the other. BOOK II.  
1605.

At length, Spinola having effectually provided for the safety of the two places which Maurice had intended to attack, left a part of the army under the count of Berg, to watch his motions, and ordered the rest to direct their march towards Maestricht.

ABOUT this time he expected the arrival of the troops which had been raised for the archduke's service in Germany and Italy, and he had appointed Maestricht for the place of rendezvous. Agreeably to the promise given him by the court of Spain, a regiment, consisting of twelve hundred men, had been embarked at Lisbon, in eight ships, which, in order to elude the vigilance of the enemy, had been hired from Hamburgh of the English and Danish merchants. But, notwithstanding their precaution, they were intercepted by the Dutch admiral Hautain, whom the states had ordered to lie in wait for them in the English channel. Four of them were either taken or destroyed, and the remaining four obliged to take shelter in Dover, where they were shut up by the Dutch till the following winter, when the long nights afforded them an opportunity to escape to Flanders (x).

THE

(x) The states disgraced themselves, and sullied the victory which they obtained on this occasion, by ordering all the prisoners to be tied, two and two together, and thrown into the sea. Yet neither Grotius nor Van Meteren, the two most respectable of the Dutch historians, have spoken of their conduct as reprehensible. Their pretext for this barbarity, was to damp

## Book II.

1605.

Spinola's  
plan for  
conducting  
the war.

THE marquis of Spinola lamented the loss of the Spanish troops the more, as they were all veteran soldiers, commanded by officers of great experience. But all the German and Italian forces which he expected, having arrived in safety, he resolved without further delay, to enter upon the execution of the plan of operations, which, in concert with the archduke, he had formed for the remainder of this campaign. It had been his intention, ever since the surrender of Ostend, to establish the theatre of the war beyond the Rhine, in that part of the dominions of the states, where the superiority of their naval force could be of no avail. His army would thus, he thought, be in some measure supported at the enemy's expence; it would be easier for him to suppress the mutinous spirit of his troops, in case it should again appear; and as the states had no dread of an attack in that quarter, he expected to find some of their principal towns unprepared for a defence. His design had been carefully concealed even from the general officers: councils of war had been held, in which the archduke, in order more effectually to prevent a discovery, had sometimes proposed to undertake the siege of Sluys, and sometimes that of Bergen op Zoom, or of Grave, or of Breda; and the different opinions of the officers had, from time to time, by secret agents, been communicated to the states.

PRINCE Maurice, as already mentioned, was almost the only person upon whom these artifices did

damp the courage of the Spaniards, but it rather served to inspire them in all their rencounters with desperate rage and fury; and as no better reason could be given for treating with so great inhumanity the prisoners whom they took at sea, than those who were taken in the siege of towns, or in the field of battle, it was an example calculated to revive that savage method of carrying on the war, which had excited such general horror when it was practised by the duke of Alva and his son.

did not produce the desired effect. He could not be persuaded that Spinola, who had given conspicuous proof of superior sagacity, would undertake the reduction of any of these towns, where the army of the states was at hand to interrupt his operations. He suspected that his attack must rather be intended against some more distant place, which could not be so easily relieved; and had therefore proposed to station the troops on the banks of the Rhine, in order to prevent the enemy from entering the Dutch dominions on the eastern frontier (y). But the states having, in consequence of the information they had received of the deliberations in the archduke's council of war, rejected this advice, Spinola was now at liberty to carry his design into execution.

BOOK II.  
1605.

BEFORE he left Flanders, he had given orders to the count de Boucquoi, his general of artillery, to secure a convenient passage for his army over the Rhine; and this active officer, after planting batteries on the banks, and thereby clearing the river of some Dutch armed vessels, which were stationed there, had begun to erect two strong forts, one on each side of the Rhine at Keiserwert, a small town in the electorate of Cologne. As soon as these forts were finished, Spinola set out from Maestricht, with all the troops which he had assembled there; and having joined those which were under Boucquoi, and crossed the Rhine at the passage which had been secured for him, he called a council of war, and, for the first time, communicated to them his design.

July.

THE enemy, he told them, had been first led to expect an attack in Flanders, and they now believed that he had formed a design on Rhinberg.

(y) Grotius. Meteren.

BOOK II.

1605.

berg. But his intention, from the beginning, had been to lay siege to Lingen; and by the reduction of that important place, to open an entrance into Friesland. He was sensible how much it was contrary to the common maxims of war, to leave behind him so strong a place as Rhinberg, but he did not from thence apprehend any danger or inconvenience, since, with the forts which had been erected, he could always command a safe passage over the river; besides that, the success of his enterprize against Lingen, must greatly depend on the celerity with which it should be executed, as prince Maurice would no sooner hear of the danger to which that place was exposed, than he would hasten to its relief. That although Lingen lay at a great distance, and the march must be performed in a neutral country (z), in which the troops would not be supported by plunder, yet there was no ground to dread a scarcity of provisions; he had brought a considerable quantity along with him; he had money sufficient to purchase whatever more should be necessary; and, as he was determined to enforce the strictest military discipline, he had received assurances from the towns of Westphalia, that, on that condition, they would cheerfully furnish him with supplies. But attention to discipline was indispensibly necessary, and for this reason, he was resolved that every violation of the rules of it should be punished with the utmost severity and rigour.

WHAT he declared on this occasion to his officers, he afterwards carried into execution. Some of the soldiers having ventured, notwithstanding the peremptory orders which he had issued, to leave their standards, they were instantly seized and put to death. The rest were intimidated by this example; and although a great part of them had

(z) Westphalia and the dutchy of Cleves.



had long been accustomed to rapine and disobedience under former generals ; yet so great is the power of discipline over troops which regularly receive their pay, that almost no army ever marched through a neutral country against which the inhabitants had so little reason to complain. His camp, in consequence of this prudent conduct, was at all times abundantly supplied, and no time was lost in sending out detachments to procure provisions. The inhabitants still retained a bitter remembrance of their sufferings from the Spanish army, under the admiral of Arragon, and were in some measure animated with gratitude to Spinola for the justice and humanity which he displayed.

AFTER traversing a part of the dutchy of Cleves and Westphalia, he first directed his march to Oldenzeel, a fortified town in the province of Overysse, and soon compelled the garrison to capitulate ; immediately after which he advanced towards Lingen, which lies at the distance of only one day's march from Oldenzeel, and, without meeting with any opposition, assigned to his troops their several quarters round the town. Prince Maurice, on whom the states general had, as formerly mentioned, bestowed the property of Lingen and its territory, as a reward for his important services, had, at his own expence, made great additions to the fortifications of it. But as the enemy's attention had, for several years, been turned to another quarter, it was defended, at this time, only by the ordinary garrison, amounting to five or six hundred men.

Spinola  
lays siege to  
Lingen.

EVEN with so small a garrison, however, Prince Maurice had expected it might sustain a siege of several weeks ; and the governor, an officer of the name of Cobbe, seemed at first determined to

**BOOK II.** defend it till the last extremity. Spinola was therefore obliged to begin the siege in form, and to make his approaches to the place as usual, by working trenches. The garrison had not sufficient numbers to interrupt his operations, and he soon reached the ditch, which was of an extraordinary breadth and depth, and filled with water; nor could the water be drawn off, because the ditch lay considerably lower than the adjacent ground. But at length, his troops got over it, though not without considerable slaughter, by filling it up with earth and fascines, and then begun to work a mine under one of the principal bastions of the town; when the garrison, importuned by the inhabitants, and despairing of being able to defend themselves much longer, capitulated on honourable terms.

August 18.

PRINCE Maurice, in the mean time, had advanced as far as Deventer, the capital of Overijssel, and was employed in preparing for an attempt to raise the siege.

ON the first intelligence which he received of the march of the enemy from Maestricht, he had dispatched his brother, Henry Frederick, with four thousand foot, and one thousand horse, to watch their motions; and a few days after, he had set out himself, at the head of another division of his forces. But, having judged it necessary to leave a considerable proportion of them in Flanders to oppose any attempts which the enemy might make in that province, he was obliged to stop for some days at Deventer, till he had collected a sufficient number of troops from the neighbouring towns, to enable him to undertake the relief of Lingen; and before his preparations were complete, a messenger arrived with the news of its surrender. He was highly incensed against the

the governor and officers, for the feeble defence they had made of a place of so great importance, and threw them all into prison, where they remained for near a twelvemonth, and though they were afterwards set at liberty, they were all of them degraded from their rank. BOOK II:  
1605.

He had just cause for the resentment which he felt on this occasion, as Spinola, who had thought it unnecessary to secure his army by entrenchments, must have raised the siege as soon as the army of the states had approached. He had ground likewise for great anxiety, when he considered the defenceless state of most of the towns in the neighbourhood of Lingen; and particularly that of Bourtang and Coevorden, by the conquest of which the enemy would have a free course into the provinces of Groningen and Friesland. It was believed, that if Spinola had immediately attacked these places, he might, without great difficulty, have made himself master of them. But having spent some time in strengthening the fortifications of Lingen, he thereby afforded leisure to prince Maurice to provide for their security. He judged it to be of greater importance to preserve what he had already acquired, than to multiply his conquests; and, as Maurice had collected an army in the neighbourhood, nearly equal to his own, he thought that he could not venture any farther into the enemy's country so late in the season, without exposing himself to the greatest risk. Having, therefore, taken every necessary precaution for the safety of Lingen and Oldensal, he returned afterwards to Keyserwert, and repassed the Rhine.

THE forts which had been erected there, having given offence to the elector of Cologne, on whose territory they had been raised, the archduke,

**BOOK II.** <sup>1605.</sup> in order to appease its resentment, had sent orders for demolishing them; which Spinola did accordingly, and then began to build other two, a little farther down the river, at Rorerort in the county of Meurs, which was at that time subject to the Dutch.

WHILE a part of his army was employed in building these forts, so necessary for preserving his communication with his late conquests, he sent the rest, under the count de Bucquoi, to lay siege to Wachtendonc, a town in Guelderland, which stood in a marshy soil, and was deemed one of the strongest towns in that province, but was at this time rendered more accessible than usual by a long continued drought. As the fortifications however were complete, and the garrison numerous (*a*), he had reason to apprehend that the siege must last for several weeks, and that prince Maurice, who had left Overysfel, and was encamped in the neighbourhood of Wesel, would certainly attempt to raise it. He therefore ordered the count de Bucquoi to fortify his camp with strong entrenchments, and having lately received a strong reinforcement of Italians, besides a considerable number of English, Scotch, and Irish Catholics, whom James, agreeably to his treaty of peace with Spain, had permitted the archduke to enlist in his dominions, he took his station near Rorerort, with a resolution to attack prince Maurice's army in the rear, in case he should venture to approach to Wachtendonc.


IN distributing their quarters to his troops on the north side of the Rhine, next to the enemy, he committed an error which was likely to have been attended with fatal consequences, by station-  
ing

(*a*) Twelve hundred men.



ing his cavalry at the village of Mulleim, on the banks of the Roer, where they were at too great a distance from the infantry to receive immediate support; no entrenchments had been thrown up to secure them against an attack, nor was there any place of shelter near but a fort on the other side of the Roer, opposite to Mulleim, called the castle of Broeck, which was neither strongly fortified nor furnished with a sufficient garrison. Prince Maurice, having got intelligence of their position, resolved to avail himself of the advantage which it afforded him, and instantly set out from his camp at Wesel, with all his cavalry, and a select body of infantry, amounting to two thousand four hundred men. That no time might be unnecessarily lost on the march, the foot soldiers were put into carriages: the cavalry was ordered to hasten forward before the foot, one half of them commanded by Marcellus Baex, an officer of distinguished spirit and intrepidity, and the other half by prince Henry Frederick, who was at that time only twenty years of age, but who had already given conspicuous proof of superior prudence and capacity. Prince Maurice himself followed as quickly as possible with the infantry, colonel Baex was ordered to cross the Roer, and to endeavour to get possession of the castle of Brock, in order to intercept the enemy's communication with their camp, while Henry, supported by prince Maurice, was to attack them at Mulleim.

BAEX was successful beyond what could justly have been expected in his first assault upon the fort, having expelled the garrison from every part of it but one, which was defended by a small number of men; but he was interrupted in his progress by the accidental arrival of a party of foragers, who attacked him with great vigour,  
and

BOOK II. and obliged him to abandon his attempt upon  
 the fort.

1605.

Engage-  
ment near  
the village  
of Mulleim.

IN the mean time prince Henry had passed a narrow defile, which the enemy had left unguarded, and was about to begin the attack at Mulleim. It was unfortunately judged proper to defer it for a little time till the infantry should arrive somewhat nearer. At length he gave orders for his troops to advance, and they obeyed at first with great alacrity; but finding that, through the delay in making the attack, the enemy had taken the alarm, and were in a better posture of defence than they had expected, they were seized, though greatly superior in number, with a sudden panic, and, after an irresolute and feeble effort, they turned their backs and fled, till they were met by prince Maurice at the head of the infantry.

ASHAMED of their dastardly behaviour, and being severely reproached by the prince, they were persuaded to return. The Spanish cavalry, from whom they had so precipitately fled, far from venturing to pursue, were in great confusion retreating across the Roer, before a small number of the Dutch cavalry that had remained with their commander. Henry was now rejoined by the rest, and being likewise supported by the English and Scotch infantry, under colonel Vere and lord Buccleugh, he pursued the enemy to the other side of the river; but there the Spaniards, commanded by Trivulcio, in the absence of Velasco, general of the cavalry, having recovered their ranks, returned with great resolution to the charge; and the Dutch, being again unaccountably struck with terror, gave way before an inferior enemy, and left prince Henry almost alone in the field of battle. He must have been cut to pieces or taken prisoner, but for the seasonable interposition of  
the

the British troops, who, being armed with pikes, attacked the Spanish cavalry, and kept them long at bay.

BOOK II.  
1605.

HENRY, perceiving himself abandoned by almost all his men, went over with the few that remained with him, and joined the troops under colonel Baex, who had been long engaged in combat with the enemy in another part of the field. Soon after this the Spaniards, having received a reinforcement under Velasco, this part of the Dutch cavalry too was intimidated, and the two commanders, with a small number of adherents, were left, surrounded by the enemy; but in the mean time prince Maurice arrived with his vanguard, and having planted some field-pieces on a rising ground, he played them off so successfully upon the Spaniards, that he soon threw them into confusion, and put them to flight with considerable slaughter. He was preparing to pursue them into a wood, where they had taken shelter, when he received intelligence that Spinola himself was approaching with all his forces.

THIS general had got early information of the attack, and had instantly set out at the head of six hundred men, leaving orders for two thousand more to follow as quickly as possible. In order to intimidate the enemy, by making them believe that his whole army was at hand, he sent forward a great number of drummers on horseback, and as the ground was favourable to his stratagem, it produced the desired effect. Prince Maurice gave immediate orders for sounding a retreat. Spinola pursued, and made considerable slaughter; but his troops were stopt short in their career by colonel Vere, who being supported by the count de Chatillon, with a select body of French infantry, placed his men in an advantageous situation, behind

BOOK II. hind a hedge, and kept up so hot a fire upon the  
 1605. Spaniards, as obliged them to desist from the  
 pursuit.

THE loss of men in this action, which lasted for upwards of eight hours, was considerable; and probably not less than five hundred men on either side. Had the Dutch cavalry arrived at Mulleim a little earlier, or acquitted themselves after their arrival as they had done on all former occasions, the Spaniards must have been compelled to lay down their arms (*b*). Prince Maurice therefore, who had never before conceived more sanguine hopes of victory, was highly incensed against them for their pusillanimous behaviour, and reproached them in the severest terms. He could no longer confide in their courage for the execution of any important enterprize, and found it necessary to act with the utmost circumspection through the rest of the campaign (*c*).

In order however, if possible, to extinguish the memory of this repulse, he soon after made an attack in the middle of the night on the town of Guelders, and he so far succeeded as to demolish one of the outer gates of that place; by fixing a petard in it; but the garrison having taken the alarm, by the bursting of another petard which happened to fall into the ditch, he was repulsed with loss, and obliged to abandon his attempt. His ill success in this, and in his enterprize at Mulleim, made a strong impression on the minds of  
 of

(*b*) Grotius, in speaking of this action, makes the following observation, “*tum id si evenisset, reliqua exercitus invadere statuit, laudabili consilio, & magnam illo die victoriam elaturus, ni Deo visum, longa Batavorum prospera & belli gloriam adversis retundere: namque haud alii rectius causæ tam fatalem pavorem adscripserim.*”

(*c*) Grotius, lib. xiv. p. 469, &c. Van Met. lib. xxvii. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vii.



of the garrison of Wachtendonc. They had from the beginning expected that he would come to their relief, and, in the hopes of his being able to raise the siege, they had given him the strongest assurances of their resolution to defend the town to the last extremity; but when they found that, notwithstanding his most vigorous exertions, the enemy still maintained their superiority, their courage failed, their defence became more feeble and irresolute, and, on the twentieth day after the commencement of the siege, they offered to capitulate, though their number still amounted to more than a thousand men.

BOOK II.  
1605.

FROM Wachtendonc Spinola ordered the count de Bucquoi to lead his troops against the castle of Cracao, of which the count made himself master in a few days, and obliged the garrison to surrender at discretion.

HAD not the season been so far advanced, it is probable, from the great disparity between the contending parties during this campaign, the states must have suffered still greater losses; but it was now the end of November, the rains had begun to fall, and the troops were greatly exhausted with the fatigues which they had undergone. Spinola therefore, after carefully providing for the security of his new conquests, sent his army into winter-quarters, and his example was soon after followed by prince Maurice. This general had at no former period suffered the enemy to gain so great advantages with impunity; yet, on his part, neither prudence and vigilance, nor vigour and activity, were wanting in opposing their designs. Had the states permitted him to follow his own judgment in the conduct of the war, a different plan of operations would have been adopted;

**BOOK II.** <sup>1605.</sup> adopted ; Spinola would probably have been prevented from passing the Rhine, and the places lost have been preserved. His army was from the beginning much inferior in number to the enemy, yet, if his well concerted attack at Mulleim had not proved abortive, through that unaccountable panic with which his troops were seized, the Spanish cavalry would have been cut off, and Spinola obliged to act on the defensive through the rest of the campaign.

BUT while for these reasons it should seem that no blame can justly be imputed to prince Maurice, Spinola was surely well entitled to the applause which he received from his contemporaries, by whom he was henceforth regarded as one of the greatest generals of the age.

Sanguine  
hopes of the  
Spaniards.

THE Spanish ministers had no reason to repent of the confidence they had reposed in him, when they reflected on the vigour and great abilities he had exerted during this campaign ; and their hopes of being able to compel the revolted provinces to lay down their arms were at this time raised to the greatest height. The archduke likewise had conceived the most sanguine expectations of success, and was assiduously employed throughout the winter, in preparing for a vigorous prosecution of the war.

HAVING removed the seat of it into the enemy's country, his subjects in Brabant and Flanders could, with greater ease than formerly, afford their annual supplies ; but these were not alone sufficient to enable him to carry the plan concerted with the general for the next campaign into execution ; and, in order to procure from Spain the assistance which was requisite, he judged it necessary that Spinola himself should undertake  
another

another journey to Madrid. The Spanish minis- BOOK II.  
ters had acquainted him that they were at present 1605.  
involved in the greatest difficulties, occasioned  
by the loss of some of their ships loaded with  
treasure, which had foundered in a storm, in their  
passage from America ; but he hoped that, through  
Spinola's personal influence with the king, which  
was so great as even to excite the jealousy of his  
ministers, they might be induced to have recourse  
to some extraordinary expedient for his relief.

THE marquis, who left Brussels about the mid-  
dle of winter, found, on his arrival at Madrid,  
that the account transmitted to the archduke, of  
the exhausted state of Philip's finances, had not  
been exaggerated. There was hardly money in  
the exchequer sufficient to defray the necessary  
expences of government, and the ministers had  
no prospect of being able to procure the sums  
requisite for carrying on the war with vigour,  
before the season fit for action would be elapsed.  
Philip could not resolve, in the midst of victory,  
to abandon a cause in which he was so deeply in-  
terested : and Spinola was determined to decline  
accepting of the command of the forces, unless  
an adequate fund should be provided for their  
pay. Many weeks were spent in fruitless endea-  
vours to raise the money which he demanded (d).  
At length the ministers offered to mortgage the  
treasure which was expected to arrive towards the  
end of the year from America. And the mer-  
chants of Cadiz and other places, upon receiving  
an obligation for their reimbursement from that  
fund, agreed to advance the money that was  
wanted : upon a condition, which marks their  
diffidence either in the good faith or good œco-  
nomy of the ministers, that the marquis of Spi-  
nola

Expedient  
of the Spa-  
nish minis-  
try for rais-  
ing sup-  
plies.

(d) It amounted to three hundred thousand crowns a month.

**BOOK II.** nola should give an additional security for their  
 1606. payment on his estates in Italy.

**THE** marquis did not hesitate in complying with this request; and, immediately after receiving bills of exchange for the money, he set out for the Netherlands, by the way of Italy. In that country he was seized with a fever which detained him for several weeks, and prevented him from reaching Brussels till the beginning of June.

Sickness of  
Spinola.

Strange remissness in the conduct of the United States.

**THE** states general, on the other hand, having got early intelligence of the difficulty which he must encounter in raising money, had long flattered themselves with the hopes that he would not be able to procure it. They were afterwards amused for a considerable time by a report which had been propagated of his death; an event which they were persuaded would contribute more than any other that could happen to relax the archduke's exertions in the prosecution of the war. Influenced by these hopes, and this report, joined to their desire of avoiding any unnecessary expence, they had been uncommonly remiss in their military preparations. They had not availed themselves of Spinola's detention in Italy; and when they heard, not only that he had arrived in the Netherlands, but was daily receiving reinforcements of fresh troops from Germany and Italy, they were filled with the most disquieting apprehensions; but it was now too late to remedy their error. They had not sufficient time to augment their army, by making new levies, as they used to do in Britain; and almost all the protestant soldiers, whom they might have enlisted in France and Germany, were, during the greatest part of this summer, detained at home; those in France, by a quarrel between the king and duke of Bouillon; and those in Germany, by an insurrection



insurrection of the inhabitants of Brunfwick, against their sovereign.

BOOK II.  
1606.

WHEN the campaign therefore was about to be opened, their forces, being greatly inferior in number to those of the enemy, prince Maurice was obliged to adopt a plan of operations which was merely defensive.

Prince Maurice adopts defensive operations.

HAVING carefully provided for the security of such of the frontier towns, as were most exposed to danger, he next applied himself to fortify the banks of the Waal and the Issel, wheresoever he suspected that the enemy might attempt to transport their forces.

ALONG the banks of all that part of Waal, which extends from the fort of Schench to the isle of Bommel, redoubts, at small distances from each other, were raised on the north dyke of the river. The troops, to which the defence of these redoubts was committed, were ordered to keep themselves in constant readiness to march to each other's assistance, on the first notice of an attack. And a great number of armed barks and boats were ordered to cruize in the river, to watch the motions of the enemy, and to be ready to attack them, in case of their adventuring to embark.

THE same care and pains were taken in fortifying the Issel; on the banks of which another line of redoubts was raised, extending from Arnheim to Hattem, which stands at the distance of only a few hours march from the Zuider Sea.

THESE works, in which the Dutch were more expert than any other nation, and which had been carried on with surprising expedition, were far advanced before Spinola had fully prepared to

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Spinola determined to penetrate into Utrecht and Holland.

to take the field. His plan had, from the beginning, been what the states and prince Maurice had suspected, to penetrate into the provinces of Utrecht and Holland, through the Betuwe on one side, and the Veluwe on the other. He justly considered, that while the Dutch maintained their superiority at sea, it was only on their eastern frontier, he could expect to make any sensible impression; and that, in case he should so far succeed as to get possession of Utrecht, which was a large town, but weakly fortified, not only the numerous fortified places which lie to the north and east, would be easily compelled to submit, because their communication with Holland would be interrupted; but Holland itself, the chief seat of the wealth and strength of the revolted provinces would be laid open in that quarter, where it would be most successfully attacked.

He was sensible, that since the states had employed such wise precautions for their defence, it must now be extremely difficult for him to carry this plan into execution. But he still resolved to persist in it, and hoped, on one side or other, either to find the enemy off their guard, or to overpower them by his superior numbers.

HAVING divided his forces, he gave the command of one army, consisting of ten thousand foot and twelve thousand horse, to the count de Bucquoi, with instructions to attempt to transport it over the Waal into the country of Betuwe; and he himself conducted another, still more numerous, into the province of Overijssel, which had been the scene of his operations in the preceding year.

Bucquoi, having passed the Maese at Mooch, pitched his camp in the neighbourhood of that village,

village, resolving to attempt the passage of the Waal, between the fort of Schench and Nimeguen, and, in case of his being able to effect it, to lay siege to the latter of these places. With this view, he transported a great number of boats in carriages from the Maese; and having launched them in the Waal, he put a select body of troops on board, under the command of Justiniano, an Italian general of distinguished abilities. But before Justiniano could approach the opposite bank, Dubois, a French general, in the service of the states, had drawn up some companies of French and English soldiers, brought hastily from Nimeguen, and was prepared to dispute his landing. Justiniano still continued to advance, having first obliged all the Dutch armed vessels to retire, by planting a battery at the place of his embarkment. An obstinate engagement soon followed, in which he lost about one hundred and twenty men.

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THE rowers were intimidated, and being furnished with a pretext, from the rapidity of the current, they suffered the boats to fall down the stream. Dubois followed along the dyke of the river. Other attempts were made afterwards to approach the shore, but the enemy were every where prepared to make resistance. At length the boats, which at first had proceeded in good order, being attacked by the Dutch armed vessels, which were six abreast, were thrown into confusion; and Justiniano, despairing of success, abandoned his attempt.

SPINOLA in the mean time had passed the Rhine at Rorerort, and was advancing through the province of Overysse. But he was greatly retarded in his progress by an extraordinary quantity of rain which had begun to fall before he left Rorerort,

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Rorerort, and continued falling after he had set out upon his march. All the rivers were swelled to an unusual height; and at those places, where in ordinary seasons they were fordable, much time was lost in collecting boats, or in building temporary bridges. A great part of the country through which he marched being naturally wet and marshy, the roads were every where so much broken, that the one-half of his army was commonly a whole day behind the other. The artillery carts, and his waggons with provisions, of which he had near three thousand, were dragged along with the utmost difficulty, and, as they often sunk in the mud, they proved almost every hour the occasion of confusion and delay. Many of his men fell sick from the unhealthiness of the season, and many were overpowered by the extraordinary fatigue which they underwent.

It was past the middle of July before he arrived in the neighbourhood of the Issel; and he still entertained the hopes of finding it practicable to bring his enterprize to the desired issue: but, as the rains had not yet begun to abate, he found the river every where unfordable. It was, at the same time, crowded with armed vessels, which must have rendered all attempts to cast a temporary bridge over it impracticable: and prince Maurice, having had leisure to fortify the opposite banks, had collected an army of ten thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse, with which he stood prepared to oppose his passage.

AFTER deliberating for some days what course he should pursue, he would have undertaken the siege of Deventer or Zutphen. But, besides that every precaution had been taken for their defence, prince Maurice had pitched his camp on the opposite side, at an equal distance from each



each of these places, and was ready, with forces nearly equal to his own, to march to their relief. BOOK II.  
1606.

HE had, in the mean time, sent the count de Solre with a detachment of his army down the river, to attempt a passage in the neighbourhood of Swoll, where he hoped the enemy might not be so much upon their guard. But de Solre was vigorously repulsed by the garrison of Swoll, supported by some armed vessels, and obliged to return, without being able to execute his enterprize.

SPINOLA therefore found it necessary to relinquish his plan of penetrating through the country of Veluwe, and to rest satisfied with employing his arms against some of the towns of the province of Zutphen, where Maurice could not attempt to interrupt his operations, without exposing himself to the risk of a general engagement. He first attacked the town of Lockem, and in a few days compelled the garrison to surrender. Immediately after which he laid siege to Groll, a town much better fortified than Lockem, and defended by a garrison of one thousand three hundred men. Siege of Groll. He was the more desirous to get possession of the place, as it would greatly contribute to the security of his former conquests, Lingen and Oldenzeel. And for the same reason prince Maurice was equally solicitous to prevent it from falling into his hands.

THE prince, therefore, having augmented his army, by drawing the garrisons from Zutphen, Deventer, and other places, resolved to attempt, without delay, to raise the siege. But Spinola being acquainted with his design, pushed forward his operations with the most unremitted ardour, and, though not without considerable slaughter

**BOOK II.** of his troops, he, in a few days, drove the garrison from all the out-works of the place.  
 1606.

THEY might still, however, have resisted till prince Maurice had arrived; but the governor, a young man of little experience, being either prevailed upon by the importunity of the inhabitants, or intimidated by the threats of Spinola, who sent him notice that if he did not immediately surrender, he would put all his garrison to the sword, capitulated on the ninth day after the commencement of the siege.

SPINOLA had no sooner got possession of the town, and repaired some breaches in the fortifications, than he resolved to remove his army from Overysfel, where their health was greatly affected by the humidity of the soil, and to employ them in some other quarter, in which they would not be exposed to the same inconveniencies. Having called a council of war to assist him in his deliberations on this occasion, it was agreed, conformably to his own proposal, that no enterprize could be undertaken at that time, with any probability of success, of equal importance with the siege of Rhinberg.

Rhinberg  
besieged.

THIS town, which commands one of the most convenient passages over the Rhine, had, several times, been taken and retaken, since the commencement of the war; and the Dutch, in whose possession it had remained since the year 1601, when it was subdued by prince Maurice, had, at an immense expence, made great additions to the fortifications. Round the old fortifications, they had drawn a new rampart, strengthened with half-moons, redoubts, and ravelins, and had surrounded the whole with a second ditch, of extraordinary breadth and depth; to which they had added

added a covered way. They had erected on the island, which is separated by a narrow channel from the town, a strong fort with regular bastions, of nearly the same extent, as the island itself; and they had furnished another fortification of still greater extent and strength, defended by a deep intrenchment, on the opposite bank of the river.

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SPINOLA was aware of the difficulty he must encounter in reducing a town so strongly fortified, and which he knew likewise to be abundantly supplied with provisions and military stores: but, having been greatly disappointed by the failure of his enterprize against the interior provinces, and being desirous of performing some atchievement, that might justify the opinion which the archduke and the court of Spain had conceived of his abilities, even the difficulty of accomplishing his design proved a motive for adopting it; while, at the same time, it determined him to exert his utmost vigour in the execution.

HAVING sent orders to the count de Bucquoi to come to his assistance, the count immediately directed his march towards Rhinberg along the south-side of the river, while he himself advanced towards it on the north. No delay was unnecessarily admitted by either general; but before they could throw up their intrenchments, prince Maurice, having received intelligence of their design, had time to send his brother Henry Frederick with a reinforcement to the garrison of two thousand men. Henry was accompanied on this occasion by a large body of cavalry, and having executed his commission without any loss, he immediately returned with the cavalry to the camp, where his brother was preparing to march to the relief of the besieged with all his forces.

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1606.

IN the mean time Spinola began the siege by attacking the fort above-mentioned, which had been raised on the side of the river opposite to the town. Of this fort, which communicated by temporary bridges with the island and with the town, and was deemed a post of the first importance, the defence was given to colonel Edmund, a Scotch officer of distinguished merit, who had been advanced in the service of the states from the rank of a common soldier to that of colonel. Besides a numerous garrison, upwards of seventy French gentlemen, who had come into the Netherlands to learn the military art, served under him as volunteers; and, that they might merit promotion on their return to their native country, were ready to expose themselves to every danger. With this determined band, supported by his garrison, both horse and foot, he sallied out against Spinola, as soon as he approached, threw a great part of his army into confusion, and made considerable slaughter. Spinola himself narrowly escaped being taken prisoner: but fresh troops coming forward to his assistance, Edmund was at length repulsed, and obliged to retire into the fort.

From the intrepid spirit which the garrison displayed in this sally, joined to the character of their commander, Spinola had reason to expect the most vigorous resistance. But a few days after, Edmund was killed by a shot from the enemy's camp while he was viewing his intrenchments; and the garrison, immoderately disheartened by his death, evacuated the fort in the following night, and passed over into the island.

THIS precipitate measure, the effect of sudden dejection, on account of the loss of their commander, was quickly attended with the most important



tant consequences. The fortifications of the Book II.  
 island were in a great measure commanded by 1606.  
 the artillery of the fort which they had so hastily  
 abandoned, and Spinola, by keeping up an incessant  
 fire on them, from which their ramparts did  
 not long afford protection, compelled them to  
 take shelter in the town.

He then applied himself to strengthen the fortifications which he had gained on the banks of the river, in order to prevent prince Maurice from approaching on that side to the relief of the besieged; and having brought his bridge of boats above mentioned from Rorerort, he transported the greatest part of his forces over the Rhine, to co-operate with the count de Bucquoi, who had begun his operations against the town.

BEING already secured against an attack on the side towards the river, he now laboured to render himself equally secure on the other side, by casting a strong intrenchment round his camp. And as he was perpetually present himself, and no hands were permitted to be idle, the work was carried on with extraordinary expedition, while a great proportion of his troops were employed in making their approaches to the town,

THERE was nothing omitted on the part of the garrison, which prudence and bravery could perform, to retard their progress. Animated by the example of the French volunteers, they spurned at danger, and made several vigorous sallies on the enemy, in some of which they succeeded in their attempts to demolish their works, and in all of them put considerable numbers to the sword.

BUT the exertions of the besiegers were in proportion to the obstacles which they found it necessary

**BOOK II.** <sup>1606.</sup> sary to surmount. Spinola had on no former occasion given more conspicuous proofs of vigour, skill, and bravery; he exposed himself to every danger to which his troops were exposed, and at the same time discovered the most perfect composure and tranquillity. The conduct of Bucquoi and Velasco fully justified the opinion that was entertained of their abilities. The duke D'Offuna, one of the first grandees in Spain, the princes of Caserta and Palestrina, and the marquisses of Est and of Bentivoglio (*e*), were commonly mingled with the foremost combatants, and exhibited a bright example of the most heroic valour. The behaviour of the troops corresponded to this example of their general and officers. The Italians and Spaniards on the one hand, and the Walloons and Germans on the other, animated by their leaders, and stimulated by ambition to surpass their companions, displayed in every rencounter the most determined intrepidity.

THE garrison therefore, notwithstanding the most obstinate resistance, were compelled to abandon one part of their fortifications after another; and it soon appeared, that in order to save themselves from utter destruction, they must, ere long, deliver up the town, unless prince Maurice should come speedily to their relief.

THIS general had already crossed the Rhine near Wesel, with an army amounting to fourteen or fifteen thousand men; and had advanced as far as Alphen, which lies at the distance of only a few hours march from Rhineberg. From his approaching so near, and from the various movements of his troops, Spinola could not doubt that he intended to attack his intrenchments. He therefore immediately applied himself to fortify  
some

(*e*) Nephew to the celebrated historian of that name.

some hills adjoining to his camp; and having ordered such of his forces as had been left for guarding the fort on the opposite side of the river, to come to his assistance, he stood prepared to accept of battle, in case it should be offered by the enemy.

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1606.

BUT prince Maurice was too prudent, and too well acquainted with the character of Spinola, as well as with the strength of his present situation, to expose his army to so great a risk. From the time when the garrison had abandoned the fort on the opposite side of the river, he had despaired of being able to raise the siege, as all communication with the town on that side was thereby intercepted, and the enemy enabled to effectuate a junction of their forces. They were now greatly superior to his in number. No precaution had been omitted by their general to prevent a surprise. It was impossible to attack them without resolving to try the fortune of a battle. And he considered that while the preservation of Rhineberg would be the only fruit which he could reap from a victory, a defeat must be attended with the loss of other towns of still greater importance, and, at the same time, render it practicable for Spinola to execute his first plan of an invasion of the country beyond the Waal; he thought it rather fortunate that this general, with so numerous an army, had engaged in an enterprize which could not greatly affect the prosperity of the United Provinces; and hoped that, by his persisting in it, he would exhaust his strength, and lose what remained of the season fit for action.

MANY of prince Maurice's countrymen, however, were dissatisfied with his inactivity on this occasion, and the states general sent deputies to his camp to acquaint him they had expected he would

BOOK II. would have made an attempt to raise the siege.  
 1606. But having brought over the deputies to his opinion, he despised the general censure to which his conduct was exposed, and still adhered to his resolution.

By the various movements which he made he prevented the garrison from despairing of his approach; kept the enemy under perpetual alarms; and thus contributed in some measure to retard their progress. But Utenhove, the governor, coming at length to perceive that the prince had no serious intention to relieve him, and dreading, if he persisted much longer in the defence, that the town might be taken by assault, resolved to capitulate, and offered to deliver up the town upon certain honourable conditions, which Spinola  
 October 1. readily granted, as the winter season was fast approaching, and his army had already suffered such considerable diminution that in several regiments hardly one half of the original number remained at the termination of the siege (*f*).

SPINOLA had hitherto preserved the most perfect discipline in his army, and had fully experienced the benefit arising from it, in the facility with which he procured supplies from the neutral countries adjoining to his camp. But, some time before the present period, a convoy with a part of his money, having been intercepted by the enemy, and the affairs of some merchants, who had accepted his bills, having fallen into disorder, in consequence of losses sustained at sea, he was no longer able to pay his troops with the same regularity as formerly, and considerable arrears had become due. They had begun to complain  
 before

(*f*) Grotius, lib. xv. Van Meteren, lib. xxviii. Bent, parte, iii. lib. vii.



before the termination of the siege, and soon after the same mutinous spirit appeared among them, which had so often proved pernicious to the Spanish interest in the Netherlands. Spinola, in his treatment of the mutineers, mingled gentleness with severity, and omitted nothing in his power to prevent the infection from becoming general; but his endeavours were in a great measure ineffectual. A considerable number deserted, and went over to the enemy's camp; while a body of two thousand horse and foot, with several officers, directed their march towards Breda, and put themselves under the protection of prince Maurice; who, agreeably to his usual maxims, resolved to encourage them in their revolt; and sent orders to the governor of Breda to grant them permission to fortify their quarters under the cannon of the town, and to purchase provisions from the citizens.

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Mutiny and  
desertion of  
Spanish  
troops.

As soon as intelligence had reached him of the surrender of Rhineberg, Maurice had retired with his army into the province of Overijssel; and he now resolved to embrace the opportunity, which the mutiny of Spinola's troops afforded him, to recover some of the towns in that province which had been lost. He first attacked Lochem, which he reduced in a few days, and immediately after he laid siege to Groll. Spinola, anxious for the preservation of a place which he deemed of great importance, immediately conceived the design of attempting to relieve it, and called a council of war to deliberate on the subject. A great majority of his officers endeavoured to persuade him to relinquish his design, by arguments drawn from the lateness of the season, the humidity of the country through which he must pass, joined to the weakness of his army, and the pernicious consequences which must

Siege of  
Groll.

**BOOK II.** must accompany a defeat. He was deeply sensible of the force of these objections. But he considered that the loss of Groll would probably soon draw after it that of all his other conquests beyond the Rhine; that his late conquest of Rhineberg would thereby become in a great measure insignificant, as it derived its importance chiefly from the secure communication which it afforded with his other conquests; that the glory he had acquired would thus be quickly buried in oblivion; and the fruit of all those labours lost, which had been attended with so great an expence of blood and treasure.

STIMULATED by these motives, he persisted in his design, though it could not perhaps be justified on the principles of prudence; and instantly selected from his whole army eight thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse, on whose obedience and bravery he could depend for the execution of any enterprize, however dangerous. These troops were highly pleased with the flattering distinction which they received, and began their march with every symptom of ardour and alacrity,

THE success of his enterprize Spinola knew must entirely depend on his preventing the enemy from having time to compleat their entrenchments, and with this view he advanced towards them with the utmost rapidity, and in a few days arrived within sight of the town. Prince Maurice, on the other hand, having from the beginning believed that Spinola would not attempt to interrupt his operations, had neglected to employ such precautions as might have obstructed his approach. Being desirous to spare his men, he had not as usual drawn any lines of circumvallation round the place, and his camp itself had no other defence on one side but some marshy ground, which he had


had thought sufficient to prevent any sudden incursion of the enemy.

BOOK II.  
1606.

IT was in this quarter that Spinola resolved to begin his attack ; and having drawn up his army in four battalions, each of which had a small train of artillery attending them, and a part of the cavalry secured by a double row of carriages on their flanks, he first rode through the several ranks, encouraging and exhorting them, and at the same time declaring that he was determined either to die or conquer ; immediately after which he gave the signal to advance.

BUT prince Maurice had from the first appearance of the enemy resolved to decline the combat, and had already began to raise the siege. He first withdrew his troops in good order to an advantageous situation, near his camp, where he was free from danger, and soon after retired to a greater distance from the town. His army was greatly superior in number to that of the enemy ; but many of his men were sickly, and worn out with the fatigues of a long campaign ; and the event of battles he considered, depended less on the numbers than on the intrepidity and vigour of the combatants. To the ignorant his conduct was a matter of censure and surprize : but, as both his skill and courage were unquestionable, the constraint which he imposed upon himself on this occasion was, by the more prudent and judicious, deemed deserving of admiration and applause.

SUCH was the conclusion of this campaign, through accidents against which no human prudence could provide. Spinola had been disappointed in his hopes of reducing the interior parts of the United Provinces ; but, from his conduct  
in

**BOOK II.** in the siege of Rhineberg, and the relief of Groll,  
 all the world were satisfied that, on his part, neither  
1606. abilities nor vigour would have been wanting to  
carry the plan which he had concerted into suc-  
cessful execution ( g ).

( g ) Piafecii Chronica. Grotius, lib. xv. Bentivoglio,  
part. iii. lib. vii. Meteren, lib. xxviii.



T H E  
H I S T O R Y  
OF THE REIGN OF  
PHILIP THE THIRD,  
K I N G O F S P A I N.

B O O K III.

**S** OON after the transactions above related a Book III.  
negociation for peace was begun, in the Negociati-  
course of which it appeared that neither of the on for a  
two contending parties were intent on the farther peace.  
prosecution of the war. But, in order fully to  
comprehend their views and motives, a more par-  
ticular account of some of their operations at  
sea, in the East Indies, and in America, is neces-  
sary, than could have been conveniently given in  
the preceding books.

It may justly appear surprizing, that a state  
possessed of so small a territory as the republic of  
the United Provinces should have been able to  
support the expence of a war at home against so  
potent an enemy. Yet, during the continuance  
of this war, their exertions were not confined to  
the Netherlands. They maintained at the same  
time a numerous fleet of ships of war, with  
which they generally proved victorious in all  
their naval rencounters with the enemy, while  
they successfully attacked his dominions in the  
most distant quarters of the globe. They had been  
much

**BOOK III.** much indebted for their success in the Low Countries to the assistance in money and troops which they received from Henry IV. and queen Elizabeth; but as the aid which these princes could afford them was never liberal, they must have sunk under the power of their enemies, but for those copious resources which they opened by the extension of their trade.

Progress of  
arts in the  
Low Coun-  
tries,

THE inhabitants of the Low Countries had for several centuries been distinguished by their industry, and their skill in manufactures. Even in the time of the Roman republic, they had given proofs of their superior ingenuity (*a*). When by the irruptions of those northern barbarians who overturned the Roman empire, all the useful arts of life, as well as letters and science, had been well nigh extinguished, they were first revived and successfully cultivated by the Flemings, and other inhabitants of the Netherlands. About the middle of the tenth century, free marts, or fairs, were established by Baldwin, earl of Flanders, to which great numbers of merchants from Germany, France, and other places resorted, to purchase the manufactures in which the Flemings so much excelled. The example of Baldwin was imitated by his successors for almost three centuries, during which period the industry and commerce of the Flemings were carried to the greatest height, and remained unrivalled by the other European nations. But the succeeding sovereigns, finding it necessary for defraying the expence of the wars in which they were often engaged with the neighbouring princes, to impose various taxes on commodities, great numbers of the manufacturers and merchants, unaccustomed to such impositions,

(*a*) Est summæ genus solertiæ, atque ad omnia imitanda quæ a quoquo traduntur aptissimum. Vide Cæsar, lib. vii.

positions, withdrew into Holland, where they BOOK III. were at once free from taxes, and much less exposed to those calamities of war, which they had often experienced in the more open provinces of Flanders and Brabant.

THE art of salting herrings having, in the fourteenth century, been discovered by William Burem, a native of Pierulem, in Flanders, the herring trade, which hath proved so copious a source of wealth and industry to the Netherlands, was first cultivated by the citizens of Sluys and Bruges; but it was soon afterwards communicated to the Dutch, who improved to the utmost the advantages which their situation afforded them for carrying it on with success. They were, at the same time, in possession of the cod and whale fishery; and, while they exported great quantities of fish, and of manufactures, they were every year extending their trade in the southern parts of Europe, in the countries which lie round the Baltic, and in those parts of Germany with which they communicated by the Rhine and other rivers which pass through their territory, before they fall into the sea.

BEFORE the middle of the sixteenth century the provinces of Holland and Zealand underwent an important change by the great increase of the number of inhabitants, occasioned by the persecutions on account of religion in France and Germany. Charles the Fifth had resolved to extirpate the Protestants from his dominions in the Netherlands, as well as from those in Germany; but he had been in a great measure deterred from the prosecution of his design, partly by the partial affection which he bore towards his Dutch and Flemish subjects, and partly by his dread of the fatal consequences, with which the rigorous execution

BOOK III. cution of his edicts might be attended, with regard to their manufactures and their trade.

BOTH the French and German Protestants therefore found an asylum in the Netherlands, and imported thither their families, their wealth, and their industry. Of the advantages resulting from thence Brabant and Flanders participated in common with the more northern maritime provinces, but the intolerant and oppressive Spirit of the Spanish government prevented them from long enjoying these advantages. It was chiefly by the manufacturers and merchants that the opinions of the reformers were embraced; they were persecuted with the most unrelenting fury, and they likewise most severely felt the burthen of those oppressive taxes that were imposed. By the cruel treatment which they received several thousands of them were compelled to withdraw into other countries. Many went over to England, where Elizabeth was ready to afford them her protection. But when the maritime provinces had asserted their liberty, and Ghent, Bruges, and Antwerp, after an unsuccessful struggle, had again submitted to the Spanish yoke, by much the greater part of the Flemish emigrants retired into Holland or Zealand, and took up their residence in Middleburg, Haerlem, Leyden, and Amsterdam. In their new abode they enjoyed the free exercise of their religion, a privilege which they deemed a compensation for every hardship they might find it necessary to undergo. The country which they had made choice of being of small extent, could not afford sustenance for one third part of its inhabitants. But being situated in the heart of Europe, at the mouth of several navigable rivers, and most of the towns communicating with each other by these rivers, or by canals, no country could be more commodious either for in-  
land



land or foreign trade. While their situation there-  
fore prompted them to apply themselves to com-  
merce, by the conveniencies which it afforded for  
carrying it on, they at the same time found it ne-  
cessary to engage in it, as the only means of their  
subsistence and support.

BOOK III.

And com-  
merce.

No branch of it, to which they could find ac-  
cess, or from which any profit could be derived,  
was neglected; nor did they confine themselves,  
like other nations, to the exporting of such of  
their own commodities as they could spare, or  
the importing of such commodities from other  
countries as their necessities required, but they  
likewise traded for other nations, and had many  
of their ships continually employed in carrying  
the merchandize of one nation to another. This  
species of commerce had been formerly possessed  
by the Anseatick or maritime towns on the Bal-  
tick; but the situation of the Dutch, between the  
Northern and Southern European nations, was  
more commodious for carrying it on. The neces-  
sity which their circumstances imposed upon them,  
of continual action and employment, had prompt-  
ed them to engage in it; and their extreme fru-  
gality and rigid œconomy, by rendering it prac-  
ticable for them to trade for smaller profits, had  
enabled them to wrest it from their competitors,  
and to engross it almost wholly to themselves.

Among the various branches of commerce in  
which the Dutch displayed so much activity and  
enterprize, one of the most considerable consisted  
in carrying from the countries lying round the  
Baltick to the different ports in Spain and Portu-  
gal, great quantities of corn and naval stores;  
in return for which, besides fruits, wine, and  
other productions of those Southern Kingdoms,  
they received the gold and silver of America, and

VOL. III.

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the

**BOOK III.** the spices and other commodities which the Portuguese imported from India or Lisbon. The period when this branch of trade commenced, cannot be exactly ascertained. Being of small extent at first, it has escaped the notice of historians. But it had become considerable soon after the beginning of the sixteenth century, and before the middle of that century, it was deemed a species of commerce of the first importance. It was equally necessary to Spain and Portugal as to the United Provinces, and was for this reason connived at by the court of Spain for many years after the revolt in the Netherlands; being still carried on by the Dutch themselves, who found no other precaution necessary but to sail under the flag of some neutral power at peace with Spain. But Philip's resentment against his revolted subjects being on some occasions too violent to be restrained by considerations of policy or prudence, the Dutch ships were sometimes confiscated, the commanders thrown into prison, and the sailors either sent to the galleys, or compelled to serve on board the Spanish fleet. This monarch having come at length to suspect that the commerce which he had hitherto in some measure permitted, was of infinitely greater advantage to the enemy than to himself, and being desirous to deprive them of what he believed to be a principal source of their increasing wealth and strength, he resolved to enforce an edict which he had formerly published, prohibiting his subjects in Spain and Portugal from holding intercourse with the revolted provinces; the Dutch traders were, in consequence of this resolution, every year more harassed than the preceding, till the restraints and vexations which they suffered had become intolerable.

FINDING themselves therefore under the necessity of abandoning this gainful traffic, they began  
to

to consider whether they might not, in another way, secure to themselves the advantages which they had hitherto derived from it. BOOK III.

HAVING so long acted as carriers for the Portuguese, in distributing the rich productions of the East over the Northern nations, they well knew where to find the speediest sale for these productions, and they likewise knew that the demand for them was every year increasing: nor, when they considered the great advantages of their situation, joined to their superior naval power, could they doubt of being able to deprive the Portuguese of this profitable trade, provided they could procure the commodities requisite for carrying it on.


BUT, for this purpose, it was necessary they should perform a voyage of several thousand leagues, through seas with which they were unacquainted; that they should visit countries of which they were almost entirely ignorant; and after their arrival there, should enter into a competition with a bold and enterprising nation, who, besides being in possession of the trade of these countries, had established a formidable military force for its protection. The Dutch, though sufficiently aware of these difficulties, were not thereby deterred from persisting in their design. In order to shorten their voyage, the great extent of which through unknown seas, was the principal cause of their dread, they made three different attempts to discover a passage to India, by the Northern Ocean; but these attempts, like all others of the same kind, proving fruitless, they resolved to undertake the voyage to India by the customary route, provided they could procure some person already acquainted with it to conduct them.

BOOK III. It happened opportunely when they were deliberating on the subject, that some merchants of Amsterdam received an application from Cornelius Houtman, a native of Flanders, who was in prison for debt in Lisbon ; representing, that having made several voyages with the Portuguese to India, he was not only well acquainted with the course of navigation thither, but likewise with the nature of the India trade ; and that, in case they would furnish him with a sum of money to purchase his liberty, he would gladly communicate to them all necessary information, and undertake in person the conduct of their ships. His proposal was instantly accepted, the money which he requested for his release, was transmitted to him, and soon afterwards he arrived at Amsterdam. The merchants, highly satisfied with the information which they received from him, and perceiving him to be a man of uncommon penetration and abilities, immediately formed an association, to which they gave the name of the Company of Distant Countries, and equipped a squadron, consisting of four ships, which they put under his command. This little squadron had two hundred and fifty men on board, and a hundred pieces of cannon, which were furnished by the states ; besides naval and military stores, and a variety of merchandize fitted to the taste of the Indian nations (*b*).

As the principal object of the voyage was to procure more particular information than they yet possessed concerning the country, and the different branches of trade which it afforded, Houtman was instructed, as much as possible, to avoid the

(*b*) The two largest of these ships were of two hundred and thirty tons ; the third, of one hundred and thirty ; and the fourth, of fifty. The value of the whole equipment was estimated at four hundred thousand florins.



the settlements of the Portuguese, and carefully BOOK III. to abstain from all hostilities, when they were  not necessary for his defence: nor was he inattentive to these instructions; he might, in his way to India, have seized a rich carrack in which the archbishop of Goa was returning home; but though he went on board that vessel, in order to procure intelligence, he suffered it to proceed on its voyage without molestation.

AFTER visiting the coasts of Africa and Brazil, he doubled the Cape of Good Hope, and proceeded to the isle of Madagascar, in which island and that of St. Mary he was detained for some time, in consequence of a dissension which happened between him and the other commanders, Operations in the Indies. with regard to the route which it was proper to pursue. From St. Mary he at length proceeded to Sumatra, and from thence to Bantam, in the island of Java, where he began to purchase pepper and other spices. June, 1596. At first he was well received, and no aversion was discovered by the natives to enter into a commercial treaty with him; but the jealousy of the Portuguese merchants, a considerable number of whom resided at Bantam, being instantly alarmed, they resolved to exert their influence to effectuate his ruin. For this end, carrying rich presents in their hands, the only means of procuring access to the princes of India, they represented the Dutch to the king or general of Bantam as pirates, and the common enemies of human kind, of whose rapine and violence his subjects would soon have fatal experience, if they did not embrace the present opportunity, when they were few in number, to cut them off, and to prevent their return. The governor, ignorant, and therefore credulous, was easily persuaded of the truth of this representation, and consented to follow the counsel that was given him. But distrusting his ability to destroy them

**BOOK III.** them by open force, he resolved to employ fraud and treachery. He pretended an inclination to have a commercial treaty, which had been proposed by the Dutch, concluded, and desired that Houtman and the other officers would come to his palace to adjust the terms. Suspecting no deceit, Houtman, and one or two more, complied with his request, and were immediately taken into custody. The governor had absurdly believed that all the officers would have accepted his invitation, and that the ships, having no persons on board that were fit to command them, would then have become an easy prey. Being disappointed in this expectation, he dreaded the consequences of putting his prisoners to death, while their companions remained at liberty to take vengeance on him for his perfidy. Still, however, he detained them in prison, and refused to listen to the repeated solicitations of their friends in their behalf ; till the Dutch ships having begun to cannonade the town, and laid part of it in ruins, he at length restored them to their liberty.

Soon after this, Houtman finding, on a review of his men, that by death, occasioned chiefly by the climate, they had suffered a diminution of more than one third of their number, ordered one of his ships to be burnt, and set sail for Europe with the rest ; carrying with him some of the natives of Madagascar and Sumatra, a Japanese, a Chinese, and a pilot of the name of Abdul, distinguished for his knowledge of the Indian seas. After a prosperous voyage of between five and six months, he arrived safe in the Texel in the beginning of August, 1597, having spent almost two years and a half in his expedition. He hardly brought home with him wealth sufficient to defray the expence of his equipment ; but both he and his companions were now able to  
give

give the most satisfactory information to their BOOK III: employers. The Indians too, whom he had induced to accompany him, were likely to be afterwards of the greatest use; and the hopes which his countrymen conceived of greater success in their future voyages, were raised to the greatest height (c).

THE Portuguese, they knew, would give all the opposition in their power to every attempt which they could make, either to establish their trade, or to procure a settlement in India; but, from the accounts which they had received of the declining power of the Portuguese, and of the manner in which the eastern nations were affected towards them, they hoped to be able, either to elude, or to counteract their malignity.

A BOLDER and more enterprising spirit had never been displayed than the Portuguese had manifested in their numerous conquests and discoveries; and no conquests, so extensive and important, had been ever made with so small a force, or by a nation possessed of such scanty resources. Animated at once by almost all the passions which most powerfully impel the human mind, by avarice, by bigotry, and by ambition, they had performed exploits, which seemed to be beyond the power of man, and were regarded by all those barbarous nations, over whom they triumphed with so great facility, as more than men. They had made themselves masters of all the more important parts of the coast of Guinea. They had expelled the Arabians from that of Zanguebar, where they had formed settlements, which gave them the command of all the gold and silver

Portuguese settlements in India.

(c) Meteren, lib. xvii. & xviii. Antonii Thysii Historia Navalis, Lugd. Batav. 4to. 1657, p. 117, &c.

**BOOK III.** silver mines in their country, from Sofala to Melinda. They had acquired a decided superiority over the Egyptians, though aided by the Venetians, in the Red Sea ; and had thus put an entire stop to that gainful trade which the Venetians had so long carried on with India, by the way of Suez and Alexandria. Their arms had been attended with equal success in the Persian Gulf, and on the coasts of Persia, Malabar, and Malacca. They had acquired possession of Ceylon, and the Molucca and Sunda islands ; and, by their establishment at Macao, they had secured to themselves the trade of China and Japan.

HAD the Portuguese, at the present period, possessed the same vigour and intrepidity of which they had given such conspicuous proof on their first arrival in India, it is probable that any attempt to dispossess them would have proved abortive : but they were no longer the same people as before. The first conquerors of India were all extinct ; and their successors, a few only excepted, were men defiled with the most odious vices, which rendered them a scourge to the people committed to their care. Removed to so great a distance from the seat of government, as gave them hopes of impunity for the most flagitious crimes ; corrupted by prosperity, and enervated by the climate, while their religion, of the most illiberal kind, only served to render them more ferocious, their conduct towards the natives was equally oppressive and perfidious. Attempts were made, by some virtuous viceroys, to reform the numberless abuses which had been committed ; but these great men, whose names are handed down to posterity with just applause, were too few in number, and their government of too short continuance, to produce any permanent effect. Corruption of every kind had struck its root too deep to be so easily



easily extirpated ; and the natives, who had been long disgusted, began to feel contempt, mixed with abhorrence of their oppressors, in the room of that respect and dread which they had formerly been accustomed to entertain. BOOK III.

AFTER the subjection of Portugal to the crown of Spain, the affairs of the Portuguese in India were more than ever neglected by the government at home, and disorders of every kind were increased and multiplied. It was believed by some persons, that Philip II. agreeably to the maxims of his malignant policy, was well pleased that the power of his new subjects should suffer a diminution, as he would thereby find it easier to maintain his usurped authority. But it is more reasonable to suppose that his attention being wholly engrossed by objects, which he judged to be of greater importance, he had not leisure to attend to the affairs in India ; and found it, therefore, in some measure necessary to leave the several governors at liberty to act without controul. However this be, it is certain that they acted more like independent monarchs than the subjects of one common prince, to whom they were accountable for their conduct, and seemed to have forgotten the relation which they had bore, and the duties which they owed, both to their country and to one another ; while each individual was solely attentive to his private interest, and seldom scrupled to promote it at the expence either of faith or of humanity. The natives had, on different occasions, taken arms, and attempted to vindicate their rights against their lawless oppressors. Their efforts hitherto had not been vigorous, nor attended in the issue with success ; but they were become more than ever impatient under the injuries which they suffered, and longed for an opportunity to assert their liberty.

SUCH

**BOOK III.** SUCH was the state of the Portuguese, and such the disposition of the natives with regard to them, when the Dutch made their first voyage to the Indies. They were thereby encouraged to persist in their attempt to establish trade in those parts; and a spirit of enterprize and adventure was excited, which soon diffused itself over all the maritime provinces. The Spanish ministers imprudently contributed to quicken this adventurous spirit, and to confirm the Dutch in the resolution they had formed, by republishing, soon after the accession of the present king, an edict, prohibiting the Spaniards and Portuguese from all commercial intercourse with them in the strictest manner, and under the severest penalties. They might have perceived the folly of this measure from the effects which their former restrictions on the Dutch trade had already produced; but they attended only to the immediate inconvenience which was occasioned thereby to the enemy, without considering either the advantages which the Dutch might ultimately derive from their prohibition, or the prejudice which the Spaniards and Portuguese were likely to sustain.

By the advice of the count de Fuentes, a nobleman of great abilities, but naturally haughty and severe, and extremely ignorant of the commercial interest of his country, the prohibitory edict was carried into the most rigorous execution. A strict enquiry was made, at all the sea-ports of Spain and Portugal, whether any of the Dutch had come thither under the colours of any neutral power; and as a considerable number were discovered to have been guilty of this temerity, their ships and goods were confiscated, and they themselves either cast into prison, or sent to the galleys, and condemned to work as slaves.


THE states general, in order to express their BOOK III.  
contempt of this conduct of the Spanish court, published an edict, in which, besides prohibiting all intercourse between their subjects and those of the king of Spain, they declared, that they would treat as enemies the subjects of all neutral powers, who should carry commodities, of whatever kind, to the ports of Spain, Portugal, or Flanders.

To this manifesto, copies of which were sent to the courts of the several maritime powers, no answer was returned, nor any objection made, by the states or princes who received it; and the French monarch gave, on this occasion, a striking proof of his favour for the Dutch, by publishing a declaration, that if any of his subjects should, for the space of six months, adventure to trade with Spain, they must do it at their private risk, without the hopes of his protection.

WHILE the Dutch in this manner shewed their contempt of the Spanish trade, and the prohibitory edict, being more than ever intent on prosecuting the trade which they had begun in India, several different associations were formed by the merchants in Holland and Zealand, almost immediately after the return of their fleet under the command of Houtman; and before the end of the following year, more than eighty ships, completely equipped, and furnished with various articles of commerce, were sent out; the greater part of them to the East Indies, and some to the West, and to the coasts of Africa, while others were ordered to attempt the passage by the Streights of Magellan into the Pacific Ocean.

Dutch trade in both Indies, and on the coast of Africa.

THEY were divided into small fleets, consisting chiefly of four, six, or eight armed vessels, from about

**BOOK III.**  about one hundred and fifty to three and four hundred tons, some of which had regular troops on board, that were furnished by Prince Maurice and the states. Their instructions were nearly the same as those which had been given to the commanders employed in the first expedition, to avoid the settlements of the Portuguese and, as much as possible, to abstain from hostilities. But it was impossible for them strictly to comply with these instructions. Their enemies were spread almost every where over the coasts which they visited ; and being equally animated by jealousy, and by resentment, were resolved to give them all the opposition, and to do them all the mischief in their power. They had laboured to inspire the natives with the same malignity ; and on the minds of some of them their misrepresentations had produced the desired effect. It was not only the dangers, therefore, of voyages, so long and difficult, through climates the most adverse to the human constitution, which the Dutch encountered in the prosecution of their design ; but, after their arrival on those coasts, where the trade, which they desired to establish, must be carried on, they found it necessary to fight, and to negotiate by turns. They had the prejudices of the natives to overcome ; and they were obliged to stand perpetually on their guard against the machinations of the Portuguese, who practised every method which they could devise to accomplish their destruction, whether of secret fraud, or open force and violence.

THE Portuguese had no such formidable opposition to encounter, when they first arrived in India. The ships of their enemies were few in number, and much inferior to their's, both in respect of strength and size ; and the towns which they attacked were weakly fortified, and unskillfully



fully defended by a dastardly, effeminate, and feeble race of men. Whereas the Dutch encountered fleets of ships of the same construction as their own, and were obliged to contend with an enemy, who, besides being accustomed to the climate, and familiarly acquainted with the Indian seas, were not less distinguished than themselves for their naval and military skill. BOOK III.

BUT their conduct was wisely adapted to their circumstances, being equally prudent whether it respected the natives or the Portuguese. They soon convinced the former of the falshood of those injurious aspersions which the latter had cast upon their character; and by the moderation, justice, and humanity, which they displayed in all their dealings, proved that, in purity of manners, they were much superior to their accusers. They were soon allowed to trade in many places, from whence the Portuguese had laboured to exclude them; and as with indefatigable industry they improved to the utmost every advantage which they enjoyed, they came, ere long, to procure admission to several of the most important branches of commerce.

As the extension of their trade, and not conquest, was the great object which they pursued, they avoided all unnecessary rencounters with the Portuguese; but they were generally well prepared to defend themselves when attacked, gave many proofs of the most determined bravery, and sometimes triumphed over the superior force and numbers of the enemy. Still, however, they kept the great end of their voyages perpetually in view. The same time which they found it necessary to spend in repairing the damages sustained in battle, was likewise employed in trading with the natives; and as soon as their cargoes were complete, and their

**BOOK III.** their damages repaired, they returned to Holland :  
 { thus enriching their employers, and enabling them  
 not only to defray the expence of their equipment,  
 but to exert themselves with redoubled vigour in  
 the prosecution of their designs.

ALTHOUGH some of the numberless voyages which they had undertaken, had, through misconduct or cross accidents, proved unfortunate, they had been in general sufficiently successful to render it their interest to persevere. The societies, however, of merchants, by whom the Indian trade had been carried on, were not satisfied with the profits which it afforded. They complained that too great a number of adventurers had engaged in it ; and that in consequence thereof, as they must pay much higher prices for Indian goods than had been formerly given by the Portuguese, so they found it necessary to sell them much cheaper ; and would either be ruined by their efforts to establish this new branch of commerce, or obliged to abandon it altogether.

THIS evil, which could hardly have been apprehended in the beginning of a trade, attended with so great expence and danger, would probably have soon been remedied by a diminution of the number of competitors, the natural consequence of small profits in any branch of commerce ; and if the evil complained of, had been the only reason for the interposition of the states, it may be questioned whether they ought to have interposed. But, besides this, there was another reason of greater weight. The Portuguese in India, being under the direction of their governors or viceroys, could more easily act in concert, than the great number of independent Dutch societies : and the small fleets or single ships, belonging to these societies, were exposed to the danger

ger of being separately attacked and destroyed one after another, by an enemy with whom if they too could act in concert, they might be able to contend. Determined by these considerations, the states general in the year 1602, united the several societies of traders into one body, under the name of the East India company; on which, besides the exclusive privilege of trading beyond the Cape of Good Hope on the one hand, and the Straights of Magellan on the other; they conferred the power of administering justice, of building forts, of appointing governors and garrisons, of raising troops, and of making peace and war with the Indian princes. A fund, amounting to more than six millions of florins, was immediately subscribed for by the merchants in the principal maritime towns, and managers were appointed, under whose direction all the trade to India was henceforth to be carried on. This company being the first regular commercial society, of which we read in history, has served in some measure as a model to all the trading companies that have been created in modern times. It consisted chiefly of those who had been engaged as private adventurers in the Indian trade; and by these men, who had profited from their former errors, and were well acquainted with that trade in all its branches, the affairs of the company were, from the beginning, conducted with consummate skill; nor was their good fortune inferior to the prudence which they displayed. Having, by their justice and moderation, extinguished those groundless prejudices against their national character, which the Portuguese had laboured to instil into the minds of the Indian princes, they were almost every where received with favour, and in several places obtained permission to establish factories, and to build forts for the protection of their trade. They were requested by some

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1602.

Dutch East  
India Com-  
pany.

**BOOK III.** <sup>1602.</sup> some of these princes, to lend their assistance in expelling the Portuguese, and in their rencounters with that nation they generally came off victorious. They made innumerable captures of their richest ships. Their trade was every year more widely extended, and the profits arising from it, were greater than they had been accustomed to derive from any former branch of commerce. The principal causes of their weakness have been already explained, and to these must be added this consideration, that, on the other hand, the trade and power of the Portuguese were quickly hastening to decay. While their rivals were every season receiving reinforcements both of ships and troops, they were left unsupported by their friends in Europe, to struggle with the difficulties which surrounded them. The strength of Portugal had long been exhausted by the too numerous emigration of its inhabitants, and the Spanish ministers, besides that their attention was entirely occupied by other objects, found more than sufficient employment at home for all the force and treasure which they possessed.

It was this reason, and not, as has been supposed, the desire of having Portugal reduced to a state of weakness, and thereby rendered more tame and obsequious, that prevented the Court of Spain from affording that assistance to the Portuguese in India, which their exigencies so much required at the present period. They were almost equally inattentive, or equally unable to afford support to the Spanish traders and colonists as to the Portuguese. Many captures were made of their ships loaded with the treasures of America and the Indies. Their fleets were sometimes blocked up in their harbours, till the season fit for entering on their voyages had elapsed; and their settlements on the coasts were often plundered, sometimes



sometimes by the Dutch, and sometimes by the English, with impunity.

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1602.

NOR was it only in the Indies, and on the coasts of America, that the subjects of the Spanish monarchy were exposed to the depredations of their enemies. While the war with England subsisted, the coasts of Spain itself had been insulted both by the Dutch and English, and many ships in the harbours either taken or destroyed. After the establishment of peace with France and England, the Spanish ministers had conceived the hopes of finding it easy, not only to resist the most vigorous efforts of the Dutch, but ere long, to reduce them to obedience. But although they had now only a single enemy to contend with, whom they had long been accustomed to despise, that enemy, through the great increase of their trade and navigation, were become more powerful, while they themselves, from the decay of their trade and other causes, were much weaker than before. For some time past, therefore, the Spaniards had found it equally difficult to defend themselves against the Dutch alone, as they had done formerly against the Dutch, and English, and French united.

PHILIP'S ministers were not ignorant of the sources from whence the Dutch had received so great an accession of wealth and power; and of one of these we have seen, they had in vain endeavoured to deprive them, by the prohibition of their trade with Spain and Portugal. Another not less copious they knew, was their cod and herring fishery, on the coast of England and the Netherlands; and to deprive them of this, and at the same time, to intercept their navigation in the narrow seas, between the southern and northern states of Europe, had for some years been a

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1607.  
The Spaniards attempt to destroy the Dutch commerce.

principal object of their attention. It was with this view that all those gallies had been equipped, which, as formerly related, had been intrusted to the command of Frederick de Spinola; and with the same view there had been fitted out at Nieuport and Dunkirk a great number of armed vessels, from which the Dutch suffered considerable molestation in their coasting trade and fishery. But all Spinola's gallies had either been destroyed or had fallen into the hands of the Dutch, when they got possession of Sluys; and the States having provided some ships of war on purpose, had, on some occasions, taken signal vengeance on the privateers of Nieuport and Dunkirk, the crews of which they always treated as pirates, and either hanged or drowned. Their fleets now rode triumphant from the Baltic to the streights of Gibraltar, and their European as well as their African and Indian trade was at this time in a much more flourishing condition than ever (*d*).

Causes which induced the Spanish ministers to wish for peace.

THE courts of Spain and Brussels had long beheld this superiority of the naval power of the Dutch, with much anxiety. They dreaded from it the utter extinction of their commerce; and perceived, that in order to prevent this effect, it would, ere long, be necessary to put a period to the war. Nor did peace appear to be less necessary, when they considered what had hitherto been the issue of their military operations at land, than when they reflected on the numberless losses which they had sustained at sea. Their most strenuous endeavours to reduce the revolted provinces

(*d*) Recueil des Voyages &c. Van Meteren passim; --- Grotius. De Wit's Maxims --- Thysii Hist. navalis, passim. Huet on the Dutch Commerce. Janizon Etat present des Prov. Un. Recueil des voyages qui ont servi a l'Etablissement & aux Progrès de la Compagne des Indes Orientales formée dans les Provinces Unies des Pais-Bas, a Rouen, 1725.

vinces to obedience had served only to render the people more expert, and more obstinate in their defence ; to strengthen the bond of their internal union ; and to confirm the neighbouring powers in their resolution of affording them assistance and support. The maritime provinces almost surrounded by the sea, and every where intersected by the rivers and canals, had hitherto been found impregnable ; and the southern frontier had lately been strengthened by the acquisition of some of the strongest places in Flanders and Brabant, Sluys and Breda.

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THE Marquis of Spinola had wisely directed his attack against the confederates in that quarter, where they were the worst prepared for resistance. The army which he commanded, had been the most numerous which could possibly be collected.

THROUGH the united exertions which had been made by the arch-dukes, the court of Spain, and by the marquis himself, who had mortgaged his ample fortune in order to procure money, his troops having regularly received their pay, had been kept under the strictest discipline. All his operations had been conducted with consummate skill ; and nothing had been omitted on his part which might have ensured success ; yet he had been utterly unable to surmount the difficulties which he encountered. Instead of penetrating into the interior provinces, he had been obliged to rest satisfied with conquests, from whence no solid advantage could be derived. From the fatigues which they had undergone, and the moisture of the climate, the army had lately suffered considerable diminution. Those funds from whence the marquis had defrayed the expences of the last campaign, had for several months been

BOOK III. <sup>1607.</sup> almost entirely exhausted; and considerable arrears being now resting to the soldiers, the same mutinous spirit by which they had formerly been actuated, had again begun to appear. A part of them as above mentioned, had already abandoned their officers; and having chosen others from among themselves, had begun to indulge themselves in every species of licentiousness. To these disorders no adequate remedy could possibly be applied during the continuance of the war. All the money which could be raised in the Netherlands, or furnished by the court of Spain, would be hardly sufficient to defray the expence of the new levies which must be made before the next campaign. And in the mean time the licentious spirit of the mutineers must diffuse itself throughout the army; and both the army itself and the provinces, be thereby exposed an easy prey to a watchful enemy; who, being possessed of more certain resources for carrying on the war, had been always ready to avail themselves of every advantage that was afforded them (*e*).

BESIDES these considerations there were some others, which with Philip and his ministers, were supposed to have had still greater weight. A report at that time prevailed, that the Dutch, having entered into a correspondence with the Moors on the coast of Barbary, had agreed to furnish them with ships to transport an army into Spain. And another report was likewise propagated, that the French monarch having formed the design of annexing the Netherlands to France, was now prepared and resolved to carry it into execution. It does not appear, that there was any just foundation for either of these reports. But they seem to have made a strong impression on the minds of the

(*e*) Grotius Lib. XV. Bentiv, art xiii. lib. viii.



the Spanish ministers; who dreading that either an interruption of that domestic tranquillity which Spain had so long enjoyed, or the entire loss of the Netherlands, must be the consequence of the continuance of the war, were now more desirous than ever to have it brought to a conclusion.

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THE archduke was still more solicitous for peace than the Spanish ministers. From the commencement of his sovereignty he had lived in perpetual disquietude. He had fully experienced the vanity of his hopes of success from the support of Spain, which he knew to be too much exhausted, and removed at too great a distance from the scene of action, to afford him the assistance that was necessary. He had no heirs of his own body to whom he could transmit his dominions. And both he and the infanta, besides being sensibly affected by the calamities in which their subjects were involved, were desirous to pass the remainder of their days in peace.

The Archduke Albert solicitous for peace, and why.

THEY were confirmed in their resolution by the marquis of Spinola, who did not hesitate in advising peace, notwithstanding the renown which he had acquired from his conduct of the war. But his ambition being tempered with prudence and moderation, he wisely judged it better to rest satisfied with the glory which he had already gained, than to run the risk of exposing himself to reproach, by attempting what he knew to be impossible. He was better acquainted than any other person with the difficulties to be encountered in the prosecution of the war, and therefore exerted all his influence to persuade the archduke and the Spanish ministers of the folly of persisting in their attempt. The time might come, he represented, when the confederates divided among themselves,

Peace recommended by Spinola.

(f) *Memorie recondite*, Vol. i. p. 418.

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themselves, and no longer supported by so powerful an ally as the king of France, might be induced or compelled to return to their allegiance; but while, through their dread of Spain, their internal union was preserved inviolate, and a prince so near them, possessed of such inexhaustible resources, ever ready to lend them his assistance, as it was absurd to expect to bring the war to the desired issue, so the consequences of persisting in it must prove equally ruinous to the dominions of the archdukes, and to the Spanish monarchy (g).

Albert offers peace to the confederacy.

ALBERT, who entertained the most profound respect for Spinola's judgment, being now more firmly than ever persuaded, that peace was necessary, resolved, whatever construction might be put upon his conduct, to make the confederates an offer of it without delay. Having previously sounded their inclinations, by two persons of the names of Wittenhorst and Gevart, he some time after sent these men back to Holland, with instructions signed by himself and the infanta (b).

Prince Maurice opposes an overture for peace.

THESE instructions they first communicated privately to several individuals, and afterwards requested to be permitted to lay them before the assembly of the states. The members were of different opinions with regard to the expediency of granting them this permission: and prince Maurice endeavoured to dissuade the states from granting it, by expressing his apprehensions that some insidious design was covered under the present proposal, and that as no treaty with Spain, or with the archdukes, while they were so entirely governed in all their conduct by the court of Spain, could be productive of any good effect, so  
the

(g) Bentivoglio Grotius, Baudius, &c.

(b) Dated January 3, 1607.

the granting of a public audience to the commis- BOOK III.  
sioners would only serve to inspire the people with 1607.  
fallacious hopes of peace, and so damp their zeal  
in the prosecution of the war.

BUT Maurice yielded (i), on this occasion, to the persuasions of the celebrated John Olden Barnevelt, pensioner of Holland; one of the greatest statesmen of the age, and equally eminent for his public spirit as his political abilities and integrity. By this venerable patriot it was urged, that while the king of Great Britain stood an idle spectator of the war, and the French monarch seemed to have some great object in view, which he deemed of more importance than the support of the Dutch republick, both these princes were well pleased to observe the Spaniards exhaust their strength by an obstinate perseverance in the war with the Netherlands; and would probably be more liberal in their offers of assistance to the states than they had hitherto been if there were a negociation begun for the establishment of peace. A great majority of the assembly, with Maurice himself, came readily into this opinion, and the commissioners were readily admitted to an audience. They represented that the archdukes, being desirous to put an end to the calamities of war, were ready to enter into treaty with them, either for establishing a perpetual peace, or a long truce, and would consent to such reasonable terms as they could not suppose would be rejected by the United Provinces. That the states could not be ignorant of the equity of the pretensions of the archdukes; that in all their conduct they had shewn how averse they were to every severe and arbitrary measure in the government of their subjects; that they would claim nothing to which they

Peace strenuously recommended by Barnevelt.

(i) It does not appear to have been candour or conviction. Vide Jeannin tom. iii. 106, 107.

**Book III.** <sup>1607.</sup> they had not the most unquestionable title; and that the states might assuredly depend on receiving from them every sort of satisfaction and security they could require for the full enjoyment of their rights and privileges.

To this proposal the states, after an interval of a few days, replied, that no regard could be paid to what the commissioners had delivered in the assembly; since the archdukes, it appeared, still persisted in supposing themselves possessed of a right to the sovereignty of the United Provinces. That in the solemn deed, entitled the Union of Utrecht, the states having, on the justest grounds, renounced the authority of the king of Spain, had asserted their liberty and independence; that this deed had been recognized by many of the European states and princes; that they had long maintained their liberty by force of arms; and were still determined to maintain it to the last extremity; and to reject every proposal for treating with the archduke or the king of Spain, either for a truce or a perpetual peace, unless they were acknowledged as a free state, over which these princes could pretend to no authority.

The United States insist on a recognition of their freedom.

WITH this answer the commissioners returned to Brussels, from whence they wrote a letter to the states, acquainting them that, by the proposal which had been made, the archduke did not mean to claim any authority over them, or to introduce any change into their form of government; but, leaving all their laws and institutions on their present footing, to put a period to the miseries attendant upon war, by a peace or truce; and, soon afterwards, another commissioner was sent into Holland, in whom it should seem Albert could put greater confidence than in his first commissioners. This person was Ney, or Neyen, a native



native of Antwerp, who had been educated in the Protestant religion, but having afterwards embraced the Popish faith, had resided for several years in Spain, and was at this time general of the order of Franciscans; a man of considerable learning, and of great integrity and abilities, and highly distinguished for his eloquence and address. Having been upwards of twenty years of age before he left the Netherlands, he retained a warm affection for his native country; he was at the same time animated with zeal to signalize himself in the service of the archdukes and the court of Spain, and undertook the task imposed upon him with great alacrity.

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HE had no sooner after his arrival in Holland had an interview with some of the principal persons in the republic than he discovered that it would be vain to hope for success in the execution of his embassy, unless the states were in the treaty proposed to be acknowledged free and independent, and for this reason he immediately returned to Brussels, in order to convince the archdukes of the necessity of making this concession.

THESE princes, conformably to the tenor of the above mentioned letter, written by Wittenhorst and Gevert, at their desire, were willing to agree that no mention should be made in the treaty of their right of sovereignty, but expressly to disclaim this right, and formally to acknowledge the sovereignty of the states, they considered as equally dangerous and dishonourable. It would be in words to acknowledge what in their hearts they must disavow; it would be to give their sanction to rebellion, and thereby to afford encouragement to their subjects to imitate the example of the revolted provinces.

BEING

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BEING conscious however, from the state of their finances, that they were utterly unable to carry on the war, they resolved, in conformity to the advice of their counsellors, to yield at least so far as to empower their commissioners to declare, that they were willing to treat with the confederates as with a free people, over whom they pretended to no authority: a form of expression which might be adopted they thought consistently with their honour, as it only denoted a matter of fact, but did not import either a renunciation of their own right to the sovereignty, or an acknowledgment of a right inherent in the states to independence.

A letter  
from the  
archdukes  
to the U-  
nited States.

IN the hopes however that it might satisfy the confederates, Ney was immediately sent back to the Hague with a letter addressed to the states, and signed both by Albert and Isabella, of which the following were the principal contents: that being extremely solicitous to put a stop to the effusion of human blood, they were ready to treat with the United States as with a free people, from whom they claimed no submission or obedience: that they were willing to treat either for the purpose of establishing a perpetual peace, or a long truce, of twelve, fifteen, or twenty years, during the continuance of which the contending parties should retain what they at present possessed; unless it should be mutually agreed, for the common interest of both, to make an exchange of certain towns and territories: that, in order to prevent all suspicion of fraud or sinister intention, ambassadors, natives of the Netherlands, should be nominated by the archdukes, and an equal number named by the United States: that the states should have their choice of the time and place of meeting; and that while the negotiation was carrying on, there should be an entire suspension

sion of hostilities for eight months, both by sea and land.

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FROM the sequel it will appear that all the members of the states were not equally disposed to agree to these proposals ; but by a great majority they were thought a sufficient ground for a negotiation or treaty.

No objection was made to the words in which the declaration of the independence of the republic was expressed. The states, conscious of the superiority of their naval force, refused to consent to the cessation of hostilities at sea ; but they agreed that no hostile enterprize should be undertaken against any of the towns or provinces of the Netherlands, and no new forts erected. It was declared that the truce of eight months should commence on the fourth of May : and the archdukes engaged to procure a ratification of the present convention, including the declaratory clause, within three months, from the king of Spain (*b*).

THIS agreement having been first made with Ney, and a few days after confirmed in proper form by Albert and Isabella, was immediately communicated by the states general to the particular states, and a day of thanksgiving to Heaven for the prospect of peace appointed to be observed throughout the provinces.

THE people in general sincerely rejoiced on this occasion, and were greatly elated when they reflected on the proof which the proposal and concession of the archdukes afforded of the difficulties to which they were reduced.

The prospect of peace matter of joy to the people of the United Provinces.

THE

(*b*) Grotius, lib. xvi. Baudius, lib. i, Bentivoglio, lib. viii. and Meteren, liv. xxviii.

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THE war had now subsisted for almost forty years; and though, during a part of that time, only some of them had been much exposed to the calamities which are commonly attendant upon war, in the immediate scenes of action, yet most of them had experienced these calamities in some degree. They had, on numberless occasions, been disquieted with the most dreadful apprehensions; and they had long groaned under the weight of those enormous taxes, which the supporting of so many fleets and armies make it necessary to impose.

A party in the United States represent the archdukes proposals as insidious.

THERE was a considerable proportion however of the people whose interest and prosperity depended on the continuance of the war, and particularly those who held employments, which must either be suppressed, or rendered much less lucrative in the time of peace. By such persons peace was no less dreaded than it was desired by the generality of their countrymen; and the archdukes proposals were represented as deceitful and insidious. Unhappily many of the clergy joined in representing them in this light; and, by their inflammatory harangues from the pulpit, contributed to encrease the difficulties which the states afterwards encountered in carrying on the treaty.

The negotiation for peace matter of surprise to neighbouring states and princes

THIS negotiation was a matter of great surprize to the neighbouring states and provinces. They could not suppose that the archdukes would have ventured to make such humiliating concessions, if they had not beforehand obtained the consent of the court of Spain; and that court, they thought, would never have consented to it, but in order to procure by artifice what they had been unable to accomplish by force of arms. They were not wholly unacquainted with the disorder that had taken place in the Spanish finances; but they could



could hardly believe that a prince possessed of such copious resources as those of Philip, could be reduced so low as to find it necessary to treat with his rebellious subjects on equal terms. They were therefore suspicious that the Spanish ministers had secretly formed some design, by which their interest or the interest of Europe might be affected; and they were confirmed in their suspicion, by reflecting on the secrecy with which the negotiation had been carried on. At Brussels it had been communicated only to a very small number of the archdukes ministers. At the Hague, the states general alone had been privy to it; and at both these places it had been carefully concealed from all the foreign residents, till it was made known by the states general to the particular states, when they appointed the day of public thanksgiving. These precautions gave a mysterious appearance to the conduct of both parties; yet they had probably been used with no other view, but either to avoid the perplexity arising from too great a multitude of counsellors, or to prevent opposition to the treaty in its infancy, and before the resolution was fully formed, whether it should be rejected or embraced.

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Likewise an  
object of  
jealousy.

THERE were no princes so well entitled to be consulted on this occasion by the states as the kings of Great Britain and France, to whom the provinces had been so much indebted for their assistance in carrying on the war. The former of these princes, from the narrowness of his revenue, joined to his bad œconomy in the administration of it, had never been able to furnish them with pecuniary supplies; but notwithstanding the difficulties in which he was involved, he had consented that the one half of the money with which the French king supplied them, should be deducted from the debt which that prince owed to the

**BOOK III.** the crown of England, and had at all times afforded encouragement to their levies of troops in Britain; while he had secretly discountenanced those which, in consequence of the permission granted in the treaty of peace above mentioned, were attempted by the archduke or the king of Spain.

Conduct of  
the French  
king to-  
wards the  
United  
States, after  
the peace of  
Vervins.

THE obligations however of the states were much greater to the French than to the British monarch; for Henry was not only more able, but more disposed to contribute to their support. Before the peace of Vervins, he had always considered their cause and interest as his own; and after that peace, had given them every proof of friendship that was consistent with fidelity to those engagements which he had come under to the king of Spain. His protestant subjects had been freely admitted to enter into their service, and had, every campaign, formed a considerable proportion of their troops. When, in order to procure tranquillity to France, he found it necessary to engage that he would not any longer afford assistance to the states, he had solemnly declared to the Spanish ambassadors, that he did not thereby mean to preclude himself from repaying those sums to the states, which they had lent him in the time of his distress. And, for some years, the repaying of these sums (*i*) was the only assistance in money which he afforded them. But after discovering that, in violation of the peace of Vervins, the court of Spain had formed intrigues with the Mareschal Biron, and his other dissatisfied subjects, the object of which was the subversion of his government, thinking himself then at liberty to retaliate upon them for so great an injury,

(*i*) The amount of these sums was seven millions three hundred and seventy-eight thousand and eight hundred livres. Sully, liv. xxi.

jury, he had been more open and liberal than formerly in lending his assistance to the United Provinces. He spared no pains to persuade the king of England to enter into an alliance with him for their support, and had, yearly, advanced them sums of money for the payment of their forces.

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It would be absurd to suppose, that in the kindness which Henry had manifested to the states, his conduct had entirely proceeded from motives of friendship and generosity.

It can seldom happen that a prince, in his conduct towards foreign states, could be justified for acting under the influence of such motives. A regard to the interest of his subjects, was, as it ought to have been, the ruling principal of Henry's conduct; and his liberality towards the United Provinces proceeded from his conviction, that on their prosperity, in some measure, depended the peace and tranquillity of his own dominions.

HAVING formerly suffered so much from the arms, and afterwards from the intrigues of the Spaniards, he was still disquieted with apprehensions of the danger to which he was exposed from their turbulent ambition. He had long beheld with pleasure their fruitless contest in the Netherlands, which had contributed so much to exhaust their strength. But having, in concert with some of his wisest ministers, formed a plan for the humiliation both of the German and Spanish branches of the Austrian family, which required leisure before he could bring it to maturity (*k*), he was not displeased to hear that the states had agreed to the archdukes proposals for entering into a treaty; but not having been previously consulted upon the subject, and the archdukes having made

(*k*) Sully's Memoirs, p. 324, &c.

**BOOK III.** made greater concessions than he expected, he  
 1607. dreaded that the court of Spain must have formed some deep insidious design, either against the states themselves or the princes in alliance with them; and therefore he resolved to bestow all that attention upon the present negotiation in the Netherlands, which a transaction of the highest consequence deserved.

The president, Jeannin, sent ambassador to the Hague from France.

His affairs in that country had hitherto been managed with great prudence by his president, monsieur de Burerwall; but, being determined, if possible, to acquire a direction of the present negotiation, and vigilantly to watch over the conduct of the contracting powers, he sent to the Hague, in quality of ambassador extraordinary, the president Jeannin, a minister of great experience, who is equally celebrated in the annals of Henry's reign, and in those of his successor, for his fidelity, his eloquence, and his political abilities.

THIS able negociator had no sooner arrived than he required admission into the assembly of the states; where, after reminding them of the zeal with which his master had for so many years exerted himself in their behalf, he inveighed, with much severity, against those who had falsely accused the king of aiming at the sovereignty of the Provinces; and then gently reproaching the states with giving a colour to this aspersion, by entering into a treaty with the enemy, without his knowledge or consent. But as no prince, he added, could more easily forgive his enemies; so there was none more ready to overlook the omissions of his friends: and, to prove the sincerity of his friendship for the states, the king had now sent him in the character of ambassador, with powers to assure them of the continuance of his



his assistance, in case a continuance of the war BOOK III.  
 should be found expedient ; or if they chose to 1607.  
 put a period to it, to assist them in establishing an  
 honourable and lasting peace. He concluded  
 with requesting that a committee of the states  
 might be appointed, to whom he might more  
 particularly communicate his instructions, and  
 with whom he might occasionally deliberate con-  
 cerning the measures which it might be proper  
 to pursue.

THE states readily complied with this request,  
 and expressed how sincerely they rejoiced to find  
 so great a king disposed to take so warm an inter-  
 est in their affairs.

THIS interposition of Henry gave equal unea-  
 siness to the court of Spain, as it afforded joy to  
 the states. They knew that all his influence  
 would be employed, either to prevent an accom-  
 modation, or to render it derogatory to the ho-  
 nour and interest of Spain. And they were well  
 acquainted with the superior talents of Jeannin,  
 who, while he would keep the states perpetually  
 on their guard, would encourage them to persist  
 in their most exorbitant demands.

THE courts of Spain and Brussels had reason  
 likewise to look for opposition from the British, as  
 well as from the French monarch. For James  
 had no ground, they thought, to entertain any  
 jealousy of the Dutch ; as their dependence on  
 him for their English and Scotch troops, which  
 formed so great a proportion of their army, his  
 possession of the cautionary towns, which were so  
 many keys of the Netherlands, the situation of his  
 dominions, and the coincidence between his sub-  
 jects and those of the states in religious opinions,  
 seemed to render him secure of their alliance. It

**BOOK III.** could not therefore but be agreeable, they imagined, to this prince, to contribute his endeavours, in the treaty of peace, to promote the interest of the states at the expence of Spain. They supposed it, however, to be more likely that he might exert his influence to render this truly abortive, from an apprehension which they had given him ground to entertain, that if Spain were at peace with the United Provinces, she might employ her leisure in fomenting the discontents of his popish subjects in Ireland.

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The king of England concurs with the French monarch in promoting peace.

BUT they afterwards found that they had erred in this conjecture. Indolence, and an aversion to war, were predominant principles in the character of James; and on this occasion determined him, in opposition to his political interest, to concur with the French monarch, in promoting the establishment of peace; besides that, he could not decently have attempted to dissuade the Dutch from listening to the proposals which had been made to them, without being more liberal than the narrow state of his finances would permit, in contributing to their assistance. James had been no less alarmed than Henry, by the intelligence which he received of the negotiation between the states and the archdukes; and had expressed to Caron, the Dutch resident at London, his surprise at the secrecy with which it had been carried on. But the states, solicitous to preserve his friendship, having sent two of their number to explain to him the motives of their conduct, he readily admitted of their apology, and soon after sent sir Ralph Winwood and sir Richard Spencer, in the character of ambassadors, to assist them in bringing the treaty to the desired conclusion.

ABOUT the same time ambassadors arrived in Holland from the king of Denmark, the elector Palatine,

Palatine, the elector of Brandenburg, the landgrave of Hesse, and several other protestant princes of Germany; who, having no interest of their own to adjust or secure, could have no other motive in sending them, but to afford to the states, on this important occasion, a proof of the concern which they took in their prosperity (1).

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In the mean time an event happened, which, by elevating the hopes of one of the contending parties, while it depressed those of the other, contributed to hasten the treaty to a conclusion. The states having, early in the spring of this year, equipped a fleet of twenty-six ships of war, besides transports with stores and provisions, they put it under the command of Heemskirk, one of the bravest officers, and most skillful navigators in the Netherlands, with instructions to sail for the western coasts of Spain and Portugal, and by watching the motions of the enemy, to provide for the safe arrival of the East India fleet. The preservation of this fleet, which there was ground to believe the Spaniards were prepared to intercept, the states informed him was to be considered as a principal object of his expedition; but they required besides, that he should give all possible annoyance to the enemy, and remember, that the archdukes having made proposals for a treaty of peace, the issue of this treaty, and consequently the future prosperity of the United Provinces, would greatly depend on the success with which his arms in the present enterprize should be attended.

Operations of the Dutch at sea, under admiral Heemskirk.

HEEMSKIRK, flattered with the trust reposed in him at so critical a conjuncture, assured the states, when he received his instructions, that whether

P 2

he

(1) Baudius, lib. i. , Bentivoglio, Grotius, and Winwood, vol. ii.

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he should die or survive, they should not have reason to repent of the honour they had conferred on him ; and, in order to express his confidence of success, he declared that he would not accept of any reward or pay, unless the booty should amount to more than five hundred thousand florins ; in which case he would accept only of his share of what should remain after that sum was deducted. He was already, says Grotius, possessed of a greater fortune than his manner of life required ; and, being animated more by the love of glory than of riches, under the simple show and moderate deportment of a citizen, he concealed all the qualities of a hero.

April 10.

HAVING left the Texel on the 25th of March, he first directed his course towards Lisbon ; but being informed on his arrival in the mouth of the Tagus, by some merchants whom he had sent before him, under neutral colours, to procure intelligence, that the first division of the Portuguese and Spanish fleet intended for the Indies and America, had already sailed, and that the ships belonging to the second, were neither fully equipped nor had got their cargoes on board ; but that a Spanish fleet of ships of war was then riding at anchor in the bay of Gibraltar, he immediately set sail for that place, and soon arrived within sight of the enemy.

April 24  
or 25.

The Spaniards having, for several days, observed him steering his course along the coast of Andalusia, had given notice to the admiral Don John Alvarez D'Avila of his approach ; and Davila had full leisure to put his fleet into a proper posture of defence. It consisted of twenty-one ships, nine of which were greatly superior in size to those of the enemy, and was drawn up under the cannon of the fort, having the admiral's gal-

on,



on, which was much larger than the rest, in front. Heemskirk was fully aware of the great advantage which the Spanish admiral must derive from his situation ; but this consideration rather served to confirm him in his purpose than to deter him from carrying it into execution.

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For the greater, said he to his officers, in a council of war which he held before the engagement, the danger to which we shall be exposed, and the more arduous our attempt, the greater will be the glory we shall acquire, and the more important the service we shall perform to our country, if our arms shall be crowned with victory. Many illustrious exploits have our countrymen atchieved in different quarters of the globe, but we are the first who shall adventure to attack the royal fleet in the strongest port of Spain ; and, by our success, shall show how little reason the Spanish monarch, with his long proud list of titles, has to boast that he is the sovereign of the seas. Let us not be disheartened by the enormous size of the enemy's ships, for this very circumstance, by rendering them unwieldy in all their motions, will facilitate our conquest. I require you to do nothing, of which I shall not set you an example. But when the engagement shall be begun, we must remember it will be no longer possible to escape, we must either conquer or perish. Nor is it only our own preservation that depends on the fortitude we shall display in our present enterprise, but the safety of the rich fleet that is in its way from India, the safety of all our countrymen, who are engaged in trade in this part of the world, and the terms likewise of peace which the states shall obtain from the enemy. Let us only exert ourselves as we have done on former occasions, and discover that contempt of danger which is the surest pledge of victory, and we shall enjoy  
the

BOOK III. the glory and felicity of putting a period to the war, and thereby secure to our countrymen that liberty for which they have fought for more than forty years.

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HAVING delivered these exhortations with that natural military eloquence, which he possessed in an eminent degree, and received from all the officers present, the most solemn assurances, confirmed by oath, that, to the utmost of their power, they would imitate his example, and fulfill his commands, he communicated to them his plan of attack, and, as soon as they had returned to their respective ships, he gave the signal to advance.

WHEN Davila perceived them approaching, he ordered the master of a Dutch merchantman, whom he had a prisoner on board his ship, in chains, to be brought upon the deck, and enquired of him what he imagined might be his countrymen's design: to attack your fleet, answered the prisoner; to which Davila, smiling contemptuously replied, that he could not suppose it, since his single ship, he thought, would prove an over match for all the Dutch vessels that were in sight. That may be true, said the other, but, either I know nothing of the character of my countrymen, or the battle will be instantly begun.

Heemskirk attacks a Spanish fleet riding at anchor in the bay of Gibraltar

HEEMSKIRK himself led the van, and steered his course directly towards Davila, who, instead of that contempt which he had so recently expressed, being now overwhelmed with astonishment at the sight of such unprecedented intrepidity, gave orders to slip his anchors, and to retire behind his other ships, hoping that the enemy would thus be induced to exhaust their fury upon them, and


and that afterwards he might come in for a share of the victory.

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BUT Heemskirk, agreeably to his resolution, which he had communicated to his officers, that he himself would attack the admiral's galleon, without hesitation entered within the line of the Spanish fleet, and still continued to advance, keeping up his fire till he had come within musket shot of the enemy. Davila having, before his approach, given the first broadside, it was now returned by Heemskirk, whose fire being more skilfully directed, did greater execution. But soon after, while this gallant seaman stood giving orders, on the most conspicuous part of the deck, his left leg was carried off by a cannon ball, and his thigh being at the same time torn and shattered, he perceived, from the great effusion of blood, that he could not have many minutes to survive. These he employed in exhorting those about him to persevere in the attack, and to remember the oath which they had taken, and the duty which they owed to themselves and to their country; after which having recommended himself to the Divine Mercy, and appointed an officer of the name of Verhoeve to command the ship, he expired.

Death of  
Heemskirk.

So great a disaster was calculated to fill the minds of the spectators with dismay and terror; but that intrepid spirit with which his example had inspired them, far from being extinguished by his death, was rather nourished up into rage and fury, by their desire of taking signal vengeance on the enemy. The battle, which had been suspended for a little while, was instantly renewed with the same vigour as before; and another captain, called Lambert, coming up to support Verhoeve, they united together in their assault on the Spanish admiral's

BOOK III.  admiral's ship, and battered her at once on both sides with uncommon violence.

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IN the mean time the rest of the Dutch fleet had begun their attack upon the other galleons, with the same alacrity and ardour; and the Spaniards long gave proof of equal bravery in their defence. But at length, two of their ships were set on fire and burnt by the enemy, a third was sunk, a fourth, from some accidental cause, blew up, and all the rest, except the admiral's galleon, run ashore.

THE admiral himself had been killed about the same time with Heemskirk, but the officer who succeeded him in the command, had maintained the combat with inflexible fury, and the issue for several hours remained doubtful. At length, a third Dutch ship arriving to the assistance of the other two, the Spanish commander hoisted a white flag, as a signal that he was ready to surrender.

Vindictive  
fury of the  
Dutch.

BUT the Dutch, animated by the same implacable and vindictive spirit, with which their war against the Spaniards had generally been conducted, paid no regard to this signal, and still continued firing till they had beaten down the flag. The hearts of the Spaniards then sunk within them, and their efforts began to relax. The Dutch perceiving this, instantly boarded their vessel, and attacked them with so much fury, that they were quickly over-powered. Most of them were put to the sword, and the rest compelled to jump over board into the sea, where many of them were either shot or drowned. In this engagement the Spaniards lost near two thousand men; and, besides the ships above-mentioned, which were burnt or sunk, almost all the rest were rendered unfit for future service; whereas

They ob-  
tain a signal  
victory.

not



not a single Dutch ship was either lost or destroyed, and only about a hundred men were killed.

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So signal a victory, which excited the most dreadful apprehensions in the minds of the people along the southern coast of Spain, might have been attended with the most important consequences, if Heemskirk had lived to improve it; and either Cadiz or Gibraltar might have been reduced. But the officers, on whom the command had devolved, were satisfied with the glory they had acquired, and, in two days after the engagement, retired to Tetuan, on the African coast; from whence, after repairing their damages, and sending home two of the transports with the sick and wounded, and the body of the admiral, they sailed in different squadrons to the coast of Portugal, Azores, and other places, where they expected to enrich themselves by the capture of the merchant ships.

BUT although this victory was not attended with any new conquest, it had considerable influence on the temper and conduct of the contending parties at the present crisis. It contributed to inspire the Dutch with greater confidence of success in the prosecution of the war, and to render them more intractable; while it tended, on the other hand, to produce a more complying temper on the part of the Spaniards, and to heighten their solicitude for the establishment of peace.

THE archdukes had given the most convincing evidence how strongly they were actuated with this solicitude. They had not only made the first advances to the states, and readily agreed to preliminary terms, which, by all the powers of Europe, were thought humiliating; but no sooner had a cessation of hostilities been agreed to, which

Effects of  
this victory  
on the con-  
tending  
parties.

extended

**BOOK III.** extended only to hostilities at land, than they set  
 1607. at liberty, without a ransom, all the Dutch sailors, who had been taken prisoners by their ships of war, and shewed themselves determined, if possible, to put an end to every species of hostility.

THESE princes had, from the beginning, taken too little pains to save appearances, and had suffered their eagerness for peace to betray them into an act of indiscretion, which, by putting the states more than ever upon their guard, tended to increase the difficulty of accomplishing their design. Their agent having, agreeably to his instructions, requested a private interview with Aersens, the Dutch secretary, after returning him thanks for his good offices with the states, desired him to accept of a diamond of considerable value for his wife, and acquainted him that the archdukes, deeply impressed with a sense of his good intentions, had given orders for the restoration of his house in Brussels; while the marquis of Spinola had sent him an obligation for fifty thousand crowns, fifteen thousand of which should be paid upon demand, and the rest as soon as either a peace or a long truce should be concluded. Aersens, having conjectured what might be Ney's intention in wishing for an interview, and having previously consulted prince Maurice concerning the part which he should act, accepted, though with seeming reluctance, both of the diamond and Spinola's obligation for the money; but, agreeably to his concert with Maurice, he delivered them up to the council of state, to whom he gave a particular relation of the whole affair in a few days after (*m*).

THIS

(*m*) Grotius, 520.

THIS transaction, therefore, served only to excite suspicions of the archdukes designs; while it afforded a striking proof how extremely averse they were to the continuance of the war, and thus contributed to confirm the states in their resolution of insisting upon the most advantageous and honourable terms.

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Eagerness of the archdukes for peace encourages the Dutch to insist on high terms.

THE court of Spain was not in reality less anxious with regard to the issue of the present negotiation than that of Brussels; but, whether from pride or policy, they better concealed their anxiety, and artfully acted for some time as if the treaty had been entirely the plan of the archdukes, to which the king found himself under no necessity, arising from the situation of his own affairs, of yielding his consent.

OF the truth of this, their conduct, with regard to the ratification of the late agreement between the states and the archdukes, affords sufficient evidence. In order to obtain that ratification, Ney, the Franciscan, had gone to Madrid, and, after a delay of several weeks, during which he had occasion for all his address and eloquence, he had now returned with it to Brussels. It was immediately after carried to the Hague by Verreiken, Albert's principal secretary; to whom the states, impatient to know particularly the contents of his instructions, granted an audience on the next morning after his arrival. They had been beforehand informed, by a letter from Spinola, that their agreement with the archdukes had been ratified by the king, and that it was in order to communicate to them the deed of ratification that Verreiken was sent into Holland. But they were extremely dissatisfied, when they examined this deed, both with the form and the contents.

The United States dissatisfied with Philip's ratification of the preliminaries of peace.

It

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It was conceived in vague and general terms, and not in the common form of a compact or convention. It did not comprehend the essential clause relative to the sovereignty and independence of the United Provinces. Even in the copy of the archdukes agreement, which was prefixed to the deed, that clause was omitted; and, in contradiction to the spirit and meaning of it, the archdukes were styled the sovereigns of the Netherlands. It was subscribed by Philip, "I, The King," (Yo el Rey) a form of subscription which he only used where his subjects were addressed. It was sealed with his small seal, instead of the great one; and it was written on paper, and not on vellum, as was usual in all transactions of importance.

THESE omissions and informalities were instantly perceived by all the deputies; but, that their conduct might not appear precipitate, they appointed another meeting for the mature consideration of them; after which they unanimously resolved to reject the deed of ratification, as being neither such as the archdukes had undertaken to procure, nor affording a sufficient ground for proceeding in the intended treaty. Verreiken, to whom this resolution was communicated, laboured to persuade the states that the defects and informalities complained of must have been entirely owing to carelessness on the part of the transcriber, it being impossible to doubt that the king would have entirely rejected the agreement, if he had not meant to grant his ratification of the whole.

BUT the states remained inflexible in their purpose; for it was equally impossible, they thought, to suppose that a deed of so great importance, in the consequences of which not only the archdukes,



dukes, but the king himself, were so deeply interested, could have been left by his ministers to be devised by an inferior clerk or secretary. It was impossible but his ministers must have perceived the want of so essential a clause as that which related to the independence of the provinces; a clause which was obviously of such a nature, that it was impossible to doubt of its having been purposely omitted, but without which they were unalterably resolved to decline all farther negociation, either with the archdukes, or with the court of Spain.

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VERREIKEN, perceiving that no arguments he could employ would prove effectual, requested liberty to remain at the Hague for six days longer, till he should acquaint the archdukes with what had passed, and receive their instructions for his future conduct. With this request the states complied; and, before the expiration of the time specified, a letter from the archdukes arrived, in which they engaged, that, though they could not perceive the validity of these objections which the states had made to the form of the king's ratification, who thought, that, as he had ratified a part of the convention without objections to the rest, the deed ought to be considered as a ratification of the whole; yet, in order to remove every obstacle to the treaty proposed, and to shew how sincerely they desired the establishment of peace, they would procure another ratification in the form required: but, in the mean time, they hoped, and requested, that the states would give proof of sincerity on their part, by recalling their fleet from the coasts of Spain.

ON this occasion a violent contest arose among the deputies, and several of them discovered an inclination

The treaty  
in danger  
of being  
broken off.

BOOK III. inclination to break off the treaty without delay.

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It was now sufficiently manifest, they alledged, that the Spaniards were not sincere in their professions. It was absurd to expect that an enemy, so inveterate and implacable, would ever seriously think of peace on fair and equitable terms, till they were compelled by some dire necessity. It was evident that their object had, from the beginning, been to disarm the confederates, and to procure a respite from the war, till their preparations for prosecuting it with greater vigour were complete. The fleet, therefore, ought not to be recalled, but to be reinforced, and the people roused from their present lethargy, by apprising them of the snare which had been laid for their destruction.

THESE were not, however, the sentiments of the greater part of the deputies; for although the whole assembly were disposed to ascribe duplicity and artifice to the court of Spain, only some of them thought there was any ground for calling in question the sincerity of the archdukes, who, in the opinion of the generality, had, to the utmost of their power, fulfilled their engagements, and could not be justly blamed for the defects or informalities of the ratification.

The United States agree to recall their fleet from the coasts of Spain.

It was therefore resolved, partly from the respect due to these princes, and partly from dread of the imputation of insincerity in the professions which they had made of their desire of peace, that the fleet should be recalled. But they, at the same time, required that the ratification, executed in proper form, should be produced within a limited time specified; and, in order to prevent any future omission or error, they delivered to Verreiken three copies, precisely of the same import, one in Latin, another in French, and a third

third in Dutch, declaring, that, without a faithful transcript of one or other of these, they would instantly break off the negociation, and apply themselves to the prosecution of the war. BOOK III.  
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It was Barnevelt who made this declaration, in the name of the other deputies; after which he reminded Verreiken of the attempt which had been made by the Franciscan to corrupt the secretary. “There,” said he, “is the diamond, and here is the marquis of Spinola’s obligation for fifteen thousand crowns. Let them both be restored to their proper owners: such presents are not necessary for the purpose of obtaining peace, if your masters wish for it, on equitable terms; and if they are not willing to agree to such terms, their presents will not be sufficient to procure it. Were it possible that one or two persons could be found in this assembly so base as to accept your bribes, and, for the sake of them, to make a sacrifice of the liberty of their country, yet a great majority will retain their integrity, and render your largesses, though they were much greater than your masters can afford, of no avail (n).”

VERREIKEN, being unprepared for this attack, was thrown into some confusion, and replied, that “Ney must certainly have done what he was accused of without any authority from the arch-dukes.” It was impossible that the states could give credit to this assertion; but, being satisfied with having so publicly expressed their resentment, the meeting was immediately dismissed, Verreiken permitted to return to Brussels, and soon after the fleet was recalled.

THE

(n) Grotius and Baudius.

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THE archdukes, at the same time, renewed their applications at the court of Spain; and at length, though not without considerable difficulty, obtained such a ratification of their convention from the king as they hoped the confederates would accept.

IN this new deed all the same clauses were inserted, which the copies transmitted by the states contained, and nearly the same form of expression was observed; but to the declaration that the king and archdukes were willing to treat with the confederates as with a free people, over whom they pretended to no authority, a clause was annexed, declaring, that in case the negotiation should be broken off on account of religion, or any other disputed point, the ratification should be void, and all matters remain on their present footing. Besides which, the deed was incorrectly written, some words being interlined, and others wholly omitted. It was written in Spanish, and not in Latin, French, or Dutch, as had been requested; upon paper, and not on parchment, and subscribed like the former one not with the name of the king, but with the words "I The King," as if Philip had still considered the confederates as his subjects.

THESE latter circumstances, though they afforded a proof of extreme carelessness, or of the most childish obstinacy, on the part of the Spanish ministers, were deemed of small importance; and it was proved that even the king of England, in his late treaty of peace with Spain had acquiesced in the same form of subscription. But the deputies could not be so easily reconciled to the clause annexed to the declaration of their liberty; for although, as they represented to the archdukes commissioners, they were free, whether the



the king of Spain should acknowledge it or not, BOOK III.  
1607. yet the annexed clause seemed to imply that their freedom depended on the will of the king; and to accept of the ratification with a clause of this import, might be interpreted as an acknowledgment, on their part, of the truth of the position which the cause implied. Besides that, from the manner in which mention is made in this annexed clause of religion, and other disputed points, there was ground to suspect, that, in the treaty proposed, the king intended that the establishment of religion, and other matters which respected the internal government of the provinces, should be discussed.

To this the people of the United Provinces would never be persuaded to consent. To insist upon it, would be to treat them as a dependent, and not as a free people; and, therefore, to the states it appeared extremely doubtful, whether, in order to save a great deal of unnecessary trouble, it were not expedient that the negotiation should be instantly broken off. But, as they should be sorry to give ground to suspect that they were not desirous to put a period to the calamities of war, they had resolved to refer the whole matter to the states of the particular towns and provinces, that the people might have an opportunity of judging for themselves in a matter in which they were so deeply interested. With this answer the commissioners returned to Brussels, after receiving an assurance from the states, that, in seven weeks from the present time, information would be transmitted to the archdukes whether the ratification was rejected or received (o).

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Q

AT

(o) Baudius, Grotius, &c. Jeannin, tom. i. Lettre au Roy, Oct. 27, 1607.

The

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Disputes  
and parties  
in the U-  
nited Pro-  
vinces.

AT this juncture, both the people and their rulers differed widely in their sentiments with regard to the question that was now before them; while one party maintained that the ratification ought, without hesitation, to be rejected, and the other thought, that although it was not altogether such as they wished it to have been, yet it ought to be admitted as a sufficient foundation for the treaty that was proposed. Prince Maurice was at the head of the former of these parties, and Barnevelt of the latter; and each of these leaders exerted himself with great activity and zeal in gaining converts to his opinion. There was ground to suspect that the motives by which the prince was actuated, on this occasion, were not perfectly pure and disinterested, but that he dreaded the diminution of his power, if peace were established, and, partly on this account, was desirous of the continuance of war. The reasoning,

The states, on this occasion, required that the original deed itself should be left in their hands. The commissioners having no instructions on this head, the Franciscan went himself to Brussels to receive them; and the archdukes agreed to the request of the states on these conditions, that they should give an obligation in writing to restore the deed if required, and should, at the same time, declare that the archdukes, in procuring it from the king, had fully performed the engagement which they had come under in their first agreement with the states. The states refused their consent to these conditions, but still insisted, that, as the deed was addressed to them, it should be suffered to remain in their possession. Ney returned to Brussels a second time, and prevailed on the archdukes to yield to their demand. Though the ratification was not such as the states wished it to have been, yet it should seem to have been no small gratification to them, that the king had granted a declaration, however qualified and expressed, of their being a free people, over whom he pretended to no authority. In return for the complaisance of the archdukes on this occasion, they would gladly have given the declaration required, that these princes had fully performed their engagement, but thought it was impossible to give it consistently with truth.

ing, however, which he employed, was specious, BOOK III.  
and made a strong impression on the minds of 1607.  
many of his countrymen.

As the court of Spain, he said, had on former occasions given the most unquestionable evidence of their duplicity, so at present it was impossible to doubt of their being actuated by some sinister design. In their first ratification, they had not only declined to acknowledge the independence of the states, but had expressly affirmed, that they were subject to the dominion of the archdukes. To their second, they had subjoined a clause which rendered their independence contingent and precarious, and wholly dependent on the will of the king. Whoever considers the vast dominions of Spain, and her inveterate habits of domination and pride, would not be easily convinced that she intended to observe a truce, or peace, any longer than it might suit her views of tyranny and conquest. It was the design of that ambitious and politic nation, to break the spirit of the confederates by the habits of indolence and luxury. The martial spirit would leave the republic, and would not be easily revived. The citizens would become remiss and inattentive to the defence of objects, which, when they knew them to be in danger, they considered as dearer than life. None are so easily subdued as those who think they have nothing to fear. The fear of the enemy is a bond of unity, and produces both military discipline and civil obedience, while states living in security, opulence, and ease, are subdued by habits of effeminacy, torn by intestine discords, and thus fall an easy prey to some ambitious and warlike neighbour. It was for this reason, that Scipio Nasica opposed with so much wisdom, the false policy of Cato, who advised the destruction of Carthage.

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1607. WHEN the minds of the confederates should cool, and their patriotism begin to languish, the Spaniards hoped, by various arts of corruption, to bring them again under the yoke of their former sovereigns. But whatever might be the effect of such artifices, they would recruit their exhausted strength, and whenever a fit opportunity should offer, violate the peace they now solicited.

THEIR army, at the present period, was universally discontented on account of their want of pay. Great numbers had already mutinied ; and if the war continued, there was ground to expect, that the greatest part would refuse to submit to the controul of military discipline. With such an army, no prudent general would venture to engage in any important enterprize. And the people, among whom they were quartered, being grievously oppressed, both by the government and the mutineers, were ready to shake off a yoke which had become intolerable.

THE Spaniards were still less formidable at sea than at land. From the great decrease of their trade, they found it impossible to procure sailors sufficient to man their ships of war ; and their fleets, far from being able to contend with those of the states, were even unable to defend themselves in their harbours, under the cannon of their forts.

SUCH was the present state of the Spanish fleet and army ; whereas those of the confederates had never been in so flourishing a condition. Their army was at present, as it had always been, under the most perfect discipline ; regularly paid, and abundantly supplied with every thing necessary to enable it to act with vigour : while their  
fleets,



fleets, more numerous than ever, had in almost every quarter of the globe proved an overmatch for those of the enemy; and had obtained over them several important victories, which had been attended with a great increase of trade, and wealth, and power. They had established trade in many places, which, till lately, had been visited only by the Spaniards and Portuguese. They had got possession of several of the most important branches of the Indian commerce; and if they did not suffer themselves to be diverted from the prosecution of their naval enterprizes, they would ere long make themselves masters of the whole. The war, therefore, which they had carried on against the enemy at sea, had already proved, and would still continue to prove, a mine of gold to the United Provinces; while their military operations at land, had neither exhausted their riches nor their strength. Their army in a great measure consisted of foreign troops, while the natives were permitted to apply themselves to manufactures and trade, and all the money expended for the support of the army, was spent at home, either in purchasing the manufactures of the country, or those commodities which merchants found it so beneficial to import from foreign parts. It had indeed been found necessary to impose taxes on several commodities; and many persons complained of the burthens of these taxes, yet both the riches and the number of the people had every year increased, since the taxes were imposed; and no country abounded more in the necessaries and conveniencies of life.

Of the truth of these observations, the Spaniards were sufficiently aware. They had come at length to perceive that the war had to the confederates proved a copious source of prosperity; while their own strength had been exhausted by

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it, and their commerce almost ruined; and they were for this reason desirous of a temporary peace, hoping thereby to avert the danger to which they saw themselves exposed; to deprive the confederates of the advantages which they at present enjoyed; to sow discord among the provinces, and to accomplish, by fraud and artifice, what they had hitherto been unable to attain by force of arms. That such was their intention, appeared from the disingenuity of their conduct with regard to the deed of ratification.

BUT whether this was in reality a design or not, no doubt could be entertained that, as it was for the interest of the Spaniards that peace should be established, it was no less for that of the states that the war should be prosecuted with vigour, till the enemy were reduced to the necessity of acting with greater sincerity, and more equitable terms could be obtained, than they had ground to expect at the present period.

THIS reasoning produced the desired effect, chiefly in Holland and Zealand, where the people were conscious, that their prosperity had been in some measure owing to the war; while their situation rendered them more secure against its attendant calamities, than the inhabitants of the inland provinces. But the reasons on the other side, which were urged by Barnevelt, were generally thought to be more deserving of attention and regard.

The reasons urged by Barnevelt for peace.

THERE was too much ground, he allowed, for the imputation which had been cast upon the court of Spain, of insincerity in their conduct, with regard to the deed of ratification. It was evident, from the manner in which they had acknowledged the independence of the States, how extremely

extremely reluctant they had been in granting that acknowledgment. The clause annexed to it, declaring that in case the negociation should be broken off, the ratification should be void, ought not to have been inserted. It was even unnecessary to insert it for any purpose which the Spaniards could have in view, because, in every treaty, the validity of any particular concession, must depend on the event of the treaty, and if it prove abortive, all the claims of the contending parties, whether real or pretended, must remain as before its commencement. From the insertion however of this clause, it could not be inferred that the court of Spain had formed any insidious design. Their reluctance to acknowledge the independence of the states, might justly have been expected; and the little pains which they had taken to conceal it, afforded a strong presumption that their intentions were sincere.

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BUT although they should in reality intend to violate the peace which they now solicited, was this a sufficient reason for refusing to treat with them, or for declining to accept of a peace upon equitable terms? Ought peace to be rejected in every case, where it was possible that the conditions of it might be violated? Ought states to live in perpetual war, because there was ground to apprehend, that they might not be able to maintain a perpetual and uninterrupted peace? If the Spaniards shall hereafter revive their claim of sovereignty over the provinces, will this claim derive any validity from the present treaty, in which they have so explicitly renounced it? Will they not then justly expose themselves to the reproach of having acted with duplicity; and is it not the natural tendency of such a conduct, to increase the number of their enemies, while we shall then, as well as now, be possessed of arms to maintain our

BOOK III. liberty, and have the same or more numerous  
 1607. friends to assist us in counteracting their tyrannical designs?

GREAT disorders, it was true, prevailed at the present period in the Spanish monarchy: the royal navy had suffered a considerable diminution, and the archdukes army was extremely ill paid and mutinous. But although this consideration might justify the states in demanding the most advantageous terms of peace, it would not justify them for resolving to persist, at all adventures, in the prosecution of the war. From negligence and inattention, but chiefly from the folly of engaging at once in too many difficult and expensive enterprises, Spain was weakened; but it would be madness to proceed on the supposition, that her strength was spent, for she was still possessed of inexhaustible resources; and nothing but greater prudence and moderation were requisite to render her formidable to all her enemies. During the last campaign, she had exerted herself more vigorously than several years preceding, and if the rivers that year had not been swelled to an unusual height, her troops might have penetrated into the heart of the provinces. She might still continue, and perhaps redouble her exertions; and if she was incensed, as she would justly be, in case the states should obstinately refuse to treat with her, she might be determined to direct her whole attention against the dominions of the states, and put forth a degree of strength which they would be unable to withstand.

THEIR arms had hitherto been attended with greater success, than could justly have been expected against so potent an enemy; but of all human events they should remember those of war were the most fortuitous. The republic had in  
 former




former periods been brought so low, that the states would gladly have submitted to the sovereignty of a foreign prince: and one unfortunate campaign, or the loss of a fleet, which depended for its preservation on the mercy of the winds and waves, might again reduce them to the like desperate condition.

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THEY had been enabled to attain their present prosperity, by the friendly assistance of the queen of England, and the king of France; but the former of these princes, who had long been their principal support, was dead, and her successor either not so able, or not so willing to assist them; while the latter was far advanced in years; was desirous for reasons which could not be easily penetrated, to have the war brought to a conclusion; and although during his life, they might trust that he would not suffer them to be oppressed, yet he might ere long leave his kingdom to an infant son, during whose minority, the Spaniards were likely to have greater influence over the French counsels, than the United States.

THE great object, as well as the end of war was peace; and advantageous terms of peace could never be so easily obtained, as when the enemy found it necessary to apply for it, in order to retrieve the ruined state of his affairs. The object of the present war had, from the beginning, been to shake off the yoke of the Spanish government, and to assert their liberty. This object was now secured, and the king of Spain himself was ready to treat with them as with a free people, over whom he pretended to no authority. Could they be justified in their own eyes, or could they be justified in the opinion of the world, if they should refuse to treat with him? Would the pretext that he was insincere in the acknowledgment which he had

BOOK III.  1607. had made of their independence, and that possibly he will hereafter revive his claim, and refuse to fulfill his engagement, afford a vindication of a conduct so singular, so haughty, and contemptuous? Was the war to be prosecuted till they had accomplished the dissolution of the Spanish monarchy? Was this an event either to be expected or desired? Were the people of the United Provinces to be the only people on earth, who were never to enjoy the blessings of tranquillity?

THE war indeed had been the occasion of prosperity to some, who ought to rest satisfied with the advantages which they had already derived from it: but to great numbers, it had often been a copious source of distress and misery. Many groaned under the burthens which the war had made it necessary to impose; and many lamented the loss of their friends, and the ruin of their fortunes, which are the inseparable concomitants even of the most successful war. It was surely desirable to put a period to these calamities; and if they did not embrace the present opportunity of doing it, provided it could be done consistently with their honour, and their future security, they would be answerable for all the blood that should be spilt, and could not be justified in the sight either of God or man."

THIS discourse, which was delivered in an extraordinary assembly, where deputies from all the provinces and almost all the towns were present, deriving weight from the character of the speaker, as well as from the solidity of the reasoning which it contained, was listened to with great attention; and, while it produced conviction in the minds of the greater part, it imposed silence upon the rest, and extorted their consent to the measure which it was intended to recommend. Prince Maurice, supported

supported by the deputies from the province and towns of Zealand, proposed that the form of an explicit and unconditional acknowledgment of their independence should be transmitted to the archdukes, to be subscribed by them as a preliminary article; but this motion being rejected as harsh and offensive by a great majority, it was at length resolved to appoint ambassadors for the purpose of negotiating peace; and notice of this resolution was immediately sent to the court of Brussels (o). BOOK III,  
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Dec. 24th.

It was at the same time proposed to the archdukes that the conferences should be held at the Hague, which for some time past had been the seat of government in the United Provinces; and, in order to induce them to comply with this proposal, it was suggested, that, as the ambassadors of the states could not be invested with very ample powers, they might often have occasion to consult their constituents; and if any other place of meeting, or any town within the territories of the archdukes were made choice of, much time would be lost, and the negotiation be unnecessarily prolonged.

THE archdukes, solicitous to avoid every cause of delay, readily agreed to this proposal, and immediately appointed for their commissioners the marquis of Spinola, Mancieidor, a Spaniard, their secretary at war, Richardot, the president of their privy council, Verreikens, their private secretary of state, and Ney, the Franciscan, to whose activity and address they thought themselves much indebted Commissioners for peace on the part of Spain.

(o) Grotius, lib. xvi. Bent. part. iii. lib. viii. The time fixed for the suspension of arms being expired, it was prorogued on the present occasion, and afterwards, from time to time, on different occasions, till the treaty was concluded.

BOOK III. indebted for having brought the negociation thus  
 1607. far.

And on  
 that of the  
 United  
 States.

THE commissioners appointed by the states were nine in number, seven of whom were nominated by the seven provinces, and the remaining two by the ancient body of the nobles. These two were count William of Nassau, a near relation of prince Maurice, and Walraeve, lord of Brederode; and those appointed by the several provinces were among the most respectable persons in the commonwealth: but the confidence of the people of all ranks, at this important crisis, was chiefly placed in Barnevelt, who was nominated commissioner by the province of Holland.

Suspicion  
 of Spain the  
 predomi-  
 nant passion  
 of the  
 Dutch.

THIS virtuous and able statesman was indefatigable in his attention to every step of the present negociation; and, before the conferences were begun, he devised an expedient admirably calculated to promote the end in view. The predominant passion in the minds of his countrymen was still, as it had been for many years, suspicion of the intentions of the court of Spain. It had been chiefly from this quarter that he encountered so much difficulty in persuading them to agree to the archdukes proposals of a conference; and he still dreaded that the same cause might prevent this conference from being attended with the desired effect. This distrust of the Spaniards he apprehended would shew itself on every occasion, and on the slightest grounds; and it would be carefully fomented by prince Maurice and others, who wished for a continuance of the war. In order, therefore, to quiet the apprehensions of the people, to deprive the prince and his partizans of a pretext, of which he knew they would readily lay hold, and at the same time to intimidate or over-awe the Spaniards, he proposed to the French  
 and



and British ministers that, before the conferences were opened, their masters should enter into a new alliance with the states; that they should engage to employ their endeavours to procure for them an equitable peace; and, in case of their procuring it, should farther engage to afford them such assistance as should be necessary for maintaining it inviolate.

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THIS proposal did not meet with the same favourable reception from the British as from the French monarch. Though James was determined by the motives above explained to concur with Henry in promoting the establishment of peace; yet, having ground for doubt whether the interest of his own dominions did not rather require that the war should be continued, he was never so deeply interested, as he desired that the states should believe, in the success of their present negociation (*p*). Besides that, he knew how much it was in the power of the Spaniards to disturb his tranquillity by their intrigues with the Irish Catholics, and was therefore unwilling to incur their resentment. Influenced by these considerations, he declined at this time to enter into the proposal alliance. But Henry more decided in his

(*p*) This appears from several passages in Winwood's Memorials, and particularly from the letters writ by the earl of Salisbury to Sir R. Winwood, Sir Richard Spencer, and Sir Charles Cornwallis. "You added (says Salisbury, in a letter dated March 20th 1607, to the two former) that this comfort you have that both parties desire the peace with more than an ordinary affection. Which words I rather judge to proceed out of a contemplation of the tediousness which this business is to bring with it, than out of any affectionate desire or good judgment of the effects which this business is to bring with it; considering that the best in that kind that can be hoped for, is like to add but trouble and care to us in these parts; and yet I would not have you now gather that I would have you break it." Vol. ii. p. 378,

**BOOK III.** his conduct, and less afraid of the consequences  
 1607. of giving offence to the court of Spain, readily yielded his consent, and sent orders to the president, Jeannin, to finish the treaty without delay.

AGAINST this measure, which no pains were taken to conceal, the Spanish ministers having warmly remonstrated at the court of France, and having received no other answer, but that if rightly understood, it must contribute to hasten the establishment of peace, they from thence perceived that it was become necessary for them, and therefore resolved, if possible, to procure the French king's assistance in their negociation with the states. For this purpose, but under a different pretext, the marquis of Villa Franca was sent to Paris, in the character of ambassador, and from that time Henry acted as mediator between the contracting powers, although it was well understood how much more he favoured the pretensions of the Dutch than those either of the archdukes or the king of Spain (*q*).

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IN the mean time the archdukes commissioners arrived at the Hague, and a few days after the  
 Feb. 6th. conferences were begun (*r*). The two or three first sessions having been employed by the commissioners in examining their powers, and in discussing certain objections against them, which, after some

(*q*) Bentivoglio, Grotius, &c. & Jeannin, tom. ii. p. 69.

(*r*) A great number of people from the other towns had come to the Hague at this time, chiefly moved by their curiosity to see Spinola, who for some years had been an object of their highest admiration, which was on some occasions mixed with terror. Prince Maurice having gone out to meet him, received him into his own coach, and conducted him to the Hague. And both these great men, it is said, were well pleased to find the high opinion which they had formed of each other's abilities, from their actions, justified by their discourse which they held together in the present interview.

Some altercation, it was agreed were not sufficient BOOK III.  
to stop their procedure; the Dutch commissioners 1603.  
required, as a preliminary article, a solemn acknowledgment, in the name of the king of Spain and the archdukes, of the independence of the United Provinces; including an explicit renunciation of all right to authority over them; together with an obligation, binding on their successors as well as on themselves, that they should not henceforth use the arms or titles of the provinces, or any other marks of their ancient sovereignty.

THE commissioners of the archdukes were much offended at the latter part of this requisition; and, besides remonstrating against it to the Dutch commissioners themselves, they bitterly complained to the British and French ambassadors, of the arrogance discovered in making so unusual a demand. It had been the ordinary practice, they observed, of princes to retain the titles of the states or kingdoms which they had lost. The Catholic king was styled king of Jerusalem, and duke of Burgundy; the king of France called himself king of Navarre; and the king of England still assumed the title of king of France. In requiring his Catholic majesty therefore to renounce his titles as well as his sovereignty, the states were not only guilty of arrogating to themselves the privilege of introducing a new practice, but of impeaching the conduct of the greatest sovereigns in Europe, and particularly of the kings of France and Britain, who had no less reason to be offended at the demand of the Dutch commissioners than the king of Spain.

THE French and English ambassadors, however, declined on this occasion to interpose, and the archdukes commissioners, after having obtained the

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The Dutch  
refuse to  
give up  
their trade  
to India.

the consent of the archdukes, acquainted those of the states at the next meeting, that they were ready to grant the renunciation required in its full extent. The Dutch were agreeably surpris'd at the facility with which the Spaniards thus yielded to their request; but when Richardot, who was the speaker on this occasion, added that, in return for so liberal a concession, it was expected that the states would agree to abstain for the future from all commerce in the Indies, and rest satisfied, as they had done till about ten years before, with the trade which they had carried on with Spain, and other countries in Europe, they were inflamed with indignation, and exclaimed, that one moment the king and archdukes acknowledged them to be a free and independent people, and the next shewed they were determined to treat them as slaves, and, if possible, to deprive them of the most valuable branches of their liberty: that these princes, in renouncing their claim to the sovereignty of the provinces, had given nothing to the states which they did not possess before; while, in requiring them to relinquish their trade to India, they, in effect, required them to abandon what was known to be a principal source of their wealth and power: but they declared that no consideration would ever induce them to comply with a demand which was equally exorbitant and unjust; for, under what pretext could the Spaniards claim the exclusive privilege of trading to the Indies? These countries were not the property of the Spaniards, but belonged to a great number of independent princes, many of whom chose rather that their subjects should engage in trade with the Dutch than with the Spaniards or Portuguese. These countries were likewise of an immense extent; they could furnish materials for trade to all the commercial nations in Europe; and it was a violation of the law of nature, and contrary to the  
general



general good of mankind, for any one nation to endeavour to engross the whole. The states would not refuse to agree to any arrangement with regard to the Indian trade, which was calculated to promote the mutual interest of both nations. But, having been reduced by the Spaniards themselves to the necessity of having recourse to this new branch of commerce, having begun it in the face of difficulties, which it had required an enormous expence, and the most vigorous exertions to surmount, having established a company for carrying it on, and already tasted of the profits arising from it, they were determined, whatever should be the consequences, to persevere. The Spanish commissioners had no other reply to make to this answer of the states, but that the Spaniards and Portuguese had long been in the sole possession of the trade to India, and that the king of Spain had not only refused to grant a participation in that trade to the French and English, but likewise to his well affected subjects in the Netherlands: but no regard was paid to these considerations by the commissioners of the states; and they were confirmed in their purpose by the unanimous voice of their countrymen, joined to a representation which was made on this occasion to the states by the India company.

THE trade, they represented, with Spain and Portugal, had never been, and could never be productive of any advantage to individuals or to the public, equal to that which arose from the trade to India. In this, and the other branches of foreign trade, of which the Spaniards wanted to deprive them, upwards of a hundred and fifty ships and eight thousand sailors were employed. These ships were all of a considerable size, and might at any time be converted, at a small expence, into ships of war, when the public exigencies

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cies should require. The Indian trade was not only infinitely more profitable than the Spanish, as it consisted in going to the fountain head for those commodities, which they had formerly purchased at second hand from the Spaniards and Portuguese, but was likewise much more safe and certain, because it did not, like the other, depend on the caprice of the king or of the ministers of Spain. They had formerly experienced how little they had to rely on the trade with Spain and Portugal. Their sailors had been seized and imprisoned, or sent to the galleys to work as slaves, and their ships and goods had been confiscated. It would be always in the power of the Spaniards to exercise the same oppressions. They would renew them under various pretexts, on the slightest grounds of offence; and after having persuaded the states to abandon their Indian commerce, they would next exclude them from that of Spain and Portugal, in the hopes that by thus reducing their naval power, they might again compel them to submit to their authority. The states might judge of how much importance the trade of India was to the Spaniards, from the eagerness which they discovered to prevent any other nation from partaking in it; but it was of still greater importance to the people of the United Provinces, who depended almost entirely upon that trade for their subsistence, and, without the resources which they derived from it, would be utterly unable to maintain their liberty and independence. Nor was it interest only which the states would sacrifice, by granting the request of the Spanish commissioners, but likewise their integrity and honour; since alliances had been formed with the Indian princes, and some of these princes, trusting to the protection of the company, acting by the authority of the states, had shaken off the yoke of the Spaniards, and thereby exposed themselves to their severest vengeance,

vengeance, if, by any article in the present treaty, the company were to be prevented from fulfilling their engagements. BOOK III.  
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THE states were more than ever determined, by these considerations, to reject the request of the Spanish commissioners; but, that they might afford some proof of the sincerity of their desire of peace, they gave them their choice of the three following proposals. The first, that, conformably to the ordinary tenor of treaties of peace, both parties should equally enjoy the liberty of commerce by sea and land. The second, that the united Provinces should abstain from all commerce with countries under the government of Spain, on this side of the northern tropic, while, on the other side, all matters should remain on their present footing; the states being satisfied that peace should take place on this side, while hostilities, if unavoidable, might continue on the other. And the third, that Spain should give no molestation to the Dutch in India for seven years, before the expiration of which a new treaty should be set on foot, in order to devise some proper means of accommodation. The Spanish commissioners replied, that they were not possessed of power to agree to any of these proposals. They knew that the king of Spain had renounced his sovereignty over the provinces, in the hopes of their consenting entirely to desist from the Indian trade; but they should appoint one of their number to go to Madrid for new instructions. The Franciscan was accordingly dispatched for that purpose; and, in the mean time, the commissioners proceeded to take some of the other points in question under their consideration.

THE Dutch having, from the beginning, suspected, on account of the mention of religion in  
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**BOOK III.** <sup>1608.</sup> the king's second ratification, that it was intended to propose some change in their established religion, required of the Spanish commissioners to declare whether they had received any instructions on that head, and what their instructions were. The commissioners acknowledged that they were indeed instructed to make a proposal to the states with regard to religion; but added, that they could not enter on the discussion of this article till several others had been discussed. Of all the articles they knew, there was none in which the king and the duke of Lerma were so deeply interested; but since their arrival in Holland, they had come to be persuaded, from private information, that no proposal which they were empowered to make on this subject would be listened to by the states. They were likewise afraid that the discussion of a point of so delicate a nature, on which the passions of the Dutch would be so easily inflamed, might occasion a sudden dissolution of the conferences; and from the sequel it is probable that they had sent the Franciscan to Madrid as much for the purpose of sounding the inclinations of the court, and knowing their ultimate resolution on this head, as on that of the Indian commerce. Although they were repeatedly urged, therefore, by the Dutch to declare what they were instructed to propose with regard to religion, they as often declined complying with their request, and insisted that it was better previously to examine the other questions in dispute.

ONE of these related to the duties which, during the war, had been laid by the Dutch on all goods imported by the Scheld to Antwerp. The archdukes commissioners insisted that all those duties should be taken off: nor were those of the states unwilling to abolish such of them as had been imposed in consideration of the war; but they



they required that the same duties should still be paid by the subjects of the archdukes and the king of Spain as were exacted from the subjects of the states, to enable them to defray the expence of the fortifications on the banks of the Scheld, and of the ships of war that were necessary for the protection of their commerce. This was the pretext which they employed, although it is probable they were chiefly actuated by their dread lest the trade of Antwerp should be revived to the prejudice of that of their own commercial towns in the maritime provinces.

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ANOTHER point which engaged the attention of the commissioners, regarded the mutual exchange of those towns and districts which the contending powers had acquired by conquest from one another. The states were at this time in possession of Sluys, and the isle of Cadfant in Flanders, and of Breda, Bergen op 'Zoom, and Gertrudenberg, in Brabant; all of which places were of the first importance, on account of their situation and strength. The Spanish commissioners, however, proposed and urged that these places should be given to the archdukes, who were sovereigns of the provinces in which they lay, and that the states, in compensation for them, should accept of Oldenfeel, Groll, and Lingen. But the Dutch commissioners rejected this proposal with great disdain, alledging that the towns possessed by the states were of infinitely greater value than those which were offered in exchange for them; and declaring, that as no concessions which the archdukes would make were a sufficient equivalent, both parties, agreeably to what the archduke had proposed in the beginning of this negociation, should retain what was at present in their possession.

A THIRD

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The property of individuals restored by the treaty for peace.

A THIRD question related to the boundaries between the dominions of the states and those of the archdukes; a fourth, to the restitution of the effects belonging to individuals which had been confiscated; and, besides these, there were several other matters treated of, concerning which the opposite parties contended with great warmth, and discovered a wide diversity of sentiment.

MANY weeks past in fruitless altercation. The parties seemed to be more than ever exasperated against each other; and the difficulties which prevented them from coming to an agreement seemed daily to increase.

Obstinacy of the Dutch.

THE Dutch were extremely tenacious of their claims, and the archdukes commissioners often complained of this obstinacy to the English and French ambassadors; but their conduct was, at the same time, explicit and undisguised; and, from the commencement of the negociation, they had openly declared, that, whatever concessions they might be induced to make in other matters, there were two points, religion and the trade to India, on which no such concession was to be expected as the Spaniards were likely to require.

To procure some new instructions with regard to these important articles, had, as already mentioned, been the purpose for which the Franciscan had been sent to Madrid. The time fixed for his return was expired, and no satisfactory account of his delay was given by the archdukes commissioners, who studiously avoided all discourse concerning him, and maintained an obstinate silence with regard to his success.

THE Dutch were exceedingly disgusted at this behaviour: they knew not to what cause it could be

be ascribed : they were not without suspicion of some insidious design ; and they at length resolved, that either the archdukes ambassadors should give them satisfaction concerning the cause of Ney's delay, or that the treaty should instantly be broken off.

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HAVING, accordingly, in the most peremptory terms, required to know what was the ultimate determination of the king of Spain with regard to the Indian trade, the ambassadors, thinking it unnecessary any longer to conceal what they knew, replied (*r*), that Ney had not been able to obtain a more favourable answer to his application than this, that the king, from his ardent desire of restoring peace to his dominions, was still ready to renounce his claim of sovereignty over the provinces in the form proposed ; but, in return for so great a sacrifice, required that the states should abstain from all commerce to the Indies, and permit the exercise of the Catholic religion throughout the whole extent of their dominions.

August 10.

Disputes  
concerning  
the Catho-  
lic religion  
and the In-  
dian trade.

OF this declaration the deputies of the states gave immediate information to the states general, and the English and French ambassadors. James having lately entered into that defensive alliance with the states which he had formerly declined, and Henry, besides concluding such an alliance, having empowered (*s*) Jeannin to acquaint them, that, in case the present treaty were not broken off without his consent, he had resolved to assist them in the prosecution of the war ; both these princes were well entitled to be consulted on the present

(*r*) Bentivoglio, Grotius, &c. Meteren, liv. xxx. folio 652, &c.

(*s*) Negociations de Jeannin, tom. i. p 44. Seconde Instruction au Monsieur Jeannin.

BOOK III. present occasion. Henry could not decently have  
 1608. neglected the opportunity, which was presented to him, of interposing in behalf of the religion which he professed, and therefore he had instructed Jeannin to advise the states, if possible, to grant to their Catholic subjects the indulgence which Philip had demanded for them; but he did not insist on their compliance with his advice: he was sensible that this indulgence might endanger their internal peace, especially if it was granted at the request of the king of Spain; and therefore left them at liberty to determine, both with regard to religion and their Indian trade, whether any concession could be made consistently with their interest and security.

THE states themselves unanimously thought that there was no room for hesitation on the subject. With the consent of Jeannin, as well as of the English ambassadors, they rejected the conditions that were proposed; and, at the next meeting with the archdukes commissioners, it was declared by those of the states, that they considered the insisting upon these conditions as a violation of the promise which had been made of treating with them as with a free people; that they could not consider the conduct of Spain as consistent, fair, or candid, and were therefore determined to break off the present treaty; and, without suffering themselves to be any longer deceived, to resume the prosecution of the war (*t*).

THE states seem to have received sufficient provocation on this occasion for the resentment with which they were inflamed; but, from a letter of the

(*t*) Meteren, liv. xxx. folio 650, &c.



the president Jeannin's to the king of France, it appears that it was not the court of Spain so much as the archdukes commissioners, of whom they had reason to complain. For Philip, it appears from this letter, had, from the beginning of the negociation, declared that he would never consent to renounce his sovereignty, but on the condition that the free exercise of the Catholic religion should be established in all the provinces; and he had charged the commissioners to open the conferences by acquainting them that this was his unalterable resolution. But the commissioners had thought it expedient to change the order of their instructions, and to begin with an acknowledgment of the freedom of the states, hoping thereby to render them more obsequious in other articles; and afterwards, when both parties were in better humour with each other, to obtain from Philip some relaxation in his demand with regard to the Catholic religion (*u*).

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THIS information was communicated to the deputies of the states, and afterwards to the states general, with an intention to sooth their resentment; but it served rather to turn it into another channel, by directing it against the archdukes commissioners instead of the court of Spain. And it likewise served to rivet their conviction, that no solid peace could ever be obtained from that court, whose bigotry was the same in the present as it had been in the former reign, without a concession on their part, which they deemed to be no less contrary to good policy than it was inconsistent with sincerity in their profession of the Protestant faith. They were confirmed, therefore, in this resolution of declining to proceed any

(*u*) *Negotiations de Jeannin*, tom. ii. p. 403, 404.

BOOK III. any farther in the treaty, and seem to have satisfied the English and French ambassadors, that they had sufficient motives to justify their conduct.

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THESE ambassadors, however, still believed it to be practicable to restore tranquillity to the United Provinces, although not by a perpetual peace, yet by a long truce between the contending powers. The obstacles to the establishment of peace had chiefly arisen from the pride and bigotry of the court of Spain; but these obstacles, they thought, might be more easily surmounted in attempting to conclude a truce than a peace, because, if only a truce were concluded, that court might flatter themselves with the hopes, that, at the expiration of it, they might recover their concessions, and accomplish the several objects in which they were so deeply interested; besides that, there was ground to suspect, that, from the beginning of the negociation, it was a truce, and not a perpetual peace, that was intended by the Spanish ministers.

The president Jeannin admitted to an audience of the states.

THE president Jeannin having previously concerted with the English ambassadors certain preliminary articles, without which he knew that all farther treaty must prove abortive, requested an audience of the states, and, being admitted into their assembly, after expressing the concern of the French and English monarchs on account of the unsuccessful issue of the late conferences, he added, that these princes, being deeply impressed with a conviction of the necessity of putting a period to the war, had, in case it should be found impracticable to establish a lasting peace, commanded their ambassadors to recommend to the states a truce of several years, provided that such

a truce

a truce could be obtained on advantageous and honourable terms. For, in recommending this measure, he subjoined, it is by a regard for the true interest and honour of the provinces, that the French and British kings are prompted, and therefore they exhort you to adopt it only on the following conditions : first, that the king of Spain and the archdukes shall treat with you as with a free people, over whom they pretend to no authority ; secondly, that, during the truce, you shall enjoy a free commerce both in Europe and in the Indies ; and, thirdly, that you shall retain all the towns and territories which are at present in your possession.

DURING this truce you will have leisure to rectify the disorders which have sprung up during the continuance of the war, to pay your debts, to reform your government, to extend your trade, and, if you study to maintain internal union and tranquillity, this truce, it is probable, will terminate in a lasting peace, by which the advantages you have obtained will be perpetuated and secured : whereas, if at this time the war were to be renewed, we foresee innumerable difficulties to which you will be exposed ; and perceive, that, in order to insure success, your friends must be much more liberal in their assistance, than is convenient for them in the present situation of their affairs.

You are dissatisfied with the conduct of your adversaries ; but let not your resentment prevent you from listening to the counsel of your friends. It is our intention to offer them the same counsel ; and, if they refuse to follow it, to acquaint them that the kings of France and Britain are determined to give you every proof of faithful friendship  
in

**BOOK III.** in their power. But in return for this, these  
 1608. princes expect that you will not, by your obstinacy, engage them in a war to which they are utterly averse, and for which, if this truce can be accomplished, there is no necessity.

It will be difficult, we know, to obtain the consent of the Catholic king to the preliminary articles ; but, if that prince shall be found equally uncomplying and intractable, as you have hitherto experienced, and the treaty for a truce, like that for peace, shall, through his fault, prove abortive, you will be justified for again having recourse to arms ; and the princes too, whom we represent, will be justified for resolving to exert themselves with greater vigour in your behalf (x).

To this proposal the states general made no immediate reply, but that they would submit it to the consideration of the states of the particular provinces.

It was soon after communicated to the marquis of Spinola, and the rest of the archdukes commissioners, by whom it was received with all the satisfaction which might be expected from their well known aversion to the continuance of the war. But although they acknowledged how much pleasure it would give them, if any means of an accommodation could be devised, they dreaded that the archdukes would be unable to persuade the court of Spain to agree to the preliminary articles ; and, for this reason, they laboured to persuade Jeannin to omit the two first articles altogether, and to attempt to conclude a truce without any other condition but that both parties should retain what they possessed. It had been  
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(x) Jean. ii. 412.



with the utmost reluctance, they represented, that the king of Spain had formerly consented to acknowledge the independence of the states, even when he expected thereby to gain some concession from them in favour of the Catholic religion, and to exclude them from the Indian trade, had been his principal motive for desiring to put a period to the war. To procure his consent, therefore, either to the first or to the second of the preliminary articles, would be attended with difficulties, which, there was ground to apprehend, would be found insuperable; and no other agreement was like to be obtained but a cessation of hostilities, or a truce in the common form, during which both parties should retain what was at present in their possession.

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JEANNIN was sensible of the truth of this representation, and foresaw the difficulties which the archdukes must encounter, if they listened to his proposal; but, besides that these princes were, above all things, solicitous to be delivered from a ruinous war, which filled their minds with perpetual disquietude, and would employ all their influence to overcome the pride and obstinacy of the court of Spain, he knew that the Spaniards were at present extremely ill prepared for the commencement of hostilities, and hoped that on this account they might be induced to agree to terms, which, on another occasion, they would have rejected with disdain.

He would not, therefore, have been inclined to withdraw the preliminary articles, even although he had found himself at liberty; but they were a part (he said) of the archdukes commissioners proposal to the states, and the honour both of the French and English monarchs, in whose name this proposal had been made, was now pledged

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pledged either to procure the acceptance of them by the archdukes and king of Spain, or to furnish the states with such assistance as might be necessary for the prosecution of the war. This declaration he made to the archdukes commissioners in the most explicit terms; and added, that while it might be difficult to obtain the king of Spain's assent to the proposed conditions, it was extremely doubtful whether these conditions were such as would satisfy the people of the United Provinces; but the commissioners might firmly believe that nothing less than was contained in the preliminary articles would give satisfaction either to them, or to their friends.

OF the truth of this assertion, as far as it regarded the confederates, there was immediate proof in the difficulty which Jeannin encountered in persuading them to agree to his proposal. The greater part of the deputies of the particular provinces, being sincerely solicitous for the establishment of peace, were satisfied with the preliminary articles, and gave their opinion that the truce, with the conditions contained in these articles, ought not to be refused. But there were many, who, whether from motives of private interest, or a regard to the public safety, being desirous of a continuance of the war, maintained that no agreement whatever should be made, but on condition that the archdukes, and the king of Spain, should grant the same solemn acknowledgment of the liberty and independence of the states, to which they had formerly consented in treating for a perpetual peace, including an explicit renunciation for ever of all their claims of authority over the United Provinces.

THE former of these parties was headed by Barnevelt, supported by the French and English ambassadors;

ambassadors; and the latter by prince Maurice, BOOK III.  
 whose opinions was espoused not only by the 1608.  
 whole province of Zealand, over which his au-  
 thority was almost without controul, but by the  
 deputies of Amsterdam, and those of several  
 other cities in the province of Holland.

THE former endeavoured to persuade the latter, Parties for  
and against  
the peace.  
 that it was unreasonable to expect the same libe-  
 ral concessions from the enemy, in the case of a  
 truce, as where a perpetual peace was to be esta-  
 blished; and that, while the states were conscious  
 of being free and able to maintain their liberty,  
 it was of no importance whether the Spaniards  
 should acknowledge, or refuse to acknowledge,  
 their independence; for it was sufficient for every  
 valuable purpose which they could have in view,  
 if the Spaniards would treat with them as with a  
 free people, and conclude an agreement upon  
 equitable terms.

BUT these considerations had no weight with  
 prince Maurice, or his partizans. They were  
 averse to the truce on other accounts, besides  
 their objection to the declaratory clause, and la-  
 boured to convince their countrymen that a truce,  
 on whatever terms, at the present period, though  
 it might be necessary for Spain, must prove per-  
 nicious and dangerous to the Dutch republic.  
 They omitted no opportunity of inculcating their  
 opinion, whether in public assemblies or in pri-  
 vate societies, and published innumerable letters  
 and pamphlets, which being universally perused,  
 became the subject of discourse in every compa-  
 ny. Of these writings some were of the most in-  
 flammatory kind, intended to instill suspicions in-  
 to the minds of the people, that Barnevelt and  
 his friends, unable to resist the allurements of Pe-  
 ruvian gold, had sold their country to the Span-  
 ards;

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ards; and even the French and British monarchs, it was insinuated, by so earnestly recommending the truce, intended rather to serve the court of Spain than the United Provinces. Their suspicions on this head were heightened by the arrival at Paris and London of two ambassadors, who had been sent on their present embassy by the Spanish ministers, though under a different pretext, yet, probably, with no other view but to procure the good offices of James and Henry in the present negociation in the Netherlands.

No pains were spared by the French and English ambassadors at the Hague, to convince the Dutch that their apprehensions were without foundation. Above all the rest, Jeannin laboured assiduously for this end; and by giving the deputies of the states the strongest assurances that his master's friendship was inviolable, and that nothing could be more remote from his intention than to enter into an alliance with Spain to the prejudice of their republic, he seems, with regard to this matter, in which they were so deeply interested, to have set their minds at ease.

THE aversion, however, of a great number of them to the truce, and their animosity against such of their countrymen as promoted it, were as strong as ever. Their resentment was principally directed against Barnevelt, who, by his eloquence and address, his great abilities, and long experience, had acquired an entire ascendant over most of the deputies: he appears, however, to have been too sensibly affected on this occasion by the odium to which he found himself exposed. Having one day bitterly complained, in an assembly of the states, of the cruel treatment which he received in the libels daily published on the subject of the present controversy, he appealed to the



the deputies, whether he had given just ground for such injurious imputations as had been cast upon him ; and then left the assembly with a resolution to retire from public life. But he soon recovered his tranquillity ; and, at the earnest desire of the states, he returned to the assembly, and afterwards continued to apply himself to the conduct of public affairs with the same indefatigable attention as before (y).

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It would be injurious to the character of prince Maurice to suppose that he would demean himself so far as to be concerned in those anonymous pamphlets and incendiary letters, replete with threats against Barnevelt and his adherents, which were published on this occasion. He took no pains to conceal his resentment, and openly inveighed against their conduct, as being calculated to involve the provinces in ruin. Having visited several of the towns in Holland, he laboured to bring over the deputies to his opinion, and with the same intention he wrote a circular letter to all the other towns in the province.

WHAT he said and wrote on this occasion was principally intended to inspire the deputies with mistrust of the archdukes and the court of Spain, whose conduct, in the present negociation, he said, had been inconsistent with their professions in the beginning, and who could not have any reason for declining to grant the most explicit renunciation of their right of sovereignty over the provinces, but that they secretly designed to assert that right when a more convenient season should arrive.

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(y) Grotius, &c. lib. xvi.

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THEY would observe the truce only so long as they found it necessary for retrieving the ruinous condition of their affairs; and, mean while, the people of the United Provinces, deceived by a false appearance of tranquillity, would not only quit their arms, but would lose their military spirit, and be induced to agree to whatever terms should be prescribed to them, rather than again expose themselves to the dangers or inconveniences of war.

THE Spaniards, it was evident, being utterly averse to a perpetual peace, hoped to be able, during the truce, to apply some effectual remedies to the disorders which prevailed in their finances; whereas the states, having so great a number of frontier towns, where numerous garrisons must be maintained, would have nearly the same expences to defray as during the continuance of the war. It would, however, be infinitely more difficult, after their apprehensions of immediate danger were removed, to persuade the people to pay the taxes which it would be necessary to impose; and the enemy would, at the same time, practise on their fidelity, and sow the seeds of discord among the different towns and provinces, of which they would not fail to avail themselves, without thinking it incumbent on them to delay hostilities till the expiration of the truce.

As this reasoning of prince Maurice coincided with the prejudices which the Dutch had, for many years, entertained against the Spaniards, it made a strong impression on the minds of many of the deputies; nor was it considered either by Barneveldt or Jeannin, as frivolous. On the contrary, they treated it with the respect which was due to the person by whom it was employed, although they, at the same time, laboured assiduously

ously to show that the arguments on their side had greater weight, and Jeannin, in his own name and that of the other ambassadors, presented a memorial to the states, of the following purport, intended to remove the objections that were urged by Maurice and his adherents.

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Memorial  
of Jeannin  
presented to  
the United  
States.

“ THE princes whom we represent, being deeply interested in your prosperity, and believing the truce proposed, to be necessary, in the present situation of your affairs, are therefore much concerned to observe the opposition which it meets with from so many respectable members of your state.

“ You ought not, they alledge, to be satisfied that the archdukes and the king of Spain are willing to treat with you as with a free people, over whom they pretend to no authority, but you ought to require a declaration that they will consider you in this light for ever afterwards, as well as during the continuance of the truce.

“ BUT in the opinion of the princes, our sovereigns, your liberty is equally well secured by the former of these declarations as by the latter; because the former, not being limited to any particular time, but expressed in terms that are general and indefinite, it must be understood by all the world in the same sense, as if the words “for ever” were subjoined. Besides this consideration, it is not of the king of Spain and the archdukes, that you are to hold your liberty. You have long maintained that you are already free, having asserted your liberty by a public solemn deed, founded upon reason and necessity, and bravely defended it for many years against your oppressors, by the force of arms. You ought, therefore, to rest satisfied with that simple acknowledgment

**BOOK III.** 1608. ledgment of it, which is implied in the declaration of being ready to treat with you as with a free people. You would be satisfied with such an acknowledgment from any neutral or friendly power. You have equal reason to be satisfied when it is made by the archdukes, and the king of Spain. And you ought not, with so much solicitude, to require these princes to be more explicit, in declaring you to be free, lest you be considered as thereby tacitly confessing that still they have a right to your obedience.

“ BUT, even allowing, that the king of Spain should not think himself excluded by the form of words made choice of from his claim of sovereignty, will he call you before a court of justice, do you suppose, in order to have his rights examined by the rules of law? It is not in this manner that sovereigns assert their claims; it is only to the sword that they appeal: and if you be able when the truce expires, to maintain your liberty as you have hitherto done against the force of arms, you will then, as well as now, with justice despise your enemy's pretensions to dominion over you. It will be sufficient then, as it is at present, to find yourselves in actual possession of your liberty. And, in whatever sense the words of the truce may be understood by the king of Spain, you ought to be satisfied with the assurance which has been given you, and which we now repeat, that, by the princes whom we represent, whose friendship you have so long experienced, and on whose assistance you may with confidence rely, these words are considered as a clear and unambiguous declaration, that you are a free people over whom authority cannot ever be justly pretended by the king of Spain.

“ IT



“ It is farther objected by those who oppose the truce, that it will afford leisure to the catholic king to retrieve the ruinous condition of his finances, and to prosecute the war, after the recommencement of hostilities, with greater vigour. Nor can it be denied, that if he was to listen to the advice of wise and faithful counsellors, it might be, in some measure, attended with this effect. But is it to be presumed that a young king, at the head of a nation noted for restless and inordinate ambition, with ministers inattentive to œconomy, when the exigencies of his affairs required it, will be more attentive when his situation renders it unnecessary? Is it not rather to be presumed, that his treasure will, more than ever, become a prey to the avarice or profusion of his ministers? that it will be more than ever lavished on idle pomp and show; or that, by quarrelling with his neighbours, he shall ere long be engaged in some ambitious and expensive enterprize?

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“ It is from your republic, and not from the king of Spain, that those prudent measures may be expected, which are necessary to repair the mischiefs that have been occasioned by the war: you are equally distinguished for your private and your public œconomy; and you are not less distinguished for your industry, your activity, and enterprize. With these qualities, which you possess in so eminent a degree, your trade must every year be more extended; and, being carried on with smaller risks, and at less expence, the profits arising from it will be greater than ever. You will thereby be enabled to discharge your public debts, to relieve your people from the load of taxes under which they groan, and, when the truce expires, to prosecute the war with less dependence on your allies, and a greater probability of success.

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“ IT will still, indeed, be necessary for you to maintain garrisons in the frontier towns; and to retain a considerable proportion of your troops in pay, that, whether the truce be observed or violated, you may be always found in a proper posture of defence.

“ BUT at least the one half of your army may be disbanded. Your trade will, in the mean time, be carried on with much greater advantage than hitherto, and all those losses by sea and by land avoided, which you have so often represented to the kings, our masters, as the cause why you were unable, of yourselves, to defray the necessary expences of the war.

“ BUT your enemies, it is alledged by the opposers of the truce, will have access during the continuance of it, to carry on their intrigues among the people; to sow dissensions among the towns and provinces, and to persuade some of them perhaps to abandon the confederacy; while the people themselves, delivered from the apprehensions of immediate danger, will refuse to pay the taxes which the states shall find it necessary to impose.

“ WITH regard to these objections, as we do not pretend to any certain foresight of futurity, we will not affirm that they are entirely destitute of foundation. There is no state of human society that is not subject to inconveniencies and dangers; and there are dangers attending peace as well as war: but the dangers mentioned are such as, with prudent precautions, it is in your power to avoid. The objections founded on the apprehensions of them are equally applicable to a peace, as to a truce; and if they are sufficient to deter you from listening to our proposal of a truce, they

they ought to determine you to persist in the prosecution of the war, till you have accomplished the utter ruin of your enemy. But you are too wise to propose to yourselves an object inadequate to your strength. And, therefore, unless you chuse to live in perpetual war, which must much sooner prove the ruin of your republic than of the Spanish monarchy, you must, sooner or later, agree to bring the war to a conclusion, either by a peace, or by a truce. A peace on the terms which you require, is at present unattainable; and even although it were in your power to procure it, yet, in the opinion of many of your friends, a truce is more desirable. For it is a sort of medium between peace and war, and it might prove dangerous for you, before your political institutions have acquired that stability which time alone can bestow, to pass at once from the one extreme to the other. It might occasion too great a relaxation of the vigour which you have been so long accustomed to exert, and expose you an easy prey to the resentment of your enemy.

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“ BUT during the continuance of the truce, you will look forward to the expiration of it. By keeping your fortifications in repair, and your troops under proper discipline, joined to a prudent administration of your finances, you will provide for that event; and thus, when the Spaniards shall perceive that you are well prepared for your defence, they will more easily agree to those equitable terms of peace, which at this time their pride and their sense of shame have determined them to reject.

“ THE example of the Swiss cantons, whose fortune so nearly resembles your's, ought to engage you to listen to the counsel which we offer. Like you, they had thrown off the yoke of their oppressors,

BOOK III  
1608. oppressors, and their arms had generally been attended with success; yet they agreed to a truce, when proposed to them, on much less advantageous terms than those which you are exhorted to accept; and, during the leisure which it afforded them, they put their civil government and their military establishments on so respectable a footing, as effectually determined their ancient masters to lay aside the thoughts of a farther prosecution of the war. From the same conduct it is likely that you will derive the same advantages. The king of Spain will more easily consent on equitable terms, to a truce than to a perpetual peace, because he may think that his dignity will suffer less from making temporary than perpetual concessions: but many circumstances, it may be presumed, will concur to deter him from a renewal of hostilities. His animosity and resentment will be abated; his ancient sovereignty over you will be, in some measure, obsolete and forgotten: having tasted the sweets of tranquillity, he will desire to preserve it undisturbed: he will have experienced that it is the interest of his subjects at home, and still more of those in the Indies and America, to live at peace with you. And, as it will be impossible, unless you be greatly wanting to yourselves, but that, some years hence, you must be possessed of greater resources than at present, he must perceive the danger of engaging in war with you, after your power is established and confirmed; when he considers, that in the very infancy of their state, his most vigorous efforts to reduce you to obedience were of no avail.

“WHAT has been said will be sufficient, it is hoped, to evince that the objections against the truce, which have been urged by its opposers, ought not to deter you from agreeing to it, in case the  
the



the consent of the king of Spain can be procured BOOK III.  
1608  
to the terms proposed. These objections indeed are urged by some of the most respectable members of the state, whose zeal for the prosperity of the republic is unquestionable. But the wisest men are subject to error. It may be true, that some inconveniencies may arise from the truce, but it should seem that much greater are to be dreaded from a continuance of the war. And, it is a first principle of prudence, of two evils to make choice of the least.

“ BEFORE we conclude this memorial, it is necessary to remind you of two things, which deserve your attention. First, that it is not only the counsel, but the earnest request of those princes, to whom you have been chiefly indebted for assistance, that you should adopt the measure we have recommended: and, secondly, that so favourable a concurrence of circumstances as the present, for obtaining equitable terms of accommodation, may never again occur. The archdukes are princes on whose fidelity you can with safety rely for the punctual performance of their engagements: they are fond of peace; at their earnest intreaty, the king of Spain hath already made, and is still likely to make more, ample concessions than could otherwise have justly been expected; and in conducting the treaty proposed, you will have all the assistance that can be given you by two powerful monarchs, who consider your interest as their own (z).”

THIS memorial did not immediately produce the desired effect upon all the deputies. Several of

(z) *Negociations de Jeannin, tom. iii. p. 9. Ecrit fait par monsieur Jeannin, au nom de tous les ambassadeurs, jour treizieme Octobre, & mis es mains de messieurs Les Estats.*

BOOK III. of the towns in Holland, and the whole province  
 1608. of Zealand, with prince Maurice at their head, still remained as averse to the truce as ever; and Maurice still continued to employ his influence to confirm them in their resolution of opposing it. By his emissaries, and his letters, he attempted to gain over the other towns and provinces to his opinion. He sometimes talked as if both the French and British monarchs were pursuing their private interest, at the expence of the republic. He insinuated, that, unless they should drop the proposal of a truce, and immediately agree to assist the states more liberally than hitherto in prosecuting the war, the more distant parts of the provinces ought to be abandoned, and the territories of the republic contracted within such narrow limits, as might be defended by the forces which the Dutch themselves, without foreign assistance, were able to support. He alledged, that no matter of so great importance as was at present under deliberation, could be adopted without the unanimous consent of all the towns and provinces: and threatened, that the province of Zealand, if forsaken by the other provinces, would alone maintain the war against the Spaniards, till more ample concessions were obtained (a).

THE French monarch could not avoid feeling some resentment at his conduct, which he considered as equally violent and injurious. But Henry's candour would not suffer him to divest himself of that esteem which he had long entertained for the prince's character; nor to believe the suggestions of his enemies, that he was actuated by some sinister design. He still wrote to him as to a friend whom he highly respected, sparing no pains, and employing every argument to engage him to adopt his views.

HENRY'S

(a) Jeannin, tom. iii.

HENRY's endeavours were well seconded by Jeannin, who acted with the most consummate prudence, and carefully avoided giving any personal offence to prince Maurice, while he exerted himself with great activity in counteracting his designs. By the eloquence and address of Barnevelt, joined to the influence which he derived from his great experience, and the high opinion which was justly entertained of his public spirit and integrity, Amsterdam and all the other towns in Holland were reconciled to the truce, on the terms proposed; and not long after, prince Maurice and the province of Zealand, with whom Jeannin and the English ambassadors, assisted by deputies sent thither by the other provinces, assiduously employed all their influence, were persuaded to relinquish their opposition.

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THE archdukes were employing in the mean time their interest at Madrid to obtain the consent of Philip; who, from the beginning, had discovered no less reluctance to Jeannin's proposal than prince Maurice or the province of Zealand. Far from being averse to a truce, this prince was exceedingly desirous that it should take place, provided it could be concluded on the ordinary condition of both parties retaining what was at present in their possession. But to acknowledge the independence of his rebellious subjects, and formally to grant them his permission to carry on their trade in India, were conditions with which he himself and many of his subjects thought it ignominious to comply.

Reluctance of Philip, to acknowledge the independence of the United States.

The archdukes endeavoured to convince him, that in making these concessions, they would do nothing more than had been already done in consenting to the suspension of arms, and that no more important consequences could arise from it.

They

**BOOK III.** They engaged to have the article relative to the Indian trade expressed in such a manner, that it should not materially affect the interest or the trade of Spain.

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THEY represented, that the declaration so earnestly required by the United States, could not do any prejudice to the king's right of sovereignty, that it could not remain in force but while the truce subsisted, and that the Hollanders would find it of no avail, after the renewal of hostilities, if his majesty's arms were crowned with victory. They added that this was the opinion of the ambassadors of the mediating powers, and likewise of many members of the states of the revolted provinces, who opposed the truce on account of the insignificancy of the clause which contained the declaration of their liberty.

Religious  
scruples of  
Philip.

THESE considerations, urged by such powerful solicitors, had great weight with Philip, who would have yielded his consent, provided that some concession could have been obtained in favour of the Catholic inhabitants of the United Provinces. And he had some ground, he thought, to entertain the hope of being able, in some measure, to accomplish this object, in which he was more deeply interested than in any other, when he considered that the prince who was the chief mediator in the present negotiation, was himself a Catholic. But the archdukes having informed him, that Jeannin, whose zeal for the Popish faith was unquestionable, had declared that it would be in vain to attempt to introduce any proposal concerning religion among the preliminary articles, Philip doubted whether he could enter with a good conscience into any treaty with such determined heretics; and therefore hesitated, for some time, whether he



he should not utterly reject the truce, whatever consequences might follow.

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In order to dispel his scruples, the archduke sent to Madrid his confessor, Ignatio Brizuela, a Spaniard of noble birth, eminently distinguished for his piety and virtue, and of great experience in the affairs of the Netherlands.

BRIZUELA knew well how to make impression on the timid, superstitious mind of Philip; and judiciously employed religion itself as a motive, which should induce him to comply with the archdukes request. If in the course of the treaty, said he, any indulgence can be procured for the Catholic inhabitants, the French ambassador will exert his most strenuous endeavours in their behalf; but it is necessary, he added, even for the interest of religion, that the truce should be concluded, lest, considering the difficulties under which the archdukes must labour in resuming the war, instead of re-establishing the Catholic faith in the rebellious provinces, it shall be exposed to danger in those which have been brought back to their allegiance.

To this reasoning, Philip listened with great attention, and seemed to be in a great measure satisfied, that he ought not any longer to withhold his consent; but chose, as usual, before he gave an explicit answer, to hear the opinion of his favourite the duke of Lerma. The duke had not, it should seem, as yet formed a decisive resolution with regard to the part which it would be most prudent for him to act on the present occasion. He had long experienced the most insurmountable difficulties in furnishing the necessary expences of the war; and he dreaded, if it were not speedily brought to a conclusion, some great disaster might happen

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happen in the Netherlands, which would not be ascribed to the marquis of Spinola, who had so often given the most unquestionable proofs of military prudence and capacity, but to him, by whom that general had been disappointed in the supplies and reinforcements which had been promised him. For this reason, and perhaps too as was suspected by his contemporaries, from his jealousy of Spinola, who had rendered himself of so great importance as to rival him, or at least to enjoy too large a share in the royal favour, he had from the beginning been extremely intent on the establishment of peace. Observing, however, that both the pride of the Spanish nation, and Philip's superstition, were alarmed by the concessions demanded by the states, he had not ventured to advise a compliance with their requests. But it would be much easier, he was persuaded to reconcile the Spaniards to the truce, than to a peace, as the concessions to be made in the former were not to be perpetual; and Philip's religious scruples being in a great measure removed, by what the confessor had represented to him, he laid aside that hesitation and reserve with which he had hitherto acted; and uniting his influence to that of Brizuela, and of several other Spanish ecclesiastics, who were devoted to his interest, he soon persuaded Philip to grant his ratification of the preliminary articles. It was immediately transmitted to the archdukes, accompanied with a recommendation, to avoid, if possible, the consenting to an express permission of the Indian trade; and, if possible, likewise to procure some indulgence for the Popish inhabitants in the United Provinces (*b*).

Philip ratifies the preliminary articles.

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(*b*) Bentivoglio passim. Negotiations de Jeannin tom. iii. p. 223, 224. & 329, 330. Grotius. Winwood, vol. ii. p. 338, 300, &c. Jeannin, tom. iii. p. 10. & tom. ii. p. 335.

DURING the confessor's stay at Madrid, the French and English ambassadors were employed in preparing at the Hague the several articles of the treaty. And as the archduke's commissioners had some months before, at the desire of the states, who dreaded their secret practices among the deputies, returned to Brussels, the negotiations between the mediators and them had hitherto been carried on by letters.

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BUT as this method of conducting it was attended with the most tedious delays, Jeannin in his own name, and that of the other ambassadors, proposed to the archdukes that they should send their commissioners to meet with them at Antwerp. This proposal was readily complied with, and both parties arrived in that place in the beginning of February 1609.

THE ambassadors had brought with them a copy of the articles of the truce, of which they had obtained the approbation of the states: and they had engaged, that unless the archdukes commissioners should adopt it without any material alteration, within eight days after their arrival in Antwerp, they should break off the conferences, and decline all further negotiation on the subject. Both the archdukes and Spaniards, they knew, were at present utterly unprepared for the renewal of the war, and nothing, they believed, would contribute so much to quicken their resolutions, as the dread of its being instantly renewed.

BUT when the resolution of the states was communicated to the Spanish or archdukes commissioners, they complained that their masters were rather used unhandsomely, and represented that the time allowed was too short for the dispatch of business

business of so great importance. The ambassadors were sensible of the truth of what they said, and obtained the consent of the states, to prolong the time ; after which both parties began seriously to apply themselves to the discussion of the several articles of the treaty.

AGAINST the fundamental article, which regarded the liberty and independence of the revolted provinces, the commissioners offered no objection, except to the title assumed in it by the states, of High and Mighty Lords, which they so obstinately opposed, that instead of the terms high and mighty, the ambassadors were obliged to substitute the word illustrious. An article relating to contributions, amounting yearly to 300,000 crowns, which had been paid to the Dutch, by the inhabitants of the open country in Brabant, in order to procure an exemption from being plundered, was the occasion of much altercation. The states very unreasonably required that these contributions should be continued during the truce. But the mediators, having represented to them the injustice of this request, and that the levying of contributions was equivalent to a continuance of hostilities, they at length consented that the article should be expunged, and in return for this concession, the archdukes agreed to yield to them some extensive districts adjoining to Bergen-op-zoom, Breda, and other places, in the possession of the states, upon condition that such of the inhabitants of these districts as were Catholics should be indulged in the free exercise of their religion.

A PROPOSAL was made for a mutual exchange of towns, which the contending parties had lately conquered from each other ; but as the conquests of the Dutch had been much more important than those



those of the archdukes, no expedient could be devised, to which the former thought it their interest to agree: and for this reason, it was at length determined that both parties should retain the towns at present in their possession. The Dutch were equally averse to another proposal, which was urged with much earnestness by the Spanish commissioners, that all those duties should be abolished, which were exacted in Zealand from ships entering the Scheld, in their way to Antwerp. They gave some ground however to expect that this matter might afterwards be amicably adjusted: and the archdukes were the more easily persuaded to drop their request, as they hoped to be able in the time of peace to improve their posts on the coast of Flanders, and thereby to rival the Dutch in those branches of commerce which they had engrossed during the subsistence of the war.

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BUT of all the articles of the present treaty, the most difficult to be adjusted to the mutual satisfaction of the parties, was that which regarded the Indian trade. The archdukes were aware that unless the Dutch were gratified in this point, no accommodation whatever could take place; nor were they or their subjects personally interested in refusing to comply with their request. But being well acquainted with the obstinate and absurd reluctance of the Spaniards against making any concession on this subject, they still suspected, notwithstanding their sanguine hopes of the success of Brizuela's application, that the king would never consent to ratify the truce, if this concession were explicitly expressed. They were, for this reason, extremely solicitous to persuade the French and English ambassadors to agree to such an indirect form of expression, as might not alarm the pride or prejudice of the Spaniards, while it would

Contests about the Indian trade.

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admit

BOOK III. admit of being interpreted in favour of the Dutch.

1649. The ambassadors were not averse to this expedient ; and they afterwards prevailed upon the states to consent to it, by giving them a declaration in writing, that notwithstanding the generality and obscurity of the terms in which the article was couched, they understood it as containing a full permission to the Dutch to carry on their trade in every part of India, that was not under the dominion of the crown of Spain ; and by engaging likewise in the name of the kings whom they represented, to guarantee this article relative to the Indian trade, as well as all the other articles of the present treaty (c).

SUCH were the principal points discussed between the archdukes commissioners, and the French and English ambassadors, in the conferences that were held at Antwerp. Soon after the confessor arrived at Brussels with Philip's ratification of the preliminary articles ; and nothing now remained, but to settle some matters of smaller consequence, and to give the treaty its just form, in order to its being signed by the contending powers.

IN consequence of permission from the archdukes, the Dutch commissioners formerly mentioned, who had hitherto remained at the Hague, repaired to Antwerp : and that no solemnity might be wanting to a deed of so great importance, an extraordinary assembly of deputies from all the provinces and towns of the union, was summoned to meet at Bergen-op-zoom, where they might be at hand to ratify the several articles of the treaty, as soon as they should be digested by the commissioners

(c) Bentivoglio. Grotius, lib. ult. &c.

fioners into proper form. As the confederates Book III.  
had not for many years been engaged in any mat- 1609.  
ter in which they were so deeply interested, there  
were more than eight hundred deputies present  
in this assembly.

THE commissioners, together with the French and English ambassadors, had meetings every day in the Hotel de Ville of Antwerp; and there was still considerable diversity of sentiments among them with regard to certain articles of the treaty, and particularly with respect to the time during which the truce should subsist. It was at length agreed, that it should be concluded for twelve years from the present period; and as soon as this and the other points in dispute were settled, and the treaty drawn up in the usual form, it was transmitted to Brussels and Bergen op Zoom, to receive the sanction of the archdukes and of the states; and was finally concluded on the 9th of April 1609.

It consisted of eight and thirty articles, the most important of which were those which have been already mentioned. The rest had been prepared by Barneveldt, and were equally calculated to promote the security and interest of individuals and of the state (*d*). Treaty for a peace concluded.

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(*d*) Among other articles it was stipulated that, during the continuance of the truce, all hostilities should cease by seas, rivers, and land, between the subjects, inhabitants, and persons resident in the territories of the king of Spain and the archdukes, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other, without any exception of places or persons whatever.

That either party should retain safe and entire possession of whatever provinces, cities, places, lands and principalities it then enjoyed; and that the same conditions should be observed with regard to districts, villages, and lands and territories thereon depending.

That

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erited so highly from the republic as those of the family of Nassau ; and all parties readily concurred in giving them proof on this occasion of their respect

That the subjects, and persons residing in the dominions of Spain and the archdukes, of the one part, and of the United States, of the other, should mutually cultivate goodwill and friendship.

That all reproach, resentment, and revenge on account of past hostilities and injuries should cease ; and that there should be a free and equal trade between the subjects of the contracting parties by rivers, seas, and land.

That it should not be lawful to stop or lay hands on merchants, proprietors of ships, shipmasters, or their crews, or the ships, or merchandize, or goods of any kind, on any pretence : but that justice should have its usual course for the recovery of debts, and in criminal prosecutions.

If any judgments or sentences had been passed against the adherents of either party, on the footing of contumacy, and that such persons had been condemned without being defended, either in civil or criminal causes, such judgments or sentences were not to be carried into execution during the truce, either against the persons or goods of individuals so condemned.

Such persons, or their heirs and executors, as had suffered the loss of their property through the rage of party, or the violence of war ; by the rapine and injustice of individuals, and without the authority of the magistrates, and the countenance and protection of the laws ; such persons were to be reinstated, in virtue of the present treaty, in the full possession and enjoyment of their effects and estates, even although they should have actually passed into the condition, and assumed the appearance and nature of goods confiscated : whether they might have been deposited as pledges, given away as donations, or alienated and transferred by any species of bargain, transaction, or renunciation.

If the goods or estates shall have passed out of the exchequer, and been disposed of to private possessors, then it was stipulated, that interest should be paid to the right owners of the goods, or estates, at the rate of  $6\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. per annum. And if this payment should be delayed, it was agreed, that the proprietors should be paid out of the stock or capital. But if the disposal or transference of such goods and estates, by the exchequer, had been accompanied with such solemnities as constitute legal deeds, and the names of the right owners been erased and superseded, by such legal formalities as constitute legal rights and claims, yet even in that case, it was provided,



respect and gratitude. By one article of the Book III.  
 truce it was provided that none of the descend- 1609.  
 ants of William, the first prince of Orange, should  
 be liable for the debts which that prince had con-  
 tracted from the year 1567 till his death. And  
 by another, that such of his estates, within the  
 territory of the archdukes, as had been confis-  
 cated, should be restored, and his heirs permit-  
 ted to enjoy them unmolested during the conti-  
 nuance of the truce (e).

### THE

provided, that their estates, rights, and properties should be restored to the right owners, they refunding to any persons that might be at that time in possession, the bona fide price (where any had been given) which such persons might have paid on purchasing any of the said lands or properties since the confiscation, within the space of a year from the date of the present treaty.

That no length of time, not even the whole space from the very beginning of the commotions in 1567, should be considered as having conferred a prescriptive right to property.

Persons who, during the course of the present war, had retired into the dominions of neutral powers, were to be comprehended, and have the full benefit and advantage of the treaty: they were to return, if they were so inclined, to the places of their former abodes, or to settle in whatever place they should chuse, provided always, that they should comply with established manners, laws, and customs.

It was declared, in general terms, that all confiscations, and disinherisons, and transferences of property that had originated in the violence of civil war, and the bitterness of party-zeal, should be broken, cancelled, and to all intents and purposes, null and void.

(e) Besides these proofs of attachment to the family of the prince of Orange, the states had, some time before the conclusion of the truce, resolved that prince Maurice's appointments, as admiral and captain-general, should not suffer any diminution from the reduction of the forces. They even gave him an additional revenue, as a compensation for his share of the prizes and contributions; and they likewise augmented the appointments of prince Henry, Frederic, and count William Lewis of Nassau. Such was the conclusion of that negociation, which, for more than two years, had employed the attention, not only of the contracting parties, but likewise of most of the other princes and states in Europe.

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THE archdukes engaged that these and all the other articles should, within the space of three months, be ratified by the king of Spain ; and the king's deed of ratification was accordingly delivered to the states a few days before the expiration of that term, to transfer to his brother and his children the several high employments which he held at whatever period he should think fit. These resolutions of the states seem to have originated from the French monarch, and were formed at the instance of Barneveldt, whom Jeannin had engaged to enter into his master's views. No person questioned that prince Maurice's family were well entitled to every mark of favour which the states could bestow ; it was rather unfortunate however for the prince's character that, after so violent an opposition to the truce, his acquiescence in it was so quickly followed by pecuniary rewards. But although his enemies were disposed to insinuate that these rewards were rather to be considered as the price of his silence, than as rewards for his former services, there is nothing to justify these insinuations in the numerous letters extant in Jeannin's negotiations, either of the king or the ministers of France.

THE Dutch were henceforward considered as a free and independent people. Having gained immortal honour by the magnanimity which they had displayed during the continuance of the war, they were now considered as having obtained the reward which their virtue merited, and were every where respected and admired. Their ministers at foreign courts were now received with the same distinction as those of other sovereign powers ; and their alliance was courted by nations who had formerly regarded them as rebels, that  
must

must speedily submit to the yoke which they had shaken off.

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1609.

On the other hand, the reputation of the Spanish nation received a mortal wound ; and their power ceased to be regarded with the same dread as formerly. They had been foiled by a handful of their own subjects, and would not, it was supposed, any longer pretend to give law to other nations. The high spirited nobility, and the people in general, were secretly mortified by the concessions which the Dutch had been able to extort ; and were ready to ascribe the humiliation which the nation had suffered, not so much to any insurmountable difficulty in the contest in which it had been so long engaged, as to misconduct and want of vigour on the part of government.





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H I S T O R Y  
OF THE REIGN OF  
P H I L I P T H E T H I R D,  
K I N G O F S P A I N.

B O O K IV.

**T**HE Spanish nation was now at peace with Book IV.  
1609. all the world, except the piratic states of Barbary; and it might justly have been expected that the king and his ministers would have instantly applied themselves to the healing of those wounds which the monarchy had received during the continuance of the war. But their incapacity for government, joined to their bigotted zeal for the Catholic superstition, prevented them from availing themselves of the tranquillity which they enjoyed, and determined them to engage in a new enterprize, which, although their endeavours were attended with greater success, than had accompanied their attempt to subdue the United Provinces, proved no less pernicious to the national prosperity. The Spanish arms had been unsuccessfully employed against foreign nations, for more than half a century; and all ranks of men had felt the necessity of putting a period to the war; yet no sooner was peace established, than it was resolved to expel from the bosom of the kingdom several hundred thousands of its most industrious inhabitants.

THE

## BOOK IV.

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Account of  
the Mores-  
coes.

THE Morescoes had lived in Spain for more than eight hundred years ; and still, after so long a period, remained a separate people, distinguished from the Spaniards by their language, their religion, their character, and their manners.

THE present race were the descendants of those fanatic warriors, who, issuing forth from the deserts of Arabia, actuated with the wild ambition of compelling mankind to embrace the Mahometan superstition, had, with the most astonishing rapidity, reduced under subjection to their caliphs Persia, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, and had afterwards extended their conquests as far as the Straits of Gibraltar along the coast of Africa. From Africa they transported an army into Spain, where in less than two years they expelled the Christian inhabitants from all the open and more fertile parts of the kingdom, and obliged them to take shelter in the mountainous regions of Asturia, and the other northern provinces.

SPAIN had, about three centuries before, been conquered by the Goths, who had not only embraced the religion, but had likewise, as far as could be expected from ignorant Barbarians, adopted the language of the former inhabitants, and the distinction between the conquerors and conquered had long been lost. Their language was that corrupt dialect of the Roman tongue, with a mixture of the Gothic, which is still the language of Castile ; and their religion was the Christian mingled with the superstitions of the church of Rome. They held the religion of their invaders in great abhorrence, and being at the same time zealously attached to their own, great numbers of them chose, rather than be guilty of apostacy, to abandon the fertile provinces which they had so long inhabited, and to fly, with

with their wives and children, to those uncultivated parts of the kingdom, where, amidst caves and rocks, they might maintain their religion and their liberty.

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THE Moors, in the mean time, established their dominion in Portugal, in the greater part of Castile, Murcia, Andalusia, Valencia, and Granada. Their kings made choice of Cordova for their place of residence; and, as numerous supplies of people every year arrived from Africa, they soon attained such a degree of strength as convinced the Christians, that no attempt to recover their possessions could prove effectual.

A PREDATORY war however was begun, within half a century after the conquest, and the Christians, excited and conducted by Pelagio, and other descendants of their ancient kings, gave many signal proofs of heroic bravery; but their success did not fully correspond to their exertions, till a considerable time afterwards, when various causes concurred to render the contest less unequal.

THE Moors, naturally prone to ease and pleasure, had lost much of that warlike spirit, which they had derived from the sanguinary genius of their religion. Their kings were weak men dissolved in luxury, had been from the beginning extremely ill obeyed by their viceroys, and at length these viceroys, on whom their kings, agreeably to the oriental manners of government, devolved too great a share of their authority, shook off their allegiance, assumed the titles of kings themselves, and erected their governments into separate and independent states. They were often engaged in war against each other, or the king of Cordova, from whom they had revolted. Their strength was thereby much impaired; and they could

Their character.

BOOK IV. could seldom act in concert against their common enemy.

1609.

It was long before the Christians could rightly improve the opportunities which were thus afforded them. For they too were divided into several unconnected sovereignties; and, for many years, through misunderstandings, joined to the distance at which they lay from one another, they found it no less difficult to act in concert than the Moors. But, at length, several of these little sovereignties being united under one head (*a*), the war was carried on with greater vigour than ever on the part of the Christians. The Mahometans were, in numberless rencounters, overpowered. They were expelled from many parts of the open country, of which they had long held possession, and had much reason to apprehend that, if they did not correct the errors in their government, or conduct, which had occasioned their misfortunes, they must ere long sink under the growing power and superior bravery of the enemy.

THEIR downfall was long retarded by the folly of the Christians, who, on numberless occasions, suffered equally with the Moors, from the want of concord. Far from taking warning from the misfortunes of the Moors, they were almost continually at war with each other, and often seemed to be no less intent on one another's destruction, than on that of their common enemy. It often happened that, by the conquests which they obtained over each other, states of a considerable magnitude were formed, the sovereigns of which, if they had acted wisely, must have proved an overmatch for the Moors. But these states were no sooner formed than they were again dissolved, through the

(*a*) Under Sancho, an. 1035. Mariana, lib. viii.



the pernicious practice adopted by the kings, of dividing their dominions among their children. BOOK IV.  
1609. This practice, of which there are many instances in the history of Spain, was, at different periods, a copious source of animosity and discord. It proved equally pernicious to the people, and to the families of the kings, and long rendered it impossible for them to make any considerable effort against the infidels.

THEIR exertions, however, were generally much more vigorous and successful than those of their opponents; and before the end of the thirteenth century, they had acquired the kingdoms of Castile, Navarre, Arragon, Murcia, and Valentia. Their intestine divisions still arose, at times, to the same height as formerly; and the Christian, as well as the Mahometan parts of Spain, exhibited, almost every year, some new scenes of bloodshed and devastation; till towards the end of the fifteenth century, when, by the marriage of Ferdinand with Isabella, the crown of Castile was united to that of Arragon: an event which, while it in a great measure secured internal tranquillity to the Christians, gave them a decided superiority over their ancient enemies.

At this period, the only Moorish kingdom which remained unconquered was that of Granada, which contained a great extent of fertile country, and several of the strongest towns in Spain. From the situation of some of the chief of these towns on the sea coast, the Moors could easily receive assistance from their friends in Africa; and Ferdinand was, on this account, the more solicitous to deprive them of so important a possession.

THIS artful prince was seldom at a loss to find pretexts to colour his ambitious enterprizes; and the

BOOK IV. the present juncture was the most favourable to his  
 ~~~~~ design which could justly be expected. There  
 1609. were two competitors, at this time, for the crown  
 of Granada, Albohardill, and his nephew Boab-  
 dilla : and the whole kingdom was torn in pieces  
 by the contending parties, who often satiated  
 their vengeance in each other's blood.

FERDINAND could not suffer so favourable an opportunity to escape: he first entered into an alliance with the nephew against the uncle, under the cover of which he made war upon the latter, and expelled him from his territories; and soon afterwards, he turned his arms against his ally, made himself master of the city of Granada (*b*), and all his other fortified places; and, although he still affected to treat him with respect, he soon rendered it necessary for him to abandon his dominions, and retire to Africa.

IN the prosecution of the war, Ferdinand gave proof of great abilities, as well as of the most consummate artifice. Notwithstanding which it was protracted to the unusual length of ten years; and, from the difficulty which he encountered in his operations against a people so much weakened by intestine divisions, it is probable that he would not have been able to compleat their subjection, if their whole force united had been employed in repelling his attacks. Their kings had, in a great measure, lost their affection by their folly and misconduct; and, for this reason, they were not so reluctant, as they would otherwise have been, against transferring their allegiance: but they required, and Ferdinand judged it expedient, to grant them such conditions as they thought would put them nearly on the same footing with his other subjects.

OF

(*b*) An. 1492.

OF these conditions it was one that they should be permitted the free exercise of their religion; and for the first seven years after the conquest, no violence was offered them on that account. Ferdinand expected, that after the abolition of their government, they might easily be converted to the Christian faith. But, finding that the instructions of the ecclesiastics on this head were not attended with the desired effect, he resolved, notwithstanding his engagement confirmed by an oath, rather to employ compulsion, than any longer to indulge so great a proportion of his subjects in the exercise of a false religion.

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He made choice of the celebrated Ximenes, archbishop of Toledo, to carry his design into execution; and, for this purpose, ordered him to repair to Granada, with full power to employ whatever measures he should judge to be most expedient. Ximenes began with caressing, and making presents to some of the leading men among the Morescoes, and thus persuaded some of them to submit to be baptized. But, making little progress in this way, and his natural impatience and severity quickly prompting him to have recourse to other methods, more agreeable to his disposition, he threw all such of their leaders as refused to comply with his request, into prisons and dungeons, where they were treated as if they had been guilty of the most atrocious crimes.

The Morescoes persecuted by the Spaniards.

THE people, highly incensed against him, on account of this violent procedure, took up arms, and having surrounded his palace, demanded that their leaders might be released. But having no person among them invested with authority to conduct their operations, they were quickly dispersed by the count de Tendilla, the governor of the citadel; immediately after which Ferdinand, by

**BOOK IV.** by the advice of Ximenes, sent judges to Granada, and by these judges the people were found guilty of rebellion against his government. It was declared by these judges that the whole Morescoes in Granada, though only a small part of them had been concerned in the insurrection, were yet, on that account, liable to be capitally punished; and the king was well prepared with his army to carry the sentence into execution. But having offered them a pardon, on condition of their embracing the Christian religion; upwards of fifty thousand of them, all citizens of the town of Granada, submitted to be baptized.

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THE inhabitants of the country were treated with equal violence; for they too, upon receiving intelligence of what had passed in Granada, had begun to put themselves into a posture of defence. The count de Tendilla was ordered to march against them with an army of veteran troops; and this general, in order to intimidate them, put all the inhabitants of one of their towns, men, women, and children, to the sword. Still, however, they refused to lay down their arms, till Ferdinand himself, at the head of a numerous army, having reduced all their fortified places, the greater part of them consented to purchase their lives at the expence of their religion; and the rest, upon paying ten dollars each of them, as a ransom, were permitted to transport themselves to Barbary.

From this time, the Granada Morescoes were considered by the Spaniards as Christians, although it can hardly be supposed that any of them were sincerely converted to the Christian faith. They were styled the New Christians, in contradistinction from the Spaniards, who were called the Old. They were not admitted to the enjoyment of any office,



office, either in the church or state. But when they discovered, on any occasion, an attachment to Mahometanism, they were treated by the inquisition as apostates; and great numbers of them were, every year, condemned by that tribunal, and committed to the flames.

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By this treatment, which was equally impolitical and unchristian, their prejudices against the catholic religion, and the Spanish government, were strengthened and confirmed. Their ill humour, however, shewed itself only in murmurs and complaints: and the Morescoes in Granada are scarcely mentioned in the Spanish history, till the reign of Philip II. when, in consequence of fresh oppression, having made an unsuccessful attempt to vindicate their liberty, most of them, as formerly related, were transplanted into Castile, and other inland provinces.

It is not to be doubted that Philip would have treated the Morescoes of Valentia, in the same manner as those of Granada, had he not been deterred by his experience of the expence and danger with which the reduction of the latter had been accompanied. The Moorish kingdom of Valentia had been conquered by James I. king of Aragon, before the middle of the thirteenth century; and this prince had been extremely solicitous to have the people converted to the Christian faith. He had, for this purpose, erected schools, where the ecclesiastics might learn the Arabic; and, in obedience to his commands, several Dominicans and other friars, had applied themselves to the study of that language, after acquiring which, they had entered on the office of missionaries among the Morescoes. But whether they were not sufficiently acquainted with that language, to be able to teach in it, or had not sufficient patience for so

BOOK IV. arduous a task as that of combating the religious prejudices of a people noted for their bigotry, they soon began to represent the Morescoes as obstinate infidels, whom it was in vain to expect to convert by instruction. Even miracles, they pretended, had been wrought among them without success, and, therefore, compulsion was now the only expedient that could prove effectual.

At the instigation of these ecclesiastics, Pope Clement, the fourth of that name, having advised the king to expel the Morescoes from his dominions if they should still refuse to be converted, James would readily have embraced this council, if he could have persuaded his cortes to consent. But, by the free constitution of the government of Arragon, to which Valentia was now annexed, the consent of the cortes was requisite; and, although the clergy and commons were willing to gratify the king, yet the barons, who foresaw the ruin of their estates if the Morescoes, their vassals, were expelled, opposed the measure with such inflexible obstinacy, that James found it necessary to relinquish his design.

The tyranny of king Ferdinand restrained by the cortes.

FROM this period, to the conquest of Granada by Ferdinand, almost two hundred years had elapsed; and during all that time, the Valentia Moors had been indulged in the free exercise of their religion. But when the barons heard of the violence with which Ferdinand had treated the Moors of Granada, they dreaded an extension of his tyranny to their vassals in Valentia; and, in order to prevent it, they required, and, though with some difficulty, obtained his assent to a law passed in the cortes, in the year 1510, where it was enacted that no Moresco, within the kingdom of Valentia, should either be expelled from the kingdom,

kingdom, or compelled to embrace the Christian faith. BOOK IV.

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NOR were the barons satisfied with taking this precaution; but, in order to prevent the court or the ecclesiastics from reviving their design, in any future reign, they resolved to make it henceforth a part of their king's coronation oath, that, on no pretence whatever, he should attempt to expel the Morescoes from Valentia, or employ force to engage them to embrace the Christian religion; that he should never attempt, directly or indirectly, to procure a dispensation from this oath, nor even accept of a dispensation, in case it should be offered him.

THIS oath was sworn, a few years after, by Charles V. at his accession; and the barons seemed then to possess the utmost security which they could desire against any future oppression of their vassals. But they soon experienced, how ineffectual the wisest precautions sometimes prove against the events of fortune. A bloody war having broken out between the commons and nobles of Valentia, in the year 1520; the former, actuated partly perhaps by religious bigotry, but principally by revenge against the latter, published a manifesto, requiring all the Morescoes, under the penalty of death, immediately to embrace the catholic religion. The nobles were, at that time, unable to afford them protection against their enemies; and as the Morescoes were themselves sufficiently acquainted with the violent character of the commons, they knew that it would be in vain to offer any remonstrance on the subject. Without delay, therefore, almost the whole of them consented to be baptized, in the hopes that, when tranquillity should be restored, no advantage would be taken by the court of this deed of theirs,

BOOK IV. theirs, which was known to be the effect of law-  
less force and violence.

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BUT no sooner were the civil commotions of the kingdom composed, than Charles, having convened an assembly of the clergy, to consider of the validity of that baptism, to which the Morefcoes had been obliged to submit; it was determined by this assembly, that although they ought not to have been compelled to submit to be baptized, yet the character thereby impressed upon them was indelible, they were henceforth to be considered as Christians, and in the case of a defection from the catholic religion, to be treated as apostates; that the name of God, as is subjoined in the decree, may not be blasphemed, nor contempt brought upon the Christian profession.

THE Morefcoes, conscious of a sincere attachment to the Mahometan faith, and being at no loss to understand, that by this decree it was intended they should henceforth be subject to the jurisdiction of the inquisition, they had no other expedient left to save themselves from the cruelty of that barbarous tribunal, but to assert (which great numbers of them did) that they had not been baptized; and as, amidst the confusion of civil discord, no register of their baptisms had been kept, it was impossible in most cases to disprove their assertion.

OF this difficulty the ecclesiastics gave information to the emperor; and about the same time, a dispensation from his coronation oath was sent him by the pope (c). Charles had acquired a great accession of power by his suppression of the late rebellion; and the power of the nobles had  
suffered

(c) Clement VII. Vide Geddes.



suffered a proportional diminution. Being no longer afraid, therefore, of any opposition which he might receive from the Valentia barons, and being delivered from his religious scruples by the pope's dispensation from his oath, he first (d) gave orders to the clergy to apply themselves to the instruction of the Morescoes in the Christian faith, commanding the barons to require a punctual attendance from their vassals, on the instructions that should be given them; and in the following year, he ordered all the Morescoes, who denied their having been formerly baptized, either immediately to submit to that initiatory rite, or to quit the Spanish dominions, under the penalty of perpetual servitude.

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THE Morescoes of Pianaguazil refused to accept of this alternative, and had recourse to arms in their defence; but these men having been easily reduced to obedience, it was believed that, after the year 1526, there was hardly a single Moresco in Spain who had not submitted to the rite of baptism.

THERE was no reason however to suppose that any considerable number of them were sincerely converted to the Christian faith; and, as it is impossible for men who act a fictitious part uniformly to conceal their real sentiments, the history of Spain, during the reign of Charles and that of his successor, is filled with complaints against them (e), on account of their infidelity. Frequent councils were held at Madrid, to consider of the proper means of effectuating their conversion. Orders were repeatedly sent from thence, requiring the clergy to exert themselves with greater activity in instructing them; and the inquisition

every

(d) An. 1525. (e) The reader will remember that the Morescoes here spoke of, are those of Valentia.

BOOK IV. every year exercised against great numbers of  
 1609. them its wonted rigour and severity.

STILL, however, it should seem that their attachment to the Mahometan superstition, as well as to their ancient manners and customs, remained as strong as ever.

Nor will this appear surprising, if it is true that men are commonly attached to a false religion in proportion to its absurdity; because, not being accustomed to employ their reason on the subject of religion, they are incapable of being convinced by reason. But, besides this consideration, there were other causes which concurred in producing that unconquerable obstinacy which the Moreos discovered in their adherence to Mahometanism. They were proud of professing a religion, which was the religion of all those mighty empires that had been founded by their ancestors.

The attachment of the Moreos to the Mahometan religion accounted for

THEY had often entertained the hopes of being rescued by means of the Turks, and other Mahometans, from the Spanish yoke, and could not resolve entirely to abandon a religion which they expected, sooner or later, to be at liberty to profess. Their hereditary hatred of the Spaniards, which had been nourished by an uninterrupted course of hostilities during several centuries, had been riveted, since the conquest, by the severity with which they had been used; while their aversion to the catholic worship was heightened by the appearance which the use of images in that worship gave it of idolatry, against every species of which all Mahometans are actuated with the most irreconcilable aversion. When to these considerations we add how little qualified the Spanish ecclesiastics were to instruct them in the principles of Christianity, and that most of the Moreos lived detached

tached from the Spaniards in towns and villages, and districts by themselves, seldom associating with any but those of their own persuasion, and speaking a language of which the ecclesiastics, as well as the people, were extremely ignorant; when all these circumstances are considered, it will not be so surprising, as at first sight it might appear, that so small a number of them should have been converted to the Christian faith.

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It must, at the same time, be acknowledged that their infidelity afforded just ground for uneasiness to the Spanish monarchs, who could hardly expect to gain the affections of a people, differing so widely from themselves, and from their Spanish subjects, in matters regarded as the most important and essential. The most inveterate enemies of Spain had for many years been the Turks, and the Moors of Barbary; and it could scarcely be supposed, that, in the case of an invasion by these powers, the Morescoes would be averse to exchange their present masters for others, whose religion, customs, and manners, were so nearly similar to their own.

Good policy, therefore, required that no pains should be spared, on the part of the kings of Spain, to accomplish the conversion of their Moresco subjects. Nor does it appear that these princes were at any time neglectful of an object which they justly deemed so highly deserving of their attention. They had instituted schools, as already mentioned, for teaching the Arabic tongue. They had often inculcated upon the clergy, to whom the instruction of the Morescoes was intrusted, the necessity of greater diligence in their endeavours to reclaim them. The royal commands on this head had, on different occasions, been enforced by the Roman pontiffs; and, in order to engage men,

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men, properly qualified, to apply themselves to this important work, they had augmented the church livings in many of those parts of the kingdom where the Moors resided.

THESE were perhaps the only means which the religious prejudices of the people, and the maxims or genius of the Spanish government, would permit to be employed; and if the Moreoscoes had, at the same time, been used with greater kindness, or even with greater lenity and forbearance, it is probable that, sooner or later, these means would have been attended with the desired success. But, besides that, the faith which the Spanish princes had pledged to them when they submitted to their authority had been often violated, they had been from the beginning treated with every mark of jealousy and suspicion; they had been excluded from all the honours, and from every important office in the state; encouragement had been given to the most minute and malignant investigation of their private conduct; and after the power of the barons, who had long acted as their protectors, was reduced, they were exposed a defenceless prey to the avarice and cruelty of the Inquisition. (c).

THE kings of Spain were too deeply tinctured with the bigotry of the Romish church, and their maxims of government too despotic, to allow them to perceive the absurdity of these measures, so extremely ill calculated to promote the purpose for which they were designed. Charles the Fifth, however, and Philip the Second, two princes noted for their political discernment, being aware of the prejudice which the kingdom would sustain, if the Moreoscoes, who formed so great a proportion

(c) Carta de Don Pedro de Valentia, MS. No. 1.



tion of their subjects were expelled, had given BOOK IV.  
 no ground to suspect that they would ever con- 1609.  
 sent to their expulsion; nor does it appear that  
 the clergy, who earnestly wished that this mea-  
 sure might be embraced, ever attempted to re-  
 commend it either to Charles or his son. But,  
 soon after the accession of the present king, they  
 conceived the hopes of being able to accomplish  
 their desire; because both Philip and his minis-  
 ter, they thought, would be influenced more by  
 religious than political considerations; and, in  
 case they could be persuaded that the interest of  
 religion was concerned in the expulsion, would  
 be easily reconciled to the political inconveni-  
 ences that might attend it.

THE motives which determined the ecclesiastics  
 in their conduct on this occasion were not merely  
 such as were suggested by religious zeal or bigo-  
 try. The obstinacy of the Moreos in adher-  
 ing to Mahometanism had been generally ascribed  
 to the remissness or negligence of those who had  
 been employed to instruct them (*f*); and the  
 clergy were sensible that much greater pains were  
 requisite for this end than they were willing to  
 bestow. Besides which, their revenues had been  
 taxed for augmenting the Moreos vicarages,  
 and for building and endowing an additional  
 number of churches for their instruction. They  
 were, on both these accounts, inflamed against  
 the Moreos with a peculiar hatred; and, in  
 order that they might at once avoid the labour  
 necessary for converting them, and the censure  
 which they must incur in case of their declining  
 it, they earnestly desired their expulsion; and, in  
 order to effectuate it, were perpetually inveighing  
 against them as an incurable race of infidels, of  
 whose

(*f*) By a brief from the pope, Gregory XIII. an. 1576.

**BOOK IV.** whose conversion, without a miraculous interposition of Divine Power, no hopes could justly be entertained.  
 1609.

OF all the ecclesiastics, the person who discovered the most unrelenting hatred against this unhappy people was Don John de Ribera, patriarch of Antioch, and archbishop of Valentia, an aged prelate, who was held in high veneration by his countrymen for his piety and learning; and, in different histories of his life, published in Spain and Italy, is celebrated as one of the brightest ornaments that ever adorned the Christian church.

BUT there is nothing for which the historians have been so liberal in his praise as the flaming zeal which he displayed in his unwearied exertions for the expulsion of the Morescoes, in which they suppose him to have been animated by a patriotic concern for the safety of Spain, and a pious solicitude for the preservation of the Catholic faith.

IT has been questioned, however, whether his motives were in reality so pure as his admirers would have us to believe; for there is ground to suspect, that, after the Pope, at the request of Philip II. imposed a new tax of between three and four thousand dollars yearly on the revenues of his archbishopric, for augmenting the salaries of the curates employed in instructing the Morescoes, his zeal for their expulsion became more violent than ever. This tax, it is said, neither he, nor any of the clergy in his diocese, ever paid; and although the king, in order more easily to reconcile the Morescoes to Christianity, had obtained from the Pope an edict of grace in their favour, containing a plenary pardon for all their  
 past

AN. 1569.

past offences, on condition, that, within the space BOOK IV.  
of four years, they should make confession to 1609.  
certain commissioners, to be appointed by Ribera  
and the other bishops, yet this edict was not pub-  
lished, nor any commissioners appointed, till after  
two years and a half, when Philip III. interposed  
his authority for that effect.

IN defence of the archbishop's conduct in these instances, it may be alledged, that, from long experience, and many fruitless trials, he believed the infidelity of the Morescoes to be incurable, and that he would not have thus ventured repeatedly to disobey the orders of his spiritual superior, had he not known that the sovereign pontiff, having the same opinion as himself of the vanity of all farther attempts for their conversion, did not seriously desire to have his orders carried into execution. But whatever were the motives of this prelate's conduct, and though it justly exposed him to the imputation of wishing rather to have the Morescoes expelled than converted, no person had greater influence on this occasion with the king and his ministers in recommending the measure that was afterwards embraced.

FROM the arguments which he employed in Memorials  
two memorials on the subject, presented to the to the king  
king, the reader will be better able to judge of of Spain a-  
the motives by which both he and the court of gainst the  
Spain were determined. In his first memorial, Morescoes.  
dated in the year 1602, his principal design was  
to sound their inclination, and to awaken in them  
a sense of the danger to which the kingdom was  
exposed.

“ AFTER all the pains, he said, which had been  
bestowed in attempting to convert the Morescoes  
to Christianity, they were still as strongly as ever  
attached

**BOOK IV.** attached to the Mahometan superstition. In the  
 1609. kingdom of Valentia, the bishops, the rectors, and preachers, had in vain used their most strenuous endeavours to persuade them to avail themselves of the Pope's edict of grace, which had been lately published. In reasoning with their leading men, it had been observed, that, as often as they were put to silence by the arguments employed to convince them, they changed colour, and were so inflamed with indignation as evidently shewed how much they desired to be able to employ force in defence of their opinions. They corresponded with those of their own sect in the most distant parts of the country, and sent their emissaries every where, to encourage the people to persevere in their infidelity. They all spoke with one mouth, and had the same answer to return to their instructors, that they were already Christians; that they had already confessed all the sins, of which they were conscious, to their respective priests; and that, being occupied with their proper business, they had not leisure to attend to the conduct of others, and therefore knew not of any persons who practised the rites of the Mahometan religion. They had often been convicted of falsehood; but on these occasions they were either silent, or they repeated the same reply to the questions that were put to them. Since the publication of the edict of grace, they had celebrated the festivals of their religion with greater solemnity than before; and, with much effrontery, had caroused together, on receiving intelligence of the unsuccessful issue of the expedition of his majesty's forces against Algiers.

“ FROM this conduct of the Moriscos, continued Ribera, which I have represented with my wonted impartial regard to truth, two important consequences follow, which require your majesty's most serious attention.

THE



THE first is, that the bishops, and other pastors of the church, are laid under the painful necessity of doing what many learned doctors of the church think unlawful, the administering of the sacrament of baptism to those who they know will, sooner or later, become apostates from the faith; for there is a moral certainty that every Moresco child, whom we baptize, will, through the example and instruction of his Mahometan parents, become himself a Mahometan. And this we are taught to expect, not only by reason and experience, but by the spirit of God, who, in speaking of the infidelity of Rehoboam, makes twice mention, in one chapter, that he was the son of Naama, a Gentile; which is equivalent to declaring that to be the child of a mother who is an infidel, and to be educated by her, is a certain means of making the child an infidel.

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“ IN baptizing the Moresco children, therefore, our consciences are greatly disturbed with the apprehension that we are guilty of violating the commandment of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has prohibited the giving of holy things to dogs, and the casting of pearls before swine.

“ NOR is this the only unhappy consequence arising from the incurable infidelity of the Morescoes. But the kingdom of Spain is, therefore, exposed to the greatest risk of becoming an easy prey to the hostile designs of our enemies. This kingdom was ruined in former times by the intrigues of a single person, count Julian, by whose instigation it was invaded and subdued by the Saracens, when they had no friends within the kingdom to second their attempt. And from thence may be perceived how great occasion there is for the most disquieting apprehensions at this time, when there are established in the kingdom  
ninety

**BOOK IV.** ninety thousand men fit to carry arms, and all of them actuated with the most irreconcilable aversion to the present government. The Turks and Moors are the inveterate enemies of Spain, because she is the principal bulwark of Christendom; the French, from jealousy, or envy of her greatness; and the English, on account of her zeal for maintaining the purity of the Catholic faith; is there not just ground to dread that these our foreign enemies, allured by the hopes of assistance from those whom we nourish in our bosom, shall unite their forces, and undertake the subversion of the monarchy? Especially when it is considered that, with the powerful assistance they would receive from the Morescoes, a small number of troops would be sufficient, and no extraordinary preparations or expence required.

“ The Morescoes, in Granada alone, had withstood the whole force which the late king could muster against them, although, besides his Spanish troops, he had sent for into Spain a numerous reinforcement of Germans and Italians. But, if all the Morescoes in the different parts of the kingdom were to take arms, which it is unquestionable they would do, if either the Turks, or French, or English, were to attempt an invasion, our condition would then be the most deplorable and desperate, and, like our ancestors, we must resolve either to yield our necks to the yoke of conquerors, or to take shelter, as they did, among the rocks or mountains of Asturia.

“ As often as I have reflected on the imminent danger to which this mighty monarchy stands exposed, I have thought it unaccountable, that, during the long reigns of two such wise and powerful monarchs, as the emperor, and the late king, no sufficient security against it was provided.

Nor

Nor can I account for their negligence in this respect, but on the supposition that God, who rules the hearts of kings, thought fit to reserve this important work, so worthy of your royal breast, on purpose to adorn the annals of your pious reign; as he reserved the deliverance of his chosen people for Moses, their entrance into the promised land for Joshua, the conquest of the Philistines for David, and the inflicting of vengeance on the Amalekites for Saul.

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“ EITHER this has been his intention, or he hath so long prevented the Spanish monarchs from perceiving the necessity of delivering Spain from so great a danger, that, by means of the Moreos, he may punish us for our sins. But, in my opinion, one of the greatest of these is the permitting of so great a number of inveterate enemies of the church and state for so many years to retain their power of doing mischief; nor is it reasonable to expect success in foreign enterprizes, till the kingdom shall be purged of its domestic foes.

“ In the year 1588, when the great Armada was destroyed, I was emboldened by my zeal for the interest of religion and my country, to represent to your royal father, that, after having long and carefully enquired why it had pleased God to permit so great a calamity to befall us, I was persuaded that he intended thereby to instruct the king, that, till he had extirpated heresy from his own dominions, he ought not to have suffered his attention to be diverted by any thing that passed in foreign states. And, in like manner, confiding in your majesty's clemency for forgiveness of the liberty which I take, I must declare that, after the most mature consideration, it appears to me, that no other account but this can be given of the late failure of your expedition against Algiers,

BOOK IV. giers, in which there was nothing omitted which  
 { human prudence could suggest to insure success.  
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“ It is the will of heaven, that your majesty should first provide for the safety and tranquillity of your own dominions ; and, in order to accomplish this end, it is necessary that your domestic enemies, those apostates from the faith, who are equally enemies to the state and to our most holy religion, should be deprived of the power of disturbing your repose. No object, surely, can be more deeply interesting ; and, therefore, I trust I shall be pardoned for presuming, with due humility, to exhort your majesty to require your ministers, without delay, to apply themselves to the consideration of it, with all that serious attention which it so highly deserves, excluding from all the councils which shall be held for that purpose, all those persons whose private interest may hinder them from perceiving what is conducive to the public good ( *f* ).”

THIS memorial was most graciously received by the king and the duke of Lerma, both of whom wrote letters of thanks to the patriarch for the wholesome counsel which it contained, and required him to give them his opinion with regard to the proper means of obviating that imminent danger, to which it appeared, from his memorial, the kingdom was exposed. In compliance with this request, and emboldened by the confidence reposed in him, Ribera soon after presented another memorial, of which the purport was, partly to persuade Philip that no other means could prove effectual for the utter extirpation of the Moriscoes ; and partly to take off the force of such objections, as either religion or humanity might suggest,

( *f* ) Vita de Ribera.



suggest, to deter him from having recourse to this expedient.

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IN sacred writ, he said, there was no precept so often repeated to the chosen people of God as that of rooting out from among them those infidel nations whom they found in possession of the promised land. A strict obedience to this precept was particularly inculcated on the kings and rulers of the people; and the first king, whom God himself had appointed to rule over them, incurred the divine displeasure, and was deprived of his kingdom, merely on account of his disobedience. The pernicious consequences of permitting the Morescoes to remain in Castile and Arragon were the same as those which the children of Israel experienced from their communication with the idolatrous heathens; for the faithful in Spain were in equal danger from the infection of their example, and the extirpation of these infidels was therefore equally incumbent on the catholic king, as that of the heathens on the kings and captains of the Jews.

IN following the example of David, and other good kings of Israel, Philip would likewise imitate the conduct of some of the best and greatest of his predecessors; by whom the Jews had, at different periods, been expelled from Spain, though their provocations had never been so great as those of the Morescoes; for they were not heretics and apostates as they were, and were never accused of holding correspondence with the enemies of the state.

HIS illustrious grandfather, Charles V. the wisest and greatest prince of the age in which he lived, had published an edict, requiring the Morescoes either to submit to be baptized, or to de-

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part

BOOK IV.

1609.

part from Spain; expecting that by submitting to be baptized they would become both Christians and friends. It now appeared how much he was mistaken in this expectation; but, from the tenor of his edict, it was manifest how much he thought it his duty, and how necessary he believed it for the safety and prosperity of his people, to extirpate infidels from his dominions.

THE pernicious effects of tolerating apostates from the faith, had been severely felt by the French monarchs, whose kingdom had thereby been reduced to the lowest ebb, and their Catholic subjects exposed, for almost half a century, to all the miseries of civil war; whereas, if they had acted conformably to the measures of the church, and either put to death their heretical subjects, or expelled them from the kingdom, all these unhappy consequences might have been prevented, and the purity of the faith preserved.

THE temporal as well as the spiritual interest of the king's Catholic and loyal subjects, required that the Morescoes should be expelled; because, if they were not, there was much ground to apprehend they would ere long become masters of all the riches in the kingdom. They were not only industrious, but frugal and parsimonious to excess. They could labour for much lower wages, and were satisfied with much smaller profits in trade than were requisite for the subsistence of the Spaniards; great numbers of them were thus excluded from both trade and labour, and thereby reduced to indigence. The Spanish villages, all over Castile and Andalusia, had fallen into decay; while those of the Morescoes increased and flourished; and the Spanish farmers were unable to pay their rents, though they cultivated the most fertile parts of the country; while the Morescoes,

coes, who generally lived in the most barren parts, after paying the third part of their crops to the proprietors of their farms, were not only able to support themselves and their families, but annually to increase their stock.

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IN consequence of this their number had of late been greatly augmented; and there was ground to dread that, if some remedy were not speedily applied, the natives would in a few years be outnumbered and overpowered. But no remedy whatever, he believed, would be found effectual, while the Morescoes were permitted to continue within the kingdom. The king's humanity, he supposed, would revolt at the thoughts of putting so many hundred thousands to the sword, and therefore the only expedient which remained, was to transport them into foreign parts.

HE did not however think it adviseable to expel them all at once; for, as those of Valentia lived in a great measure detached from the Christians, in villages and districts by themselves, there was little danger from the infection of their example; besides that the Moors of those parts practised various useful arts, which were unknown to the Christians, but were extremely necessary for the comfort and convenience of life. If all these Moors were to be at once expelled, those arts would be entirely lost, and a great part of the country would become wild and desolate. But although for these reasons it might be judged expedient to delay their expulsion, they ought, in the mean time, to be loaded with taxes for the maintenance of an army, sufficient to prevent any prejudice that might arise from permitting them to remain; their numbers ought, as quickly as possible, to be diminished, by sending annually

**BOOK IV.** <sup>1609.</sup> some thousands of their young men to the gallees and the mines, and Christians, acquainted with their arts, ought gradually to be substituted in their room.

BUT a different course, he thought, ought to be pursued with regard to the Morescoes in the other provinces, who were, on many accounts, much more formidable than those of Arragon and Valentia. They had every where intermixed with the Christians; their example was consequently more infectious; and the churches and altars were profaned by their hypocritical and mock compliances with the holy rites of the true religion. They spoke the Castilian language; their minds were more cultivated and improved; they were better acquainted with the state of Spain, and much more capable of giving dangerous intelligence to her enemies; besides which, great numbers of them, having served in the royal navy, were thereby not only qualified to act as spies, but to afford assistance to the enemy, in the case of an invasion or attack, or to any foreign enemy, by whom the kingdom should be attacked.

By these considerations he was induced to believe that the preservation of the kingdom, as well as the interest of religion, required that all the Morescoes in Spain, those of Arragon and Valentia excepted, should be instantly expelled. They were all to be considered as obstinate heretics, or as apostates from the faith, whom the king, if he thought fit, might justly punish with death; and there could be no room therefore to doubt of the lawfulness of transporting them to foreign countries, which was the mildest punishment that, consistently with the safety of his kingdom, he could inflict.

THEIR



THEIR children, under seven years of age, BOOK IV.  
might be detained, in order to be educated in the 1609.  
Christian faith; and the king might, without any  
scruple of conscience, compel any number of those  
who were grown up, to serve on board his gal-  
lies, or in the mines of America; while, for the  
benefit of his exchequer, he might sell the rest  
for slaves to his Christian subjects in Spain and  
Italy. It could not be unjust to punish men in  
this manner, who by their crimes had forfeited  
their lives; and if it was just to punish them ei-  
ther with slavery or death, the simply expelling  
them from Spain, and transporting them to other  
countries, where their own religion was profes-  
sed, could not be considered in any other light  
but as an act of clemency and mercy on the part  
of the king.

It might be difficult, he acknowledged, to ef-  
fectuate their expulsion, without endangering the  
internal peace of the kingdom; but God, he  
trusted, would enlighten the minds of the king's  
ministers, and enable them to discern the most  
proper means of carrying so laudable a design in-  
to execution; for, as the counsel he had offered  
was equally dictated by his regard to the spiritual  
and to the temporal interest of the kingdom, he  
could not doubt that it was acceptable to God;  
and when he reflected on his great age, his natu-  
ral temper and disposition, and the habits which  
he had long indulged of a retired and sequestered  
life, he could hardly suppose that the zeal and re-  
solution with which he felt himself inspired in his  
address to the king, on the present occasion,  
could proceed from any other cause but the secret  
and all-powerful influence of the spirit of God  
upon his mind (g).

THE

(g) Vida de Ribera, p. 388. Por Escriva.

## BOOK IV.

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The effect  
of the rea-  
soning of  
Ribera on  
the mind of  
the king.

THE reasoning in this memorial was admirably fitted to make impression on the superstitious and timid temper of the king; nor was its efficacy lessened by the patriarch's vain pretension to divine illumination. But although both Philip's religious scruples, and his apprehensions of impending danger, were easily excited, his natural disposition, which was gentle and humane, rendered him extremely averse to a measure so replete with cruelty, as that which Ribera had exhorted him to adopt. He could not therefore resolve to comply with the counsel that was given him, and his irresolution was encreased by a memorial which was soon afterwards presented to him by the barons of Valentia.

THEY had received intelligence from some of their friends at court of the patriarch's two memorials. They knew that he had advised the king to permit their vassals to remain for some time longer, which they ascribed to his dread of their resentment; but they believed that the expulsion of the other Morescoes, would be quickly followed by that of those in Valentia, and for this reason they were equally alarmed as if he had counselled the whole to be expelled.

Remon-  
strance of  
the barons  
of Valentia  
against the  
expulsion  
of the Mo-  
rescoes.

IN order to deter the king from listening to his proposal, they unanimously remonstrated against the expulsion, as a measure that would be attended with the most pernicious consequences; for the Morescoes were not only a frugal, temperate, and industrious race of men, but they were the most skillful farmers, and the most ingenious manufacturers in Spain. There were several manufactures, equally necessary for internal consumption and foreign trade, with which they alone were acquainted; and without their skill and labour, it was an unquestionable fact, that a great  
part

part of the kingdom would lie waste, and innumerable families of the highest rank, who entirely depended on the rents of their lands, be reduced to indigence. BOOK IV.  
1609.

It had been affirmed that they were all Mahometans, but no sufficient evidence had been produced to prove the truth of this assertion. They had all been regularly initiated, by baptism, into the Christian church; they all professed themselves to be Christians; and although many of them, perhaps, were not able to give a satisfactory account of the doctrines of the Christian faith, yet the same thing might be said of innumerable other Christians of the lower rank, besides the Morescoes.

BUT if many of them were in reality ignorant or unbelieving, this could not justly be imputed to them, so much as to those to whom their instruction had been committed. Sufficient pains to instruct them, and proper methods of dealing with them, had seldom been employed. They had, at first, been dragged into the church by force and violence, and had afterwards been treated with inhumanity; as if bitter invectives, corporeal punishments, and the confiscation of their effects, were the proper means of enlightening their understandings with the knowledge of the truth. In order to engage them to listen to instruction, it was necessary that their instructors should study to conciliate their affections. This end could be obtained only by gentleness and forbearance: and if the king would be pleased to take effectual care to prevent them from being treated more like brutes than men, and still more, if, as a reward for their relinquishing the Mahometan superstition, he would grant them access to the same immunities and privileges that were enjoyed

**BOOK IV.** enjoyed by his other subjects, there would be no  
 ground to despair of their conversion.  
 1609.

THEY had been accused of holding a treasonable correspondence with the enemies of the state; but ought a vague and general assertion to be held as a sufficient evidence of their guilt? was not this crime of such a nature, that it must necessarily be confined to a few? ought the guilt of a few to be imputed to so great a number? ought even the few who had been guilty, to be condemned without a hearing, without a trial, and without the smallest evidence?

THIS imputation had been often cast upon the Morescoes, by speculative and sequestered men, who had no access to know the truth of their assertion, but were prompted by their zeal and prejudices to believe it. It had always been disregarded by the wisest of the king's predecessors; and justice, they hoped, would determine the king to imitate so laudable an example, till some proof or evidence was adduced. This remonstrance, which the barons presented in a cortes or parliament held in the year 1604, was not altogether without effect. In compliance with the intention of it, Philip resolved to delay the expulsion of the Morescoes for some years longer, and, in the mean time, to make a further trial, whether it was possible to effectuate their conversion to the faith; and for this purpose, he procured a brief from the pope, imposing a tax on the ecclesiastical revenues, a part of which he was authorised to employ in building and endowing a Moresco college; and in order to induce men of abilities to accept of curacies among the Morescoes, he was impowered, from the same fund, to augment the salaries of the curates.

BUT



BUT no greater regard it should seem was paid to this than to the other brief above mentioned. The college was not endowed, and the church livings remained the same as before: from whence there was but too much ground for the suspicion which was entertained, that the king had neither been able to interest the pope nor the Spanish ecclesiastics in the execution of his plan.

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THE latter laboured assiduously to convince both the pope and the king, that every thing had been already done for the conversion of the Morescoes, that was in the power of man to perform. The archbishop of Valentia presented a third memorial to the king, containing, as he pretended, a full reply to what had been asserted by the barons, but consisting principally, either of invectives against the Morescoes, or of denunciations of divine judgments, which must ere long overtake the kingdom, if they were not speedily expelled. (*b*).

RIBERA was powerfully seconded by several other ecclesiastics, and particularly by Bleda, a Dominican friar, distinguished for his acquaintance with the learning of his time, and equally noted for his activity, his zeal, and bigotry; who composed several bitter invectives against the Morescoes, and, dividing his time between Rome and Madrid, employed all his eloquence to persuade the pontiff and the king of the necessity of their expulsion.

BUT

(*b*) Some prodigies are recorded by Ribera in his memorial, and by other writers, as clear and certain indications of the will of heaven on the present occasion. Such as that the church bell of Villila rung of itself for several days, &c. But it does not appear, whether arguments of this kind, were despised or regarded by the king.

**BOOK IV.** BUT the archbishop's most powerful associate,   
 1609. was Don Bernardo de Roias y Sandoval, brother to the duke of Lerma, who was the cardinal-archbishop of Toledo, inquisitor-general and chancellor of Spain. This prelate approved and seconded every part of Ribera's memorials, except where he advised the king to retain such of the Morefco children as were under seven years of age, and to suffer the Morefcoes in Valentia, to remain till their place could be supplied by Christians ; for it was more adviseable this cardinal maintained, to put them all, men, women, and children to the sword, than to have the Spanish blood contaminated, as it would be, if either of these exceptions were admitted by a mixture of the polluted blood of infidels.

THE duke of Lerma, who, from the beginning of his administration, had studied, with great assiduity and solicitude, to ingratiate himself with the court of Rome and the Spanish ecclesiastics, readily espoused his brother's sentiments ; and, as the duke was at this time in the unrivalled and full possession of the royal favour, nothing now was wanting to fix the resolution of the king (*i*).

Expulsion  
of the Mo-  
rescoes.

IT was accordingly resolved, that all the Morefcoes in Spain, those in Valentia as well as those in the other provinces, should be expelled. The cardinal-archbishop went himself to Rome, with the design, it is believed, to persuade the sovereign pontiff to grant his sanction to the expulsion by some public deed : but, if this was the intention of his journey, it did not produce the desired effect. The pontiff, probably, chose that the odium which must attend a measure so barbarous and so unprecedented, should rather fall on the court of Spain

(*i*) Fonseca Traycion de Morefcoes, p. 196.

Spain than on the holy see ; and, therefore, we do not read of any other papal bull or brief published on the present occasion, but one addressed to the bishops of Valentia, commanding them to assemble together, in order to consider whether any method of converting the Morescoes could be devised. This bull was dated in the year 1606, a few months before the cardinal-primate set out for Rome, but was not published till after his return, in 1608. It was published in the month of April of that year ; and, in compliance with it, the bishops soon after met together, and spent several months in deliberating on the subject. But, as if the design of their meeting had been to condemn the Morescoes, and not to consider of the means of converting them, they at length pronounced the following sentence : “ That the Morescoes of the kingdom of Valentia were all apostates from the Christian faith, and were, besides, so obstinate and inflexible in their infidelity, that, whatever means should be employed, no hopes could justly be entertained of their conversion.

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THIS sentence, having been transmitted to the court, contributed to confirm the king in the resolution which he had formed. It was agreed, however, that the expulsion should be deferred till a more convenient season ; and that, in the mean time, the strictest secrecy should be observed. It was judged necessary to keep the design secret, lest the Morescoes should, either of themselves, or instigated by the barons, have recourse to arms ; and, as no court was ever more distinguished for maintaining the most inviolable secrecy in its councils than that of Spain, it should seem that no suspicion was entertained, either by the Morescoes or barons, of the king's determination in a matter wherein they were so deeply interested, till

Bleda, p.  
503.

BOOK IV. till every necessary preparation was made for carrying it into execution.

1609.

THE court having determined to begin with the expulsion of the Valentian Morescoes, orders were secretly given to the naval commanders in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, to receive a certain number of troops on board their ships, and to rendezvous, in August, 1609, at Alicant, Denia, and other sea-ports in the Mediterranean, on the coast of Valentia. About the same time, Don Augustin Mexia, an old experienced officer, governor of Antwerp, was sent to the city of Valentia to concert with the viceroy, the marquis of Cararena, and others, concerning the measures necessary to be taken within the kingdom to prevent a tumult or insurrection. The pretext employed for assembling the fleet was an expedition against the Moors in Barbary. But the barons, observing that frequent conferences were held, by night and by day, at the viceroy's, with regard to the subject of which they were kept entirely in the dark, and being informed that the archbishop (who assisted at these conferences), as if he expected to be besieged, had conveyed into his palace an extraordinary quantity of provisions, besides some troops and arms, they soon came to suspect what was the real purpose of the naval armament; and having, conformably to a privilege which belonged to them by the constitution of Valentia, summoned one of those assemblies of their own number, termed the Military Arms, they sent deputies to the viceroy, requesting him to acquaint them with the design of the present preparations. To this enquiry, the viceroy, without pretending ignorance of the king's intention, replied, that, whatever it was, the barons might rest assured that no resolution could be formed, either by the king, who had ever regarded them as his most faithful vassals,



vassals, or by the duke of Lerma, their country-  
man, whose estates were intermingled with theirs,  
which in the issue would not be found conducive  
to the true interest of Valentia.

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By this answer the barons were confirmed in their suspicions ; and, as they could not but suppose that the viceroy would have chosen, had it been in his power, to dispel their apprehensions, they could no longer doubt that the object of all the preparations which had been made was the expulsion of their vassals. They instantly convened again, and drew up a remonstrance to be presented to the king ; of which the purport was, that Valentia would be entirely ruined if the Morescoes, by whom most of the work in that kingdom was carried on, were expelled.

At the desire of the viceroy, who dreaded that this step might give an alarm to the Morescoes, the justiza, or chief justice in criminal matters, having attempted in vain to divert them from their purpose, was so violently agitated with grief and rage, that he dropt down dead in the assembly. This accident prevented them from coming to an immediate decision ; but next morning they had another meeting, in which they appointed deputies to carry their remonstrance to the king.

It was expressed in the strongest terms, dictated by a deep conviction of the melancholy truth which it contained ; but the deputies, though received by the king and his minister with much distinction and respect, were told, that the king's resolution, having been formed after the most mature deliberation, was unalterable ; that the Barons had been too late in presenting their petition ; and that the edict of expulsion was already published.

Remonstrance of the barons of Valentia against the expulsion of the Moors.

A STRONG

BOOK IV. A STRONG body of Castilian troops had actually entered Valentia, about the time of the arrival of the deputies at Madrid; and the Moreoscoes were now acquainted with their fate.

1609.

IN the edict of expulsion, which was published with the usual formalities, by the viceroy, in the beginning of September, 1609, they were all commanded, men, women, and children, under the penalty of death, to be ready within three days to repair to the sea-ports appointed for their embarkation, and there to go on board of ships prepared for carrying them into foreign parts.

It was ordained, under the same penalty, that they should all remain in the places where they were at the time of publishing the edict, till the commissaries appointed to conduct them to the sea-coast, should arrive; that if any of them should, before the arrival of the commissaries, presume to change the place of their abode, they might be carried by any person before a judge; and, in case they should make resistance, might instantly be put to death.

It was enacted, that all their effects should belong to the lords whose vassals they were, except such as they could carry along with them; and, that in case they should conceal or destroy any part of their effects, they should be punished with death.

For the preservation of the sugar works, granaries of rice, drains or aqueducts, and, in order that the Christian inhabitants might be instructed in the works and manufactures which had hitherto been carried on by the Moreoscoes, it was declared that six families, to be named by the barons, out of every hundred, might remain.

It

It was ordained, that all children under four years of age might remain, provided their parents or guardians should consent; that children under six or seven, one of whose parents was an old Christian, might remain, and the mothers with them, though they were Morescoes; but if the fathers were Morescoes, and the mothers Christians, that the fathers should be expelled, while the children might remain with their mothers; that all such of the Morescoes might remain, who, for any considerable time, had demeaned themselves as Christians, who could produce certificates from the parish-priests of their having received the sacrament, by permission of their respective bishops, or who had not for two years attended any of the Moresco religious meetings.

THEY were all permitted to depart into any country, not subject to the crown of Spain, provided they should leave the kingdom within the time specified; and an assurance was given them, that no violence or injury should be offered them, by those who should be employed in transporting them to Barbary, or any other country they should make choice of (*k*).

THE several concessions contained in this edict were considered by the ecclesiastics and the court of Spain as proofs of extraordinary clemency on the part of the king; but they could not be regarded in the same light by the Morescoes. They were equally overwhelmed with astonishment, and with anguish and distress. They were surrounded with enemies on every hand. The king, they perceived, though they had been taught to believe his distinguishing character to be gentleness and mercy, was their irreconcilable and mortal

(\*) Fonseca, lib. iv. cap. 3.

BOOK IV. <sup>1609.</sup> tal enemy; and their hearts sunk within them, when they reflected on the misery which they were doomed to undergo. They were not only disquieted with so near a prospect of the loss of their most valuable possessions, joined to that of perpetual banishment from their native country; but they violently dreaded that they were all to be butchered as soon as they were put on board the ships appointed for transporting them to foreign parts (*l*). They had never had any friends to whom they could look for assistance, except their patrons the barons, whose interest was inseparably linked with theirs; but the barons, they knew, were unable to afford them protection on the present occasion, and all the good offices which they had interposed in their behalf had been without avail. They had little reason, therefore, to expect that any thing which they themselves could do to avert the impending storm would prove effectual. That nothing, however, in their power might be omitted, their leading men, having met together privately in the city of Valentia, drew up a petition, and sent a deputation of their number to present it to the viceroy; in which, after solemnly asserting their innocence of the crimes imputed to them in the edict, they offered, in case the king would be persuaded to recall it, to maintain a certain number of galleys for the protection of the coast against the corsairs; to build several new forts, and to support the garrisons not only of these, but of such as were already built; to redeem all the Christians of Valentia who should ever be taken captives by the Moors; and, besides, to furnish the king with a considerable sum of money (*m*). But the viceroy

(*l*) Fonseca, lib. iv. cap. 8. (*m*) MSS. of Cottington's letters in lord Hardwick's possession. Mad. 8th Oct. 1609.



roy, though he was himself extremely averse to BOOK IV.  
the expulsion, without taking time to deliberate 1609.  
on their proposals, immediately replied, that there  
was now no room left for any petition or remon-  
strance; that the king was unalterably determined  
to put his edict into execution, and they must in-  
stantly prepare themselves, however reluctant, to  
submit (n).

WHEN this answer was reported by the dele-  
gates to the assembly in Valentia, their minds  
were variously agitated with grief, despair, and  
indignation. It was proposed by some of them  
that they should instantly have recourse to arms;  
for it was better, they maintained, to die fighting  
like men for their property and lives, than tamely  
to suffer themselves to be stript of their possessions,  
and afterwards, perhaps, to be butchered like  
sheep, by an implacable and cruel enemy, to whom  
they had never given any just occasion of offence;  
besides, that it might not be impossible for them  
to defend themselves in the mountainous parts of  
the country, till some foreign power, friendly to  
them, and hostile to the Spaniards, should come  
to their relief. But this proposal was rejected as  
desperate and impracticable by a great majority of  
the assembly, who represented that, as they were  
not provided either with arms or military stores,  
had no practice in war, and had been utterly un-  
accustomed to military discipline, it was impossible  
they could hold out for many weeks against so po-  
tent an enemy. The Spanish regular forces, un-  
der the most experienced officers, were already  
distributed all over the country, and were every  
where prepared to attack them on the first appear-  
ance of opposition or resistance. No time would  
be allowed them to put themselves into a posture  
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(n) Fonseca, lib. iv. cap. 7.

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of defence. They would instantly be either cut to pieces, or reduced to slavery, and an opportunity would be thus afforded to the Spaniards of gratifying at once, still more than by their expulsion, their avarice and their cruelty. It could not be supposed that the king would have incurred the expence, which his preparations for exporting them must have cost him, had he intended to destroy them on their passage, since he could have done it more easily without incurring so great an expence; besides, that so useless and so wanton a piece of treachery would cover his name with indelible disgrace. They might with confidence therefore expect to be safely conveyed to Barbary, and this was surely preferable either to death or to slavery in Spain. But while, for these reasons, all thoughts of resistance ought to be laid aside, they ought not to accept of either of the two offers that were made to them in the edict of expulsion. Neither their children under age, nor the six families out of every hundred who were permitted to remain, ought to be left behind. The Spaniards intended, by these concessions, to serve themselves, and not the Morescoes, and the latter should, for that reason, unanimously resolve to reject them with disdain.

The Morescoes resolve to defend themselves.

THIS resolution was warmly embraced by the whole assembly; and not by them only, but by all the other Morescoes in the kingdom of Valentia, except those, who, inhabiting certain mountainous parts of the country which they deemed impregnable, formed the desperate resolution of maintaining their possessions by force of arms. Before the meeting of Valentia, great numbers of those who lived in towns, and in the more fertile parts of the country, had earnestly solicited the barons to procure them to be named among the families who were to be permitted to remain; but

but no sooner were they made acquainted with the BOOK IV.  
determination of their leaders, than, with one <sup>1609.</sup> heart, and one voice, they declared that no consideration should now induce them to stay behind their kinsmen and companions.

THIS declaration was a matter of deep concern to the barons, who had, in some measure, been reconciled to the expulsion by the promise which had been given for six families out of every hundred to remain, and now dreaded the utter ruin of their estates, if the Morescoes should persevere in their present resolution. Of all the barons the duke of Gandia was likely to prove the greatest sufferer, as his estate chiefly consisted of those manufactures with which the Morescoes alone were acquainted. By employing all his influence with them, and making them the most advantageous offers, he at length obtained their consent, on condition that they should be allowed the free exercise of their religion. The duke solicited the viceroy to grant them this indulgence, till the Christians should be instructed in the manufactures, which would not require more than two or three years at most; but was told by the viceroy, that, agreeably to his orders from the king, it could not be granted for a single day (*n*). This answer being communicated to the Morescoes, there was not one person of more than a hundred and fifty thousand who could be persuaded to remain.

NOR were they less inflexible in refusing to leave their children behind them that were under

Y 2

six

(*n*) The viceroy received a letter of thanks from Philip on this occasion, beginning thus: Yo os agradezco mucho lo que respondistes, y el parecer que days, que no por una hora si consentia que es muy conforme a lo que de vuestra mucha Christianidad, se podia esperar, &c. Fonseca, lib. iv. cap. 8.

BOOK IV. <sup>1609.</sup> six years of age. They were well aware, as they said to the ecclesiastics who applied to them on this head, of the great inconveniencies and dangers to which so many thousand children, with their mothers and nurses, none of whom had ever been at sea, must be exposed from being crowded together on board the ships and gallies; but they were unalterably determined to carry them along with them to whatever part of the world they themselves should go, and chose rather to see them perish before their eyes than leave them in the hands of a people by whom their parents had been treated with so much cruelty (o).

THE army having been distributed into the several stations, where they might most effectually prevent any disturbance or insurrection, and the ships of war and transports, fully equipped for their intended voyage, the viceroy, without any farther delay, began to carry the royal edict into execution, by sending commissioners, with a sufficient body of troops, to collect the Morescoes in different quarters together, and to conduct them to the coast. The vassals of the duke of Gandia, amounting to more than twenty thousand men, were the first who embarked, and, after a prosperous voyage, they were safely landed at Oran, a Spanish fortress on the coast of Barbary.

AT

(o) The ecclesiastics, however, and some religious women of rank, detained a considerable number of the children, partly by stealth, and partly by compulsion; believing that, in doing so, they performed a meritorious service in the sight of God, and saved the souls of the children from perdition. Fonseca, p. 233. Dio principio a este santo latrocinio, Donna Isabel de Velasco Virreyna de aquel Reyno, la qual dio orden que le traxessen a casa algunas Morisquillas, aunque fuesse hurtandolas a sus curadores, como se hizo, &c.



AT Oran they were well received by the count of Aguilar, the governor of the fort, and, on his application to the viceroy of Tremezen, which stands at the distance of two days journey from Oran, leave was granted them to come to take up their residence in the former of these places. In their journey thither they were deeply affected, and few of them could restrain their tears, when they compared the desert barren plains, through which they passed, with the fertile and delightful regions of Valentia. It afforded them, however, no small consolation in their distress to reflect that, as the dread which they had entertained of being murdered by the way had proved groundless, they had now found a prince of their own religion, disposed to grant them his protection. Upon their arrival at Tremezen, they were suffered to retain all their wealth which they had brought along with them, and admitted to all the same liberties and privileges as the natives of the place.

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AN account of the treatment which they received having been carried to Spain, by ten persons who were suffered to return for that purpose, it contributed, in some measure, to reconcile the other Morescoes in Valentia to their fate; and, as the winter season was fast approaching, when they must encounter greater difficulties in their passage, they even discovered a degree of impatience to be permitted to embark (p).

No time was unnecessarily lost on the part of the viceroy. The Morescoes, conducted by his commissaries and the royal troops, and many of them accompanied, from compassion and humanity, by the barons whose vassals they had been, were

**BOOK IV.** were every where in motion, and hastening in  
 1609. crowds, with their wives and children, to the coast. The ships which had been provided for transporting them, having been found extremely inadequate to the purpose, many more were collected from the sea-ports in Spain, Majorca, and Italy. Of these many were hired by the Moreos themselves, who desired, as soon as possible, to emancipate themselves from the power of the Spaniards; while the greater number went on board the ships provided by the king. And in a few weeks about a hundred and twenty thousand men, women, and children had embarked.

MANY of these were persons of substance and condition; some of them, on account of their early profession of Christianity, had been raised to the rank of nobility, by the emperor Charles V. And the elegance and beauty of the young Moreos women is highly celebrated by a contemporary Spanish historian, whose bigotry often prompts him to exult in their distress.

Humanity  
 of the barons of Valentia.

WIDELY different from the sentiments of this biggotted ecclesiastic were those of the Valentia barons; who gave their vassals, on this melancholy occasion, every proof of generous compassion and humanity. By the royal edict they were entitled to all the property belonging to their vassals, except what they were able to carry about their persons: but the barons, despising this right which the edict bestowed on them, allowed the Moreos to dispose of whatever part of their effects could be sold for money, and likewise permitted them to convey their most valuable furniture and manufactures on mules and in carriages to the ships. Many of them accompanied their vassals in person to the shore, and some of them,

them, having embarked along with them, saw BOOK IV.  
them safely land on the coast of Africa (q).

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BUT this kind attention of the barons served only for a little time to mitigate their distress. Their exile from their native country, which justly excited in them the most bitter regret, and gave them so much ground for anxiety with regard to their future fortune, was soon succeeded by still greater calamities. Great numbers were shipwrecked on their passage, and never reached the African coast; while many others were barbarously murdered at sea, by the crews of the ships which they had freighted; this latter calamity befel only those who had chosen to transport themselves in private ships, and instances are recorded of such inhuman cruelty exercised against this harmless, persecuted, and defenceless people, by the owners and crews of these ships, as equals any thing of the same kind of which we read in history. The men butchered in the presence of their wives and children; the women and children afterwards thrown alive into the sea; of the women, some, on account of their beauty, preserved alive for a few days to satiate the lust of the inhuman murderers of their husbands and brothers, and then either slaughtered or committed to the waves; such were some of the horrid deeds

Hard fate  
of the Mo-  
rescos.

(q) Of the barons who thus distinguished themselves by their tenderness and humanity on this occasion, and who remained at the sea-ports during the whole time of the embarkation, employing all their interest to protect the Morescos from injury, and to procure them the best accommodation possible on board the ships, Fonseca has recorded the names of the following, adding that there were many others whom he has not named: the duke of Gandia, whose great estate was almost entirely ruined; the marquis of Albayda, the count of Alaguas, the count of Bunol, the count of Anna, the count of Sinarcas, the count of Concentayna, and the duke of Maqueda who went over in the first embarkation to the port of Oran.

BOOK IV.   
 1609. deeds of which these barbarians were convicted upon their trial, to which they were brought, in consequence of quarrelling with each other about the division of their prey; and such, if we may credit a contemporary historian, was the unhappy fate of a great number of the Morescoes (*r*).

NOR was the fate of the greater part of those who reached the coast of Barbary less deplorable. They had no sooner landed on this barren inhospitable shore, than they were attacked by the Bedouin Arabs, a wild banditti who live in tents, and support themselves by hunting and by plunder. The Morescoes, unarmed, and incumbered with their wives and children, were often robbed by these barbarians, who came upon them in numerous bodies, amounting sometimes to five or six thousand men; and, as often as the Morescoes attempted, with stones and slings, their only arms, to make resistance, put great numbers of them to the sword. Still greater numbers perished of fatigue and hunger, joined to the inclemencies of the weather, from which they had no means of shelter, during their tedious journey through the African deserts, to Mostagan, Algiers, and other places, where they hoped to be permitted to take up their residence. Few of them ever arrived at these places. Of six thousand, who set out together from Conastal, a town in the neighbourhood of Oran, with an intention of going to Algiers, a single person only, of the name of Pedralvi, survived the disasters to which they were exposed; and of the whole hundred and forty thousand, who were at this time transported to Africa, there is ground to believe, from the concurring testimony of persons who had access to know the truth, that more than a hundred

(*r*) Fonseca.



dred thousand men, women, and children, suffered death in its most hideous forms, within a few months after their expulsion from Valentia (s).

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COMPARED to the dreadful fate to which this unhappy people were doomed by the Spaniards, it would have been an act of mercy on the part of the king, had he either commanded them to be put to the sword, or committed to the flames; as their misery would, in this case, have been of short continuance. The knowledge of what had befallen them ought, at least, to have deterred him from exposing the rest of his Moresco subjects to the like calamities.

BUT the sentiments of humanity in the ecclesiastics and court of Spain were overpowered by those of the most illiberal superstition. They considered that inexpressible misery, which they themselves had brought on the Morescoes, as a signal divine judgment against that unhappy people, which served to justify the cruelty, which they had exercised, and to prove that what they had done was acceptable in the sight of God. Far from feeling remorse or sorrow for what had happened, they rather triumphed and exulted in it, and were confirmed in their resolution of expelling all the Morescoes in Spain without exception, and without thinking it incumbent on them to make provision for their reception in any of those countries to which they were about to be conveyed.

BUT before they proceeded to the expulsion of the Morescoes in Castile and other provinces, it was judged necessary to reduce to obedience all such of the Morescoes in Valentia, above mentioned,

(s) Fonseca, Gonzalez Davila, p. 146.

**BOOK IV.** <sup>1609.</sup> oned, as had retired to the mountainous parts of that kingdom, with the resolution of standing on their defence. Their number, including men, women, and children, amounted nearly to thirty thousand. Having collected together a considerable quantity of provisions of all kinds, they had begun, while the viceroy was employed in transporting their countrymen, to fortify themselves as well as they were able, and to block up the narrow passes by which the Spaniards must approach. But, besides being utterly destitute of military skill, they were extremely ill furnished both with arms and ammunition; and the folly of their attempt quickly appeared in the feebleness of every effort which they made to repel the attacks of the enemy. The viceroy having sent against them the flower of the regular forces, under the command of Don Agustín Mésica, who had acquired considerable military experience and renown in the wars of Flanders, a great part of them were compelled to surrender, through the want of water, from which Mésica had found means to cut them off; and soon after the rest were beaten from their intrenchments, and put to flight.

IN the pursuit no mercy was shewn, either to the aged or to the women and children, though rolling in the dust, and imploring mercy, by the savage conquerors. Upwards of three thousand perished (*t*). The number of those who had surrendered

(*t*) Fonseca, p. 310.—From the style of this author in this and many other passages, there is little ground for doubt, that with pleasure he would have acted the same bloody part which he describes.

Fueron Signiando la vittoria, los nuestros, matando sin excecion, quantos alcançavan, viejos, moços, grandes, pequenos, hombres y mugeres, por mas que arrodillados ellos, y ellas con los braços a biertos, les pedian misericordia, no mereciendola los que siempre usaron mall della.---Fonseca, 310.

rendered was two and twenty thousand, who were all soon after transported to Africa, except the children under seven years of age, whom the soldiers were permitted to sell for slaves. The king decreed, that, after a certain number of years, they should be set at liberty; but, as many of them were sent to foreign countries, there is ground to suspect that the decree was not attended with the desired effect (u).

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ANOTHER order of the king, which he published at this time, proved more effectual. Besides the Morescoes who were killed or taken prisoners, a considerable number, distrustful of the Spanish faith, or prompted by an unconquerable attachment to their native country, had dispersed themselves among the woods and rocks, where they hoped to elude the notice of the Spaniards. Philip put a price upon the heads of these unhappy men, and the soldiers were sent out to hunt

(u) The viceroy and the archbishop of Valentia differed widely in their opinion with regard to the proper method of disposing of the children. The former represented to the king, that all of them, who were under fifteen years of age, might be safely permitted to remain in the hands of the Christians, to whom they had been sold by the soldiers, as there would be no Mahometans in the kingdom by whom they could be perverted from embracing the principles of the Christian faith. Besides, that as most of their parents and other relations had perished in the late insurrection, it would be less cruel to put them all to the sword, than to land so great a number of helpless young creatures on the coast of Barbary. The archbishop, on the other hand, declared that, after a certain age, no Moresco could possibly be converted; and that, if the Moresco children, at fifteen, at twelve, at ten, or even seven years of age, were suffered to remain, the whole kingdom of Valentia would again be peopled with Mahometans before the end of the second, or at most, of the third generation. The king, desirous to gratify both the viceroy and the archbishop, but leaning more to the side of the latter, gave his permission, as above mentioned, for retaining only such of the children as were under seven years of age.

**BOOK IV.** <sup>1609.</sup> hunt for them, as for beasts of prey. Hardly any of them were able to escape. Some of them chose rather to die of cold and hunger than surrender themselves to the Spaniards; and at length their leader, who with his wife and children had concealed themselves in the most inaccessible parts of the mountains, was taken and carried alive to Valentia, where, after suffering much mockery and insult for having allowed himself to be elected king of the insurgents, he was, by a solemn sentence, condemned and put to death.



T H E  
H I S T O R Y  
OF THE REIGN OF  
PHILIP THE THIRD,  
KING OF SPAIN.

B O O K V.

**A**BOUT the end of the fifteenth century, the several kingdoms of Spain formed one powerful monarchy, containing above twenty millions of inhabitants. It was well cultivated, abounded in flourishing manufactures, and was governed with equal vigour and prudence by the joint authority of Ferdinand and Isabella. These princes, agreeably to the natural progress of ambition, extended their united power, by the superiority of their policy and arms, in Europe, while the inventive and daring genius of Columbus opened to their aspiring views an immense field of conquest by the discovery of a new world. An object so animating; by its novelty as well as grandeur, nourished those seeds of ambition which had taken root in the court of Spain, and roused a spirit of enterprize among the people. A succession of bold leaders, followed by numerous adventurers, allured to their standards by the love of change, or the hope of plunder, united to the Spanish empire almost the whole of those vast regions which extend from the Gulf of Mexico to the Streights of Magellan.

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1609.  
Ambition  
of Spain  
accounted  
for.

THE

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THE collected treasures of America, over which the cortes had not any controul, enabled Charles V. to trample on the liberties of his own subjects, and to threaten neighbouring states with universal dominion. The ambition of the emperor descended, together with his immense resources, to his son, Philip II. and engaged him in projects beyond his abilities. The monarch was governed by a lust of power, and the people were seized with a spirit of emigration. The energy of the nation was diverted from domestic industry, the true source of national wealth and grandeur, and turned to distant enterprizes of colonization and of war. The monarchy became faint through the loss of its blood and treasure; and the power, on which its vast ambition had been originally founded, was subverted. But ideas of uncontrollable dominion were by this time deeply impressed on the Austrian race; and Philip III. with exhausted resources, and a feeble mind, faintly pursued the same ambitious plan that had been formed or adopted by his predecessors on the Spanish throne, not more formidable for their extensive revenues, than for the vigilance, vigour, and perseverance of their nature.

It is so natural for sovereign princes to exert every nerve to reclaim the obedience of revolted subjects, that the continuance of the war in the Netherlands till the late truce, ought not, indeed, to be accounted any proof of extraordinary ambition; and the expulsion of the Moreoscos, a people industrious in an indolent climate, seemed an act by which the Spanish crown voluntarily sought its own degradation. The ambitious schemes, however, of the court of Madrid, though better concealed, and apparently suspended, were not wholly abandoned. The aggrandizement of the house of Austria was still the first object in the

the counsels of Spain. But her power corresponded not with her inclination; and her pursuit of greatness was sullied by those machinations which are the usual resources of impotent ambition, and which mark declining empire.

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THE peace of Vervins restored the appearance, but did not establish the confidence of friendship between two great and rival kingdoms. The court of Spain continued to encourage and support the enemies of the crown of France; and the French monarch, in return, encouraged and supported the enemies of Spain. Thus the ancient antipathies of these neighbouring kingdoms were still kept alive by reciprocal injuries. But, while the intrigues of Philip were dark and treacherous, the hostilities of Henry were ennobled by the occasions on which they were exercised, and the part which sound policy required him to act, was consonant to the natural generosity of his temper. This magnanimous prince, enraged at the repeated injuries he had suffered from the ambition of the Spaniards, apprized of their intrigues and influence with the discontented nobles of France, and alarmed at the dangers which threatened both his life and his crown, conceived a project of uniting different powers in a league against the encroachments of a nation which seemed still to aim at universal monarchy. His ultimate design, in the formation of such a confederacy, was to establish among the nations of Europe a new system, and to fix a durable balance of power, by the exaltation of other states on the ruins of the house of Austria (a).

Jealousies continue between the courts of France and Spain.

Great plan of Henry IV.

AT

(a) See Sully's Memoirs.—The scheme, which was ascribed to Henry, of uniting all Christendom in one great republic, for the promotion of general happiness, and the establishment of general tranquillity, has afforded matter of great

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1609.

At this time religion was the most powerful band of union among men ; and, consequently, religious sympathies and antipathies were the great engines that governed the world. The Austrians gloried in patronizing the church of Rome. Henry, from the most urgent motives of policy, had changed the profession of his faith, and embraced the catholic religion, but still possessed and deserved the confidence of the Protestants. The French monarch, of course, in a contest with the house of Austria, could depend on the good wishes of all, as he was assured of assistance from most of the princes and states of the reformed religion. With England he entered

great speculation and conjecture. Although it is impossible to penetrate into the recesses of the minds of princes, and that history is more successfully employed in tracing the consequences than in exploring the springs of events and actions ; yet, in every design of so great a man as Henry IV. we are deeply interested, and it is with difficulty that we can refrain from indulging conjectures concerning whatever appears mysterious or doubtful in his conduct.

The project of uniting the Christian powers into one general republic, as it was not unworthy, so neither was it too great for the mind of Henry. It was the perfection and just completion of his plan. Nor is it improbable, that at certain times, he amused his fancy with the contemplation of so grand an object. But, on the other hand, it is almost certain that it was not the contemplation of this great end that first suggested the idea of the confederacy, and first roused him to action. A more natural or probable account of his original motives, in his intended enterprize, there cannot be given than what we have in Sully's Memoirs. " Henry IV. recollecting the intrigues of Spain, said, I see these people will never let me alone while it is in their power to disturb me. And that the different jealousies of honour, of reputation, and of the interests of state, render all confidence and harmony between France and Spain impossible. Other foundations of security must be sought for than words. They will constrain me to do what I never intended. But I swear by God, that if I had once put my affairs in order, and raised money and all necessary supplies, I will make them repent that they have roused me to arms." Vol. iii. p. 33. duodecimo, Paris, 1663.



tered into a league for the mutual defence of that kingdom and of France. The United Provinces of the Low Countries, the Protestant princes of Germany, the greater part of the imperial towns, were ready to take an active part in his intended enterprize. And Denmark and Sweden, although from their remote situations they were not so nearly interested in his designs, if they should be involved in the flames of a general war, it was easy to foresee, would espouse the cause of their Protestant brethren.

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BUT the catholic powers were not in like manner disposed to favour the house of Austria. For neither was the veneration for the ancient equal to the zeal which appeared for the new doctrines and forms of worship, nor were political motives wanting, which in certain catholic governments counterbalanced those of religion. The princes and states of Italy, who generally looked up to Henry as their protector, favoured his views secretly. But the Venetians entered openly into a league offensive and defensive, with a monarch through whose mediation they had been enabled to maintain the civil authority of the republic in opposition to the spiritual jurisdiction of the pope, and whom they regarded as a bulwark against the encroachments of the Spanish governors of Milan. The Swiss cantons too, catholic as well as protestant, either actuated by a dread of the power of Austria, or, as other historians affirm, induced by a promise of Franche Compté, Alsace, and Tirol, embarked in this confederacy (*b*). The duke of Savoy also, a catholic prince, but who never professed an inordinate zeal for the Romish faith, Henry drew over to his side, by a promise of his eldest daughter in marriage to the

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prince

(*b*) Mezeray Abrege Chronologique, 1609.

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prince of Piedmont, and by holding up to his ambition the sovereignty of Milan. That sovereignty the duke had in vain expected to receive in partage with Catherine, a daughter of Spain; a mortification the more severe, that the joint authority of the archduke Albert and the infanta Isabella governed the Austrian Netherlands.

THE high esteem in which Henry held this new ally, appears from the terms on which he purchased his alliance. The general voice of admiration had bestowed on both these princes the title of great: and their respective talents and virtues, so formidable to each other when in a state of mutual hostility, inspired them now with reciprocal confidence.

WHILE Henry thus prepared to carry his intentions into execution, an event happened which, according to his usual good fortune, gave him an opportunity of covering his real designs, under the veil of redressing injuries, and supporting the cause of justice.

Succession  
of Cleves  
and Juliers;

JOHN WILLIAM, duke of Cleves and Juliers, having died without children, the right of succession to the sovereignty of those states was claimed by different princes. The most powerful of these prepared to maintain their pretensions by arms. But the emperor Rhodolphus II. as well to support his own authority, as to prevent the calamities of war, summoned the several competitors to appear before him, to explain the nature of their particular claims. In the meantime, he sequestered the fiefs in dispute, the administration of which he bestowed on his brother Leopold, bishop of Strasbourg and Passau. The administrator, seizing Juliers, levied troops, and began to extend his territories around that city.

Two

Two of the competitors, the marquis of Brandenburg, and the count Palatine of Neuburgh, protestant princes, alarmed at the conduct of the emperor, agreed to make a fair partition of that sovereignty to which they severally made pretensions, until their differences should be terminated in an amicable manner by arbitration.

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THE count Palatine took the field with an army, and assembling the states of Cleves and Juliers at Dusseldorp, engaged them to acknowledge himself and the elector of Brandenburg as the lawful hereditary sovereigns of Cleves, and all the other principalities that had been possessed by John William beyond the Rhine. Alarmed at these proceedings, the Catholic princes of the empire formed a league for the defence of the ancient faith, and sent deputies to demand assistance from Madrid and from Rome. The princes of Brandenburg and Neuburgh, on the other hand, endeavoured to fortify themselves in the states of which they had taken possession, by adding to the support they received from the princes of the evangelical union, the powerful aid of the king of France. The states of Cleves and Juliers annexed to the Austrian Netherlands, on which they bordered, would have extended the dominions of Spain beyond the Rhine, and bridled the power of the seven United Provinces. It was not therefore with difficulty that the Protestant princes prevailed on Henry to espouse their cause. To the prince of Anhalt, whom they had sent to Paris, he readily replied, and in the most obliging manner, that he would not only assist them with all his strength, but would himself march for their protection at the head of his army. This army consisted of thirty thousand foot, and six thousand horse, a great proportion of which troops were veterans, commanded by officers formed

Z 2

for

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1610.

for war under his own standard. He had a train of artillery superior to any that had ever before been brought into the field, and provided with ammunition for sixty thousand round of shot. And so great and judicious had been the œconomy of Henry, that he possessed treasures sufficient to keep on foot so great a military force for ten years, without the least oppression or injury to his subjects (c). Besides this, there was an army in Dauphiny, of twelve thousand foot and two thousand horse, under the command of the mareschal Lesdiguières, ready to join the duke of Savoy in an attack upon the Spanish dominions in Lombardy. Europe had not seen military preparations so great, or known a juncture apparently so big with revolution. The wealth of Venice, the valour of the Swiss, the impetuosity of the Savoyards, the juvenile ardour of the United Provinces, the active zeal of the Protestant princes and states of Germany, the disciplined bravery of France, the good wishes of all who professed the reformed religion : these, in the hands of a warlike and political prince, formed an engine fitted to subvert kingdoms, and to change the face of the world. The force of the means he possessed, and the grandeur of the end he had in view, were a source of delight to the martial and sanguine disposition of Henry. Sometimes he would take pleasure in reviewing his troops, at others, in trying the arms he designed to wear in the day of battle. He slept but little, was constantly in motion, and conversed much with the ministers and officers in whom he most confided. He burned with impatience to exchange the luxury of a palace for the dangers and hardships of the field, and was eager to retaliate on the marquis of

(c) Duke of Rohan's Discourse on the Death of Henry the Great. *Memoires de Sulli. Mezeray.*



of Spinola, the advantages that had been gained B o o k V.  
 over himself by the duke of Parma. He had 1610.  
 already strengthened the garrisons in his frontier towns, and his troops began to file off in separate divisions towards the general rendezvous in Champagne. He acquainted the archduke Albert at Brussels of his intended march through part of his territories, and desired to be informed whether he should be received as an enemy or as a friend. Nothing detained him in Paris but a desire to be present at the coronation of Mary de Medicis, his queen, whom he had appointed during his absence regent of France.

THE house of Austria, against which this gathering storm was directed, beheld it with astonishing indifference. The emperor, Rhodolphus, more intent on observing the motions of the heavenly bodies, than on watching the movements of his enemies, indulged a natural love of science, the only passion that is able to extinguish the pride of power in the breasts of princes. He had given up, with little reluctance, to his brother Matthias, the government of Hungary, Moravia, and Austria, and soon after he also resigned that of Bohemia. With the title of emperor, he lived a private man. It is matter of greater wonder that the king of Spain, in whom the passion of religion did not eradicate all the seeds of ambition, appeared unconcerned at the warlike preparations of an inveterate enemy. Whether the ministers of Spain trusted to the success of those plots they had formed against Henry in his own palace; or, that with the superstitious credulity of the age in which they lived, they confided in the completion of those predictions that about this time were so frequent in the mouths of Catholics concerning the sudden death of the king  
 of

BOOK V. of France (*d*) ; or that they weakly imagined this  
 1610. monarch had no other object in view than the  
 expulsion of Leopold from the states of Juliers ;  
 or from whatever secret cause, it is certain, that  
 amidst a general and anxious suspense, the court  
 of Madrid discovered not any symptoms of alarm.  
 The world, struck with the mighty preparations  
 of France, wondered at the serenity of Spain,  
 when an event happened which proved how  
 much human affairs are governed by causes be-  
 yond the reach of princes ; which frustrated the  
 well laid designs of the great Henry, and supplied  
 the want of vigilance and wisdom in the counsels  
 of Philip.

Death of  
 Henry IV.  
 of France.

ON the eve of the day fixed for the coronation  
 of Mary de Medicis, Henry IV. was going in  
 his coach to the arsenal, to converse, according  
 to his custom, with the duke of Sully, superin-  
 tendant

(*d*) This conjecture may appear at first sight, to certain  
 readers, wholly absurd and groundless. Nevertheless it will  
 not seem altogether extravagant, if we reflect on the power  
 of universally received prejudices on even the strongest  
 minds.

About this time, and even long after it, the science of ju-  
 dicial astrology was studied by philosophers of the highest  
 reputation, with great gravity, and, as they firmly believed,  
 with great success. There is in the university of Peters-  
 burgh, a very able mathematician, who is making great  
 progress in judicial astrology at this very day. It is certain  
 that the duke of Lerma was a firm believer in the doctrines  
 of this science. See *Anecdotes du Ministère du Comte duc  
 D'Olivarez.*

Men of sense, of the present times, struck with that mix-  
 ture of genius and extravagance which distinguishes the writ-  
 ings of antiquity, are at a loss how to reconcile so much  
 reason with such great extravagance ; and suspect that many  
 of the opinions delivered in those writings were not real, but  
 popular and affected. There is not a doubt but posterity  
 will entertain similar doubts concerning some of the doc-  
 trines of the seventeenth and even eighteenth century. Men  
 are ever changing their opinions, yet ever wondering that  
 the world did not always think as they do now.

tendant of the finances, and grand master of the artillery, when he received two stabs with a knife, one of which pierced through the great canal which conveys the blood from the heart to the other parts of the body. The king fell dead on the duke of Epernon, who was on one side of him, and in whose ear he was whispering when he received the first wound. This parricide was committed by Francis Ravailiac, a native and schoolmaster of Angouleme, on the 14th day of May, 1610. The ministers of France conceiving that this execrable deed might have been the effect of some secret conspiracy, put Ravailiac to the torture, not only as a punishment due to his crime, but as a means of discovering his abettors and accomplices. But that miserable fanatic had no accomplices; and his only abettors were the priests of the Catholic superstition, whose writings and discourses had fully persuaded him that by murdering the protector of the Protestants, and the enemy of the pope, he would save his own soul from perdition, and obtain, as a reward, eternal life.

BOOK V.  
1610.

THE tragical end of Henry filled one half of Europe with exultation, and the other with horror. The house of Austria rejoiced at the destruction of a formidable enemy; and the votaries of that religion which they patronized, applauded the pious zeal of Ravailiac, which they compared to whatever is most heroic in the lives or deaths of saints, martyrs, and confessors. But a general consternation seized not only the Hugonots of France, but every state professing the reformed religion. The whole Protestant world deplored the untimely fate of the patron of religious toleration: and nations differing in matters of religion, united in bewailing the loss of the illustrious guardian of the liberties of Europe. They indulged

Effects of  
the death of  
Henry.

BOOK V.

1610.

indulged the melancholy recollection of his amiable and heroic virtues; his compassion, to which, on different occasions, he had sacrificed his ambition; the boldness and vigour of his genius, which disdaining the windings of subtlety and refinement, pursued the paths that led directly to success; his courage, which never forsook him in the most depressing circumstances; his bravery in the field, which by a powerful contagion inspired throughout his whole army irresistible intrepidity; his patience under hardships, and affability in every fortune, which so won the hearts of his soldiers, that they served him not only with the loyalty of subjects, but the affection of friends. But the celebrated Benjamin, duke of Rohan, not contented with mingling his own with the groans of nations, found a melancholy satisfaction in pouring forth the sentiments of his heart in a pathetic composition, and transmitting to posterity a memorial of his devotion to his beloved sovereign. This elegy, written in a strain of passion which nothing could have inspired but the deepest sorrow, is a lively picture of the grief and consternation which followed the death of Henry, and exhibits a conspicuous proof of that ascendant which he had acquired over the greatest minds (e).

AFTER

(e) I deplore, says Rohan, among other expressions of extreme and vehement grief, I deplore in the loss of our invincible king, that of France, and from the bottom of my soul grieve at the manner of his death. Our own experience will soon inform us how fit a subject he is for our tears: the people are alarmed and filled with melancholy presages of future calamities; the towns are guarded as if they expected a siege; the nobility seek their safety amongst the most eminent of their own order, whose factions rather threaten them with danger, than console them with any hopes of safety. Together with the loss of his person, I bewail that of his courtesy and affability, his sweet and obliging conversation, the honour he did me, the admittance he deigned to grant me even to his most private recesses, oblige me



AFTER the death of Henry, his friends and al-  
 lies had reason to apprehend that the vindictive  
 passions of the house of Austria would be height-  
 ened and inflamed by the hope of gratification (*f*).  
 The Italian states especially, overawed by the  
 power of Philip in Naples and in Lombardy,  
 trembled lest the Spanish arms should over-run all  
 Italy. But Charles Emanuel, duke of Savoy,  
 whose noble mind was inspired with the pride ra-  
 ther than the despondency of grief, endeavoured  
 to

BOOK V.

1610.

me not only to mourn for him, but even not to love myself in  
 those places where the sight of my good prince once afforded  
 me such infinite happiness. I regret the disappointment of the  
 most noble and heroic enterprize that was ever yet conceived.  
 It is not credible that a military force of thirty thousand foot,  
 six thousand horse, a train of artillery of sixty guns, and am-  
 munition for sixty thousand round of shot, besides the army  
 then in Dauphiny, should be destined for the siege of Juliers,  
 which was since undertaken with eight thousand foot, and one  
 thousand horse. Have I not good reason to lament the loss of  
 such an opportunity of proving my courage, zeal, and fidelity  
 to my king? One push of a pike given in his presence,  
 would have been a greater satisfaction to me, than I should  
 have now in obtaining a victory. Much more should I have  
 valued the least praise in that art of which he was the greatest  
 master of his time, than the approbation and applause of all  
 other captains now alive. I grieve at the manner of his de-  
 plorable death: a prince composed of sweetness and clemen-  
 cy; who never condemned an innocent person to death; whose  
 victories were never stained with blood; who having once re-  
 claimed his enemies to their duty, cherished them as friends,  
 and loaded them with favours. Who that ever lived under  
 this most august prince, as I have done, can take pleasure in  
 these present times? I will therefore divide my life into two  
 parts, and call that part of it I have already passed, *happy*,  
 since it was employed in the service of Henry the Great; and  
 that which is yet to come, *unfortunate*, and spend it in la-  
 mentations, tears, sighs, and complaints; and out of the ho-  
 nour which I owe to his memory, I will devote the remainder  
 of my days (the kingdom of God being preserved entire)  
 to the service of France, because it was his kingdom; to the  
 king, because he is his son; and to the queen, because she  
 was once his dear companion and spouse.

(*f*) Spes addita suscitaturas.

VIRGIL.

**BOOK V.** to rally the broken forces of the league, and to  
 1610. unite them once more into a compact and formidable body.

Character  
of the  
dukes of  
Savoy.

THE house of Savoy, one of the most illustrious in Europe on account of its antiquity, is more nobly distinguished for wisdom of policy, and valour of arms. Environed by the dominions of the empire, France, and Spain, the princes of Savoy are under a constant necessity of watching the balance of power among their ambitious neighbours, and of penetrating early into their designs, that, by affording timely support to the weaker against the stronger party, they may be enabled to preserve their own independence. And, if Providence has placed this family in a situation in which it is necessary to guard against the encroachments of superior power; the nature of their country, bold, abrupt, and sublime, inspires that confidence which is necessary effectually to resist them. The fastnesses and narrow defiles of the Alps, together with a hardy race of men inhabiting a mountainous and snowy region, encourage the dukes of Savoy boldly to enter on war, whenever the complexion of the times demonstrates its expedience. Thus nature have conspired with moral causes to form that illustrious character which the race of Savoy has justly obtained in the world.

Character  
of Charles  
Emanuel.

CHARLES EMANUEL did not disgrace, but, on the contrary, added lustre to the dignity of his birth. Nature, which had formed this prince of a weakly constitution of body, adorned his soul with a splendid variety of talents and virtues; and these the parental care of Philibert, renowned for his victory over the French at St. Quintin, exalted and matured by a learned and liberal education. The writings of antiquity, so full of heroic actions  
and

and rapid conquests, nourished the natural ardour of his mind, and inspired an emulation of the ancient heroes of Italy. Together with that intrepidity of spirit which delights in pursuing great designs, he possessed in an eminent degree those qualities which are requisite in order to carry them into execution ; political conduct, and military prowess. His courage was not of that calm and equal kind which is connected with firmness of nerves, and which characterizes the warriors of the North. But, being derived from that vigour of imagination, and sensibility of frame peculiar to southern climates, it was ardent and impetuous. His genius also like that of the warmer climates, was fertile even to excess, and prone to subtlety and refinement. From a temper so sanguine, and an imagination so luxuriant, he derived an elasticity of spirit that rose under misfortunes ; whence, though sometimes defeated, and often disappointed, he was never discouraged. His resources were endless : for there could not be a conjuncture in which the superiority of his genius could not find some favourable opportunity of practising on the passions, and managing the hopes, and fears, and follies of men. So various were his stratagems of policy and of war, that the most penetrating of his cotemporaries professed themselves unable to form any probable conjecture concerning his designs. Something, however, of the vast and unbounded characterized his conduct, the ardour of his inventive genius, engaging him not unfrequently in projects beyond his utmost power to accomplish (g). Nor were the powers of his capacious mind wholly absorbed in schemes of ambition. Whatever was elegant or great touched his soul, and he was prone to the pleasures.

(g) *Vastus animus immoderata, incredibilia, nimis alta semper cupiebat.* Sallust.

**BOOK V.** pleasures of society and love. He was a friend  
 1610. to men of letters, a patron of all the arts, an enthusiastic admirer and bountiful rewarder of merit of every kind. And the greatness of his mind was so happily tempered with benignity and grace, that the engaging affability of his noble deportment alleviated in the breasts of his subjects the hardships which they suffered through his restless ambition. On the whole, it is difficult to conceive that qualities so opposite should co-exist in the same person : so great boldness with such deep design ; such loftiness of spirit, with such sweetness of demeanour ; such ardour of mind with so much subtilty, and such profound dissimulation (*b*).

Charles E-manual endeavours to revive the league against the house of Austria.

THIS prince, who had opened his mind to the greatest designs, and whose natural ambition had been encouraged and fortified by confidence in Henry, did not abandon them after he was deprived by death of so great an ally. His penetrating eye had discovered the languid state of the Spanish monarchy, and he entertained a contempt for the counsels by which it was now governed (*i*). He did not, therefore, yet despair of being able to extend his dominion over that fair territory which had awakened his ambition. Should he be able to reunite the scattered forces of the league, success would be certain : even if France should remain neutral, he hoped to maintain a contest with the Catholic king, both with glory and with advantage.

(*b*) In this singular character there is not a trait unsupported by the testimony of cotemporary historians, who, all of them, mention this prince with an admiration which could not have been excited but by the most amazing talents. See *Bellum Sabaudicum*, &c. Alfonso Loschi ; Battistia Nani ; Siri *Memoire recon dite* ; *Le Mercure Francois*, *Histoire de la Regence de Marie de Medicis*, &c. &c.

(*i*) Batt. Nani, lib. i. Siri *Memorie recon dite*, tom. iii, p. 242.



tage. He, therefore, endeavoured to revive a powerful combination against the house of Austria, whose power he represented as excessive and dangerous. He attempted to establish an alliance with France, by obtaining from the new regency a confirmation of the promise that had been made by Henry of giving his eldest daughter in marriage to the prince of Piedmont. But, after the death of the French monarch, all the maxims of his policy were subverted, and the schemes he had projected abandoned. The parliament of Paris, intimidated by the menaces of the duke of Epernon, who commanded the regiment of guards, committed an involuntary act of usurpation (*k*), by declaring Mary de Medicis sole regent of France during the minority of her son, an infant only in the ninth year of his age. This queen, uniting in her character the refinement of an Italian, with the feebleness of a woman, and the superstition of a good Catholic, was governed by maxims directly contrary to those which had been adopted by the manly and liberal genius of Henry. She sought to establish her authority, by exciting jealousies among those who wished to subvert it; and armed her enemies against herself by concessions intended to conciliate their favour. She had obtained the regency without opposition, but not without envy. The princes of the blood, highly offended at the advancement of a stranger, though a queen of France, to a dignity to which they themselves made pretensions, retired from court, and were followed by their numerous adherents. It was the policy of Mary to raise up in opposition to her domestic enemies a faction among the rest of the nobility, and to acquire friends by a profusion of pensions, offices, and governments. The treasures which the late king had amassed in order

BOOK V.  
1610.

Character  
of Mary de  
Medicis,  
queen re-  
gent of  
France.

(*k*) The right of electing a regent had hitherto belonged to the general estates of the kingdom.

BOOK V. order to overawe his enemies, she employed in  
 soothing resentment, and allaying discontent. All the assiduities, and intreaties, and remonstrances of Charles Emanuel to a princess, whose conduct was directed by these principles, were fruitless. Far from joining a confederacy against the house of Austria, she hearkened with pleasure to a proposal, that had been rejected by the late king, of a double marriage between the dauphin of France and the eldest infanta, and of the prince of Spain with Elizabeth, the eldest daughter of France. This project was first suggested to the court of Madrid by the Pope, who believed that by means of these intermarriages the house of Austria would acquire such an influence in the councils of France, as would in the end exterminate that heresy which had so obstinately resisted all other efforts.

IMMEDIATELY after the death of Henry, the court of Madrid, having first discharged the duties of decorum by going into mourning, and by the strongest professions of condolence, renewed to the regent queen the proposition of that double alliance, which had met with her fondest approbation before that tragical event which led to the power with which she was now invested. That event did not produce any change in the inclinations of Mary towards an union with Spain; on the contrary, if that union appeared formerly desirable, it now seemed necessary, in order to support her authority, in so much danger of being overturned by the turbulence of faction.

1611.  
 Project of  
 intermarri-  
 ages be-  
 tween the  
 royal fami-  
 lies of  
 France and  
 Spain.

In the month of April, 1611, the king of Spain and the queen regent of France formally expressed their consent to the intermarriage of their sons and daughters by their respective ambassadors. On this occasion they also entered into a defensive league,

league, engaging to give each other mutual aid in case of either intestine commotions or foreign invasion. The Spaniards endeavoured to improve and consolidate this union, by engaging the French in a league, offensive as well as defensive; but to this the queen, whose utmost ambition was to maintain, not to extend her power, refused, in positive terms, to consent (1).

BOOK V.  
1611.

Thus not only was the house of Austria delivered from the attacks of that confederacy which had been formed against her, but she acquired an accession of strength by an ascendant in the counsels of that kingdom which so lately appeared her most formidable enemy. In vain did Charles Emanuel, seconded by the importunities of the Pope (*m*), solicit the Venetians to join in an offensive and defensive league against the ambitious Spaniards. The conduct of France determined that of Venice. The senate, having learned the designs of Mary de Medicis, replied to the duke of Savoy, that it was indeed the interest of all the sovereign powers of Italy to maintain a good correspondence among themselves, and to provide for the common safety; but it was to be feared, they added, that such a league as had been proposed by his highness would serve only to excite the jealousy of Spain, a nation which, of all others, had the strongest motives to cultivate peace with all her neighbours. To his holiness, whom they suspected of a versatility of character, which might soon lead him to relapse into the views of that court, against which he now declaimed, they answered, that they could not be persuaded that his apprehensions concerning the views of Spain were well

(1) Siri Mem. recond. tom. ii. p. 524. Memoires de la Regence de Marie de Medicis. Histoire des Dernieres Troubles en France. Malingre.

(*m*) Winwood's Memoirs, vol. iii.

**BOOK V.** well founded. But Charles Emanuel, not discouraged by the defection of both France and Venice, pursues a thousand schemes, and extends his intrigues all over Europe. He held a close correspondence with the discontented lords in France. He inflamed the jealousy and the resentment of the Protestant princes of Germany. He proposed to king James a marriage of the prince of Wales with the princess of Savoy, and of the prince of Piedmont with a daughter of England. The mysterious character of Charles, in the opinion of some writers, renders it doubtful whether he believed he should, or desired he might, succeed in this project; and whether it was not his only object, by exciting a jealousy among the great Catholic powers, of his connection with a Protestant prince, to dissolve the treaty of the double alliance between France and Spain, and to obtain the eldest daughter of one of these crowns in marriage to the prince of Piedmont (*n*). Whatever

(*n*) The conjectures of these writers, which mark so strongly the general opinion that was entertained of the duke of Savoy, appear rather refined. I find in Chamberlayne's Letters, among Dr. Birch's Collection in the British Museum, that the duke, on this occasion, shewed every mark of sincerity and earnestness. To the English ambassador at Turin, he was highly munificent. He consulted the temper of the English monarch, by sending, as his ambassador to the court of London, a person who concealed the most profound penetration under the mask of dissipation, mirth, and pleasantry. "Fabrito, says Chamberlayne, in his Letters, anno 1612, spends his time merrily with the king, and is never from him."—"The Savoyard ambassador, says he again, gives himself *buono tempo*, notwithstanding that the match grows cold, and frequents good company."—King James, as is well known, had a passion for hunting, and delighted in a collection of wild beasts. The duke of Savoy, who knew this, as a mark of attention to his majesty, sent him a present of an ounce and a leopard. The animals were fetched from London to Theobald's, where the king resided. The leopard had almost committed an unpardonable fault, for he fixed on  
a red



ver were his views, they were frustrated by the mean vanity of the English monarch, who concealed not from the world his opinion that any alliance, below that of a great king, was entirely unworthy of the heir apparent to the crown of England.

BOOK V.  
1611.

IN the mean time, the Spanish troops that were on foot in the Milaneſe, thoſe of Savoy in Piedmont, and the French army, under Leſdiguières, in Dauphiny, were ſubjects of various jealousies and apprehenſions. The Spaniards ſeemed ready to pour into Piedmont, and the Savoyards threatened an incuſion into Milan; while an army, commanded by a Proteſtant general, excited an uneaſineſs in the queen regent herſelf, as well as other Catholic princes.

IN this ſituation of affairs, the Pope interceded with Mary de Medicis to diſband the troops in Dauphiny, and importuned the king of Spain and the duke of Savoy to diſmiſs thoſe troops which were a ſource of ſo much anxiety and dread to France as well as to Italy. The influence of his holineſs eaſily prevailed on the queen to diſband an army, commanded by a general in whoſe fidelity ſhe did not repoſe entire confidence, but did not operate ſo quickly on the minds of Philip and Charles Emanuel. The former inſiſted that the duke of Savoy ſhould lay down his arms firſt, and make ſatisfaction for this engagement with the late king of France. The latter alledged, on the contrary, that the weaker party ought to ſtand

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A a

upon

a red deer's calf, nurſed up at Theobald's by a woman entertained for that purpoſe, and much ado there was to ſave the poor ſuckling. Theſe circumſtances, however trifling, are proofs that the duke of Savoy had ſtudied the diſpoſition of James, and that he wiſhed to gain his affections.

BOOK V upon his guard when he seemed to be threatened  
 1611. by a more powerful neighbour (o).

THE satisfaction which Philip demanded of the duke of Savoy was, that he should ask pardon for his secret treaty with France to the prejudice of the crown of Spain ; and that he should send one of his sons to Madrid, to remain there as a pledge of his father's fidelity.

The duke of Savoy obliged to make submissions to the king of Spain.

CHARLES EMANUEL, deserted by all the world, was under a necessity of complying with these mortifying conditions. Prince Philibert, of Savoy, set out from Turin to Madrid on horseback ; and, while he pursued this long and tedious journey, he had a foretaste of those severe mortifications which he was to experience after it should be accomplished ; for he received not, in any of the Spanish towns through which he passed, the least mark of attention or respect from the king his uncle. Philip, however, received his nephew, at the first interview, with a decent civility : not a word, indeed, was said of the duke, but the kindest enquiries were made concerning the princes and princesses of Savoy. But the second audience was not so agreeable to this stranger : he was now to make satisfaction to the king of Spain in name of the duke of Savoy. The prince, accordingly, had framed an address to his Catholic majesty, sufficient, as he imagined, to satisfy the pride of Spain on the one hand, but, on the other, such as was not unworthy the independent dignity of the duke his father. This address he delivered with a noble grace, and with all those demonstrations of respect which can have place in an intercourse between sovereign princes. With this appearance of his nephew, the mild temper

(o) Siri Memorie recondite, tom. ii. p. 335.

temper of the king was inclined to be contented ; BOOK V.  
 but in the air and manner of Philibert, as well as 1611.  
 in the sentiments he expressed, there appeared to  
 the Spanish ministers something not sufficiently  
 humble and submissive ; wherefore they drew up  
 a new form of submission, breathing the supplica-  
 tions of a subject prostrate before his offended so-  
 vereign. The prince, yielding to necessity, re-  
 hearded these haughty dictates with indignant re-  
 luctance.

PHILIP now ordered his troops to withdraw  
 from the Milanese ; but Charles Emanuel, pro-  
 voked even to madness at the indignities with  
 which the court of Madrid had insulted him in  
 the person of his son, refused to disband his ar-  
 my in Piedmont. He threatened to disavow the  
 submission that had been made in his name to the  
 king of Spain, against whom he declaimed with  
 indignation and rage ; and, by various move-  
 ments, indicated an intention of revenging his  
 cause either on that monarch, or his new ally, the  
 queen regent of France. These confederates he  
 attempted by various arts to divide ; but all his  
 efforts were fruitless ; and the united authority of  
 the Pope, Philip III. and Mary de Medicis, com-  
 pelled him at last to lay down his arms (p).

THE storm that threatened the house of Aus-  
 tria being thus finally dispelled by its authority  
 rather than power, Spain, pursuing the same pa-  
 cific system, studied to maintain her dignity by the  
 arts of policy, not the terrors of war. In the  
 month of August, 1612, the duke of Pastrana  
 was sent to Paris to conclude and confirm a ma-  
 trimonial contract between Elizabeth of France  
 and the prince of Spain ; and, about the same  
 time, Contract of marriage between Elizabeth of France and the prince of Spain.

A a 2

(p) History of the Reign of Lewis XIII. by Levaſſor, vol.  
 i. anno 1611.

**BOOK V.** <sup>1612.</sup> time, the duke of Mayenne arrived in Madrid, in order to settle and ratify a treaty of marriage between young Lewis and the infanta Ann. The two princesses renounced every right of succession to any of the states of their native kingdoms; and their dowries were equal, being each five hundred thousand crowns. But these contracts were not performed till an interval had elapsed of more than three years (*q*).

COTEMPORARY writers relate, with a minute circumstantiality, the festivity and magnificence that was displayed by the courts of France and Spain on occasion of these intermarriages, and describe, with equal exactness, the ceremonies that constituted and accompanied them. They observe, with a sort of satisfaction, that the year 1612, in which the parties were mutually betrothed, was justly styled the year of magnificence. For this year, also, Matthias II. being raised to the imperial throne in the stead of his deceased brother, Rhodolphus, all Germany, as well as France and Spain, resounded with the voice of gladness and exultation (*r*). So naturally do men sympathize with the great, and so sincere is their joy at their prosperity! This disposition sufficiently accounts for those copious details of anecdotes, circumstances, and facts, which we find in the journals of those times; but would not apologize for a recital of them in a narrative addressed to another age. Such particulars, however, as serve to paint characters and manners are interesting at all

(*q*) Histoire de Louis XIII. durant la Regence de la Reine Marie de Medicis. Malingre.

(*r*) Hist. du Regne de Louis XIII. et de principaux Evenemens arrivez pendant ce Regne dans tous les Pais du Monde. Historia de Don Felipe IV. por Don Gonçalo de Cespedes, libro. i. capitulo 2. Memoires de la Regence de Marie de Medicis. Mercure François, 1612.



all times, and, therefore, ought not to be wholly omitted.

BOOK V.  
1612.

WHEN the duke of Mayenne took leave of the court of Madrid, before his return to Paris, he entreated the infanta to honour him with some commission to the king his master. “Tell him, said the infanta, that I am very impatient to see him.” This answer of the princess overwhelmed her governess, the countess of Altamira, with shame and confusion. “Ah, madam, cried this lady, what will the king of France think when the duke shall report to him that you have so great a passion for marriage?” “You have taught me, replied the infanta, with great liveliness, that one must always speak the truth.” After this frank declaration on the part of Ann, Lewis could do no less in return than express, in like manner, an impatience to see and to receive his bride. Accordingly, as soon as he was informed that the infanta had arrived in France (r), he sent a letter to her, by his favourite Luynes, fraught with expressions of respect and of love. The queen-regent also wrote an affectionate letter to her daughter-in-law. Ann replied to the young monarch’s address, in a manner that could not offend the delicacy of even the countess of Altamira. Having first expressed great satisfaction in the accounts she had received of his majesty’s health, she professed a desire of arriving at a place where she might have an opportunity of serving the queen, her mother, and where she would be freed from the langour of her present solitude (s).

1615.

THE

(r) This did not come to pass until the month of November, 1615.

(s) Hist. du Regne de Louis XIII.

“Sennor,

“Mucho

## BOOK V.

1612—15.  
The gallantry and honour of the Spanish nation accounted for.

THE Arabian conquerors of Spain had introduced into that kingdom an hospitality, generosity, and refinement, unknown before in the West (*1*). The court of Cordova was the most elegant and polite in the world; and thither generous spirits resorted from all parts of Europe. Together with the mechanical, the Saracens cultivated the liberal arts; and while an external magnificence appeared in their buildings, furniture, and dress, their poetry and music, consecrated to heroism and love, displayed an inward generosity and elegance of mind still more noble and affecting. Hence the Spanish nation possessed a taste for grandeur, a generosity of disposition, and a delicacy of sentiment, which in the period under review were unequalled, and which have not yet been exceeded in any other nation. Accordingly in that competition of courtesy and gallantry, which arose, on occasion of the intermarriages, the Spaniards far outshone the French. Not only did they exhibit greater splendour in their equipages, processions, and shews, but a more delicate taste, and a higher style appeared in their manners. The munificence of the grandees to the princesses of Spain and the ladies of her court, to the young queen of France and her attendants, and also to the queen-regent, was unbounded. The French ambassador, in his way to Madrid, received a sumptuous entertainment at the mansion

“ Mucho me he holgado con Luynes con las buenas nuevas, que me ha dado de la salud de V. M. yo tengo con ella, et muy deseosa de llegar donde pueda servir a my madre. Y así me doy mucha Priessa a caminar por la soledad que me haze y bezar a V. M. la mano a quien dios guarde come deseo. Beza las manos a V. M. Anna.”

(*1*) A very amusing as well as philosophical account of the causes that formed this national character, is given by Mr. Richardson in his Dissertation on the Languages, Literature, and Manners of Eastern Nations.

on of the prime minister of Spain. This enter-  
tainment was so contrived that it appeared to have  
been given, not by the duke, but at the expence  
of the inhabitants of the town of Lerma, trans-  
ported with joy at the presence of a stranger so ho-  
nourably distinguished. In Burgos, Segovia,  
Madrid, and other towns of Spain, in which the  
prince had occasion to appear, the citizens cele-  
brated his nuptials with fire-works, illuminations,  
triumphal arches, balls, masquerades, musical and  
dramatical performances, and other ingenious di-  
versions (*u*).

BOOK V.

1612—15.

AT this time, there did not appear in the Spa-  
nish dominions any symptoms of declining  
trade, or exhausted wealth. The face of the  
whole empire was gay and magnificent. But so  
expensive a display of loyalty was not approved  
by the duke of Ossuna, viceroy of Naples, a  
man of wit, whim, and fancy, and in every res-  
pect himself the most extravagant person subject to  
the crown of Spain. The men of rank in Sicily  
(*x*), with a strange mixture of obsequiousness and  
vanity, presented a petition to Ossuna, humbly  
praying that they might be permitted to solemnize  
the publication of the double marriages as well as  
the other subjects of the empire. They proposed,  
at the same time, to levy a tax upon themselves  
for this purpose. The duke greatly applauded  
this design, which he encouraged, by contribut-  
ing himself to its execution with equal frankness  
and liberality; but, after the money of the Sici-  
lians was all put into one bank, the viceroy, in the  
plenitude of his transcendant power, gave orders  
that not one maravedie should be wasted in idle  
pomp

(*u*) *Mercure François*, 1612. *Historia de Don Felipe IV.*  
por Don Gonçalo de Cespedes, libro i. capitulo 2.

(*x*) *The Titoladi*. Winwood's *Memoirs*, vol. iii p. 377.

BOOK V. 1613. pomp and shew ; but that it should be distributed among certain poor virgins of honourable descent ; adding withal, that, in his opinion, the money would be better employed in the multiplication, than in the solemnization of marriages. The subsequent conduct of this singular person will recall this anecdote to the mind of the reader, and incline him, perhaps, to conjecture that this judicious disposal of the Sicilian treasure, did not originate either in a disapprobation of waste, or in mere regard to the Sicilian damsels.

The political schemes of Spain disordered by the restless ambition of the duke of Savoy.

THE Spaniards had now leisure to breathe after the toils of war ; and the authority of the Spanish name being in some measure restored by the submission of the duke of Savoy, and an advantageous connection with France, they endeavoured, for the present (y), to maintain it by policy, rather than to extend it by a hazardous appeal to arms. But the ambitious spirit of Charles Emanuel, incapable of rest, and impatient of disgrace, soon obliged them to quit that shade of ancient authority and renown, under which they attempted to conceal the real state of Spain, and to prove its strength or its weakness in the field of battle. The duke of Savoy, being descended from the imperial house of the Paleolagi, possessed ancient pretensions to the sovereignty of Montferrat, which was also claimed and enjoyed by the family of Gonzaga. In order to compose the differences which frequently arose from this contested claim, a marriage was concluded between Francis, duke of Mantua, and Margaret of Savoy ; Charles Emanuel, in favour of this alliance,

(y) There are writers who affirm that at this time the Spanish ministers were so elated at the alliance with France, that they considered it as the sure forerunner of the reduction of the revolted provinces.



liance, having resigned to his daughter and her children his right of succession to the marquifate in question. Francis died in the month of December, 1612, leaving behind him an only child, a daughter, in the fourth year of her age. Ferdinand, cardinal of Gonzaga, brother to the late duke, was, beyond all doubt, heir to the duchy of Mantua; but the sovereignty of Montferrat, which was not a fief-male, descended upon his niece, the young princess Maria. In these circumstances the duke of Savoy conceived the design of reviving his pretensions to that state. His right to the marquifate he did not consider as diminished, but rather strengthened by that of his grandchild; and the guardianship of this infant would give him an entire power over that inheritance, which he claimed in her name, as well as his own. And, that the cardinal might not derive any advantage over him, in the contest that was likely to ensue, by immediate succession, he had recourse to one of those stratagems of which his genius was so singularly fruitful. His daughter Margaret, the widow of the deceased duke of Mantua, as well as all his other children, returned the fondness of his parental affections with a tenderness and filial reverence that knew no bounds. This lady he easily persuaded to declare that she was pregnant; and soon after, he sent the prince Victor Amadæus to Mantua, on pretence of consoling his sister, but, in reality, in order to conduct her to Turin, if that could be accomplished, or to Milan, or to Montferrat. "It is not fit," said the prince of Piedmont to the court of Mantua, that a mournful widow should pass her days in a place where every thing around her renews her grief, by recalling to her imagination the object of her sorrow; nor is it decent that she should remain longer under the eye of a person jealous of the succession to Mantua. And whithersoever

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The duke  
 of Savoy  
 revives his  
 pretensions  
 to the sovereignty  
 of Montferrat.

my

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my sisters goes, continued the prince, thither it is reasonable that the young princesses should accompany her. Nature herself recommends children to the care of their parents: and, what nature unites by the dearest ties of affection, it would be impiety to separate." But the cardinal, well knowing the end of this discourse, replied, that it would be improper to remove the duchess from Mantua, while she carried in her womb the important pledge of the happiness of the Mantuan state. "If the sight, said he, of my deceased brother's palace be afflicting to his widow, others are not wanting, whither she may retire with safety, and where she may live with comfort."

IN the mean time Charles Emanuel, the better to effect his designs, endeavours to engage in his cause the influence and authority of the crown of Spain. The Spanish governor of Milan at this time was John Mendoza, marquis of Inoiosa, who had formerly signalized his valour in the military service of the duke of Savoy, and who had been rewarded with the marquisate of St. German. By this substantial mark of favour, and perhaps not less by those honours and assiduities with which he cultivated the friendship of Mendoza, Charles Emanuel had acquired an ascendant over his mind that seemed almost the effect of superior and invisible power. This man he persuaded to send the prince of Ascoli, accompanied by a numerous retinue, to Mantua, to demand the persons of the duchess and her daughter in the name of the king of Spain; not doubting that, if they should once be brought to Milan, he would afterwards be able to find means of conducting them to Turin. But the cardinal refused to let the princesses go; a resolution in which he was confirmed and supported by the emperor, the queen-regent of France, and the republic of Venice,

Venice (z). At length, after an interval of three months, the duchess Margaret, having declared that she was not pregnant, was allowed to return to her father's house; but all her tears could not obtain permission to take along with her her infant daughter. Ferdinand, having assumed the title and power of duke of Mantua, sent the bishop of Diocæsarea to Milan to apologise for his disobedience to the orders of Spain, from a regard to the decree of the emperor, who had adjudged to him the tutelage of his niece; farther enjoining the prelate to pass on to Vercelli, to console Margaret who lived there, and at the same time to insinuate a proposal of a marriage between that princess and the cardinal duke, as the only means of quenching the flames of discord, and uniting the houses of Savoy and Gonzaga both by blood and affection.

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THE bishop, discharging his trust with fidelity and zeal, pressed the duke of Savoy to consent to an accommodation of differences. The duke discovered a readiness to converse on that subject, which inclined the Mantuan envoy at first to conclude that his embassy would not be fruitless. But Charles, still rising in his demands, in proportion to the importunity of the bishop, had nothing else in view than, by amusing this ecclesiastic with frequent conferences, to gain time for ripening a project as bold as any that had ever been conceived by any politician or hero. Before his eyes there lay the state of Montferrat, to which he had ancient pretensions, and which intersected and broke the strength of Piedmont, on one side extending itself even to the Alps, and on another stretching well nigh to Turin. This state,

(z) Batt. Nani, lib. i. 1613. Siri Mem. second. tom. iii. Winwood's Memoirs, vol. iii.

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state, defended only by the lamentations and complaints of its present possessor, lay naked and exposed to the sudden attack of any hostile invader. The princes of Italy, enervated by luxury, would not easily be awakened from that profound sleep into which they had been lulled by long habits of indolence, subordination, and peace. The emperor, on that side of the Alps, scarcely possessed the shadow of power. The kingdom of France was torn in pieces by intestine discord; and the power of Spain, though formidable, was distant. The Milanese, lately disarmed, was destitute of military stores and provisions; and, what was a great encouragement to Charles Emanuel, it was governed by his confident Mendoza, whose mind he might regulate with his usual address; or, if he should prove unmanageable, which possessed not those masterly powers which are requisite to act a successful part in new and difficult situations. The deliberative genius of Spain would not act with an unusual celerity on an occasion, when a fear of drawing the French into Italy, would naturally recommend cautious circumspection: or, if the personal hatred of the duke of Lerma should prevail in the breast of that favourite, over reasons of state, before the hands of Inoiosa could be strengthened by a reinforcement from Spain, the power of Savoy might be established in Montferat. Of all considerations, that which gave the duke of Savoy most uneasiness, was the vigilance of the Venetian senate, to whom no revolution in their neighbourhood ever appeared an object of indifference. But he hoped that however they might interpose their counsels, they would not hastily exchange the blessings of peace for the calamities of war. On the whole, while distant states were ignorant of his schemes, and before the princes of Italy, involved in clouds of mutual



tual jealousy, diffidence, and doubt, would unite BOOK V.  
 either in power or design to oppose him, he re- 1613.  
 solved to carry into Montferrat the thunder of his  
 arms, and to anticipate resistance by decisive con-  
 quest and firm possession.

HAVING secretly assembled his troops, while The duke  
of Savoy  
invades  
Montferrat.  
 the bishop of Diocesarea yet waited for a defini-  
 tive answer to the proposals he had made for re-  
 conciliation and peace, Charles Emanuel issued  
 forth from Vercelli in the silence of the night that  
 followed the 22d day of April; and distributing  
 his army into three divisions, poured into Mont-  
 ferrat the terror and devastation of war. There  
 was not any thing in that marquisate capable of  
 sustaining his impetuous force; Casal, the capi-  
 tal, in which the duke Vincenzo had planted a  
 strong fortress, only excepted. And this also  
 would have quickly fallen into his hands, if Gon-  
 zaga, duke of Nevers, who happened at that  
 time to be in Italy, had not suddenly thrown him-  
 self into it, with a small force which he hastily  
 raised on the coast of Genoa. By garrisoning  
 and fortifying such of the towns he had taken,  
 as were most important for their situation and  
 strength, he formed a chain of posts which open-  
 ed a communication between those rich and fer-  
 tile countries that are extended along the courses  
 of the Tanarus and the Po: and in these he  
 hoped to maintain his army by contributions and  
 plunder (a).

It was now the duke of Savoy's object to se- The duke  
of Savoy  
endeavours  
to secure  
his con-  
quests.  
 cure his conquests, and, for this purpose, he en-  
 deavoured either to appease those powers whom  
 he well knew the violence of his conduct had of-  
 fended,

(a) *Mercure François*, 1613. Batt. Nan. Hist. lib. i.  
 1613. Hist. du Règne de Louis XIII.

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fended, by submissive professions of respect, and insidious concessions; or, to divert their attacks from himself, by making them objects of jealousy to one another. The queen regent of France, being informed of the irruption of the Savoyards into Montferrat, was not untouched by the situation of her nephew the duke of Mantua. In the first fervour of passion she declared her resolution to support the cause of Gonzaga, both with her influence and arms. Accordingly she immediately sent the duchess of Nevers to Grenoble, to engage the marshal Lesdiguières, who commanded the troops on the confines of Savoy, speedily to march with a powerful army to check the progress of that prince in Montferrat, and to chastise his presumption. But Charles Emanuel wrote a letter full of respect to the Queen, and, in order to soothe the first transports of her resentment, offered to submit his pretensions to her arbitration, and to resign into her hands, in the mean time, the places he had taken in Montferrat, as a pledge of his deference to her authority and her justice. At the same time he instructed his partizans at the court of Paris, where he had found means of conciliating the good-will of the favourites, the marshal and marchioness D'Ancre, to represent to the queen the impolicy of trusting a great army in the hands of a Protestant general; and the desperate imprudence of rousing the jealousy, and inviting the resistance of the king of Spain. The nuncio too, and the Spanish ambassador having, from obvious motives, urged the same arguments, the queen determined to countermand the orders she had sent, or rather the application she had made to Lesdiguières, and to employ in behalf of her nephew only her good offices at the court of Madrid (*b*).

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(*b*) Batt. Nani. Hist. lib. i. 1613. Histoire du Connetable de Lesdiguières, lib. viii. ch. 4 & 5. Siri Memoire reconditte, tom. iii. p. 92, 93.

IN order to divert the resentment of Spain, or BOOK V.  
to suspend its effects, Charles Emanuel employed 1613.  
greater art than that which had managed the  
court of France, but with less success. He dis-  
patched his confessor to the governor of Milan,  
humbly to apologize for his invasion of Montfer-  
rat, without the knowledge and consent of the  
king of Spain. This messenger was, soon after,  
followed by the prince of Piedmont, and the  
prince of Piedmont by multitudes of other am-  
bassadors in rapid succession. These were all of  
them charged with offers so various and incompat-  
ible, that the mind of Inoiosa, distracted and  
confounded amidst so great a variety of views,  
knew not which to pursue, and remained in a  
state of inactivity and irresolution. Thus the  
duke endeavoured to prevent a contest with his  
friend Mendoza in arms, by storming as it were  
the feat of his affections and passions, whence  
alone flow all the operations of war and of peace;  
and by making, in the language of the celebra-  
ted Nani, a war of wit upon his mind. But the  
ingenious subtlety of Charles Emanuel, not satis-  
fied with preventing Inoiosa from acting at all,  
attempted to make him act in such a manner, as  
to advance the interests of Savoy in Italy, and  
wholly to ruin those of Spain. The stratagem by  
which he hoped to effect this bold design was spe-  
cious. He proposed that the governor, in the  
name of the king of Spain, should, with his as-  
sistance take possession of the metropolis, the  
only place of considerable strength in Montferrat,  
but that every other part of that marquisate should  
be annexed to his own dominions. At the same  
time, that the authority of the Spanish monarch  
might be paramount over the whole province,  
he proposed farther, that the towns which he  
had taken, being garrisoned by Savoyards, should  
have the arms of Spain affixed to all their gates.  
But

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But Mendoza, who wanted decision rather than penetration, was not ensnared by this insidious proposal. For he was aware, that should the Spaniards seize a part of Montferrat, while the pagantry of their name blazed over the whole, a jealousy would be excited among all the neighbouring powers, which the policy of Charles Emanuel, at a time when the Milanese were almost wholly disarmed, would use as an engine to subvert the Spanish power in Italy.

The duke of Savoy's conduct a subject of mortification to Spain.

THE deep alarm which the invasion of Montferrat spread throughout all the Italian states, was a severe mortification to the lofty spirit of Spain, as it implied a suspicion, that the power of that kingdom might not be sufficient to controul the ambitious designs of the duke of Savoy. The Catholic king, reluctant to enter on war, endeavoured at first to subdue the turbulence of that prince with menaces and frowns; and, by the mere authority of Spain, to quiet the fears and restore the peace of Italy. The secretary Vargas was dispatched from Madrid to Milan, with orders to the governor to announce to Charles Emanuel, that it was the will of Philip that he should withdraw all his troops from Montferrat, and to threaten force in case of disobedience.

THE Spanish ministers in Italy, in like manner, laboured to maintain the authority of their nation by raising their language to the most majestic tone. The marquis of Inoiosa encouraged the Italian princes to trust in the protection of the king of Spain, rejected with disdain the idea of admitting any associate with that monarch in composing the differences of Italy, and attempted by various artifices to prevent Cosmo, duke of Tuscany, from sending assistance to his relation the duke of Mantua. Don Alphonso de la Queva,



Queva, the Spanish ambassador at Venice, assured BOOK V.  
the senate, "that, without any noise or trouble, <sup>1613.</sup>  
Charles Emanuel should be punished, and Ferdinand restored to his rightful inheritance; that there was no reason to be fearful of any event, or to dread the turbulent ambition of any prince, while the undiminished goodness and power of the great potentate whom he served, would not suffer any innovation in Italy, nor any disturbance of that peace which was so happily enjoyed under his authority (c)."

BUT, although he was thus threatened by Spain, although the emperor denounced the imperial ban, and his adversary was directed and supported by the counsels and wealth of Florence and of Venice; yet the duke of Savoy remained undaunted, and steadily pursued his object by policy and arms. In order to alarm the jealousy of Spain, he threatened to call to his aid the troops of France. When the Pope exhorted him to peace, he protested that he would overwhelm Italy with an inundation of heretics. He dismissed the Venetian ambassador with orders to inform the senate, that if they should persist in affording succour to the duke of Mantua, he would cover the Adriatic with Turkish pirates. But while he thus studied to work on the fears of his adversaries, he neglected not to use any means by which he might conciliate their favour. He offered to deposite in the hands of the Spaniards his rights to Montferrat, and the places he possessed in that province; on condition that the princess Mary should be brought to Milan, and remain there along with her mother; a proposition by which he intended at once to shew his own deference to the king of Spain, and to sow the seeds of jealousy

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B b

lousy

(c) Batt. Nani. Hist. lib. i. 1613.

**BOOK V.** <sup>1613.</sup> lousy between that monarch and the duke of Mantua. Nor was his design disappointed; for to the measure which he had proposed the governor of Milan cordially agreed. But Ferdinand utterly rejected it, with bitter complaints against Inoiosa, who presumed, without his knowledge, to dispose of the blood of Gonzaga.

**CHARLES EMANUEL**, having thus thrown the blame of disobedience to the will of Spain on Ferdinand, endeavoured to improve the advantage he had gained by sending Victor Amadeus to represent to the court of Madrid, how much the duke, his father, inclined to do what should be agreeable to their desire. Of this, he said, he had given a signal proof, by committing into their hands the heir of his dominions as a pledge of the obedience of his whole house.

ON the strength of all this merit with the court of Spain, the duke, having hastily thrown a garrison of four hundred men into Pontestura, under the colours of Spain, marched onward with his army to Nizza de la Paglia, and began to batter it from three different places. This town, which was but weakly fortified, was, however, effectually defended by the fidelity and valour of its governor, Manfrino Castiglione, who, by rigorous discipline, and by frequent sallies, gained time for its relief.

The governor of Milan checks the ambition of the duke of Savoy.

**THE** governor of Milan, who had by this time reinforced his army, roused by a general clamour, and constrained by the orders of Spain, resolved effectually to curb the troublesome ambition of his friend, the duke of Savoy. He sent the prince of Ascoli with five thousand men to join the prince Vincenzo, who waited their arrival with three thousand more in the service of the duke of

of Mantua. The slowness of Ascoli's march BOOK V.  
 seemed to indicate an intention to hearken to a 1613.  
 proposition that had been made for a suspension  
 of arms; but the Mantuans urging him to advance  
 without delay, the united army at last approach-  
 ed to Nice. The Savoyards, no longer doubt-  
 ing the intention of Inoiosa to raise the siege, on  
 pretence of respect to the ensigns of Spain, re-  
 treated in good order without being pursued.  
 The duke of Savoy now offered to surrender all  
 that he possessed in Montferrat, and peace was  
 made on this condition. But this pacification did  
 not remove the apprehensions of the princes of  
 Italy; for the duke of Savoy had uniformly con-  
 tended for an act of oblivion in favour of count  
 St. George, and other subjects of Mantua, who  
 had taken up arms to support his claim to Mont-  
 ferrat; and the duke of Mantua, on the other  
 hand, had as constantly insisted on their punish-  
 ment, and also on reparation of damages.

THESE mutual pretensions appeared to the fa-  
 gacity of the Italian states the embers of a war,  
 ready to flame out with increased fury. There  
 was evidently a collusion, they thought, between  
 Charles Emanuel and the marquis of Inoiosa,  
 some secret design which would soon transpire:  
 for though the duke evacuated the towns he had  
 taken, he did not dismiss, but, on the contrary,  
 reinforced his troops; and the governor, though  
 he seemed to have accomplished the design of his  
 military preparations, remained still in arms.  
 Their conjectures were not without foundation;  
 for Ferdinand would not pardon the partizans of  
 a competitor for the sovereignty of any part of  
 his dominions, and still insisted on reparation of  
 damages. And Charles published to the whole  
 world, in writing as well as discourse, that the  
 governor promised him that no farther mention

**BOOK V.** <sup>1613.</sup> should be made of damages, and that the exiles of Montferrat should be restored to their estates, and all the privileges of other subjects; a condition from which he was determined never to depart.

The award of Spain respecting the dispute concerning Montferrat.

IN this contest the marquis of Inoiosa took a decided part in favour of Savoy, and in the most haughty strain threatened Ferdinand with all the rage of war, if he should refuse to agree to the terms which he had prescribed. He instantly dispatched Antonio Pimentelli, general of the Milanese light-horse, to bring the young princess from Mantua to Milan. This Pimentelli would have done, even by force, if, having been conducted into the apartments of the child, he had not been convinced, that, from illness, she was not in a condition in which she could be removed. Upon this the duke of Mantua sent an envoy to Madrid with his excuse for not giving up the princess, and another to France to solicit the good offices of the queen-regent with the Spanish monarch, which she readily granted. The ministers of Spain at last declared the will of Philip to be, "That the differences between the dukes of Savoy and Mantua concerning reparation of damages, and the pardon of the rebels, should be referred to the arbitration of the pope, the emperor, and himself; that the princess Mary should be brought to Milan; that the duchess Margaret should marry Ferdinand; and that both dukes should disarm their forces, those of the king being sufficient to execute whatever should be necessary for relieving the oppressed, and subduing the obstinate."

The marquis of Inoiosa, at the same time that he sent Pimentelli to Mantua, in order to preserve the appearance of impartiality, dispatched Sanchio



chio del Luna, governor of the castle of Milan, BOOK V.  
to Turin, to signify to the duke of Savoy that 1613.  
he must lay down his arms. Charles was now  
sensible that his contest with Ferdinand had no  
other tendency than to reduce himself, as well as  
that prince, under the dominion of Spain: un-  
willing, therefore, to disband his army, the only  
pledge of his sovereign independency, he imme-  
diately set about framing excuses, and inventing  
stratagems. He represented to the Spanish mi-  
nisters at Milan, that in the province of Dauphi-  
ny there was an army, commanded by the mares-  
chal Lesdiguières, which waited only the queen-  
regent's orders to pour into Piedmont; it was,  
therefore, necessary for him to stand on his guard.  
Instead of disbanding, he insisted on leave to re-  
inforce his army; and, as a pledge of his fide-  
lity to the king, and his disposition towards  
peace, he desired that some Spanish regiments  
might be quartered in Piedmont. This, he said,  
would be doing him an essential service; because,  
his country being defended by the arms of Spain,  
he would be at liberty to march whithersoever  
the necessity of his affairs should call him. But  
the Spaniards were by this time too well acquaint-  
ed with the artifices of Charles to fall easily into  
his snares. They perceived that it was his aim  
to excite the jealousy of France, and to produce  
a rupture between that kingdom and Spain. He  
doubted not, that if he could draw the Spanish  
troops into Piedmont, he would easily prevail  
on the marshal Lesdiguières to cross the Alps  
in order to expel them. Hostilities, once begun,  
would not cease with the retreat of the Spaniards  
into their own dominions; and, amidst the con-  
tentions of his enemies, he might find some  
means of his own aggrandizement. Such was  
the refined project of the duke of Savoy!

ABOUT

**BOOK V.** **1614.** ABOUT this time, the secretary Vargas, in his return to Spain, passing by Turin, demanded of the duke a categorical answer to the question, whether he would disband his troops or no? Charles hesitated not a moment to shew his respect to the Catholic king by answering in the affirmative. He immediately made a shew of disbanding his army in the presence of the Spanish minister; but he took care to keep on foot his foreign troops, having dismissed only his militia, which might be quickly re-assembled.

Effect of  
the award  
of Spain on  
the minds  
of the dukes  
of Savoy  
and Man-  
tua.

THE determination of the Catholic king, and his peremptory tone respecting Montferrat, filled Ferdinand with resentment, and Charles with indignation. Nevertheless, Ferdinand declared that he was willing to accept all the other terms prescribed by the court of Madrid, provided they would not insist that the young princess should be carried to Mantua; a condition to which they agreed without difficulty. But Charles Emanuel, to all the foreign ministers residing at his court, poured forth the bitterest invectives against the pride of Spain, which he represented as a just ground of general apprehension. "If the Spanish monarch, said he, shall be suffered to impose his imperious commands upon me; the princes of Italy, deluded by treaties, or subdued by arms, will thenceforth lie at his feet, fearing punishment and asking pardon. If the present juncture shall prove the servility of our dispositions, we shall quickly be stripped of the shadow of that power which we wanted wisdom to preserve the reality."

Reception  
of the  
prince of  
Piedmont  
at the court  
of Madrid.

THE indignation of the duke was still more inflamed when the prince of Piedmont gave him an account of his treatment at Madrid. He had no sooner arrived in Catalonia than he received an

an order to remain in that province, until it should be known whether his father would yield obedience to the orders of the king; and, if he was at last received at court, it was with coldness and with scorn. The prime minister spoke of the duke of Savoy with disdain and with hatred, and threatened the severest chastisement if he should not submit, without reserve to the authority of his Catholic majesty.

BOOK V.  
1614.

THIS narrative of his son fixed the resolution of Charles. He instantly declared his firm purpose to maintain his independence with his sword, or to perish in the attempt. Accordingly he levies fresh troops, and exerts every nerve again to form a confederacy against that imperious race, whose incurable ambition still aimed at the sovereignty of Europe (*d*). He still kept up a close correspondence with the prince of Condé and the discontented lords in France, hoping to find employment for the arms of Philip in supporting the authority of Mary de Medicis. And in spite of the positive orders of the queen-regent, Lefdiguieres found means to pass several thousands of French soldiers from Dauphiny into Piedmont, who greatly reinforced the Savoyard army (*e*).

Courageous  
resolution  
of Charles  
Emanuel,  
duke of Sa-  
voy.

CHARLES also insinuated himself, on this occasion, into the confidence of Maurice, prince of Orange, and engaged in his service some troops under count John of Nassau. But, what encouraged him most, was the hope of assistance from the republic of Venice, which, he doubted not, would readily unite their arms with his for the purpose of removing from their confines, or at least

(*d*) *Mercure François*, 1614. *Siri Memor. recon.* tom. iii. p. 222. *Memoires de la Regence de Marie de Medicis.* Batt. Nan. lib. i. 1614.

(*e*) *Histoire du Connestable de Lefdiguieres*, lib. viii.

BOOK V. <sup>1614.</sup> least of humbling the power of an imperious neighbour. He therefore dispatched to Venice John James Piscina, a man of distinguished abilities and powerful eloquence, to propose to the senate a league, defensive and offensive, for the preservation, or rather, the recovery of the liberties of Italy. Piscina painted, in glowing colours, the dependent condition of the Italian princes, and the inordinate ambition of the court of Spain. He offered to refer to their arbitration the difference between the houses of Savoy and Gonzaga; implored their aid and their advice; declaring, at the same time, that whatever counsels other states should follow, the duke of Savoy was determined to die with his sword in his hand, rather than to live in subjection to the tyranny of any power on earth.

THE Venetians admired the noble spirit of the duke, and found the highest satisfaction in reflecting, that the natural guardian of Italy (*f*) possessed all that courage and foresight which that important character required. Nevertheless, being unwilling to involve themselves in war, while there was a ray of hope that the liberty of Italy might be united with its peace, they declined to interfere in the dispute concerning Montferrat, as that matter, they said, had already been referred to the arbitration of the emperor and the king of Spain. They advised Charles to accommodate all differences with the duke of Mantua, and to yield to the superior power of Spain whatever satisfaction might not be unbecoming the dignity of a sovereign prince. At the same time they assured him of their affection and good offices,

(*f*) "Al cui Senno, al cui Petto, alla cui Destra  
Commise il Ciel la Cura  
Delle Italiche Mura."



ees, and that they would not remain idle spectators of injustice and oppression.

BOOK V.

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FAITHFUL to their promise, the Venetian senate exerted their influence in all the courts of Europe in favour of the duke of Savoy. To the Spanish ministers, particularly, both at Madrid and Milan, they represented the calamities and the dangers of war, and expatiated on the advantages of concord and peace. But the deep wound which the boldness of the duke of Savoy had given to the pride of Spain was fomented by lenitives, and to be cured only by the sharp remedies of fire and sword. The Spaniards provoked, not pacified, by the intercession of the Venetians in behalf of Charles Emanuel, proudly rejected every condition that might wear the complexion of treating that prince on a footing of equality, or even of honouring him with a capitulation.

The duke of Savoy favoured by the Venetian senate.

INOIOSA, although his own inclinations were wholly towards peace, in obedience to the positive and reiterated commands of the court of Madrid, sent an ambassador to Turin with orders to Charles to lay down his arms; to require a promise, in writing, that he would not molest the territories of the duke of Mantua; and to inform the duke, at the same time, that the king of Spain would not be bound by any conditions but such as should be dictated by his own moderation. The duke of Savoy listened to this message with a serene countenance, and without making any reply; but he ordered the ambassador instantly to leave his dominions; and, tearing from his neck the ensign of the Golden Fleece, he returned it into the hands of that minister, desiring him to deliver it to the king, and to tell him that he scorned to wear a badge of honour conferred

Book V. <sup>1614</sup>ferred by a prince who threatened him with chains. The duke hastened to Asti to collect his forces (g).

The governor of Milan takes the field against the duke of Savoy.

INOIOSA, whose army, lately reinforced with troops from Spain, consisted of thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse, crossed the Sesia, and took up his quarters at Carefana, not far from Vercelli, in the hope that Charles would humble himself before so great a military force, and yield to the renown of the Spanish arms. But the duke, with an army in numbers greatly inferior to that of Inoiosa, passing over to the other side of the Sesia, let loose on the Milanese all the rage of war; and, having surprised and burned several towns and villages, returned within his own confines with prisoners, plunder, and troops inspirited by success. The Spaniards, seeing the Milanese thus invaded, and knowing that it was naked and exposed to the frequent attacks of their vigilant and enterprizing enemy, having set fire to Carefana and La Mota, abandoned their posts in Piedmont, and retired within their own territories.

THE governor of Milan, in order to make up, in some measure, the loss and disadvantage he had suffered in this contest with the duke of Savoy, encamped near Vercelli to cover the building of a fortress within the Spanish bounds, but so advantageously situated as to protect the Milanese by shutting up a passage through which it was open to hostile invasion, and at the same time to curb the power of the Savoyards in the adjacent quarter of Piedmont. This fortress was a mile in circuit, and, in honour of the duke of Lerma, called Fort Sandoval. The Spaniards had  
long

long meditated this design, but hitherto deferred its execution, being unwilling to excite any jealousies in the princes and states of Italy. In this undertaking several weeks were spent; mean while the season elapsed that was fittest for action.

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WHEN the news of the ravages committed by the duke of Savoy in the Milanese reached Madrid, the Spanish ministers were astonished at his boldness, and being unaccustomed to resistance in Italy, were inflamed with the highest degree of resentment. They vowed his destruction, execrated his name, and reproaching the governor of Milan with ignorance, or want of spirit, excited him to revenge the dishonour that had been done to the territories of Spain, and to the royal standard. The resentment of Spain was farther vented in a manifesto, devolving to king Philip all the estates of Charles Emanuel which were fiefs of Milan; and the imperial ambassador (*b*) denounced against Charles the ban of the empire, if he should not instantly disband his army (*i*).

The rage of the Spaniards against the duke of Savoy.

AGAINST those attacks of the pen, Charles Emanuel defended himself with the same weapon. That none of his estates were fiefs of Milan, he proved from records of history. To his imperial majesty he wrote a respectful letter, giving an elaborate and circumstantial detail of the reasons he had to be dissatisfied with the conduct of Spain, of the ravages of the Spanish troops, and the necessity he was under of keeping up a force to oppose them. In conclusion, he intreated the emperor to revoke the interdict he had issued against him; and farther, that he would employ his influence with the king of Spain, in order to engage

(*b*) At Milan.

(*i*) Batt. Nan. Hist. lib. i. 1614.

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gaged him to disband his troops (*k*). The other Spanish ministers in Italy, perceiving that the lofty spirit of Charles Emanuel was still unbroken, complained of the remissness of Inoiosa, and expressed to that commander a suspicion that the Spanish arms had lost their character of invincible (*l*). In order to retrieve their reputation, they sent a powerful naval force, part of a fleet which had been fitted out to watch the motions of the Turks, to make a descent on the coasts of Piedmont.

Oneglia taken by the Spaniards.

THE marquis de Croix, who commanded this armament, finding that he had not a force sufficient to take Nice, turned his arms against Oneglia, a maritime town of Savoy, environed by the confines of Genoa, except where it is separated from Piedmont by the Appenine mountains. Disembarking his troops on the territories of the Genoese, he placed within their bounds his battering cannon, which played upon Oneglia with success. To this place Charles Emanuel could not send any succours, without the consent of Genoa, which was refused. This act of hostility he revenged by reducing Zuccarello, a fief of the empire, under the protection of that republic. Oneglia was defended five days, by the valour of the marquis of Dogliani. Having surrendered this town on honourable terms, this commander brought a part of the garrison into Marro, a castle situated on a rock, a little more inland, and which commands some vallies full of villages. This fortress was also soon after reduced by the Spanish forces, increased to the number of five thousand, by the arrival of several gallies from Sicily.

THE

(*k*) Histoire du Regne de Louis XIII. Roy du France, et des principaux Evenemens arrivez pendant ce Reigne dans tous les Pais du Monde. Merc. François.

(*l*) Batt. Nan. lib. i. 1614.



THE governor of Milan, urged by the reproaches and importunities of his countrymen, in order to support this naval expedition, put his army in motion, though weakened by sickness, and afflicted in their march, by those excessive rains which at that season overflowed all the country. Having crossed the river Tanarus, not without a gallant opposition from the duke of Savoy, he found himself in a situation full of embarrassment: for the advanced season did not admit of the siege of Asti, and to canton his troops in the open country, would expose them a prey to the vigilance and rapid movements of Charles Emanuel. He, therefore, judged it prudent to retire to the country about Alexandria.

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IN the spring following, the hostile armies were reinforced, and on both sides great preparations made for war. But in the city of Asti, and presence of Charles Emanuel, a treaty was framed by Julius Savelli, nuncio at Milan, and the marquis of Rambouillet, ambassador extraordinary in Italy from France, the chief articles of which were, that the duke of Savoy should disband his troops, keeping on foot only his usual garrisons; that within fifteen or twenty days after, Innocent should also disband his army, and give his word to the pope and the king of France, that he would not commit any act of hostility against the duke of Savoy; that the prisoners and places taken on either side should be mutually restored; that the jewels and dowry of Margaret should be returned; and that an act of indemnity and oblivion should be passed in favour of such subjects of Montferrat, as had taken up arms in opposition to the duke of Mantua. These conditions were not altogether satisfactory to Charles Emanuel; nevertheless, having in vain endeavoured to rouse other powers to arms against Spain, and being desirous of conciliating

Treaty of peace between the Spaniards and duke of Savoy.

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ating the favour of the pope and France, who offered to guarantee the treaty they proposed, he declared his readiness to accept them. It is alleged by some writers, that this prince would not have agreed to this treaty, while he had no other enemy to contend with than Inoiosa, if he had not imagined that it would be rejected by the Spanish ministers. If this was his conjecture, he was not deceived; for when Rambouillet and Savelli presented it to the governor of Milan, in full confidence that he would sign it, he told them that he was deprived of all power of making peace with the duke of Savoy, by a late order from Madrid.

War in  
Germany.

THE resolution of the Spaniards to maintain the predominancy of their power over the princes of Italy was heightened and confirmed by the success of their arms in Germany.

PRINCE MAURICE, assisted by troops from France and England, on the first of September 1610, made himself master of Juliers, which, with all its dependencies, immediately submitted to the marquis of Brandenburg, and the count Palatine of Neuburgh, known at that time by the title of the princes in possession. These princes lived upwards of two years in the same castle, and governed the states of Cleves and Juliers by their joint authority. But having quarrelled at last, as might have been expected, they broke through the agreement that every thing should be done in concert, and issued edicts, not conjointly, but separately. Their mutual friends, in order to heal this rupture, advised them to cement a friendship by marriage (*m*). But this advice, widened the difference it was designed to compose. For the

(*m*) *Interests des Princes* par Monsieur de Rohan, part. i. disc. iv.

the prince of Neuburgh, having, in consequence of this counsel, gone to demand the daughter of Brandenburg in marriage, at a feast, when his blood was warm, and his spirits high with wine, let fall some expressions, which so exasperated the elector that he gave him a box on the ear. This effectually cured the young suitor's passion for his daughter. Henceforth the princes in possession became avowed enemies, and thought of nothing but fortifying themselves against each other by strong-holds, troops, and allies. The count Palatine, by various acts of obedience, courted the favour of the emperor; and, in order to conciliate that of the Catholic league, the prince of Neuburgh married the sister of the duke of Bavaria, and the elector of Cologne. The marquis of Brandenburg, on the other hand, called to his aid the military power of the states general of the United Provinces. It is probable, that when this infant republic consented to employ its arms in defence of Brandenburg, it apprehended not any opposition from those of Spain. That monarchy, about five years before, had betrayed its inability to prosecute war, by its eagerness for peace. Since that time, it had exhibited a striking token of improvidence and langour, when it beheld without concern, at least without any exertion, the mighty preparations of Henry the Great; and the duke of Savoy had insulted it in Italy, as yet with impunity. Prince Maurice, therefore, without any apprehension of resistance from the Spaniards, on pretence of carrying relief to the marquis of Brandenburg, prepared to extend the boundaries of the United Provinces by new conquests in the duchies of Cleves and Juliers. Having gained the governor of the castle of Juliers, he poured into that fortress a strong Dutch garrison, without opposition. He afterwards came to fort Schenck with an army of eighteen thousand men; and

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Ambition  
of the Uni-  
ted States.

**BOOK V.** and penetrating into Germany, took Emmerick  
 1614. on the Rhine, where he placed a garrison, and  
 many other places in the duchy of Cleves, and  
 the county of la Marck.

Prince  
 Maurice  
 opposed by  
 the Mar-  
 quis of  
 Spinola.

THE accession of the states of Cleves and Juliers, to those of the United Provinces, would, in the issue, have extended the dominion of that republic over all the Austrian Netherlands, had not the rapidity of prince Maurice's conquests received a check from the judicious and quick movements of the marquis of Spinola. This penetrating genius, who had strenuously supported the pacific counsels of Prince Albert at the court of Madrid, now perceived the necessity of having recourse to arms. He convinced the archduke Albert, and also the ministers of Spain, that the present was the proper time to oppose the views of that youthful state, whose successful struggle with the power of Spain had inspired ideas of ambition and new conquests. It was better, he said, at this juncture, to commit their cause to the fortune of war, and to contend for what remained of their sovereignty in arms, than to remain inactive until the power of the revolted Provinces, in the Low Countries, should be irresistible. On pretence of restoring the supremacy of the emperor and the pope over the Protestants of Aix la Chapelle, who had deposed the Catholic magistrates of that city, and banished the Jesuits and Romish priests, Spinola, assembled an army of thirty thousand men, and provided a great train of artillery. By secrecy and celerity he surprised Aix la Chapelle, where he reestablished the papal jurisdiction and imperial power. Thence he bent his course to the north-east, and by this movement seemed to indicate an intention of laying siege to Juliers. But, wheeling suddenly about,  
 he



he crosses the Rhine two leagues below Cologne, and, joining the troops of Neuburgh, enters Molsheim, falls down the Rhine, reduces Orsoy, and proceeds onward to Wesel, which he invests with part of his forces. The inhabitants of this place, by a constant and heavy fire, repulsed the assailants with great slaughter. But Spinola, having brought up his whole army, formed his intrenchments with so much judgment, that his troops, covered from the fire of the enemy, made their approaches with celerity and with safety. And, having planted three batteries of eight cannons, he kept up so hot a fire, that within less than two hours, one of the city gates, and all that could oppose an entrance by that way, was reduced to ashes. The besieged, understanding that prince Maurice and the marquis of Brandenburg were coming to their relief, determined to make a vigorous resistance. But the women mounting the walls with their children in their arms, with tears and cries entreated them to surrender. The men, melted by the suppliant voices of their wives and screaming infants, sent deputies to Spinola to ask a favourable capitulation. This was readily granted: it was stipulated on the one side, that no change should be introduced in the religion or government of the city; that the military officers of Brandenburg should march out of the city with their baggage, arms, and warlike stores; and that the citizens should have liberty to retire and settle wherever they pleased. On the other hand, Spinola only demanded that he should be allowed to introduce into Wesel a garrison of a thousand men, there to remain until the Dutch garrison should be withdrawn from Juliers. As soon as he entered this place he began to strengthen its fortifications, and by all means to secure its possession. He built three hundred barracks near the walls, and obliged the inhabitants to furnish beds and

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other necessary furniture. He also increased the garrison of Wesel with two thousand foot, and three hundred horse, under the command of Velasco. The inhabitants in a strong remonstrance represented to Spinola, that, according to the terms of capitulation, he was to introduce a garrison of one thousand men. Spinola sternly replied, that it was indeed agreed that he should bring into Wesel one thousand men; but that he had never promised that he would at no time increase their number (*n*). Having obliged the inhabitants of Duysburg, a city between Wesel and Dusseldorp, to admit a strong garrison, he passed the Rhine, and approached so near the camp of Maurice that the centinels of the opposite armies frequently conversed, and sometimes drank together. The prince of Orange sent a messenger to Spinola, to know in what prince's name he entered the states of Cleves and Juliers. Spinola answered, by putting a similar question to the prince.

Convenient  
method of  
making  
conquests.

These illustrious antagonists lay near to one another for a considerable time; but neither found an opportunity of attacking the other with advantage. And, without breaking the truce, or incurring the usual calamities of war, they had fallen on a very convenient method of making conquests, by a kind of tacit compact, to divide between them the states they pretended to protect. The United Provinces, alarmed at the success, and apprehensive of the future enterprizes of Spinola, at last engaged France, England, and certain Protestant princes in Germany to mediate a reconciliation between the princes in possession. A conference was held for this purpose at Santhen, a town which in this quarrel had remained neutral, but

(*n*) *Interests des Princes* par M. de Rohan. partie ii. discours. v. *Histoire du Regne de Louis XIII. et des principaux Evenemens*, &c.

but without effect. The articles of agreement BOOK V. proposed by the mediators of peace, though they 1614. would in all probability have been accepted by Brandenburg and Neuburgh, were only a subject of cavil to both Maurice and Spinola, who sought not to compose the differences of these princes, but to fix themselves in the places they had taken. Thus ends this singular campaign, which is not distinguished by bloody battles and splendid victories; but whose origin and issue convey important political instruction. For thence it appears that concessions to a hostile people naturally invite them to repeat their attacks; that the only proper time for a nation to make peace, is when the enemy desires it; and that no state can admit within its bounds the arms of a superior power, without endangering its own independence.

A LITTLE good fortune is sufficient to revive 1615. the projects of mortified ambition. The court of Madrid elated by the successful career of Spinola in Germany, felt their resentment more and more inflamed against that daring prince who first exposed the Spanish weakness in Italy; and not less against his feeble opponent the marquis of Inoiosa. A letter was intercepted from the king of Spain to the governor of Milan, in which he upbraided him with the remissness of his former conduct, and gave orders from that instant to make an irruption into Piedmont, before the duke of Savoy, or any others of the enemies of the monarchy, could collect their forces, dispersed in winter-quarters, to oppose him. The governor, who had received repeated orders to the same purpose, as soon as the season of action arrived, took the field at the head of an army of thirty thousand men. To this formidable body of veteran Spaniards the duke of Savoy opposed an The success of the Spaniards in Germany inflames their resentment and ambition. Duke of Savoy takes the field against the governor of Milan. army

BOOK V. <sup>3615.</sup> army of seventeen thousand men, French, Swiss, and Savoyards, and those noble efforts of courage and conduct with which he was wont to encounter danger, and to raise himself above misfortune. The contest which ensued proved how much the success of an army depends on the genius of one man; and how vain are the greatest military preparations, if they are committed to the conduct of an unskilful commander.

THE first movements of the Spaniards, in the present campaign, indicated an intention of surprising Cortemiglia, the possession of which would lay open to their incursions the states of Piedmont on the side of Asti, Seve, and Canelli. Into this place, therefore, Charles Emanuel immediately throws three regiments of French, and eight hundred Swiss, under the command of the count of St. George. The duke himself, hastening from Turin with seven thousand men, comes up with the marquis of Mantua, in his route to Cortemiglia, at the head of five or six thousand, at Bistagno, a fortress of Montferrat, situated upon a height, commanding a highway from the sea to the confines of Milan. The thick and solid walls of Bistagno, and the frequent and bold sallies of the garrison, rendered all the efforts of the duke of Savoy to reduce it under his power fruitless. In the hurry of his march he had not been able to bring up to this place more than two small cannon. He attempted therefore to scale the walls, and attack the garrison sword in hand. He was persevering in this desperate and mad attempt, when he was informed that Inoiosa was on his march for the relief of Bistagno, at the head of a powerful army. He therefore immediately raised the siege, retreated in good order to Canelli(c), and thence to Asti, having perceived

(c) Hist. du Regne de Louis XIII.



perceived that thither the Spaniards bent their course. This place, before the arrival of the duke, BOOK V.  
1615. was garrisoned with four thousand foot, and a considerable number of cavalry, under the command of prince Thomas. Here the whole forces of Charles Emanuel were now collected; and the issue of the siege of Asti, was likely to decide the fate of the house of Savoy. But the city being of large extent, and the walls in many places infirm, the duke determined to meet the enemy at the river Versa, on the banks of which Inoiosa appeared with an army of twenty-four thousand men. The rest of his forces he had thrown into St. Damiano and Ulpiano (*p*), towns of Montferat, the first not far from Asti, and the second on the verge of Turin. The duke of Savoy, with fifteen thousand foot, and fifteen hundred horse, opposed the passage of the Spaniards over the Versa in vain. And Inoiosa, having crossed this river with his whole army, endeavoured to gain the heights of an hilly tract which stretched in a winding course to Asti. This station he hastened to occupy, that he might thence be enabled not only to cut off the duke's retreat to that city, but to drive him out of the adjacent plain. But Charles, having penetrated his design, immediately fell back to two posts in that strong ground, which he had already slightly fenced by small trenches. These posts he committed to his French and Swiss troops, forming together about two-thirds of his army, with some pieces of cannon. The Savoyard infantry he reserved to act as necessity might require, and with the cavalry he flanked his two posts in a plain immediately below them. The firm order, and deliberate valour of the Spanish troops sustaining the furious assaults of the Savoyard cavalry, and pressing up the

Engagement between the duke of Savoy and the Spaniards under the marquis of Spinola.

(*p*) Batt. Nan. Hist. della Repubblica Veneta, lib. i. 1615.

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the hill which was occupied by the French, gained at last an eminence, the possession of which decided the contest. For two pieces of cannon played from thence on the enemy with such effect, that they retreated, with such confusion and trepidation to the second post, as struck a panic into the Swiss, and threw them also into a disorder that was soon after followed by a precipitate flight. The duke of Savoy, on this important day, which seemed pregnant with the fortune of his house, appeared resolute to maintain his sovereign power, or at least to prove that he deserved it. Performing the duty both of an able commander and gallant soldier, he directed the fight, brought relief to the oppressed, animated the weary, rallied the faint hearted, and poured on those that fled the bitterest reproaches. But the terror that had seized multitudes being more contagious than the courage of an individual, though a general and sovereign prince, every effort of Charles to withstand the steady valour of the Spaniards was ineffectual. At last, yielding to adverse fortune, but not despairing of better, by the most extraordinary exertions of courage and of art, he carried off from the scene of action five field-pieces, and part of that baggage which had been left by the Swiss.

NOTHING was now wanting to make Italy tremble, but either the duke of Savoy at the head of the Spanish army; or the Spanish army under the colours of the duke of Savoy. The governor of Milan knew indeed how to fight; but not how to direct a campaign, or to improve a victory. He suffered the enemy to march unmolested to Asti. And, instead of laying siege to that city, fortified himself against the attacks of his antagonist, by the most extensive lines of circumvallation, and every possible method of defence.

fence. The distant and ineffectual bombardments of Inoiosa, the skirmishes which followed between the Savoyards and Spaniards, and the desperate but unsuccessful assault that was made by the former on the camp of the latter, might demand a particular description, were it necessary farther to illustrate the courage which was exhibited this campaign by the duke of Savoy, or that incapacity which disgraced the conduct of the governor of Milan. The Spanish troops lay for six weeks in the open air, on the hills near Asti; and the excessive heat, the unripe fruits, and the impurities of the camp, producing diseases, there ensued a great mortality both of men and cattle. Although the army had been reinforced with the troops at Sandoval, and others that arrived by sea, it was not half so strong as when it sat down before Asti. Charles, on the other hand, though he enjoyed more commodious quarters, experienced such frequent mutinies among his foreign troops, that it was difficult for him to determine whether they were of greater service or disadvantage. Thus both parties were in situations which inclined them to hearken to terms of peace. A capitulation was drawn up by the marquis of Rambouillet, and effectually recommended to the acceptance of the governor and the duke, by the Venetian and English ambassadors. This was not materially different from the treaty which had been framed by the pope's nuncio and the French ambassador, in the name of their respective courts, towards the end of the preceding year, in the city of Asti. Only, it gave greater security to the duke against the attacks of Spain. For it was guaranteed by the republic of Venice; and, in case of its being violated by the Spaniards, a power was assigned to the duke of Savoy, of summoning to his assistance, in the name of the king of France,

the

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Book v. the mareschal Lefdiguieres, and all the governors  
 of provinces bordering on his dominions. The  
 1615. French ambassador, thinking he had now accomplished the object of his embassy, returned to Paris. But no sooner had he left Piedmont than Ferdinand, whose thirst of vengeance was in proportion to the narrowness of his capacity, began to let loose all the fury of his resentment on his revolted subjects. And Charles, on the other hand, only made a shew of disbanding his troops (q), being justly apprehensive that the late agreement between him and the governor of Milan would be disavowed by the court of Madrid. The treaty of Asti was equally violated on both sides.

1616. WHEN the court of Madrid was informed that Inoiosa had concluded a disgraceful war by a dishonourable peace, they were moved with great indignation. But the man whose wrath on this occasion blazed forth with the greatest fury, was Don Pedro de Toledo, marquis of Villa Franca, distinguished even in Spain by an haughty boldness, and a zeal for the glory of the monarchy. His temper was vehement, yet his understanding was at once subtle and solid, and his courage both exalted and constant. Such a character would have appeared a fit instrument for inflicting the vengeance of Spain on the duke of Savoy; although he had not been allied by blood to the house of Mantua. This man, therefore, was chosen by Philip to succeed the marquis of Inoiosa in the government of Milan, and the consenting

(q) He very formally disbanded his French troops, but took care that they should be all of them incorporated into his Savoyard companies. As to the Swiss they could not be discharged without payment, concerning which there arose innumerable delays and difficulties.



senting voice of the Spanish nation applauded his choice (*r*). BOOK V.  
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THE duke of Savoy, dissembling his suspicions of the hostile designs of Spain, sent a gentleman of his bed-chamber with two letters to Toledo, in one of which he congratulated him, according to the custom of Italian princes, on his safe arrival at Milan, and in the other he described, in a pleasing manner, the mutual advantages of faithfully fulfilling the treaty of Asti. To the first of these letters the governor, with becoming politeness, replied, by returning his most humble thanks to the duke for the honour he had done him, and declaring that he would not fail to acquaint the court of Madrid with the respect and affection his highness had expressed for the Catholic king. To the other he answered, “that the true way to regain the favour of Philip, and to preserve lasting concord, was, not to think any longer on what was to be done, when both parties

(*r*) A famous Italian historian (Bat. Nani), and others in deference to his authority, suppose that Inoiosa would have been recalled sooner, had not the duke of Lerma been afraid, by too great military successes in Italy, to defeat the project of the double marriages, which were not consummated (as has already been observed) till the end of the year 1615. But when we reflect on the great military force committed to Inoiosa, which was nearly double that of Charles; on the repeated orders he received from his court to act with expedition and with vigour; and of the attempts he made in consequence of these orders; that conjecture appears rather refined than solid. The regency of France wished for the final accomplishment of the double marriages as ardently as the court of Spain: and if they had been averse to that measure, an unsuccessful struggle on the part of Spain with the duke of Savoy would not have been the means of reconciling them to it. The appointment of the marquis of Villa Franca, at this time, to the government of Milan, seems to have been the natural result of the feelings of the Spanish ministry, on an occasion that wounded their pride, and excited their resentment.

**BOOK V.** ties had their swords in their hands (s).” This  
 1616. answer, had it needed any comment, would have been sufficiently explained by the governor’s common discourse, and still more by his actions. It was his common talk that the peace of Asti was a mere collusion between his predecessor and the duke of Savoy, and that a powerful king could not be tied down to the observance of a treaty with an inferior prince, by any other bands than those of his own moderation. In the meantime he did not leave Charles in any uncertainty concerning what he had to expect from his Catholic majesty’s moderation; for he every day made new levies, and reinforced his army with a great number of Swiss, Germans, and Italians.

THE menaces of Don Pedro did not escape from that wary politician through any intemperance of discourse. They were intended to bend the lofty spirit of Charles to an humble submission to the crown of Spain, and to prepare his mind to catch at the bait by which he hoped to govern his ambition. He insinuated to his envoy at Milan, that if the duke his master would ask pardon of Philip, and submit his pretensions wholly to his arbitration, that monarch would add to the dominions of Savoy the city of Geneva. But Charles Emanuel was not unacquainted with the artifices of the Spanish court. It was but lately that they had attempted to incite the prince of Piedmont to rise in rebellion against his father, and that Toledo himself had entered into a treaty with the governor of Zuccarello to deliver that place into the hands of the Spaniards. The duke, provoked equally at the pride and insidious policy of Spain, rejected with indignation the offer of Toledo,

(s) Siri Mem. second. tom. iii. p. 409, 410.

Toledo, and prepared to maintain his independency and honour by force of arms. He represented to the guarantees of the treaty of Asti the conduct and the designs of Toledo, and immediately summoned to his aid the mareschal de Lesdiguières, in virtue of that authority with which for this purpose he had been invested by the king of France. Toledo, on the other hand, inveighed against the obstinacy of the duke, and solicited Lewis to compel him to disband his troops, and to deliver the places and prisoners he had taken, into the hands of the king of Spain, promising that this monarch should afterwards take every step, not inconsistent with the dignity of his crown, to remove all jealousy of his arms. Lewis had already sent the count de Bethune, a man of capacity and singular address, into Italy, in order to accommodate those differences which disturbed the repose of that country. He now sends the mareschal Lesdiguières to join his influence to that of Bethune, hoping, that Toledo would yield to the presence, and reputation, and power of the mareschal, what he might otherwise find means to evade. Lesdiguières without delay went to Turin, where, in conjunction with Bethune, he framed a treaty of accommodation, which being proposed to the consideration of the governor and the duke, both parties agreed to a cessation of arms. The mareschal, having assured the duke of Savoy of his warmest support, if it should be found necessary, departed from Turin, and returned to Dauphiny (*t*).

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The king of France resolved to maintain the treaty of Asti.

MEAN while the duke of Monteleon, the Spanish ambassador in France, assured the court of Paris, that the views of Philip in Italy were not those of ambition, but of justice and peace. And this

Intrigues of Spaniards at the court of France.

(*t*) Hist. du Connet, de Lesdiguières.

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this assurance being accompanied by arguments that spoke directly home to the wants of some courtiers, and the avarice of others, effectually changed those resolutions which had been taken in favour of Charles Emanuel. The strictest orders were issued that no troops should be levied in France, without the express commission of the king. The design of these orders was, either to oblige the duke of Savoy to give his consent to an accommodation, on terms dictated by Spain, or to render him unable to carry on a war with that nation, should he refuse it.

BUT the duke found firmer support in the wisdom and fortitude of the Venetian senate, than was to be expected from the feeble and fluctuating counsels of France. That republic levied for his service a considerable body of French troops, and contributed besides, a supply of seventy-two thousand ducats a month, for the purpose of maintaining his army in Piedmont. The orders of the young king of France were in vain opposed to the gold of Venice, the authority of Lesdiguières, the duke of Mayenne, and other chiefs who encouraged all soldiers of fortune to cross the mountains, and to join the standard of the duke of Savoy. But above all Charles was encouraged by the prospect of the duke of Nemours pouring down into the plains of Milan from the mountains of Savoy, at the head of an army of six thousand men. He was ignorant that the military preparations of this duke, was that which chiefly nourished the hope of victory in the breast of Toledo.

The duke  
of Nemours  
joins the  
Spaniards  
against the  
duke of  
Savoy.

HENRY, duke of Nemours, chief of a branch of the house of Savoy established in France, had been amused by Charles Emanuel with the hope of marrying a princess of his family, for not a less space of time than six or seven years. The disap-



disappointment made a deep impression on his mind, and filled him with resentment. Don Pedro, having learnt these circumstances, conceived the project of fixing Nemours in the interests of Spain, by operating at once on his ambition, and that spirit of revenge which was then his domineering passion. He insinuated to his rankling mind, through the dukes of Guise and Monteleon, that on condition of his taking up arms on the side of Spain against his relation Charles Emanuel, the Spanish monarch would reward his services with the investiture of the duchy of Savoy. The duke of Nemours did not hesitate to close with these terms. Counterfeiting an ardent desire to maintain the independency of that sovereign family whence he derived his origin, he raised a force of seven thousand men (*u*), which he was about to lead into the heart of Savoy, while Toledo with a powerful army was ready to penetrate into Piedmont. But Charles Emanuel, having discovered the designs of Nemours, instantly sent orders to the governor of Savoy to secure those places which had been destined for the reception of the troops of Nemours. And the prince of Piedmont hastening to the northern passes of the Alps, seized the posts on the route which a body of troops was to take, that had been levied by the Spaniards in Franche Compté and Burgundy.

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In the mean time the duke of Nemours had taken the field, and penetrated through lofty mountains, by rugged and difficult ways, into the valley of Sizeri. This small district yielded to the superiority of his power, without much resistance. He was preparing to improve the advantage he had gained, and to press forward upon the other territories

(*u*) Batt. Nani, lib. ii. anno 1616.

**BOOK V.** territories of Savoy, when part of his troops deserted him, carrying along with them the greater part of both the provisions and ammunition. The troops that remained, being few in number, and weakened exceedingly by hunger and thirst, served as pastime to the shepherds of the mountains, who harrassed and hunted them from one place to another. In this extremity the duke of Nemours implored the succour of Spain, that he might be enabled to save the remains of his army from inevitable ruin by crossing the Rhone; but the Spaniards were deaf to his prayers. They even refused to send him a supply of bread and ammunition, and debarred him from the liberty of lodging his troops in Franche Compté, a province which in those days belonged to the crown of Spain. In this desperate situation he found relief in the generosity of Charles Emanuel. That magnanimous prince, at the intercession of Lesdiguières, and other chiefs of France, pardoned his revolt, and, on the disbanding of his troops, restored him to the possession of his estates in Savoy (*w*).

Operations  
of the new  
governor of  
Milan.

THE governor of Milan, in expectation that the irruption of the duke of Nemours into the dominions of Charles would distract his mind, and divert his arms, drew near with thirty thousand men to the frontiers of Piedmont. And, having thrown bridges over the Tanarus and the Sesia, and fortified and garrisoned them at either end, he waited for a favourable opportunity of entering that country, his head quarters being fixed at Candia and Villata. The duke of Savoy, on the other hand, lodged in Carefana and la Motta, in the province of Vercelli, with an army not exceeding

(*w*) Mercure François 1616. Hist. du Regne de Louis XIII.

ceeding twenty thousand. After various skirmishes with the troops of Savoy with various success, Toledo, having separated his army into two divisions, ordered one of these to pass the Sesia at Gattinara, and to join the other, which he was to conduct himself, near Crescentino, a town on the Po, on the confines of the principality of Vercelli and Montferrat. It was Don Pedro's design, by this movement, to inclose his enemy by the Sesia with fortified bridges and fort Sandoval on the east, by the Po with Crescentino on the south, and by taking and garrisoning St. Germano, a fortress equidistant from both these rivers. Charles was now posted in Sigliano, a place environed with lakes and morasses, and accessible only by one narrow entrance. This station the duke had chosen, as being very convenient for the relief of Vercelli, the reduction of which seemed the object to which all the steps of his adversary ultimately tended. As soon as he perceived that Toledo directed his course to Crescentino, he mounted two thousand musqueteers behind an equal number of cavalry, and passing by the Spaniards with great speed, threw succours into that town sufficient for its protection. The Spanish general in revenge ravaged the villages of Piedmont, and Charles, from a like motive, those of Montferrat.

THE autumnal rains now overflowed the country on all sides, and the hostile armies lay for some days inactive, the Savoyards in Crescentino, the Spaniards in Livorno and Bianze, towns of Montferrat. The waters having subsided, Toledo, aided by the treachery or cowardice of the governor, made himself master of St. Germano, the possession of which was a considerable step towards the reduction of Vercelli. This important place was still his aim, though, in order to obtain it,

BOOK V. it, he made a feint of marching to Crescentino.



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The duke constantly harraſſed his troops in flank, that by interrupting the march of his enemy, he might be enabled himſelf to preoccupy the plain of Apertole, where he might make ſuch arrangements as would put it in his power either to give battle, or to ſtand upon the deſenſive. The ſubtlety of the Spaniſh commander, on this occaſion, practiſed a ſucceſſful ſtratagem againſt the artful Charles Emanuel. Toledo made ſuch a diſpoſition of his troops as ſeemed to indicate an intention of obſtructing the march of the Savoyards, even at the expence of a battle. Upon this the duke brings forward the flower of his army into the van, expecting every moment to be attacked in front by the enemy. But the Spaniards, with ten thouſand foot and ſome cavalry, ſuddenly made an attack on his rear, conſiſting of four thouſand French infantry and ſome cavalry, when they were filing through a wood. The Savoyards, ſtruck with ſurprize and terror, began to retreat in the greateſt confuſion; but the duke ſaved his diſmayed forces, if not from the diſgrace, yet from the ſlaughter that commonly purſues a flying army. He diſpatched the intrepid count of St. George to check the purſuit of the victorious enemy, with a ſelect band of five hundred muſketeers. The brave reſiſtance of the count, and the quick approach of night, enabled the French troops in the ſervice of Savoy to retreat with ſafety to the main body of the army.

THE duke, whoſe ſanguine temper contemplated the bright ſide of every object, comforted himſelf under this miſfortune, by reflecting, that it would revive the ancient animoſities between the Spaniards and the French, and that this laſt nation, enraged at their late diſcomfiture, would retrieve at once his loſs and their own honour.

With



With these sentiments he retired to Crescentino. BOOK V.  
 The season was now far advanced; and Toledo, 1616.  
 having in vain attempted to surprise Crescentino,  
 and finding that keeping the field served only to  
 diminish the number and impair the health of his  
 troops, abandoned the posts he possessed in Pied-  
 mont and Montferrat, having left garrisons only  
 in Trino, St. Germano, and Gattinara. This  
 last was a town which commanded a passage over  
 the Sesia, and which had been reduced under the  
 power of the Spaniards by Don Sancho del Luna,  
 governor of the castle of Milan (x).

THE duke of Savoy, through excessive fatigue  
 and agitation of mind, about this time contract- 1617.  
 ed an illness, which, concurring with the rigour of Illness of  
 the advanced season, seemed to promise on his the duke  
 part a respite from all hostilities. He could not take of Savoy.  
 the field in person, and was even unable to walk  
 abroad. In this irksome confinement the activity  
 of his mind amused the tedious hours by forming  
 various projects and stratagems of war. And,  
 under his present infirmities, he felt a sensible con-  
 solation in the capacity, bravery, and filial affec-  
 tion of four illustrious sons, who were ready to  
 execute with fidelity and alacrity whatever he  
 should command then to perform. The duke of  
 Nemours having been constrained to lay down  
 his arms, the prince of Piedmont repassed the  
 mountains by the valley of Aosta, and conducted Movements  
 his troops to Ivrea. Here he received orders to of the  
 lead them against Gattinara, in which was a Spa- prince of  
 nish garrison of four thousand men. The prince Piedmont.  
 did not hesitate to carry the orders of the duke  
 his father into execution. But yielding to the re-  
 monstrances of his most experienced officers, he  
 exchanged an enterprize which appeared to be  
 VOL. II. D d imprac-

(x) Batt. Nani, lib. ii. 1616. Levassor. tom iii. Merc.  
 Franc. 1616.

BOOK V. impracticable, for another which might be accomplished without difficulty, and which was not of less importance.

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THE principality of Masserano is bounded on the east by the river Sesia, and in every other quarter by the territories of the duke of Savoy ; a circumstance which naturally placed it under the protection of Spain. Toledo, with a view to strengthen that chain by which he designed to invest and straiten Vercelli, had made an offer to the prince of Masserano to garrison his capital, and also the fortress of Crevalcor with Spanish forces. The prince, aware of the danger of such a measure, chose rather to undergo the hazard of an irruption from Piedmont than to resign the sinews of his power into the hands of Toledo. He returned the governor thanks for his proffered aid, but expressed a hope that it would not be necessary. Toledo had in the mean time marched his troops to the banks of the Sesia, and seemed ready to pour into the territories of Masserano. In this situation of affairs the prince of Piedmont, by a concealed and forced march, surprised and invested the capital of that small state, which opened its gates without resistance. He now marched against Crevalcor, with eight thousand foot and four hundred horse. He appeared before the walls of that place on the 27th of January, and having seized all the avenues by which it might receive relief, he soon made a breach in the walls, and took the town by assault. The terrified inhabitants fled before the slaughtering sword, directing their trembling steps towards the castle. Multitudes were trodden to death in this scene of confusion and horror, and in the eager contest to enter through that narrow gate which was the only avenue of life. A very few made their way into the

the castle. The rest were either taken prisoners or slain by the sword.

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THE prince of Masserano, as soon as he learnt the hostile designs of Victor Amadeus, had implored that aid which he had formerly rejected. And the governor of Milan had immediately dispatched to his relief Don Sancho del Luna, with two thousand foot and three hundred horse; but in the mean time the castle capitulated. And, in too late an attempt to relieve it, Don Sancho, with many officers and private men, lost his life (y). Thus the duke of Savoy contended with the power and the art of the marquis of Villa Franca not without advantage. It is however probable that all the efforts of Charles Emanuel would have been repelled in the end, by the valour, discipline, and ancient renown of the Spanish arms, directed by the genius of Toledo, if they had not been supported by the magnanimous resolution of the mareschal Lesdiguières equally to consult his own and the glory of France, in spite of the allurements and the threats of the misled princes, by whom it was at that time governed.

ALTHOUGH fortune sometimes raises the worthless and the weak to the highest offices, yet it must have been singular merit that, in times productive of great characters, could exalt a private gentleman of a very narrow fortune, to the first dignity of a great kingdom that can be enjoyed by a subject. Francis de Bonne, with a patrimony of fifty crowns a year, rose to the station of constable of France, in opposition to many rivals of noble birth and great power. He was of an agreeable aspect, a mild temper, and easy manners; qualities which were not indeed very shining in themselves,

Character  
of the  
mareschal  
Lesdiguières.

D d 2

selves,

(y) Batt. Nani, lib. ii. 1616. Merc. Franç. 1617.

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selves, but which contributed not a little to raise the mareschal Lesdiguières to situations in which he had opportunities of displaying the greatest talents and virtues (z). His understanding was manly and solid; he possessed in an eminent degree the virtues of political and martial courage; and, though he was susceptible both of friendship and love, his ruling passion was ambition. The duke of Savoy cultivated the friendship of this man with uncommon attention, and practised with unwearied diligence all his address in order to gain so important an acquisition. To the mareschal Lesdiguières he shewed all the respect due to a crowned head. If he received him at Turin it was with the utmost pomp and magnificence. If he addressed him in writing, he bestowed on him the endearing and flattering appellations of "good neighbour, and faithful friend." He consulted him on every occasion: and the mareschal returned his confidence and assiduities with the sincerest fidelity and affection. The attachment of Lesdiguières to Charles Emanuel was well known to the court of Spain, and they endeavoured to counteract its effects by operating on his natural ambition. The king and queen of France, at the instigation of the Spanish ambassador, attempted to seduce him from the interests of Savoy, by calling him to court in order to be invested with the privileges and rank of a duke and peer. And, that he might be enabled to support the magnificence of that character, the king of Spain offered him any sum of money he should be pleased to demand, to be paid in any part of Europe. These allurements failing of success, a supply of money was offered sufficient to raise and maintain for a year, an army of forty thousand men, with a suitable train of artillery, to be

(z) Amelot de la Houssaie.



be employed in making himself master of Savoy. Book V.  
 Of this duchy the duke of Monteleon, in name 1617.  
 of the Spanish monarch, offered him the investiture, on condition of his assisting the Spaniards to conquer Piedmont. This temptation having been also resisted, Monteleon engaged Louis to transmit to the marshal the most peremptory orders to abstain from levying troops, and on no pretext whatever to move to the assistance of the duke of Savoy. These orders were in vain reiterated and enforced, at the desire of the feeble court of Paris, by the authority of the parliament of Grenoble. Lefdiguieres, in a letter to the king, represented to his majesty, in a firm though respectful tone, that his duty called him to restore the dignity of France in Italy, by fulfilling the engagements of that kingdom to the duke of Savoy, and chastising the perfidy and insolence of Spain. Magnanimous resolution of Lefdiguieres.  
 And he added, that, however treacherous counsels might beguile the good intentions of his majesty for a time, he did not despair of his present conduct meeting one day with the approbation of his sovereign (a).

On the nineteenth day of December 1616, the marshal Lefdiguieres, exhibiting a signal proof of the greatness of his own mind, and the weakness of the crown of France, set out from Grenoble, at the head of an army of seven thousand foot and five hundred horse, raised in Dauphiny by his own authority, and at the expence of the republic of Venice. Having crossed the Alps in the midst of winter, he arrived at Turin on the third day of January. Reinforced by so considerable a body of gallant troops, and encouraged by the presence, reputation, and aid of a great commander, whose natural abilities were matured by long

(a) Hist. du Connetable de Lefdiguieres, lib. ix,

**BOOK V.** long experience in the military art, the duke of Savoy was elated with the hope of vindicating his own independence, and inflicting severe vengeance on that haughty court which threatened him with subjection. The united forces of Lesdiguières and the duke were irresistible. St. Damiano, Alba, and Montiglio, with other places of inferior importance, reduced under the power of Charles, with a rapidity corresponding to the ardour of his mind, nourished his hopes of making other conquests still more important. The reduction of Montiglio is eminently distinguished, not by any noble display of generosity or courage, but by an incident extremely humiliating to man, as it reminds him how much he partakes of the nature of those ferocious and noxious animals which are the constant objects of his hostility and abhorrence. A contest having arisen concerning the garrisoning of that fortress between the French and the Savoyards, the fierce disputants, enflamed by their engagement with the common enemy, directed their unsettled fury and reeking swords against each other. Upwards of a hundred had fallen on either side, before the authority of the general, the count of St. George, was able to prevent a mutual and complete massacre. The savage thirst of blood being now excited, and incapable of being suddenly quenched, loudly demanded an inhuman gratification, and found it in the slaughter of the garrison that had capitulated on favourable terms (b).

Reduction of Montiglio, and a memorable incident that happened on that occasion.

The blindness of ambition.

THE discontents in France had now drawn to a crisis which threatened the crown with all the violence of civil war. These discontents Charles Emanuel, as above related, had assiduously nourished with his usual dexterity and address. But the most

(b) Batt. Nani. Hist. lib. iii. 1617.

most enlightend genius sees not far into futurity, and often the most sagacious ambition blindly labours for its own destruction. The intestine discords and commotions of France obliged the king to recall Lefdiguieres; and instantly the marquis of Villa Franca, who yielding to a torrent which could not be resisted, had resolved to confine his troops within narrow limits, and to act wholly on the defensive, renewed his attacks on the duke of Savoy, commencing his operations with the siege of Vercelli. He sat down before this important place towards the end of May, with a strong army and a very great train of artillery. When Charles was informed that the governor of Milan had begun to put his troops in motion, he was not at a loss to discover his intention; and, with a view to disappoint it, having speedily increased the garrison of Vercelli to the number of four thousand, he determined to march his army from Gabbiana, and, by reducing the fortress of Pontestura, to oppose, with advantage, the progress of the Spanish army. But, while he meditated this scheme, he discovered that other dangers threatened him than the siege of Vercelli.

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May.  
Siege of  
Vercelli,

DON PEDRO, constrained to relinquish for a time all open attacks on the states of Charles Emanuel, had employed the natural subtilty of his active mind in laying plots against that prince's person and family. Different persons were suborned to cut off the duke by assassination or by poison; and a conspiracy was formed by certain French officers of the garrison of St. Ja to seize the prince of Piedmont, who commanded that fortress, and to deliver him into the hands of the Spaniards. The discovery of these ignominious plots (c) diverted the design of the duke against

(c) It is remarkable, that, although there never was a people more distinguished than the Spaniards for honour and fidelity,

BOOK V. against Pontestura, by summoning his attention to  
 1617. cares more immediate and urgent. The conviction and punishment of conspirators and assassins employed that critical time which would otherwise have been occupied in preventing the siege of Vercelli, or, by plentiful stores of provisions and  
 ammu-

lity, yet there is not any period in the history of any nation more disgraced by plots and conspiracies than that which forms the subject of this narrative. When resentment, ambition, or other passions, cannot find gratification openly, and by the direct road of superior force, they have recourse to stratagem, as fully appears from the history of nations as well as individuals. Perhaps, too, ideas of superior dignity have a tendency to blunt the sense of injustice committed against inferiors. The different prices or compensations for wounds, and even for murder, that took place about eight hundred years ago in so many nations of Europe, is a striking proof how much this iniquitous sentiment naturally prevails in the human mind. There is as great injustice in wantonly maiming, or otherwise torturing, or putting to death a dog, a horse, or other animal, as there would be in wounding or destroying a man; yet there are but few whose consciences would be stung with remorse at the commission of such crimes; a matter which is to be accounted for only from that immeasurable distance which our fancy, still more than nature, interposes between men and the inferior animals, and which precludes his sympathy. A nation accustomed to think itself vastly superior in dignity to all others, and to arrogate to itself an exclusive privilege of dominion, fancies it has a right of asserting that privilege by all means, however inconsistent with justice. The inhabitants of Calais were saved from the furious resentment of Edward III. of England by the transcendent virtue of six of their fellow-citizens, who devoted themselves to certain destruction for the sake of their relations, friends, and companions: the condition required by that haughty and cruel conqueror. These six heroic burghesses were saved from death, not by the generosity of Edward, but by the importunity and tears of his queen. Yet this prince was profuse enough in his civilities to the French officers, who, about the same time, had fallen into his hands, although their bravery was not to be compared with that of the burghesses. Had six knights appeared before him in the guise of malefactors, instead of six citizens, he would have been shocked at the idea of ordering them to be led to execution, and have been full in his praises of their signal patriotism and resolution.



ammunition, to prepare it for a vigorous resistance. BOOK V.

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THE siege had not been continued above sixteen days, when the Savoyards were reduced to the necessity of supplying the place of iron balls and lead with tin and stones. The quantity of their powder also was insufficient; nor could all the efforts of Charles encourage the gallantry of the besieged by a fresh supply. Two hundred and fifty cavalry, with sacks of powder of twenty-five pounds each, were waylaid in their concealed march to Vercelli, through the vigilance of Toledo; and the fire of the Spaniards having been communicated to such inflammable materials, only thirty of that number made their way into the place of their destination. Two hundred and twenty horses, with their riders, miserably perished in one sudden conflagration; yet the besieged made a gallant defence, and repulsed the Spaniards, in different sallies, with great slaughter. The assailants made a furious effort to carry the place by a general assault; but, if the valour of the Spaniards was animated by the love of glory and the hope of plunder, the Savoyards, anticipating in their imaginations the calamities and horrors that awaited themselves, and objects still dearer to them than life, in case of defeat, were roused with the fury of despair. The steady bravery of the besiegers gave way on this occasion to the rage which impelled the besieged; and, in the first moment of their retreat, a hundred cuirassiers, falling with their swords in their hands into the ditch, made a dreadful carnage. Fifteen hundred men perished on the side of Spain; on that of Savoy not a hundred. The duke of Savoy, being informed of the desperate intrepidity of his faithful garrison, was filled with all those emotions which the fidelity, bravery, and danger of

BOOK V. of men suffering in his cause, were naturally fitted  
 1617. to produce in his generous mind. He attempted, a second time, secretly to convey ammunition and provision into Vercelli; but lost by that fruitless effort four hundred men. At last, exasperated by repeated disappointment, he drew near to the Spanish camp by night, by storming, or even making a faint of storming which, he hoped to be able to succour Vercelli. Having ranged his troops along the banks of the Sesia, he sent a strong detachment over that river, in separate parties, under the marquis D'Urfe, who was repulsed by a body of Spanish horse with the loss of six hundred men. This bold measure of the duke was not wholly without success; for while the Spaniards hastened to oppose the Savoyards in that quarter where D'Urfe directed his attack, a thousand men, loaded with ammunition, made their way into Vercelli by another. But this scanty supply was far from being sufficient; and, besides this circumstance, the garrison was now greatly diminished by the accidents of war and the fatigues of duty. In this situation were the besieged, when Toledo, on the 25th of July, which, being the festival of St. James, was deemed fortunate for Spain, made a general assault, and effected a lodgment in a bastion, against which, from the commencement of the siege, he had principally directed the fury of his artillery. The garrison, at that instant, demanded and obtained honourable terms of capitulation; their baggage, and arms, and all the honours of war. Toledo, having garrisoned Vercelli, and levied very high contributions on the inhabitants, marching his army along the course of the Tanarus, reduced, under the power of Spain, Soleri, Felician, and Anona, with other places, the possession of which he hoped would pave the way to the execution  
 of

of an enterprize he meditated against the important city of Asti (*d*).

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AN unexpected and tragical event in France interrupted the career of Toledo in Italy. Concino Concini and Eleanor Galigai, afterwards the mareschal and the lady mareschal D'Ancre, made their first appearance at the court of Paris in the train of Mary de Medicis, on her first arrival in that city from Florence. Their abilities and address, aided by that sympathy which men feel for their compatriots, however humble their rank of life, when in the course of Providence they accompany or meet each other in foreign lands, so gained on the favour of the indulgent queen, that she raised them to a degree of power intolerable to the nobles, and odious to the people. Depending on the queen-regent, they depended also on Spain, the great prop of her power, and were naturally devoted to the interests of a crown, which, by supporting Mary's, supported also their authority. In order to prolong the period of their borrowed power, they diverted the thoughts of Lewis, now of age, from matters of state, by encouraging him in the pursuit of those youthful amusements which had hitherto occupied all his time, and engrossed all his attention. The more effectually to fix his mind in an indifference towards all political objects, they provided him with companions of his own age, whose society, they imagined, would amuse his leisure, and heighten, by sympathy, his relish for those pleasures to which he was addicted. Among these, Charles Albert de Luines, a young gentleman of Avignon, was distinguished for the handsomeness of his person, the gracefulness of his air, and the obliging politeness of his behaviour. He gained

Tragical fate of the mareschal and lady mareschal D'Ancre.

Albert de Luines becomes the favourite of the king of France.

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gained by degrees the affection and confidence of his young sovereign, and was indulged, at all times, with familiar access to his person. Concini perceived the ascendant this young favourite had acquired over the king; and, in order to attach him to himself, preferred him to the government of Amboise. But Luines, prompted by his own ambition, and encouraged by the murmurs and discontents that pervaded the kingdom, gave such an account of the conduct and designs of his benefactor, as filled the inexperienced mind of his prince with horror, and persuaded him that the preservation of his own life, as well as his power, depended on the death of the marshal D'Ancre. Vitri, captain of the guards, undertook and accomplished the bloody purpose of sacrificing the life of the marshal to the suspicions of the king. On the 20th of April the unfortunate Florentine carelessly entered within the gate of the royal palace of the Louvre, which was instantly shut behind him, and was walking towards the apartments of the queen-regent, reading a letter as he went, when the captain of the guard arrested him, in the name of the king, and beckoned to his accomplices, who stood by him in anxious expectation of that signal. Three assassins, at that instant, poured the contents of their fire-arms into his body, which, after he had fallen dead on the ground, they spurned, and cut in different parts with their swords; but the populace, greedy of every opportunity of giving vent to the animal ferocity of their nature, and zealous on all occasions to avenge on the powerful and great the unequal distributions of fortune, dug up the mangled corpse of Concini, which had been ignominiously buried, and dragged it in horrid triumph along the streets of Paris. They afterwards, having cut it in small pieces, roasted and inhumanly devoured it; and happy was the man



man who could obtain the smallest morsel of the BOOK V.  
savage sacrifice (*e*).

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THE wretched Galigai was condemned to death, on pretence of forcery. She exerted on her trial, and in her last moments, a constancy and strength of mind, which the melting spectators compared with the fortitude of Socrates, and contrasted with those tears which, not many years before, disgraced the exit of the intrepid duke of Biron.

THE authority of the queen-regent was annihilated by the stroke which cut off the marshal D'Ancre; and Luines, who succeeded to all the power of that stranger, agreeably to the common conduct of new ministers in all nations, departed at first from the maxims, and vehemently arraigned the conduct of his predecessor. He particularly exclaimed against that uniform deference which had been shewn by the former administration to the counsels of Rome and Madrid (*f*). In this temper was the court of France when news arrived of the surrender of Vercelli. Immediately it was resolved to succour the duke of Savoy. Lesdiguières once more crosses the mountains with twelve thousand foot, and two thousand horse. In his train were many lords and gentlemen of France, volunteers, among whom was the great duke of Rohan, at the head of three squadrons of cavalry. The orders of the marshal were strenuously to aid the duke of Savoy in his efforts to recover his own dominions, but

Lesdiguières marches to the assistance of the duke of Savoy.

(*e*) Bernard Histoire de Louis XIII. Siri Mem. recon. tom. iv. Relation de la Mort du Marechal d'Ancre. Journal de Bassompierre. Memoires de Deageant Amelot de la Houssaie.

(*f*) Siri Mem. recond. tom. iv. p. 68. Relation de la Mort de Marechal d'Ancre. Memoires de Rohan. lib. i.

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but not to involve the court of France in a war with Spain, by insulting either the territories of Milan or Mantua. But Lesdiguières had grander objects in view than to expel Don Pedro from the coasts of Savoy. The military reputation of the Spanish commander, instead of repressing the courage of the marshal, filled him with an ardent desire to take the field against an antagonist whose genius and vigour would give full exercise to all his abilities and experience, and over whom a victory would be truly glorious. However, making a shew of respect to his majesty's command, he ordered his troops to lay aside, for a while, the colours of France, and to wear those of Savoy.

DON PEDRO DE TOLEDO, after the reduction of Vercelli, had distributed his army, for the purpose of refreshment, in different towns and villages of Montferrat, but chiefly in those of the province of Alexandria. In the midst of all his quarters lay the village of Feliziano, which was slightly barricadoed, and defended by two thousand men. The experienced eye of Lesdiguières quickly perceived, that by surprising this central station, he would deprive the Spaniards of the most proper place of rendezvous in their possession, and prevent a junction of their divided forces. He communicated these ideas to Charles Emanuel. The duke was at first struck with the danger of attempting an enterprize against a place surrounded by the posts of the enemy; but Lesdiguières insisted that by a nocturnal, rapid, and unexpected march, it would not be difficult, but, on the contrary, a very easy matter to make the duke master of Feliziano, from which centre he might turn his successful arms against the other quarters of the Spaniards with great glory and advantage. Charles acquiescing in the reasoning,

or

or yielding to the authority of the mareschal, an Book V.  
1617. expedition was concerted against Feliziano. Thither the combined army began to march, as soon as the darkness of the night favoured the enterprize, in three divisions. The van was led by the mareschal Lefdiguieres, the main body by the duke of Savoy, and Shomberg, marshal of the camp, brought up the rear with the artillery. But Charles Emanuel, taught by the reduction of Vercelli to respect the valour of the Spaniards, and the abilities of the marquis of Villa Franca, bethought himself, after the troops under Lefdiguieres had moved, that the situation and motions of the Spaniards rendered the expedition on which he had entered extremely dangerous; he therefore sent a courier to the mareschal, advising him to return on his steps. The mareschal, who, in an advanced age, possessed all the fire of youth, replied to the messenger with much emotion, "I have followed the profession of arms above fifty years without having ever turned my back on the enemy: an honour of which I am determined my conduct on this day shall not deprive me. There is more shame in retreating than danger in going on." Having said this, he jumped out of the litter in which he had hitherto been borne; and, notwithstanding some feverish symptoms that were about him, mounted on horseback, placed himself at the head of his troops, and continued his march (g). He arrived at Feliziano about the dawning of the day; and the duke of Savoy having joined him soon after with the main body of the army, which he conducted by a private way with astonishing celerity, the place was immediately invested, and taken by assault. All the common soldiers, and  
many

(g) Hist. du Regne de Louis XIII. et des Evenemens Principaux, &c.

BOOK V. <sup>1617.</sup> many of the inhabitants, were put to the sword. The officers were made prisoners. Not a man of Feliziano escaped with his liberty and his life (*b*). Quatordeci, Renfracora, Anona, Rocca, and Nice, were also quickly subdued by the united arms of Charles Emanuel and Lesdiguières, the rapidity of whose conquests, in the space of a week, weakened the Spanish army by a loss of more than five thousand men. Don Pedro now abandoned his design of besieging Asti, and retreated from Soleri into the Milanese; all his force, vigilance, and art, being necessary to put that country in a posture of defence against the threatened irruptions of the duke of Savoy. But the duke of Monteleon having assured the king of France that Vercelli should be restored, and the treaty of Asti executed with fidelity and promptitude on the part of Spain, Lesdiguières was recalled in the full career of victory. The marshal, having in vain remonstrated that the present juncture presented a glorious opportunity for recovering the Milanese to the crown of France, yielded obedience to the reiterated commands of his sovereign. Toledo agreed to a cessation of arms, and promised to use his utmost endeavours to effectuate an entire accommodation, and, particularly, came under an engagement to Bethune, at Pavia, the 9th of October, that, on condition of the duke's disbanding his army, and restoring the places he had taken in the course of the current month, he on his part would give up Vercelli with the other places he had seized, and disarm his troops, in November. This agreement being made, the marshal marched back to Grenoble (*i*). But the ministers of Spain, not satisfied with the return of the French troops in-  
to

(*b*) Batt. Nan. lib. iii. 1617. Mem. de Rohan. liv. i.

(*i*) Hist. du Connetable de Lesdiguières, liv. ix.



to Dauphiny, remonstrated to the court of France, BOOK V.  
 that the keeping on foot so great a force, so <sup>1617</sup>  
 near the confines of Savoy, would be an in-  
 fraction of the treaty of Asti. They declared  
 that Vercelli would not be delivered up to Charles  
 Emanuel, while the Swiss troops hovered in the  
 county of Vaux, and his friend, Lesdiguières,  
 was ready, on the shortest notice, to march to his  
 aid at the head of an army. Lewis, who was  
 willing to maintain the independency of Savoy,  
 but averse to any violent rupture with the Ca-  
 tholic king, not only disbanded his own troops  
 in Dauphiny, but also urged Charles to preclude  
 Toledo from every pretext of war, by laying  
 down in good earnest his arms; assuring him of  
 his warmest support and protection, in case the  
 Spaniards should attempt, either by open force or  
 secret artifice, to elude the execution of the trea-  
 ties of Pavia and Asti. The promise of the  
 king having been warranted, at his majesty's de-  
 sire, by the superior authority and credit of the  
 marshal Lesdiguières, Charles Emanuel disband-  
 ed his army. Upon this the French ambassadors,  
 Modene and Bethune, went from Turin to the  
 governor of Milan to assure him of this fact, and  
 to engage him to imitate the duke's pacific ex-  
 ample. They soon perceived, from his affected  
 difficulties and evasions, not only that he had no  
 mind to restore Vercelli, but that it was his  
 intention to make fresh attacks on the duke of  
 Savoy.

LEWIS, who, in the solitude of rural scenes The gover-  
 nor of Mi-  
 lan averse  
 to peace.  
 and amusements, had hitherto concealed an ele-  
 vated courage, was moved with equal indigna-  
 tion and surprize at the treacherous conduct of  
 Toledo. "I am not at a loss, said he to the  
 Spanish ambassador, to conjecture the cause to  
 which I ought to ascribe the delays of Spain to

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give satisfaction to the duke of Savoy. The king, your master, thinks I dare not go out of my kingdom without leaving it full of distractions; but I wish him to know, that it is not altogether in so bad a condition as he imagines it to be; and, if my kingdom should be ruined, and my sovereignty annihilated by my absence, I am determined to cross the mountains, and, at the hazard of my life and of my crown, to fulfil my promise to the duke of Savoy, and to oblige the king of Spain to make good his word to me." The voice, the looks, and gestures of the young king, made an impression on the mind of Monteleon, which he communicated to the court of Madrid. Orders were forthwith dispatched from thence to the government of Milan, to execute with promptitude and good faith all the articles of the treaties of Asti and Pavia (*k*). But the court of Spain found that it was as hard task to incline the marquis of Villa Franca to peace, as it had been to rouse Inojosa to arms. His first excuse for not disbanding his troops was, that the Swiss regiments, lately in Piedmont, had not returned to their own country, but halted in the country of Vaux, ready to obey the nod of the duke of Savoy, from whom they still drew their usual pay. Bethune protested, in writing, that the troops of the duke were disbanded, and charged Toledo with all the calamities that might arise from his disbelief of a matter of fact, of which he might easily obtain the most undoubted evidence. The governor, driven from this ground, privately offered the duke of Savoy the greatest advantages, if he would abandon his connections with Venice and France, and unite his interests with those of Spain. Provided that Vercelli should

(*k*) Discourse de ce qui s'est passé dans le Piedmont et l'Etat de Milan, &c. Apud Hist. du Regne de Louis XIII.

should remain in the hands of the Spaniards, and that Casal should also be added to the state of Milan, he promised to extend the dominion of Charles over all the rest of Montferrat. This artifice having failed of success, he endeavoured to persuade the duke of Mantua to insist on a compensation for damages, and on, what he had always so much at heart, the liberty of punishing such of the subjects of Montferrat as had espoused the cause of his adversary. But neither did this stratagem succeed. He next had recourse to a contrivance which he deemed infallible. He attempted to excite the jealousy of the duke of Savoy by circulating whispers, that, when Ferdinand should be restored to the sovereignty of Montferrat, the house of Gonzaga would give it up to Spain, in exchange for other possessions. But Charles having disregarded these false reports, Don Pedro devised yet another expedient, which might subdue the wary but spirited duke, by provoking his indignation. His secretary, Carone, who was then at Milan along with the French ambassadors, Toledo haughtily ordered instantly to leave the territories of Spain, and to go about his business. By this artifice he surprised the mind of Charles, and gained an advantage over his understanding through the agency of his passions. The high-spirited duke, not adverting that Toledo was now practising such ingenious stratagems on his own mind, as he himself had employed when he carried on a war of wit on that of Inoiosa, instantly suspends the evacuation of the places he had taken, and sends advice to Modena and Bethune to return from Milan. The subtlety of the Spaniard (such is the advantage of making an attack!) would have triumphed over that of the Savoyard, which was equal, if not superior, had not the French ambassadors conjured the latter not to make sport to the for-

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mer, who sought nothing else than a pretext for reviving hostilities. The duke, admonished by the prudence of these ministers, restored, on the 6th of April, all the places he possessed in Montferrat: he also evacuated Zucarello, Anona, and Masserano, and every other fief he had seized of the empire. His prisoners he delivered into the hands of the French ambassadors. News having arrived of all these things at Milan, the governor, equally surprised and chagrined, exclaimed, "It appears that the treaty of Asti must at last be executed, since heaven and earth will have it so (1)." He released his prisoners, and evacuated St. Germano, but still held fast possession of Vercelli.

THE court of Madrid, in the mean time, had sent repeated and positive orders to fulfil all the conditions, without exception, of the treaty of Asti; and, in order to give the world a striking proof how much they disapproved the conduct of Don Pedro, they determined to recall him, and to appoint the duke of Feria his successor in the government of Milan. This intention was not kept a secret from Don Pedro, yet he persevered in the invention of new evasions. "It is not consistent, said he, with the honour of the monarchy to restore Vercelli, while the French ambassadors remain at Milan. The restitution of that place must not seem to be extorted by the threatenings of France, but to be, as it in reality is, a voluntary deed on the part of Spain." This pretext was removed by the immediate departure of Modena and Bethune. "Before I give up Vercelli, said Don Pedro, once more, I insist that Garesio, (a town of Montferrat, belonging to the count de St. George, but now gar-  
risoned

(1) Bat. Nan. Hist. lib. iii. anno 1618.



risoned by the troops of Savoy) shall be restored to its right owner." Garesio was restored; and Toledo, all his artifices being now exhausted, began, with proud reluctance and by slow degrees, to carry away from Vercelli the ammunition and the arms. But, after this operation was begun, he bethought him of yet another pretext for gaining time. He required a new promise from Charles Emanuel, that he would not give any occasion of offence to the duke of Mantua; but the ministers of Ferdinand, impatient of these multiplied delays, and more suspicious of Toledo himself than of any of the princes of Italy, declared in writing, to the great vexation of Toledo, that they required not any other assurances of the pacific intentions of the duke of Savoy, than those they had already obtained.

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MEN's astonishment at the public conduct of the marquis of Villa Franca was heightened when they remarked its coincidence with that of the duke of Ossuna.

DON PEDRO GIRON, knight of the Golden Fleece, and a grandee of the first class of Spain, inherited from a long line of ancestors the pride of noble birth, and the command of a princely fortune: circumstances which are sometimes indeed found in conjunction with meanness of sentiment, but which fostered that natural sublimity of imagination that carried Ossuna to pursue grand designs by extraordinary means. His temper was uncommonly fervent, and his fancy lively even to extravagance. Hence, though his understanding was quick and penetrating, his conduct was neither regulated by the common maxims of policy and prudence, nor his demeanour, in the intercourses of life, by the rules of propriety and decorum. In the presence of his sovereign,

Character  
of the duke  
of Ossuna.

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sovereign, he would talk with a gaiety and boldness unknown in the courts of kings, and which appeared to the sage gravity of his compatriots to border upon madness. But his conversation in all companies, and on all occasions, was adorned with a brilliancy of wit, which, in the eyes of most men, would more than compensate many levities and indiscretions. This duke is justly censured by grave historians for his gallantries, which were not veiled or palliated by delicacy of sentiment; but, on the contrary, sensual, open, and licentious. Yet that grosser species of love was attended with this advantage, that it left his mind free and disengaged, and did not interfere in any respect with his projects of ambition (*m*). He had served in the army in the war with the United Provinces, in a high rank, and with great glory: and his merit, as a soldier, was either the cause, or, as oftener happens in courts, the pretext for his preferment to the important station of viceroy of Naples. In this station he amazed the world with the singularity of his character, and disturbed its repose by the boldness of his ambition (*n*).

History of  
the Uscoc-  
chi.

WHEN the race of Ottoman extended their conquests from the Black Sea to the gulf of Venice, a number of the ancient inhabitants fled from the terror of their irresistible arms, to the forests and mountains on the frontiers of the countries now known by the name of Turkey in Europe. And, having acquired, from their wandering and unsettled manner of life, a ferocity of character, they

(*m*) What was said of Sylla is applicable to Ossuna. *Voluptatum cupidus, gloriæ cupidior, otio luxurioso esse, tamen a negotiis nunquam voluptas remorata.*

(*n*) Batt. Nan. Hist. della Repubblica Veneta, lib. iv. 1620. Historia de Don Felipe IV. Rey de las Espanas por Don Gonçalo de Cespedes. Lib segundo, capitulo seg.

they gradually became careless of their herds and flocks, and subsisted chiefly by hunting and by rapine. The Uscocchi, for that is the name by which those fugitives were distinguished, were no longer that effeminate race which yielded without resistance their fertile possessions to the invasions of their enemies. Impelled by the hardships and the courage of barbarians, they made frequent inroads into the settlements of their conquerors, and satisfied their wants by plunder, while they gratified their revenge by devastation. In this vagabond state they lived for many years, wandering from place to place, still directing their course to those wild and rugged abodes which prosperous nations avoid, but which the unfortunate court as the seats of freedom. The Austrian coasts on the confines of Istria, broken by the operation of the elements into a thousand rocks and creeks, and small islands of difficult access, appeared a fit habitation to the Uscocchi: and the emperor, Ferdinand, desirous by all means, to form a barrier against the irruptions of the Turks into Hungary, bestowed on this fierce and warlike people, the strong town of Segna, which became their capital. In the neighbourhood of these fugitives lay the territories of a people similar in their origin, but more prosperous in their fortune (o), whose wealth both on sea and land, invited the rapacity of men who had no other profession than that of robbers and pirates. The Uscocchi, instead of punishment for these offences, received protection from Ferdinand, archduke of Gratz, within whose government Segna was situated. This produced a war between the Austrians and the Venetians. The menaces of the

War between the Austrians and Venetians.

(o) The Venetians found an asylum from the fury of Attila, in the insignificance still more than the natural strength of the fens and morasses,

BOOK V. *Turks (p)*, and the prospect of an expensive election to the crown of Bohemia, soon inclined Ferdinand to hearken to terms of accommodation with the republic, whose army, powerfully reinforced by soldiers of fortune from Holland, had invested the capital of Goritia, and reduced it to the greatest extremity of distress. The Spaniards would have willingly furnished the means of carrying on a war against a people that on every occasion strenuously opposed their domineering schemes in Italy. But their contest with Charles Emanuel fully employed all their resources, and prevented a disjunction of their forces. Yet, whatever could be done in favour of Ferdinand and the Uscocchi, was performed by the duke of Ossuna and the marquis of Villa Franca. Amidst the heat of the campaign in Piedmont, Toledo kept up a considerable military force near the Venetian borders, and made other preparations which seemed to threaten a diversion in favour of the Austrians. This, the truce with the duke of Savoy brought about by the mareschal Lesdiguières, enabled him afterwards to accomplish. While Don Pedro, by his menaces, and by his attacks on the Venetians by land, endeavoured to relieve the Austrians; Ossuna, by various operations at sea, and with great success, laboured for the same end. By his orders, a Spanish fleet cruized in the Mediterranean, in order to intercept any succours that might be sent to the republic by that channel; while another interrupted the sources of their wealth and power, by seizing their merchant ships in the Adriatic. These were brought in triumph into the port of Naples, which became the rendezvous of corsairs and pirates. Here, such of the Uscocchi as had been driven from

(p) Winwood's Memoirs, vol. iii. A letter from sir Dudley Carleton, dated Venice, 27th February, 1612.



from their strong holds on the Austrian coast, found freedom of trade and personal protection. BOOK V:  
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The profuse genius of Ossuna did not afford shelter to the Uscocchi and other pirates that he might share in their plunder, but that he might collect a sufficient number of desperate men for the execution of any daring enterprize. In the mean time, the Neapolitan merchants found means of representing to the court of Madrid, that the piratical trade which was now carried on at Naples, had ruined fair commerce, and of course diminished the royal revenues. Happily for the Neapolitans, their complaints coincided, both in time and intention, with the remonstrances of France. An order was dispatched to all the Spanish ministers in Italy to suspend hostilities, as a negociation was now on foot for a general peace between Savoy and Spain, and the Venetians and Ferdinand of Austria.

THE marquis of Bedmar soon after paid his compliments to the Venetian senate on its happy conclusion (g); and Toledo withdrew the troops he had sent into the states of the republic, into the territories of Milan. But Ossuna, enraged at the very name of peace, sends a fleet into the Adriatic, under the command of the famous admiral Rivera, and denounces immediate death against the man who should dare to complain to the court of Madrid of the interruption of commerce. Both this fleet and that which was sent to oppose it from Venice, after a slight encounter,

(g) It was agreed that the Venetians should restore their conquests without reserve: and on the part of the Austrians, that they should restrain the piracies of the Uscocchi; banish their ring-leaders, and also the banditti of the republic that lived among that people; that they should change the governor of Segna, and bridle that place by a German garrison; and finally, that they should give up all the captures of Ossuna.

**BOOK V.** <sup>1618.</sup> ter, were dispersed by a storm. The Spaniards took shelter in Brundisium, the Venetians in St. Croce, a port which they had occupied for some time, with a view to prevent Ossuna from fortifying, as he threatened, several rocks on the confines of Ragusa, a small republic protected by the Turks. The Ragusians, a commercial people, were naturally disposed to give every encouragement to a power that disputed the empire of the Adriatic with a nation whom they had long considered as their oppressors: accordingly, they had received, at different times, Ossuna's fleets into their harbours, and both refreshed them with provisions, and recruited them with sailors. The Venetians now chastised this avowed partiality for their enemies; and the Ragusians complained of their conduct, and represented their designs as dangerous to the Ottoman port. A military force was immediately stationed along the coasts of Dalmatia and Albany; and Ossuna, taking advantage of this circumstance, endeavoured to spread, throughout all the Italian states, the terror of a Turkish invasion. The best possible expedient on this alarming occasion, he said, would be to strengthen his hands with such a naval force as might be sufficient to defend the liberties of Europe, and raise, among the Infidels, the name of Christians. But the vigilance of the Venetian senate, discovered that at this very time Ossuna was practising on all the passions which usually determine the public conduct of the Porte, in order to draw the fury of their arms upon the island of Candia, at that time subject to the dominion of the republic. This fact, announced to all the courts of Europe, confounded the subtlety of Ossuna, and left him, for a short time, without the resource of a single stratagem. The Spanish fleet in the mean time, and numbers of privateers, continued to plunder the

the ships, and to ravage the coasts of Venice. BOOK V:  
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The pope, and the ambassadors of France, interposed their good offices with Ossuna, in behalf of the republic, in vain. Philip himself, by letters written with his own hand, commanded him to abstain from all hostilities, and to restore all that he had taken from Venice. His Catholic majesty had not better success than his holiness and the count de Bethune. Ossuna offered, indeed, in consequence of the orders of the king, to restore the empty vessels, but declined to give back their valuable freights. He continued his piracies and depredations, deigning, however, to cover his disobedience to the commands of the king, by those excuses which the various course and accidents of war readily suggest to the imagination of an ingenious commander. "It is not fit, he would say, at one time, that I should sit still, while the Venetians are fortifying the harbour of St. Croce." "I will persist, he would exclaim with vehemence at another, in my present conduct so long as the Venetians shall retain in their pay the most inveterate enemies of the king my master." When he was ordered to deliver an account of the merchandize he had seized, he seemed to sport with the orders of Philip, by giving an inventory so imperfect as the Venetian ambassador refused to accept, and even complained of the mockery. The Venetians, thus plundered, and insulted, equipped a fleet, which retaliated on the Spaniards all the piracies and depredations of the viceroy of Naples: but, at the same time, the senate regretted the necessity they were under of defending themselves by making such reprisals. To the marquis of Bedmar, the Spanish ambassador, they complained of the never-ceasing hostilities of Ossuna, and professed themselves at a loss to reconcile the actions of the viceroy of Naples with the declarations of  
the

**BOOK V.** the king of Spain. The ambassador, in reply, touched with an imposing delicacy on the irregularity of Ossuna's disposition, and insinuated that the conduct of that duke was neither under the controul of the king, his master, nor of any fixed principles or regular system of action. In reality, the behaviour of Ossuna seemed to furnish matter for such an apology, while he directed the Spanish arms, in spite of repeated orders from his sovereign, against a state with whom he had not declared war; and constantly meditated hostile designs, of which he talked without reserve to all around him, although, from their nature, the utmost secrecy was necessary to their execution. His conversation turned wholly upon surprising the Venetian ports in Istria, plundering their islands, and even making a descent on Venice. He had himself carefully studied the plan of that city, and he now described it with infinite accuracy to all who possessed his confidence. He contrived flat-bottomed boats, with machines to facilitate their motion, and made daily experiments of the weights which the several depths of water were capable of bearing, according to the different constructions and dimensions of vessels. To the Venetians, transactions so open and avowed, were a subject of laughter, and gave weight to the defence of the marquis of Bedmar. They were ignorant that the hostilities, of which they complained, proceeded from the secret machinations of this minister himself, which were more effectually concealed by the extravagance and apparent folly of the duke, than they could have been by the most studied secrecy and circumspection (r).

THE

(r) Batt. Nan. lib. iii. 1617. *Conjuration des Espagnols, &c.* par M. L'Abbé St. Real,



THE princes and states of Italy, enervated by luxury, or employed in commerce, committed themselves to the protection of mercenaries (s), distinguished by the name of Leaders of Bands (t). The transition was not unnatural from mercenary soldiers to private assassins. The military and generous spirit of ancient Rome was subdued by despotism and by luxury; and throughout the whole of Italy, broken into innumerable principalities by the dissolution of the Roman empire, the petty sovereigns had recourse on all occasions to stratagems and plots, not the valour of arms. And, as customs and manners always descend from the higher to the lower ranks of men, plots and assassinations became common among the people as well as their princes. Conspiracies, together with other practices and arts, were diffused from Italy over other parts of Europe; and especially over those countries between which and Italy there was a close intercourse and connection (u).  
It

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Frequency of plots and assassinations accounted for.

(s) Nichol. Machiavelli, *Historia Florentina*, lib. i.

(t) Condottieri.

(u) It is confessed, that plots and assassinations are to be found in the history of all nations: yet it will readily be allowed, that these are more frequent in that of modern Italy than in the accounts we have of any other country, if the reign of Philip III. of Spain does not form an exception to this position. As writers commonly chuse for the subjects of their productions, things not wholly unknown, but which they suppose to need new proofs and illustrations, so the famous Machiavel did not interweave into his political system, those dishonourable artifices which set all justice and fidelity at defiance, from a mischievous originality in his own mind. He laid down rules for conspiracies, because conspiracies were in every body's mouth, and every where practised. To plan and accomplish an ingenious plot, formed, in his time, a branch of political education. Archbishop Spotswood, in his *History*, relates, that when he visited the earl of Gowrie, who formed a conspiracy against James VI. king of Scotland, he found him reading a Latin book *de Conjuratibus*. The earl had been a professor of philosophy in Italy, from whence he had just returned.

BOOK V. It is the nature of every passion to tend as directly as possible towards its object (*v*). The love of power, and the desire of revenge, wait not the slow process of conspiracies, nor trust to their uncertain issue, when they can gain their end by the plain and direct road of superior force. It was a proof of the decline of Spain, that she adopted a practice, founded in fear and weakness. But of all the conspiracies or plots which were formed or connived at by the Spanish ministers, in this or any other period, that which was framed against the republic of Venice, by Don Alphonso de la Cueva, marquis of Bedmar, was the most remarkable, and the most important, whether we have respect to its end, or to that complicated machinery by which it was to be accomplished. That the marquis was a person of very extraordinary abilities sufficiently appears from this circumstance, that, at a time when the cabinet of Madrid had an option of distinguished abilities, he was appointed ambassador in ordinary at Venice, of all the courts of Europe the most refined in its politics and determined in its counsels. From an intimate acquaintance with ancient as well as modern history, which he read with the eyes of a philosopher and statesman, and much observation on the scene of human life, in which he was at once an important actor and judicious spectator, he acquired a sagacity to which the council of Spain looked up with an almost superstitious veneration. To a deep insight into the nature of political affairs, he added those qualities that are so requisite in a practical politician; a facility of speaking and writing with inexpressible grace; a quick discernment of characters; an air and manner always frank and unreserved; and at the

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Spanish  
conspiracy  
against Ve-  
nice.

Character  
of the mar-  
quis of  
Bedmar.

(*v*) Unde feritur ed tendit gessitque coire. Lucret.

the same time such force of mind, that under the most trying feelings of the heart, and the severest agitations of the passions, he betrayed not the smallest symptom of perturbation, but on the contrary retained the most unequivocal appearance of perfect serenity (*w*). With these qualities, which distinguished his character, he possessed in an eminent degree another, which is common to all Spaniards; a zeal for the glory of the monarchy and the honour of the Spanish name. This had of late undergone an eclipse, and the marquis was willing to revive its lustre by the total ruin of a power that had contributed so greatly to its decay, the republic of Venice. He was invited to attack this state by various circumstances: the war with the Austrians had drained Venice both of arms and men; the fleet was confined to Istria, the seat of the war; the land army was equally distant; the exigencies of war had occasioned the most oppressive taxes, which, as the people suspected, were not wholly applied to the public use: the marquis, therefore, persuaded himself that the revolution he had planned would not only be practicable, but to the generality of the people, acceptable; nay, of the nobility, not a few were discontented with the government, and rejoiced in all the misfortunes of the state, as the effects of measures which they had disapproved. The more necessitous of that order, the marquis knew by experience, might be prevailed on, if not to act a part in the tragedy, yet to give such intelligence as might in reality promote the catastrophe of Venice. Another ground of encouragement was, that the flower of the Venetian army consisted of Hollanders and Walloons, mercenaries, whose officers he trusted might be seduced by the powerful allurements of gold, to betray the cause of Venice,

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(*w*) Conjuración des Espagnols, &c. St. Real.

**BOOK V.** <sup>1618.</sup> nice, and to espouse that of Spain. The fleet of the republic was indeed formidable, but there too he hoped to make dreadful havoc with the same weapons he proposed to employ in weakening the Venetian army. It only remained, that he should attach to his person, and to the terrible object he had in view, a sufficient number of determined confidants, by means of whom he might combine the efforts of thousands in a scheme, with the nature of which they were not to be entrusted until the moment of execution. He imparted his project to the marquis of Villa Franca, and the duke of Ossuna. These ministers were delighted with the novelty and the boldness of his ideas, and without hesitation promised to contribute all in their power towards its accomplishment. It does not appear that he communicated his design to the court of Madrid; but he was sufficiently acquainted with the ideas of ambition that still reigned in the council of Spain, to know, that if the project should be carried happily into execution, of which he did not entertain any doubt, it would meet with their hearty applause and admiration. But while this project was ripening by degrees, the court of Spain was obliged, by the vigour of the young king of France, to make gradual advances towards a general peace in Italy. This would have disarmed the troops of Spain, and deprived the conspirators of those instruments with which they hoped to subject to the monarchy the states of Venice. Hence the various artifices of Toledo and Ossuna to prolong the war, and to prevent a final accommodation of differences. The marquis had by this time entered into the most intimate correspondence and confidence with a number of men, who, confiding in the transcendent powers of his mind, and contemplating the mighty rewards that were exhibited to their view, were ready to execute his orders



ders with promptitude and alacrity. These men BOOK V.  
1618. were highly distinguished from the multitude, by constancy in the most trying situations, by unshaken fidelity to their engagements, and by a bold and daring courage. Nothing was wanting to entitle them to the highest degree of praise, but the exertion of these virtues in a worthy cause.

THE principal arrangements in this conspiracy were these : fifteen hundred veteran troops, chosen from the Spanish army in Milan, by Don Pedro himself, were to be introduced into the city of Venice, not in a body, but a few at a time, and unarmed. They were to receive arms from the marquis of Bedmar. But lest any unforeseen accident should marr the intentions of Toledo, five thousand Hollanders, who lay at the Lazaretto, not above two miles distant from the city, were ready to be introduced, man by man, at first, and afterwards, in the tumult and confusion that was expected to ensue, in a body. Brigantines and barks were to be sent from Naples into the channels and ports of Venice, having on board six thousand men. A number of large ships were afterwards to cast anchor on the shores of Friuli. Under the countenance of the latter, and amidst the confusion and horrors to be excited by the former, the conspirators were to act their several parts in the intended tragedy : one was to set fire to the arsenal, others to different parts of the city ; some were to take possession of the mint ; some to seize the principal places of strength ; and the part allotted to many, was, to annihilate the constitution of Venice by murdering the senators. Artillery was to be drawn up to the highest eminences, for the purpose of laying the city in ruins, in case the inhabitants should attempt resistance. Field pieces were to be disposed in different quarters of the city, pointing into the principal streets.

**BOOK V.** And as it was necessary to be in possession of some inland town in the territories of the republic, which might serve as a barrier against the return of the Venetian land army, if called to Venice to oppose the conspirators, and as a magazine for the Spanish army, Don Pedro held a close correspondence with certain officers of the garrison of Crema, who were to betray that town into the hands of the Spaniards. Another plot was yet necessary to give full effect to the grand conspiracy. A port was to be occupied in the Venetian gulf, which might receive the Spanish fleet, if, by any accident, it should be obliged to seek a retreat, when employed in that sea. There is a place of considerable strength, called Marano, in an island bordering upon Istria, with a harbour capable of receiving a large fleet. The officer second in command in the garrison of Marano engaged to assassinate the governor, whenever he should receive orders from Toledo, and to hold the town in the name of the Spaniards (x).

SUCH was the complicated scheme formed for the destruction of the renowned city and republic of Venice: a scheme which involved in its nature whatever human ingenuity could plan, or the courage of man dare to execute, but which failed of success from some of those unforeseen accidents that so often happen to intimidate the hearts of assassins, and to disconcert the projects of conspirators (y).

A. CON-

(x) *Conjuration des Espagnols, &c. St. Real. Conspiration & Trahison admirable des Espagnols, &c. en 1618. Histoire du Connetable de Lesdiguières, liv. ix. Batt. Nani, Historia della Republica Veneta, lib. iii. 1618.*

(y) The abbé St. Real says, that the conspiracy was discovered by one of the conspirators, who was struck with horror and remorse as the intended ruin and bloodshed: Battista Nani,

A CONSPIRACY so important in its end, and at the same time so various in its means, does not occur in history. That of Cataline against the Roman republic, pointed to equal horrors, and to still greater revolution; but the means by which he hoped to accomplish it were more simple, and consequently less absurd than those employed by the bold imagination, rather than the solid judgment of the marquis of Bedmar. It was probably in imitation of that circumstantial and interesting narrative which the Roman historian has given of the Catalinarian conspiracy, that the eloquent and profound Saint Real composed his beautiful account of the Spanish conspiracy against Venice. This copious narrative, though heightened in some instances by the colourings of poetry, and the circumstantiality of fiction, is yet true in the most material particulars, and serves, in the words of the author to display the “power of prudence over human affairs, and the dominion of fortune; the extent of the limits of the human mind, its greatest strength, and its secret frailties; the numberless considerations to which the politician must attend, who aspires to govern his fellow men; and the difference between true and false refinement.” It is this last reflection which perpetually recurs to the reader, and strikes him with peculiar force. Nothing but the extravagance of hope, and the blindness of passion, could have seduced the judgment of Don Alphonso de la Cueva, to believe that he should be able, by any efforts of genius, to combine into one harmonious machine, so many and such various springs. The various ideas and corresponding emotions and passions which rise in the mind on different occasions, and in different circumstances,

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ces,

Nani, that it was discovered by two French gentlemen, who had come to the knowledge of it, relations of mareschal Lef-diguieres.

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ces, render the views and designs of men fluctuating and uncertain. The smallest incident in health or fortune, is sufficient to shake a resolution big with danger and death. The minds of men are so delicate, refined, and variable instruments, that a thousand accidents disturb their operation. The most fortunate adventurers in life, are those who do not pretend to form, but who have vigilance and sagacity to improve conjunctures. Political revolutions are not to be effected by the subtleties and refinements of a genius profound and metaphysical; but by the boldness and dexterity of a Cæsar or a Cromwell, who know to seize the important moment of decisive execution.

Character  
of the  
Spanish na-  
tion.

BUT if so vast a project as the conspiracy against the city and republic of Venice, had not been altogether beyond the reach of human abilities, it might possibly have been accomplished by the united efforts of Toledo, Ossuna, and the marquis of Bedmar. Though the revenues of Spain were greatly diminished, and a manifest languor and irresolution appeared in her counsels, her military genius was yet entire and unbroken; nor in the history of any people is there to be found a greater compass of political ability and art than at this time distinguished the Spanish nation. While the ministers of Spain in Italy, by the most extraordinary efforts to support or retrieve the glory of the monarchy, signalized at least their own ingenuity and courage, the abilities of her ambassadors generally managed the courts at which they resided with equal dexterity and success. The ties of interest and blood, which united the two branches of the house of Austria, obscure the praises that are due to the abilities of the Spanish ministers at the courts of Ferdinand and Matthias. But in France, Monteleone knew how to adapt his tone to the timidity of Mary, the high spirit of Lewis,



Lewis, and the different passions and views of their respective favourites. And in England, Gondomar gained mightily on the favour of the pedantic, social, and impolitic king, by talking false Latin (z), with other facetious humours, and by amusing him with the hope of a marriage between the prince of Wales and the second infanta (a).

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A WAR with the Saracens, prolonged, with few intervals, for eight hundred years, nourished in the Spaniards a vigour of character, a love of their country, and a passion for glory. The necessity of continually engaging, formed as many heroes as there were men in each city: military renown was the great object of their vows; and the tombs of the deceased were adorned with a number of obelisks equal to that of the enemy they had slain in battle (b). While they lived exposed to continual dangers they acquired that gravity of deportment, that deliberate valour, that perseverance and vigilance which still distinguish the

Digression concerning the character of the Spaniards.

(z) Mr. Arthur Wilson, in his Life of King James, informs us, among other curious anecdotes of that good-natured monarch, that "Gondomar in his merry fits would tell the king that his majesty spoke Latin like a Pedant, but that he himself spoke it like a gentleman." The king, we may presume, accepted this as an high encomium. There was nothing in which James exulted so much, as in that superiority which he undoubtedly possessed over most of his courtiers, in literature. "Sir Edward Conway, says Mr. Wilson, governor of the Brille, one of the cautionary towns, was made by king James, secretary of state: a rough unpolished piece for such an employment! But the king, who wanted not his abilities, would often make himself merry with his imperfect scrawls in writing, and hacking expressions in reading, so that he would break into laughter, and say, had ever man such a secretary, that can neither read nor write?" Gondomar had perfectly understood the character of the king: and he practised on his weaknesses with infinite dexterity.

(a) Franklyn, p. 71. (b) Johannes Genesius Sepulveda de Rebus Gestis, Caroli V. lib. i.

**BOOK V.** <sup>1618.</sup> the Spanish nation. Before the ambitious and warlike reigns of Ferdinand, the emperor, and Philip II. the sagacity and vigilance of the Spaniards appeared formidable to the other nations of Europe (*c*). These reigns continued to call forth and exercise the spirit of the nation, and to support, if not to heighten, that national character which had been formed by the wars with the Moors. And this national character still shone forth with undiminished lustre after the imprudence of the court, and exhausted resources, had undermined the foundations of the grandeur of the empire. As prosperous war rouses the genius of a nation, the glory of letters would have corresponded to that of the Spanish arms, had not the progress of taste and knowledge been checked by the tyranny of the inquisition, and that despotism which was introduced into the government. But although these circumstances have prevented among the Spaniards the growth of sound philosophy, in their poetry, history, romances, and even their commentaries on the sacred scriptures, as well as on Aristotle, whose metaphysical notions were deemed so orthodox by the Catholic church, we recognize that boldness and invention, that subtlety and refinement which were conspicuous for ages in the military and political conduct of Spain.

Thus, that power of genius and valour among his subjects, which at once adorned and disgraced the feeble reign of Philip III. seems deducible from

(*c*) Machiavel says, in his Account of the State of France, that the French were afraid of the Spaniards on account of their sagacity and vigilance. It is true, that this account was written after Ferdinand had begun to reign: but it was before the exertions of that prince could have stamped on the minds of his subjects, a national character.

from a train of moral causes, as obvious in their existence as powerful in their nature. But when the reader revolves what is left on record concerning ancient Spain, he will be inclined perhaps to subscribe to the opinion of an ingenious writer, that the characters of nations as well as families, are influenced by accidents antecedent to birth (*d*), and particularly by climate, acting either immediately with powerful energy on the fabric of their being, or as a local circumstance leading to a variety of action in the œconomy of civil life. At all times, valour and genius have ennobled the character of the Spaniards. Not the robust German, impelled by the fury of a savage religion, displayed such enthusiasm in arms and contempt of death, as shone forth in the invincible resolution of the inhabitants of Numantia, Astapa, and Saguntum. A greater hero than Viriatus is not to be found in the history of ancient Rome (*e*). Between the times of the Scipios and those of Augustus, there intervened a period of two hundred years. During this long space, Spain maintained a contest with the policy and disciplined valour of Rome: and it seemed uncertain which masters the world was to obey, the Spaniards or the Romans. The destiny of Rome to give law to the nations finally subdued all resistance, and Spain had the glory of being the last that yielded to the Roman yoke. But it was the fortune of the vanquished to receive literature and refinement from the conquerors of the world: and in return, Trajan added lustre to the Roman purple; and the names of Quintilian, Martial, Mela, Seneca, Lucan, and Florus, appeared in the list of Latin authors.

ALL

(*d*) Essay on the History of Mankind, &c. by Dr. Dunbar.

(*e*) This man, who had resisted the Roman arms for twenty years, and who was deemed invincible, was at last insidiously cut off by the Romans, who bribed his body guards.

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The duke  
of Savoy  
and the  
Venetians  
maintain  
their inde-  
pendence.

ALL the valour and artifices of Spain were found unable to subdue the independence of the duke of Savoy and the Venetian republic. And the discovery of Bedmar's conspiracy was quickly followed by the restoration of Vercelli to the duke, and that of their ships and merchandize to the Venetians. The court of Madrid, at the desire of the senate, recalled de la Cueva; but a commission to act as first minister in the Netherlands, a department which the situation of affairs in Germany rendered equally difficult and important, proved how much they approved his designs, as well as confided in his abilities.



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H I S T O R Y  
OF THE REIGN OF  
P H I L I P T H E T H I R D,  
K I N G O F S P A I N.

B O O K VI.

**T**H E astonishing efforts of that extraordinary triumvirate Bedmar, Ossuna, and Villa Franca, to restore the predominancy of Spain in Italy, was an eruption of that ardent spirit which had been bred in times of national enterprize and prosperity. The monarchy, drained of its blood and spirits by emigrations, and by war, was in a state of languor which naturally sought for repose. To maintain the dignity of the Spanish nation in that languishing state, was the arduous task devolved by the feeble hands of Philip on the duke of Lerma. That pacific and prudent minister, unwilling to expose the weakness of the empire, avoided as much as possible all appeals to arms, and it was not without reluctance that he drew the sword which he had sheathed at Antwerp, in the dispute concerning the succession to Juliers, and in the contest with the duke of Savoy. It was his chief study to support the authority of Spain by intrigue, and by external magnificence and profusion. The court of Madrid was the most brilliant in Europe: and a veil of pomp and splendour thrown around all the departments

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**BOOK VI.** <sup>1618.</sup> **Internal policy of Spain.** departments of government concealed from the vulgar eye the symptoms of its decay. The duke also made some attempts to recruit the vigour of the state, as well as to hide its infirmities, by reviving agriculture, and protecting commerce.

THE frequent examples of immense and rapid fortunes, made in the Indies, inspired a contempt of tillage, the profits of which, though certain, were both slow and inconsiderable. Until the fatal year 1609, Spain possessed a remedy against this evil. The Morescoes, excluded by the laws from America, and from the profession of arms, were not only expert manufacturers, but skilful and industrious husbandmen; but their expulsion was followed by a still more general neglect of agriculture, and a scarcity of the necessaries of life punished the people for the bigotry of the court, and their own indolence. The duke of Lerma, in order to repair the loss of the industrious Saracens, issued an edict, offering an order of nobility (a) to every man who should give proofs of industry and skill in agriculture. It is remarkable that this measure, the propriety of which seemed to be founded in the national passion for lofty titles, was altogether fruitless. An exemption from all military service was then promised to all industrious men; but neither had this proffered indulgence any considerable effect. A great part of the land still lay waste, and in the succeeding reign, strangers were invited to cultivate the fields of Spain, with several advantages of great importance.

THE commerce of the Spaniards in the Mediterranean having been disturbed by the corsairs of

(a) The title and rank of Esquire. *Les Delices d'Espagne & de Portugal.*

of Barbary, Don Lewis de Faxarado received Book VI.  
1618. orders to build a strong fort on the gulf of Marmora. This was happily effected in the month of August 1613, and contributed not a little to scour the sea from pirates (b). But commerce still languished as well as manufactures and agriculture, and the exactions of a government profusely expensive, were severely felt by the oppressed people. Nor were the exigencies of the public the only source of those taxes which afflicted the nation. The minister amassed an immense fortune from the spoils of the people. From the island of Sicily alone he drew an annual revenue of as much wheat as, being converted into money, amounted to seventy-two thousand ducats. This he obtained from his easy master, in the name of a reward for his important services. Even the good qualities of the duke multiplied the oppressions of his administration. His love of splendour and magnificence, his liberalities to his servants, his dependants, and to all men who had recourse to his bounty, rendered his paternal inheritance wholly inadequate to his constant profusion, which he supported at the expence of the public. The great offices of state too, he either seized himself or bestowed on particular favourites. And although caution and prudence are qualities generally and justly ascribed to the duke of Lerma, in the distribution of offices he was not always governed by motives of policy, but sometimes those of personal attachment. But of all his favourites the chief was the famous Don Roderigo de Calderona, whose singular fortune and fate demand particular attention. He was the son of a poor soldier of Valladolid, and Mary Sandelen, a native of Flanders. He possessed fine talents, and there  
was

Don Roderigo de Calderona.

(b) Summarium de Rebus Hispaniæ. Mariana.

**BOOK VI.** was something highly interesting and engaging in his manner. He entered on the career of ambition in the character of a menial servant to the duke of Lerma, then marquis of Denia, and gained over the mind of his master such an ascendant as that favourite possessed over the mind of the king. Having risen through all the principal offices in the household of the duke, he was advanced by the unbounded favour of his patron to places of great power and trust in the state, created first count of Oliva, then marquis of Siete Iglesias, and acquired an estate of a hundred thousand crowns a year. Agreeably to the natural progress of human wishes, Calderona considered all the favours of fortune only as so many steps to farther preferment. He openly aspired not only to a vice-royalty, but to the rank of a grandee of Spain. He was at first ashamed of the meanness of his descent, and affected to conceal it: a frailty to which he afterwards shewed himself far superior, by receiving his father into his family, procuring for the old soldier offices of emolument as well as honour, and treating him throughout life with the greatest tenderness and respect. Though he had risen from the lowest rank of life, there was nothing in his behaviour unworthy of the highest birth. The dignity both of his sentiments and manners was such as might beseem a prince. The vanity of Calderona which had made him ashamed of his father, was now converted by an excess of prosperity into a haughty boldness and overbearing pride. His temper, naturally violent and impetuous, was unrestrained by any of those condescensions and regards, which were so necessary in his situation, to soothe jealousy and disarm the rancour of envy. He mingled in all the intrigues at court; he delighted in the exercise of power; his favour was the surest road to preferment, and this




this he distributed, for the most part, according to his own fancy and caprice, and without any regard either to merit or natural pretensions. He had audiences as if he had been a sovereign prince, held frequent consultations, and shared, in one word, the administration of public affairs with the duke of Lerma. The haughtiness and impetuosity of Don Roderigo was contrasted by that decent moderation which appeared in the whole conduct and deportment of his father. This man frequently told his son, that his bark, which had so little ballast, if he should continue to croud sail, would infallibly be overset in a storm: a prediction which was afterwards fatally verified (c).

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THE nobles of Spain, whose power and influence had been reduced in the two preceding reigns, from the highest to the lowest pitch, were called to the court of Philip III. and many of them enjoyed important political stations. But during those reigns the order of nobility, if it was depressed by the vigour and the tyranny of the court, had not the mortification to see any subject exalted so far above them in the royal favour as to possess in reality the power of the sovereign. To the grandees of Spain, a favourite was a hateful novelty, and the immoderate aggrandizement of Calderona seemed a studied insult on nobility of blood. Nor was the present administration distinguished by any prosperous events which might drown the general murmurs of discontent in the voice of applause and acclamation. The prime minister was accordingly a general subject of satire and invective, both in discourse and in writing. The complaints of the nation served as  
an

(c) Gonçales de Cespides, lib. i. capitulo vii. Amelot de la Houssaie Discours Historique, p. 142. Las Memorias, &c. con Escolios de Don Juan Vitrian, 11. 13.

**BOOK VI.**  **1618.** an engine in the hands of his enemies to effect his downfall, which was embittered by this cruel circumstance, that his power was subverted by those very men who were the most bound, by the ties of blood, or of gratitude, to support it.

**Fall of Lerma.**

**HAVING** risen to the highest power attainable by a subject, and having no farther object of ambition, the duke of Lerma only laboured to establish the authority he possessed in the councils of Spain, on the firmest foundations, and to perpetuate it, if possible, in his family. With this view he introduced his son, the duke of Uzeda, at proper times, into the presence of the king, and used every art to recommend him with effect to the royal favour. And, well knowing that the influence he possessed on the mind of Philip might be either strengthened or overcome by any argument that should make its appearance in the guise of religion, he brought Lewis Aliaga, a monk, from his convent to court, and advanced him to the office of confessor to the king. Aliaga was a man of a narrow capacity, and the duke entertained a high opinion of his probity. From a character of this kind he imagined he had nothing to apprehend. And, as the monk owed every thing to his favour, he trusted that he would be entirely devoted to his interest. Uzeda was one of those insignificant characters, whose understandings are below mediocrity, and who are neither remarkable for vice nor virtue. But he possessed in an eminent degree the polished manners of a court, and by his constant assiduities to please, soon obtained as high a place in the affections of the king as Lerma still maintained in his esteem. The bewitching smiles of sovereignty, equally dissolving filial reverence and paternal tenderness, occasioned a rivalry between the father and the son, which terminated in an animosity

animosity that proximity of blood seemed only to BOOK VI. irritate. Aliaga perceived the power which this 1618. diffension placed in his hands, and deliberated whether he should cast the balance in favour of Lerma or Uzeda. The alternative he embraced is worthy of attention, not only on account of its political consequences, but as it seems to prove that there is in the mind of man a disposition to expect, in his own behalf, a higher degree of virtue from others than he is conscious of possessing himself. Friar Aliaga, equally unmindful of that creative bounty which the generosity of a patron so readily extends to the person whom he has already obliged, and of the treachery and ingratitude of his own heart, determined to abandon his benefactor, and to unite his interest with that of Uzeda, imagining that he had more to expect from a minister on whom he had conferred, than from one to whom he owed the greatest obligations. The duke of Lerma endeavoured to counterbalance the growing influence of his son, by raising up a rival to him in the affections of the king. For this purpose he now laboured to insinuate into the royal favour his sister's son, the count of Lemos, a nobleman of high spirit and sublime genius. He hoped to excite such movements of jealousy and envy between the count and Uzeda, as that he himself should be equally necessary to both, and be able to hold in his own hands the balance of power between the contending rivals. But the pliant mind, and gentle manners of Uzeda, were more congenial to the nature of Philip than the erect and independent spirit of Lemos. The king was constantly attended by his new favourite and his confessor, and surrounded with numbers of discontented nobles, with whom these men kept up a close correspondence.

IN

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IN the midst of these intrigues the duke of Lerma solicits and obtains the rank of a cardinal, hoping that this religious dignity would prove the means of prolonging his power over the mind of the pious king, or at least, that it would place him above the malice of his enemies and the enquiries of justice. But it was the fortune of this duke to undermine his own power by those very measures which were intended to support it. The indolent Philip was displeased to be under the necessity of exchanging the ease of former familiarity for those ceremonies of respect which were due to the purple. The regard that had been every where shewn to the duke of Lerma was well pleasing to the king, so long as all that he enjoyed was derived from his own bounty. The respect that was paid to the creature of his power he considered as an homage done to himself. But all his affections for the duke ceased the moment he attained to an equality with kings, and derived the splendour of his character from another source than the grace of his sovereign. The presence of the cardinal was uneasy to him, and if he received him with formality, he received him also with coldness.

THE estrangement of the king from his old minister was not unobserved by the eager eyes of the courtiers. The enemies of the cardinal duke, who had hitherto conducted their attacks by regular and slow approaches, now resolved to carry that fortress, which had so long defended him, and in which he still fondly confided, by assault. Upon the plausible pretext of zeal for the service of the king, and affection for his person, they represented the nation as one scene of oppression, disorder, and discontent, and threw the blame of the whole on the duke of Lerma. That minister, they affirmed, bestowed the most important



portant offices on persons who possessed not any other merit than that of being agreeable to his fancy, and the creatures of his power. And as the appointment to offices was a matter that depended solely on his favour, so the exercise of the power he bestowed was determined by his will: for he over-ruled the freedom of deliberation in the different councils established for the conduct of public affairs, and assumed the prerogative of dictating on every subject. The judges, in all cases where he chose to interfere, being obliged to give sentence according to his orders, the very tribunals of justice were organs of his pleasure. On the distresses of the people they insisted with peculiar zeal, lamenting, that the poor of a whole nation should be despoiled of the few things they possessed, and even deprived of the necessaries of life, for the purpose of supporting the magnificence and mad extravagance of one man: a man who by various impolitic measures, and particularly by the circulation of brass money, had contributed so fatally to the decline of manufactures, the ruin of commerce, the depopulation and impoverishment of the kingdom. Passing beyond the limits of Spain, they reviewed the conduct of the duke in the dependencies of the monarchy. The revenues of Sicily he had converted into a private estate. The war in Piedmont, so unavoidable in its progress, and in its issue so dishonourable to the Spanish name, might have been crushed in its beginning by force of arms, or prevented by a timely attention to the situation and designs of foreign states. As in war an able commander makes it his chief study to divide the forces of his enemy, so the art of government consists not in resisting, but in preventing confederacies. Wars which, even if successful, cannot be advantageous, ought never to be undertaken. The lion, said they,

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in the proverbial manner of Spain, is not honoured by a victory over the lamb. A superior power, if not greatly efficient in foresight, can never be at a loss to restrain the turbulence of an inferior, without coming to an open rupture, and resting its authority on the doubtful events of war. From Italy they turned the eyes of the king to the seven United Provinces, once a part of that fair inheritance to which he had so just a claim as the heir of the duke of Burgundy. The truce with Holland; the formalities and solemnities with which that treaty had been ratified, and particularly the pompous title that had been given in that contract to the rebels, they mentioned with particular marks of indignation. They contrasted the virtue and the ability of the pensionary Barnevelt, with the incapacity of the duke of Lerma, and his indifference to the prosperity and glory of the nation. Unable to conduct the war, the Spanish minister, they said, sought to establish his own power in peace; a peace that was disgraceful in its nature, and which involved in its consequences a greater loss to the monarchy than it had incurred during a war of forty-five years that preceded it! While the war continued in the Netherlands, the main force of the rebels, concentrated in those provinces, acted only on the defensive. But the ignominious treaty of Antwerp had let loose that force on the widely scattered settlements of Spain in both the Indies, which were either torn from the monarchy, or demanded such additional garrisons for their protection, as might have been employed with greater honour, as well as advantage, in prosecuting the war on the theatre of rebellion. If the Spanish crown, in a glorious contest to maintain its just rights, should have proved unsuccessful, nothing more disastrous could have ensued than what had actually happened: while, on  
the

the other hand, to have continued the struggle, BOOK VI.  
 would have supported the honour of the nation ~~~~~  
 among foreign powers, and, in the end, might 1618.  
 possibly have derived some advantage from the  
 chance of war, or that change which is incident  
 to the policy and the views of states and princes.  
 These and many other charges against the duke  
 of Lerma, were constantly sounded in the ears  
 of the king, by his confessor and his favourite,  
 and confirmed by the testimony or the authority  
 of all whom they permitted to have access to his  
 person.

THOUGH sovereign princes, from the superemi-  
 nence of their stations, be naturally capricious,  
 and fickle in their attachments (*d*), it would be  
 unreasonable, after these remonstrances, to ascribe  
 the fall of Lerma to any inconstancy in his sove-  
 reign. There never was a prince, however de-  
 spotic, so secure against the resentment, so insen-  
 sible to the applause, or so unconcerned for the  
 prosperity of the public, as to oppose, for the sake  
 of a favourite, the general voice of his people.  
 The constant appointment to offices, in contra-  
 diction to the recommendation of Lerma, fully  
 illustrated the nature of that reserve, which had  
 given that minister so much pain, and was an un-  
 equivocal proof that he had wholly lost the royal  
 favour. In this extremity he laboured to ac-  
 quire the good graces of the prince of Spain,  
 fondly hoping that the rays of the rising would  
 brighten up the gloom that attended the setting  
 sun. The count de Lemos, and Don Ferdinand  
 de Borgia, a man of sound understanding, and  
 possessed of talents for business, both lords of  
 the bedchamber to the prince, had been raised to

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that

(*d*) Go, says Agamemnon to Achilles, if you have a  
 mind; there are not wanting others who will shew me ho-  
 nour. First Iliad.

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that dignity by the duke their uncle. Betrayed and injured by the cunning of Aliaga and Uzeda, the duke of Lerma had recourse to the friendship of his nephews; he met with virtue and honour where one would wish to find them, and where in reality they are oftenest to be found, in conjunction with vigour of understanding, and sublimity of genius. The count de Lemos and Don Ferdinand de Borgia were united by the ties of blood, of friendship, and gratitude to their uncle. They readily undertook to use their good offices with the prince in behalf of their beloved relation; they represented to his highness the weak capacity of Uzeda; and expatiated on the talents, virtues, and political experience of the duke his father. And their authority and address prevailing over the subtleties and assiduities of the condè duke of Olivarez, consoled Lerma with the hope of living in the favour of the heir apparent to the Spanish empire. But this intrigue was not long concealed from the king, and, like all the other efforts of the minister to prolong his power, served only to precipitate his fall. The image of death which was held up to the imagination of the king by the court that was paid to his successor, converted his indifference to Lerma into aversion. The count de Lemos had gained so much on the favour of the prince, that he was in the practice of conversing with him sometimes for hours after he went to bed. Orders were now sent to the count to forbear this practice in future; but to these he did not yield a ready obedience. The king therefore dismissed from the service of his highness (e) four officers of his bed-chamber, who were in the confidence of Lemos, and appointed his cousin and faithful friend, Don Ferdinand de Borgia, viceroy of Aragon.

(e) Su Altezza, so the prince was distinguished.



ragon. The high-spirited count, deeming the disgrace of the officers, and the exile of his friend from court, an affront and injury to himself, had the boldness to ask the king his reasons for removing Don Ferdinand from the service of the prince, adding, that if Ferdinand should be banished from the court, he would accompany him to the place of his retirement. The king replied in an angry tone, that it was his pleasure to treat Don Ferdinand as he had done; and that the count, if he were so minded, might accompany him in his exile. Lemos was mortified by so severe a reply; yet he made another effort to keep Borgia at court, and that almost in spite of the king. He engaged the council for Italian affairs, of which Borgia was president, to remonstrate against the removal of a minister, who, of all men in the world, was the best informed with regard to the affairs of Italy. The king answered, that he would appoint as successor to Don Ferdinand the count of Benavento, whose knowledge of Italian affairs was unquestionable. Upon this the count de Lemos retired from court, consoling himself with the reflection that he had made no mean compliances to gain the royal favour, but had performed the duties of friendship, and in the whole of his deportment maintained the noblest propriety and dignity of character.

THE magnanimity of the count seemed to arraign the conduct of the duke of Lerma, who, even after the disgrace of his friends, lingered about the Escorial, and manifested the most eager desire still to hold his office. The king, finding that no marks of his disgust, however striking, were able to induce his old minister to prevent the disgrace of a formal dismissal, in a billet written with his own hand, ordered him in express

BOOK VI,  1618. press terms to withdraw himself from Madrid; but permitted him to retire to whatever place he should chuse, and enjoy in peace the effects of his former bounty. In these circumstances the duke condescended to appear as a suppliant at the feet of the treacherous Aliaga. He entreated the monk to intercede in his behalf with the king. It is superfluous to inform the reader that this humble application was wholly fruitless. He then sent a message to his brother, the archbishop of Toledo, whom he had raised to the high dignity and opulence he enjoyed, and who at that time resided at Madrid, earnestly soliciting him to come to the Escorial, and to support him with his countenance, his advice, and his influence with the king. The archbishop excused himself from undertaking that ungracious office, by alledging that he was in a bad state of health; but he sent to the assistance of his brother father Jerome, of Florence, a Jesuit, a preacher for whom the king entertained a particular respect. Father Jerome, in his private discourse with the king, endeavoured with great address to revive in his mind sentiments of favour and regard to the duke of Lerma. But Philip did not receive his favourite preacher with his usual affability, nor listen to his instructions with wonted attention. The Jesuit, perceiving this alteration in the deportment of the king, did not persevere in his commendations of Lerma, and only pleaded, in favour of that minister, for a short respite, which was refused in positive terms.

THE duke of Lerma now summoned up all his fortitude, and by the propriety and dignity of his deportment atoned for the meanness of his former solicitations. On the 4th day of October 1618, being still in his apartments in the palace, he was ready to take his journey to his paternal estate,

estate, with a train of attendants suitable to his high rank, when the prince of Spain, who happened to take a walk in the garden, came up to the door of his chamber, and calling him aside, conversed with him a considerable length in the language of tenderness and complacency. The duke then went to take leave of his sister, the countess of Lemos, first lady of the bed-chamber to the princess of Spain. Having bowed to that lady five times, with great respect, he went into his chariot, and repaired for the last time to the mansion of the king. On his approach, he alighted from his carriage, and viewing the royal apartments with an eager eye, he ardently poured forth his blessing on them, and on the royal family. Having performed this duty, he remounted his chariot, and drove straight to Guadarrama, where he lodged all night. At this place he received a letter from the king, the contents of which were never revealed to the curious and speculating world, with a present of a stag, slain by his own hand that day in the chace. Thus both the king and the prince of Spain, with a generosity worthy of their exalted stations, mixed the bitter cup of Lerma with refreshing spices: and as no minister ever descended from a greater height of power, so none was ever laid more softly down (*f*), and few perhaps ever deserved a gentler fall.

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THE duke of Lerma was a personage of a noble mien, gentle manners, and a beneficent disposition. The natural benignity of his heart appeared

Character  
of the duke  
of Lerma.

(*f*) Historia de Don Felipe III. por Don Gonçalo de Cespedes, lib. i. cap. 3, 4. lib. ii. cap. 1. 17. Anecdotes du Ministère du Condé duc d'Olivarez. Les Memorias de Comines con Escolias propios de Don Juan Vitrian. Amelot de la Houssaie. Disc. Histor. Addiciones a la Historia de Malvezzi Historia d'España.

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peared in the mildness of his aspect, the tone of his voice, and innumerable acts of munificence and liberality. His promotions to public offices were chiefly determined by political motives and personal friendship. Yet, it may be safely affirmed, that during his administration, all the places of principal trust and importance were filled with men of extraordinary abilities. The judgments of men are commonly influenced by their natural temper. Agreeably to the mildness of his own disposition, and his love of magnificence, he was of opinion that the dignity of the Spanish monarchy was best maintained by peace, pomp, and parade (g). And though he might, perhaps, have pursued this plan with greater œconomy; as it is certain that his profusion was not the main cause, so it is probable that all his savings, had he been ever so much inclined to frugality, would not have been able to alleviate in any considerable degree the distresses of the nation. Though his capacity was but moderate, his soul was elevated, and his mind was firm. If he descended from his natural dignity to humble applications, in order to preserve the good graces of his prince, we ought not on that account too hastily to stigmatize his memory with meanness of spirit. The greatest political and military courage has sunk under the deprivation of royal favour. Neither the resolute Ximenes, nor the undaunted Albuquerque, was able to support the frowns of his sovereign. Notwithstanding the  
invectives

(g) He was very careful to exact every mark of respect to the crown of Spain from neighbouring nations, and sometimes discovered a jealousy on this head which was unworthy of a great nation. I find in Chamberlayne's Letters MSS. anno 1616, in the British Museum, the following passage: "The Spanish ambassador complained to the king at Theobald's, that whereas we kept ambassadors at Venice and in the Low Countries, an agent served the turn in Spain and with the archdukes."



invectives of Lerma's enemies, the most respectable Spanish historians (*b*) not only celebrate the beneficence of his disposition, but do justice to the moderation of his power, and the prudence of his public conduct. These indeed, were afterwards confessed by the whole nation, when the vast ambition, and sublime but irregular genius of Olivarez, by stretching the sinews of the empire beyond their utmost tone, threw it into convulsions, and only rendered the dissolution of its strength more violent and painful.

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THE whole employments of the duke of Lerma devolved on his son Uzeda, except that of governor to the prince, which was conferred on Don Balthazar de Zuniga, a man of cultivated genius, and great experience in political affairs, particularly in embassies (*i*).

Soon after the disgrace of Lerma, the count of Oliva was arrested by order of the king, and thrown into prison, where he languished for the space of two years. His rise from so low a station to so great a height of power gave birth to an opinion that he was a forcerer, which his enemies were at great pains to propagate. He was charged with having poisoned the queen, who died in 1612; a charge as improbable in itself, as it was found to be unsupported by any evidence; for Don Roderigo stood as high in the favour of that princess as the duke of Lerma did in the affections of the king. Many other groundless accusations were brought against him: but at last he was found guilty of having been accessory to the murder of two Spanish gentlemen: a matter which, according to some historians, was never clearly proved; he was however condemned to death, and

Tragical  
end of Don  
Roderigo  
de Caldero-  
na, count  
of Oliva.

(*b*) Gonçales de Cespides y Meneses. Don. Juan de Vitri-  
an, &c. (*i*) Gonçales de Cespides, lib. i. cap. 4.

BOOK VI. and his estate was confiscated. The evidence on  
 1618. which he was convicted was not direct, but circumstantial; and if we may judge from some of the circumstances left on record, as the principal ground of his condemnation, we may infer, that the deficiency of the proof was supplied by the zeal of both his accusers and judges. The trial and confinement of Calderona were prolonged for two years and six months; a measure calculated to keep alive the general odium against his patron the duke of Lerma, and to prevent the return of that ancient favourite to court, of which the new ministry were not a little apprehensive. During all the time that Calderona lay in prison, there was not one among the multitudes he had obliged, except the cardinal Don Gabriel de Trejo, whose name deserves to be recorded, nephew to the countess his lady, who had the humanity and the courage to attempt his relief, or to afford him any comfort. The cardinal was no sooner informed of the imprisonment of Calderona, than, impelled by a generous gratitude, he set out from Rome to pay his respects to his patron in a dungeon, and determined to move every engine that his utmost efforts could command in order to release him. But the cardinal was neither permitted to visit the court nor the prison. He lingered, however, a long time in Spain, in anxious hopes of finding some fortunate occasion of saving his friend; but, on the death of pope Paul V. which happened in February 1621, he returned, by order of the king, to Rome.

Don Roderigo bore confinement, solitude, and torture, with incredible patience. After his doom was fixed, he was visited, at his own earnest desire, by the ministers of religion. His great soul, which had braved all the rage of his enemies with such singular constancy, discovered, on  
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the approach of death, a nobler heroism in the most perfect resignation to the will of God ; and in the most candid confession, and sincerest contrition for the errors of his life. The ardour of his mind was now displayed in the severities of self-mortification. He was covered with hair cloth : he watched and prayed night and day : he afflicted himself with fasting, and with stripes ; and, had not his confessor interposed, he would, in all probability, have anticipated the stroke of the executioner, by an excess of voluntary pain. One the 19th day of October, 1621, the first year of the reign of Philip IV. he received intimation, that within two days he should die. He received the messenger of this welcome news with a cheerful countenance, and tenderly embraced him. He now abstained from sleep and food, and spent his time in acts of devotion. About eleven of the clock on the 21st of October, he came to the door of the prison, encompassed by the officers of justice. Affliction had softened the natural dignity of his looks and mien : and his grey hairs, his beard, and his dress, suited to the present sad occasion, conspired with the expression of his countenance to impress the spectators with sentiments of veneration and love. He yet possessed sufficient strength to mount on a mule that waited for him at the prison. This he did with great tranquillity, and passed through the streets to the place of execution, embracing and adoring a crucifix which he held in his hands, amidst the tears and lamentations of the surrounding multitude. The executioner held the reins of the mule, and, as he went along, proclaimed aloud the following words : “ This is the judgment, which, by the orders of our sovereign lord the king, is inflicted on this man for his having been the instigator of an assassination ; and accessory to another murder ; and divers other crimes which appeared on his trial :

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BOOK VI. trial: for all of which he is to be beheaded, as a  
 1618. a punishment to him, and a warning to others."

Having arrived at the scaffold, the resigned sufferer beheld with a serene countenance the instruments of his approaching death; the chair, the sword, and the man whose office it was to use it. He conversed, for some time, with his confessor and other divines. And, having been received into the bosom of the church, he took leave of his attendants, and sat down on the seat from which he was never to rise. Before his hands and his feet were made fast, he made a present to the executioner, and twice embraced the man, who was bathed in tears, as a token that he bore him not any ill will on account of the office he was about to perform. Then, making bare his neck, he yielded his limbs to be bound, with the utmost composure. The instant this operation was performed, he reclined himself backwards (*k*), and while he was in the act of recommending his soul to God, his head was in a moment severed from his body. As the last impressions are commonly the strongest (*l*), men forgave and forgot the imperiousness of his former conduct and behaviour, and thought and spoke only of that mixture of humility and fortitude, that patience and piety, which he displayed in the last stage of his life (*m*).

THE counsels of Spain had, for many years, been distinguished by a singular union of a desire  
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(*k*) In Spain, traitors alone are beheaded with their faces downwards. The Spanish word, is *degollar*, *couper la gorge*. The executioner performs his office face to face with the sufferer.

(*l*) *Sed plerique Homines postrema meminere.* Julius Cæsar, Ap. Sallus. (*m*) Saavedra *Devisas Politicas*. Amelot de la Houssaie, *Disc. Hist.* Article Calderona. *Historiade Don Fellippe IV.* por Goncalo de Cespedes, lib. ii, cap. xxvii.



of power, with a love of peace : but it was found impossible to gratify at once those opposite passions. The intrigues of ambition excited the violence of arms. The commotions of Italy were followed by those of Germany. A war was kindled, the most signal and destructive in modern annals. Famine and pestilence succeeded to the destroying sword, and the direful power of hunger equally overcame the strongest antipathies, and violated the tenderest affections of nature : so bloody was that tragedy which concluded so happily for the liberties of Europe, in the famous peace of Westphalia !

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The male line of Maximilian II. having terminated in Matthias, Maximilian, and Albert, who were now advanced in years, without progeny, the succession to the hereditary dominions of Austria in Germany, might have been claimed, on plausible grounds by the king of Spain (n). But a natural love of tranquillity, the desire of preserving in his house the imperial crown, and the dread of that dignity devolving on the head of a heretic, determined Philip to comply with the request of the Austrian princes, and to yield up his pretensions in favour of those of Ferdinand of Gratz, great grandson of Ferdinand I. and distinguished by his zeal for the Catholic religion. He, accordingly, made a solemn cession of all his rights to the Austrian provinces, to Ferdinand and his brothers, and their issue male. But, if that should fail, it was stipulated, that the provinces should return to the house of Spain, of which the females were to be preferred before those born in Germany. On this occasion, Philip and Ferdinand entered into a family compact, the object of which was not only to maintain the strength of their

Origin of the thirty years war in Germany, that terminated in the peace of Westphalia.

(n) The son of Ann, daughter of the emperor Maximilian II.

**BOOK VI.** <sup>1618.</sup> their common stock, but to extend its branches over the neighbouring nations. They made a league, offensive and defensive. They engaged to support their respective rights and claims, by reciprocal succours; and to prefer the general interest of the Austrian race before any particular or transient advantage to any of its members. The date of these transactions was the year 1617. In the same year, on the seventh day of June, Ferdinand was raised to the crown of Bohemia, and in the year following to that of Hungary, with this reservation, that the regal power should remain with Matthias during his life.

THE confederacy between the two branches of the house of Austria, and the steps that had been taken to continue in that family the imperial dignity, inflamed the jealousy that had long prevailed of Austrian ambition, and diffused among the protestants of Germany, a general alarm. Ferdinand had banished from his dominions all who persevered in the open profession of the reformed religion: a severity which prognosticated all the cruelty of religious zeal, wherever his power should be established. The apprehensions of men were increased, when they considered this strict alliance with the Catholic king, with whom he was connected by blood, by religion, and by interest. As he depended for support chiefly on the treasures and arms of Spain, so it was probable, he would be governed chiefly by Spanish counsels, whose constant aim was to wreath around the necks of mankind the yoke of religious and civil tyranny. As the power of the emperor would be strengthened by an alliance, or rather a species of union with the vast monarchy of Spain, so his claims, it was dreaded, would be increased in proportion, and the enlarged prerogatives of the imperial crown, if the successions to that dignity should

should not be interrupted on the death of Matthias, would descend as an inheritance to the latest posterity of the family of Austria.

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BUT the man on whose mind these considerations made the deepest impression, was Frederic elector palatine, a prince young, high spirited, and in power not inferior to any of the protestants, the duke of Saxony perhaps excepted. He visited all the members of the electoral college, to whom he represented, that as the present conjuncture demanded, so it presented a fit occasion of forming a barrier against the progress of Austrian ambition. He entreated them, by a timely interposition, to check the growth of an authority which must otherwise become irresistible; and by a spirited and judicious exercise of their privileges, to perpetuate them in their families. The Catholic electors, as he had expected, he found attached to the house of Austria: and these were four in number, while the protestants were only three. But, in order to over-balance this inequality of numbers, Frederic with the consent and approbation of his protestant brethren, made a tender of the imperial crown to the duke of Bavaria, not doubting but the archbishop of Cologne, one of the Catholic electors, would interest himself in the fortunes of the duke, his brother, and be forward to promote his greatness. This plan, in which there was not any thing subtle or profound, was the more solid and judicious, that it was obvious and natural. But it was disconcerted by a cause that was scarcely to be suspected. The duke of Bavaria rejected the proffered dignity of the imperial crown, and all that the policy and zeal of the palatine was able to effect, was a short delay in the election of a king of the Romans (o).

THE

(o) Batt. Nan. Hist. della Repub. Venet. lib. iv.

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Description  
of Bohe-  
mia.

THE sparks of discord which in other parts of the empire had produced only murmurs, jealousies, and intrigues, having fallen, in Bohemia, on more combustible matter, had, by this time, blazed into the flames of war. As that kingdom is the highest ground, the most mountainous, and by nature, the strongest in Germany, so its inhabitants had at all times been distinguished for the loftiness of their spirit, and the vigour and success of their struggles for civil liberty and religious toleration. It is bounded on the east, by Moravia and Silesia, the countries of the ancient Quadi and Marcommani; on the west by Bavaria, part of the ancient Noricum; on the south by the ancient Pannonia, now Hungary, with other provinces of Austria; and on the north by Saxony. It is almost surrounded by the mountains of the famous Hyrcanian forest, whose sides broken into many sloping ridges, intersect this lofty and spacious amphitheatre, and form a landscape, bold, various, and of great beauty. This country is remarkably fertile, and before the spirit of the inhabitants was broken, and their industry checked by despotic government, so populous, that it was computed to have contained above three millions of souls.

THE Bohemians of those times are represented by cotemporary historians, as a people of a ruddy complexion, and of enormous stature and force of body, and in their dispositions intrepid, fierce, proud, quick in resenting injuries, of an haughty mein, lovers of a rude magnificence and pomp, and addicted to revels and intemperance. The native language of Bohemia is the Slavonic, which appears to have been the mother tongue of the Tartars and their offspring the Turks; and of all the nations inhabiting those regions which extend from the northern parts of Russia



Russia to Turkey in Europe (*p*). The metropolis is Prague, a city of large extent, stretching along the banks, and on either side of the river Mulda, adorned with many sumptuous edifices, and particularly two strong castles, one of which was the residence of the ancient Bohemian kings. The rich provinces of Silesia, Moravia, and Lusatia, were dependent on Bohemia, and formed a great addition to its power and importance in the scale of nations.

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THE authority of the church of Rome was never so great and universal as wholly to banish from the Christian world a spirit of enquiry and a love of knowledge. During the thickest darkness of the middle ages, a star appeared here and there in the firmament which reflected the light of ancient times, and formed a presage, that although the sun of science was set, it would return to enlighten bewildered nations. So early as the eighth century, Claud, bishop of Turin, sowed the seeds of reformation in the vallies of Piedmont, whence they were gradually transplanted into other countries. In the thirteenth century, the Waldenses, or Vallenses, or Albigenses, for by these and other names, the disciples of Claud were distinguished, had spread so far, and become so numerous, that the pope thought it necessary to exert his utmost efforts to suppress them. For this purpose, the first crusade was proclaimed of Christians against Christians, and the office of inquisitor was established. Such a war as had been waged with the infidels, was now carried on against these unfortunate heretics. In France alone, if we credit the authority of Mede, (*q*) ten hundred

Origin and progress of the reformation.

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dred

(*p*) Russia, Poland with Lithuania, Hungary, Transylvania, Sclavonia, Croatia, Istria, Wallachia &c. &c.

(*q*) Vide Mede in Apocalypsin, p. 503.

**BOOK VI.** <sup>1618.</sup> dred thousand perished by the sword. According to an author less liable to the suspicion of aggravating the horrors of the inquisition, the Waldenses in that kingdom were either cut off by fire and sword, or dispersed into remote regions, or driven to the fastnesses of neighbouring woods and mountains. Some sought an asylum in the Alps adjoining to Provence, part withdrew into Calabria, part obtained refuge in Britain, and others turning to the east, took up their abode among the Bohemians, and in Livonia and Poland (r). In Germany they grew and multiplied so fast, that in the beginning of the fourteenth century, it is computed there were eighty thousand of them in Bohemia, Austria, and the neighbouring provinces. And so greatly had their number increased in the space of the next hundred years, that they avowed and maintained their religious tenets, in spite of the tyranny of the pope, supported by the power of the emperor. In 1410, Robert I. the count palatine being emperor of Germany, and Winceßlaus, who had been deposed from that dignity, on account of his egregious misconduct, king of Bohemia (s).

The

(r) Thuani præfatio ad Henricum IV. p. 7.

(s) Winceßlaus was continually immersed in debauchery, and in his fits of intoxication, frequently exercised the most enormous cruelties on people of all ranks. From a strange mixture of cruelty, whim, and indecency, he contracted an intimacy with the public executioner, whom he honoured with the appellation of 'gossip.' His cook having offended him, he gave orders that he should be roasted alive. On account of these irregularities, and his selling the rights of the empire, both in Italy and Germany, he was deposed by the unanimous voice of the electors from the imperial throne. Winceßlaus was so little mortified at the news of his deposition, that he said with the most perfect acquiescence, "We are overjoyed to be delivered from the burthen of the empire." He sent a message to the imperial cities, requesting them to send him, as the last token of their loyalty, some butts of their best

The doctrines of the Albigenses were maintained by the learning, eloquence, and irreproachable lives of John Huss and Jerome of Prague. BOOK VI.  
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These reformers were condemned to the flames by the council of Constance, and suffered with the usual fortitude of martyrs. A civil war was kindled from their ashes. The Bohemians revolted against the emperor Sigismund, who with many respectable qualities was a zealous bigot to the catholic religion, and under the conduct of Zisca, defended their opinions not only with arguments, but arms. The emperor was defeated in several battles, by this bold leader, who gave law to the kingdom of Bohemia till his death, which happened in 1424. He gave orders that a drum should be made of his skin, and what is equally extraordinary, his orders were faithfully carried into execution. Zisca's skin, after undergoing the necessary preparations, was formed into a drum, which was long the symbol of victory. Procopius, a Catholic priest, converted by the writings of one of the disciples of John Huss, revived the spirits of the Bohemian brethren, many of whom, after the death of Zisca, had retreated to caves and mountains. This champion, who uniting the military with the sacerdotal character, supported the cause of his party with great courage and bravery, fell in a battle with the Catholics. Yet, so terrible had the name of the Hussites become to Sigismund, that he allowed them the cup in the sacrament of the eucharist (the deprivation of which had been the main source of their complaints) together with a general amnesty, and a confirmation of their privileges.

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best wine. He afterwards shut himself up in the castle of Visigrađe in Prague, abandoning himself to the gratification of his appetites. Such a character was not likely to intermeddle in religious disputes.

**BOOK VI.** <sup>1618.</sup> leges. But verbal and even written promises are easily retracted, where there exists not any power of enforcing their accomplishment: and a right avails nothing without a remedy. The dispersed brethren ceased to be formidable. Sigismond renewed his tyranny. His immediate successors on the imperial throne were, like him, zealous Catholics. And the reformed in Germany were languishing under the pressure of an arbitrary government, when Martin Luther raised up nations to their aid, revived their drooping spirits, increased their numbers, and exalted their power.

HAD the whole Christian word at the time when Luther began to preach against indulgences been devoted to the Romish faith, however absurd the doctrines of the clergy, and however profligate their lives, it is impossible that he could have met with any considerable success: so great is the power of established authority, and universally received opinion! But the never-ceasing contests between the popes on the one part, and the emperors with other sovereign princes on the other, diminished of themselves the reverence for the papal jurisdiction; and also tended wholly to subvert it, by rousing an enquiry into the grounds on which it was established. This enquiry was facilitated by the revival of literature, which, fatally to the reigning church, explored the foundations both of its power and doctrines. The discoveries of grave theologians and antiquarians were followed by the ridicule of wit and humour. And the learned and pious labours of Savonarola, Berengarius, and Wickliff, were aided by the raillery of Dante, Petrarch, and Erasmus. In the beginning of the 16th century, the primitive doctrines of Christianity had taken root in most countries in Europe. The materials for reformation



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mation were collected, and the foundations laid deep, before Luther and Calvin raised and completed the superstructure. The minds of men being thus prepared, the doctrines of these reformers spread far and near. In Bohemia with its dependent provinces, where similar tenets had been already adopted, and where ideas of opposition to the emperor, and contradiction to the pope, were so familiar and common, their progress was unusually rapid. And the number of Hussites and Evangelists, (appellations which cotemporary writers seem to consider as synonymous) soon equalled that of the Catholics, and was daily increasing. From their numbers they derived power, and from power a spirit of persecution. In Prague they committed many outrages on the property and persons of the clergy. The archbishop was driven from the city. And it was evident from the whole tenour of their conduct, that they aimed at nothing less than the whole power of government, both civil and ecclesiastical. Their encroachments received a check from the first Ferdinand, who, uniting vigour of conduct with lenity and moderation, asserted the rights of the established church, at the same time that he used not any other means for reclaiming the Protestants, than the influence of authority, and the power of persuasion. He entreated them to submit to the decisions of the Christian fathers now assembled in council at Trent. And on the other hand, that the authority of the fathers might have greater weight, he took the liberty of exhorting that venerable order to take measures for reforming the lives of the clergy. He re-established in Prague, the exiled metropolitan, with other Catholic priests; and sent to their aid a strong reinforcement of Jesuits. The labours of these preachers, fostered and encouraged by the countenance of the emperor, sustained a while

BOOK VI. while the declining interests of the Romish faith.

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The memory of Maximilian and Rhodolphus, the immediate successors of Ferdinand on the imperial throne, is stigmatized by Catholic writers with a coldness and indifference in matters of religion, which was extremely favourable to the growth of heresy. This charge, as far as it concerns Rhodolphus, appears not to have been wholly groundless. For while the protestant party on the one hand required an extension of their privileges, and the catholic on the other, begged that the heretics might be laid under closer restrictions, the emperor declined at first to gratify the desire of either. But a fortunate conjuncture gave weight to the applications of the protestants, and crowned them with success. Matthias, who had already usurped the government of Moravia, Austria, and Hungary, aspired now to the crown of Bohemia; and in order to pay his court to the protestants, professed the principles of toleration, and affected a zealous concern for all their rights and privileges. By these arts he effectually attached to his interest the leaders of that party, so formidable for its numbers, boldness and disposition to action. His indulgence to the reformed religion covered the violence of his usurpations with a specious veil: and his protestant partizans were not ashamed to support his unjust pretensions. Emboldened by the favour of Matthias and the justice of their cause, they took up arms, and in that hostile attitude, presented anew their petition to the emperor, for a confirmation of sundry privileges. Rhodolphus had hitherto exercised over Bohemia the power of a sovereign; and though he had neither inclination nor ability to prolong that power by force of arms, he was not so wholly indifferent to the attractions of a crown, as to resign it, if it could be retained by a few concessions respecting modes  
and

and doctrines of religion. The protestants accordingly obtained a royal edict, authorizing a free exercise of their religion in Bohemia and the adjacent provinces; a consistory or council for ecclesiastic affairs, with other institutions relating both to the government and defence of the churches of the reformation, and also to the establishment of schools, colleges, and places of worship. It is reasonable to suppose, that the utmost extent of this last concession, was a permission to the protestants to build churches on their own lands. But they, interpreting it in the most comprehensive sense, began to build religious edifices even on the estates of the ecclesiastics: a freedom which appeared to the whole Catholic party an excessive outrage. Complaints of these encroachments having been carried to Matthias, who by this time had succeeded to his brother Rhodolphus, both on the Bohemian and imperial throne, a letter of royal authority was instantly issued, prohibiting the erection of all protestant fabricks on lands belonging to the church. In consequence of this proclamation, one or two meeting houses were demolished. And the protestants were thrown into the utmost ferment, their resentment against the emperor being exasperated by the recollection of those deceitful promises with which he had beguiled them when a candidate for the kingdom.

BOOK VI.  
1618.-9

THE Bohemian protestants by means of their DEFENDERS, whose business it was to watch over the interests of the church, to spread an alarm in times of danger, and to concert measures for common defence, (1) were enabled to combine in any

(1) The DEFENDERS appear to have been the principal men of their communion, either in their several congregations, or in the different districts of the country.

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any effort that might be deemed necessary for the preservation of the true religion. Henry, count Thorn, perceiving the force of this great machine,, and also how easy it would be, in the present juncture, to set it in movement, conceived the bold design of turning it against the house of Austria. This nobleman was indeed of an enterprizing and turbulent disposition : but in the part he acted on this occasion, he was actuated not so much by any inquietude of temper, as by the passions of resentment, fear, and religious zeal. Deprived of his paternal inheritance by the tyranny of the arch-duke of Gratz, on account of his stedfast adherence to the doctrines of the reformation, and driven from his native country, he found refuge among the pretestants of Bohemia. His zeal and his sufferings in the cause of the protestant faith, gained him the favour and confidence of this people, and the superiority of his genius their esteem. At the time when Matthias deemed it good policy to court the protestants, he affected a desire to establish the fortune of the count : and accordingly, when he seized the crown of Bohemia, he invested him with the command of Carlestein, a fortress in which were deposited the regalia of the kingdom. But when the power of Matthias was firmly established by the death of Rhodolphus, he threw off the mask of good-will towards the protestants, and openly patronized the faith in which he had been educated, and which was most favourable to regal power. The independent principles of count Thorn the emperor regarded with jealousy and distrust : for having determined to repress the pretensions of the heretics, he foresaw a conjuncture in which it would be dangerous to entrust places of strength in any other hands than those of catholics. That nobleman was therefore deprived of the government of Carlestein, which



which was bestowed on count Martinitz, a devoted instrument of both ecclesiastic and regal authority. The succession of Ferdinand to Matthias, afforded not to the exiled count any hope of preferment from royal favour: on the contrary, the bigotry of that severe prince threatened him with still further oppression. In these circumstances, he saw no resource but in civil commotion and revolution. These were justified to the count by the enthusiasm of religion, and the same passion, as has been already observed, conspired with others in rousing him to attempt them (*u*). He flew to different quarters of the kingdom, and hastening from place to place, laboured both in public assemblies and private societies, to rouse a sense of danger, and a spirit of freedom. The boldness of his genius, and the fervour of his zeal, inspired a like boldness and fervour in all with whom he conversed. The flame spread from breast to breast, formed a concert of wills, and united all ranks of men in a resolution to defend their religious rights with their lives and fortunes. And at his instigation, the defenders, or chiefs of the protestants, called a general assembly of the states of the kingdom, for the express purpose of concerting measures for the redress of grievances.

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The emperor, considering this spirit of association as the fore-runner of rebellion, issued a proclamation, debarring all assemblies of the states,

(*u*) The principal authorities for this account of the origin of the troubles of Bohemia are these, *Annales de L'Empire* tom. ii. Heiss. *Hist. de l'Empire*. Batt. Nan. *Hist. Lib. iv. ann. 1618, & passim.* Gonzalez de Cesp. lib. prim. cap. v. et passim. *Veritable Recit de ce qui s'est passe a Prague le 21 May 1618.* Everhardi Wasseburgii *Embricensis de Bello inter Imperatores Ferdinandos et eorum Hostes, &c.* Wilson's History of king James.

BOOK VI.

1618.

Manifesto  
of the Bo-  
hemians.

states, untill he himself should come among them in person, or should give further orders to his ministers. Notwithstanding this prohibition, the Defenders, with numbers of other powerful barons, accompanied with armed servants and retainers, and a multitude of the inhabitants of Prague, convened at that city on the 20th day of May, and having heard a sermon, and joined together in prayer, mutually pledged themselves to defend their religion and their churches, not only in Prague, but in every part of Bohemia. It was also resolved to publish to all the world an account of their present conduct and future views. A manifesto was drawn up for this purpose. The exordium contained the strongest expressions of loyalty to the emperor, as king of Bohemia. The general estates lamented the dangers which obliged them to take measures that appeared to supersede an authority they wished to preserve inviolate. Their only design was to frustrate the pernicious projects of certain seditious and turbulent spirits, who had sworn the ruin of their liberties, and of the fundamental laws of the kingdom; who had so far abused the confidence of the emperor and of Ferdinand, as to persuade these princes to march against Bohemian subjects at the head of hostile armies; in order to seize Prague; to kill or imprison the greater number of the nobles, and deputies of states; to raze their churches; and to abolish the free exercise of their religion (x). This manifesto being read aloud, was approved by the states, and a general murmur of applause was heard among the people.

IN

(x) Everhardi Wasseburgii Embricensis Commentarium de Bello inter Imperatores Ferdinandos II. & III. & eorum Hostes.

IN the midst of these transactions, an order arrives from the imperial ministry, commanding the protestant leaders to disperse, and to retire to their respective habitations. Upon this, count Thorn, attended by a number of other barons on horseback and in armour, ride up to the castle, and having secured its gates, proceed immediately to the hall, in which the ministers of Matthias were assembled in council on the present important emergence. Invektive and altercation was soon followed by blows : and the counts Martinitz, Slavata, and Fabritius, who held the principal offices of government, were thrown headlong out at the windows. Though they fell from an height of sixty feet, and that several shots of musquetry were fired at them as they fell, they escaped, not only with their lives, but free from any material harm. The Catholics considered this remarkable preservation of these three men as a miracle wrought by heaven in support of the Romish faith. Minute descriptions are accordingly given, in the writings of those times, of the wall of the castle of Visigrade, and of the tremendous precipice which intervenes between the bottom of the wall and the ditch. But protestant writers disapprove the alledged miracle, by observing that the spot on which the Catholics fell, was covered deep with dung, and mud, and leaves of trees.

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THE Bohemians, now involved in the guilt of rebellion, determined to persevere, and to seek from their own valour and good fortune for that indemnity which they had but little reason to look for at the hands of Matthias, and still less from those of his successor. Their minds opened to greater views than those they had entertained on the first alarm of danger ; and they now resolved to vindicate by the sword, not only their religious,

Revolt of  
Bohemia.

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religious, but their civil privileges. In this resolution they were encouraged, whether they surveyed the internal situation of their own kingdom, or cast their eyes abroad upon foreign states. There was nothing in Bohemia to resist their united force. Matthias, declining in health as in years, was not able, and perhaps would not be very willing to maintain, in opposition to the just pretensions of a generous people, an arbitrary jurisdiction that must soon devolve to an ambitious rival and hated successor. The country was naturally strong and fertile, the people high spirited and warlike, and ready to encounter danger and death in defence of their religion. If passing from their own, they contemplated the state of other kingdoms; circumstances not less animating presented themselves to their view, and fanned that generous fire which glowed in their breasts. The contagion of example, which more than reason governs the world, displayed its full force on this important occasion. The Venetian republic, and the duke of Savoy, had of late maintained their independence in opposition to the pretensions and power of that civil and religious tyranny, with which the Bohemians were now called to struggle. The protestants of France formed of themselves, as it were, a separate state in the midst of a mighty kingdom. And the united provinces of the Netherlands, in spite of the veteran armies of Spain, and the gold of the western world, had risen from the lowest and most distressing circumstances that could be imagined, to the greatest height of liberty and power. These circumstances were ever present to the minds of the Bohemian leaders, and formed the chief topics in their public harangues, as well as in their writings, which were circulated all over the kingdom by means of the press, and which were full of eloquence and vigour. And as di-  
vers



vers states animated the Bohemians by their example, so all protestant powers, it was probable, would support them with substantial assistance. The sympathy of religion would render theirs the interest of nations : and their companions at the altar would be their fellow soldiers in the field of battle (a).

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THE Bohemians having determined to insist on the restoration of their ancient laws and constitution, expelled the old garrison out of the castle (which was the royal palace,) and replaced it by another in which they could confide. They appointed thirty persons to govern Bohemia, with the title of Directors. These magistrates having, in the first place, taken an oath of fidelity and allegiance, from the magistrates of Prague, proceeded to the administration of government. The first act of their power was to banish the Jesuits, and to confiscate their effects. They raised an army of two thousand horse, and twelve regiments of foot, and gave the supreme command to count Thorn. They addressed a manifesto to the emperor ; to the states of Silesia, Moravia, Lusatia ; to the whole provinces and states of the empire ; and to all the world ; containing an account of their conduct, and invoking the aid of all the friends of religious toleration, and civil liberty.

ERNEST, count of Mansveldt, was the first who espoused the Bohemian cause, and the last of its adherents who abandoned it. He was a natural son of that count Mansveldt, whom Philip II. appointed governor of the Netherlands. In his early years, he attached himself, like his father,

to

(a) Historia de Don Felipe, &c. por Gonçalo de Cespedes, lib. 1, cap. vi. Batt. Nani, lib. iv. 1618.

**BOOK VI.** to the house of Austria. The court of Vienna  
 1618. was filled with a just admiration of his talents  
 and virtues; and, in a transient fit of favour,

Count  
 Mansfeldt  
 enters into  
 the service  
 of the Bo-  
 hemians.

promised to invest him with the rights of legitimate birth, and to put him in possession of the estates of his family. But a regard to interest violated a promise that had been made merely from generosity: and as the most violent resentments are those which arise from disappointed confidence, count Mansfeldt's hatred of Matthias was implacable. His aversion to the house of Austria he extended even to their religion. He renounced the Catholic faith, and openly professed the doctrines of Luther. He abandoned the service of the emperor, and entered into that of Charles Emanuel, the most active and enterprising of all the enemies of Austria. But the present situation of affairs in Germany, opened so full a career to the genius, the ambition, and the vengeance of Mansfeldt, that he could not forbear expressing to the generous prince whom he now served, an eager desire of offering his sword to the revolted states of Bohemia. The duke of Savoy, who considered the disturbances in Germany as the surest pledge of his own security, not only applauded the views of the count, but permitted him to levy two thousand men, and also engaged to keep them in pay for him, for several months (*b*). At the head of this small force Mansfeldt marched into Bohemia, where he was received with the utmost joy, and instantly honoured with the charge of general of the ordnance. Thus the forces of Bohemia were entrusted to commanders who were both of them foreigners, both men of desperate fortunes, both breathing vengeance against the house of Austria, and both of them possessed in an eminent degree of military capacity

(*b*) Batt. Nani, lib. iv. 1618:

ty and political discernment. Yet between the characters of these men there was a remarkable difference. Count Thorn, who had the talent of rousing, uniting, and wielding the minds of men, was the best fitted to govern a nation: Mansvelt, so brave, enterprising, inventive, and refined, the best qualified to conduct an army. The military talents of this extraordinary person shone forth, indeed, beyond those of all his contemporaries. Nor did ever any hero, in any age, exhibit greater boldness in encountering, or greater dexterity in escaping from danger. These fierce commanders take the field at the head of separate armies. The flag of rebellion is displayed throughout all Bohemia, and by a powerful contagion, incites a general insurrection in Silesia, Moravia, Lusatia, Hungary, and the Upper Austria (c).

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1618.  
Characters  
of the  
counts  
Thorn and  
Mansvelt.

THE news of this revolution, distracted the emperor with opposite passions. The idea, which so naturally presents itself to monarchs in similar circumstances, occurred first to Matthias. But coercive measures might be as fatal to his own power, as to the liberty of Bohemia. He was not able to take the field in person: the command of an army would, of course, be claimed by Ferdinand: and so powerful an engine would place in the hands of that prince the whole authority of government. Moved by this consideration, he wrote, in the style of the Catholics of those times, a paternal letter, requiring the evangelical states of Bohemia to lay down their arms, and disband their troops, promising them, in case of obedience, indemnity and protection. This offer the revolted provinces regarded not as a mark of lenity, but as a proof of weakness (d). They despised

Embarrassment of the  
emperor  
Matthias.

(c) Rushworth's Coll. vol. i. p. 7, 8.

(d) Historia de Don Felipe III. por Gon. de Cesp. lib. i. cap. vi.

**BOOK VI.** despised it so much, that they disdained to answer it. Matthias then forbad all levies of troops in the empire, without the imperial permission, and published to the world an elaborate account of the Bohemian revolt. A paper war ensued between that prince and his revolted subjects; and it was evident that the quarrel must be decided, as usual in such cases, not by the pen, but by the sword. Accordingly, with the aid of the princes, friends, and allies of his house, he raised in Germany an army of ten thousand men. The king elect of Bohemia, as had been foreseen, demanded the command of this force, and obtained it; but with such restrictions, as betrayed the jealousy of the old emperor, and left little more to the nominal chief than the shadow of power. Ferdinand declined the exercise of so limited an authority, and this the rather, that it would tend to heighten the disgust of the emperor, and might even induce him to take measures for disappointing his expectations of the imperial crown. The command of the army was, therefore, with the consent of Ferdinand, intrusted in the hands of the famous count Bucquoy. This general took the field without delay, and, having reduced the town of Teutsbrod, fixed his headquarters in Budovits, the only place of strength that now remained to the emperor in all Bohemia. Count Thorn advanced against Bucquoy, reduced Krumlaw, with the suburbs of Budovits, and held that city in close blockade. Various skirmishes happened of course between the opposite armies; and fortune inclined sometimes to the one side, sometimes to the other.

Count Bucquoy appointed to the command of the imperial army.

Various skirmishes between the Imperialists and the Bohemians.

WHILST count Thorn was thus employed, in watching the motions of the imperial general, Mansveldt carried on with success the siege of Pilsen. This city was important for its situation,

as



as it commanded an extensive and fertile tract of country along the course of a branch of the Mulda; and also contained great stores and treasures. For this being the only place in that quarter of the kingdom, where the power of the Catholic predominated over that of the Protestant inhabitants, thither the Jesuits and priests, and many of the richest citizens of the Bohemian capital had retired, with their most valuable effects. The conditions on which the inhabitants of Pilsen surrendered, after an obstinate resistance, were, that they should maintain two companies of evangelical soldiers; redeem the city from plunder by sixty thousand florins; and take an oath of fidelity and allegiance to the Protestant states of Bohemia. Several Catholic soldiers as well as citizens, preferred exile with the loss of all their goods, to this last condition. Mansveldt having thrown into the city a strong garrison of both horse and foot, continued his route in Bohemia, and took several places almost without resistance.

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1619.

DURING these transactions, continual overtures were made on the part of the emperor for peace. Matthias appeared in the singular character of a suppliant for power. He condescended to address many promises and flattering expressions of regard to individuals (*e*). The evangelical states had at first, as had been already observed, treated the emperor's advances towards a reconciliation with a contemptuous silence; but after he had drawn his sword, he became a more respectable correspondent, and they deigned to honour him with a letter. This letter contained very singular matter. The whole was a bitter complaint of the ravages committed by the imperial troops

The emperor makes overtures for peace.

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I i

in

(*e*) Hist. du Regne de Louis XIII. Roy de France, & des principaux Evenements arrivez pendant ce Regne dans tous les Pais du monde.

BOOK VI. in the kingdom of Bohemia. Matthias answered, that he was sorry for what had happened, but that he would be under the necessity of sending more troops among them, if they should refuse to lay down their arms. The Bohemians at this time endeavoured to incline the emperor to peace, by the mediation of the archdukes his brothers; and it is probable, that could they have obtained the restoration of their ancient constitution, and the establishment of the protestant religion, they would have been willing to leave to Matthias, or to Ferdinand, all the power of a feudal king. But neither was the emperor inclined to rest contented with so confined an authority; nor, perhaps, could the difference have been composed if he had. All confidence between the contending parties was lost: and the matter now in dispute, was, which should retain the power of the sword? an arduous question, and which an appeal to the sword itself could alone determine.

Death of  
Matthias,  
and succeſ-  
ſion of Fer-  
dinand.

MATTHIAS had laboured long under bodily infirmities and anxious cares, when the stroke of death laid him at rest, on the 20th day of March, 1619. Ferdinand, his successor, doubtful of his ability to reduce his subjects to obedience by force of arms, attempted to gain their confidence and voluntary submission, by argument and persuasion, and acts expressive of a tender regard for their happiness. He commanded Bucquoy to cease from all hostilities, and gave orders for a general suspension of arms throughout all his dominions. To all his revolted subjects he offered pardon and oblivion, a full confirmation of their privileges, and a full toleration in matters of religion. He added many expressions of goodwill, and earnestly exhorted them to tread in the paths of peace. The exhortations of Ferdinand,

were

Were not more successful than those of his predecessor. Count Thorn having taken Iglaw, a frontier town of Moravia, with several other places, and being reinforced by troops, not only from the provinces dependent on Bohemia, but also from Hungary, at the solicitation of several Austrian barons drew near to the Danube. Having been furnished with boats by those who favoured his cause, he crossed that river with all his forces, and carried terror into the city of Vienna, as well as all the adjacent country. The whole garrison of Vienna amounted only to fifteen hundred foot, and two hundred horse. This small force was under the necessity, not only of guarding the city from external attacks, but also from internal sedition: for count Thorn had a numerous party within the walls of Vienna, who had engaged to facilitate its reduction by securing one of the principal gates. Had that commander advanced on the present occasion with his usual celerity, the possession of the Austrian capital would, in all probability, have fixed the independency of the Bohemian states, and drawn after it other important revolutions. But trusting to the terror of his arms, and the influence of his partizans, he hoped to reduce Vienna, even without a struggle. He summoned that city to surrender. But while he lay two days at Fischen expecting an answer, the university armed five hundred students, and a reinforcement of several companies of cuirassiers having passed under false colours through the midst of the Bohemian squadrons, arrived from the grand duke of Tuscany. At this instant some zealots were in the act of shaking Ferdinand by the doublet, and demanding, with many imprecations, liberty of conscience. The trampling of horses and the glittering of swords and spears relieved the king from the importunities of those rude petitioners, and filled

BOOK VI.

1619.

BOOK VI. them in their turn with consternation and terror (a). Count Thorn now drew near the city, with a design to besiege it; but, by this time, his presence was thought necessary in another quarter.

1619.

COUNT Dampierre of Lorrain had raised four thousand men in Hungary, with which he intended to join the army under the command of Bucquoy. Mansveldt, having learned his design, immediately resolved to attack him, before a junction of the Hungarians with the Imperial army should render their united force irresistible. He was on his march for this purpose, when count Bucquoy fell upon him from an ambuscade, and defeated him with great slaughter. Mansveldt himself was among the wounded, and a great number were taken prisoners. The Bohemian army retreated to Breslaw, the capital of Silesia; and on occasion of this disaster it was deemed expedient to recall count Thorn, to oppose the progress of the victorious enemy. Bucquoy, having reduced several places, retired to Budovits, where he waited for some troops he expected from Flanders (b). Count Thorn, having in vain endeavoured to bring the Imperialists to an action, but having recovered some fortresses they had taken, set out for Prague, where the reformed of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Lusatia were assembled.

In this situation of affairs the archbishop of Mentz, as chancellor of the empire, proclaimed a diet at Frankfort for the election of a king of the Romans. The electors attended either in person

(a) Gio. Batt. Nani, *Historia della Repub. Veneta* d'all an. 1613. Sin' al 1671, lib. iv. 1619.

(b) Gonç. de Cespides, *Hist. &c.* lib. i. cap. 6. *Hist. Louis XIII.*



person or by their proxies, and, on the twenty-eighth day of August, Ferdinand was adorned with the imperial purple. BOOK VI.  
1619.

THE Bohemian states had now been assembled for two months, and in the course of this period they formed a league offensive and defensive with the annexed provinces, and another of the same kind with Bethlehem Gabor, who, from the rank of a private gentleman, had been exalted, by the favour of the Porte, to the sovereignty of Transylvania. This prince the Bohemians engaged to support in an effort to mount the throne of Hungary; as he, on his part, promised to maintain their right to elect a king of Bohemia. For they had solemnly resolved never to recognize Ferdinand as their king; but to chuse a Protestant for their sovereign, and to shake off for ever the yoke of all the princes of the house of Austria. They justified their renunciation of Ferdinand by several arguments. “By preserving the forms of free government, they said, the monarchs of Europe had been enabled to conceal their progressions towards absolute power, and insensibly to impose the yoke of slavery on their unguarded subjects. The election of Ferdinand, however formal it might appear, was certainly no other than an act of authority. Matthias, in the fulness of his power, had nominated his successor on the throne, and no individual had dared to oppose his will. Thus it was that the house of Austria trampled on the liberties of a free people, and abused the power which was intrusted in their hands for the public good, for the purpose of perpetuating it in their own family. But waving the question concerning the validity of his election, they maintained that Ferdinand had forfeited all title to the crown by violating the privileges of the states, particularly by

The Bohemian states fortify themselves by new alliances, and resolve to chuse a new king.

**BOOK VI.** endeavouring to fortify himself on the throne, by  
 1619. means of foreign aid; to controul Germans by the arms of Spaniards." These were grave and solid reasons, but they added yet another, which appears very extraordinary, and even somewhat ludicrous; they said they had a right to chuse a new king, because Ferdinand had smoothed his way to the crown of Bohemia by means of Spanish gold; insinuating, that if they had sworn allegiance to that prince, they had been bribed to do so (c).

SUCH were the reasons of the Bohemians for deposing their king. . Their motives for electing another were equally cogent. As they had not yet experienced the inconveniencies of an aristocracy, the election of a king did not seem necessary for the purpose of internal government, nor were they so much attached to regal dignity, as to choose a king merely for the pomp and parade of a court. But the vigour of the prince who claimed the throne made it necessary for them to form by all means powerful alliances and connexions. They made a tender of their crown first to the duke of Savoy. That prince had already given them proofs of his good-will; and his superior genius seemed necessary to defend them against the threatened danger. But the duke declined to accept the crown, though he applauded the generous spirit of the Bohemians, and exhorted them to persevere in the noble course on which they had entered. They next cast their eyes on the elector of Saxony; but the hope of succession to the duchy of Cleves restrained that prince from opposing the house of Austria. They now made an offer of the Bohemian throne to the elector Palatine. The spirit and

(c) Harte's History of Gustavus Adolphus.

and zeal of this prince seemed not unworthy of a crown; and by his own force, and his connexion with prince Maurice (*d*), and the king of England, they imagined he would be enabled to preserve it. Frederic, after some little hesitation, which was easily overcome by his natural ambition, and the incitements of the princess his wife, who had great influence over him, accepted the offer, and, having levied an army of ten thousand foot and two thousand horse, marched into Bohemia in support of his new subjects.

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1619.

The elector Palatine accepts the crown of Bohemia.

WHILE the commotions in Germany drew attention from every quarter, and from interest, from affection, or from religion, interested all nations, a comet appearing towards the North in the heavens, aggravated the general gloom; and the minds of men were agitated at once by the alarms of war, and a superstitious terror. A belief in astrology was at this period universal in Europe as well as Asia. Pamphlets were daily published, containing interpretations of the comet. While the vulgar considered it as ominous of domestic and particular events, men of genius and learning, deriding such absurd comments, supposed that a general sympathy pervaded the universe; that nature at certain periods was in a kind of commotion; and that, in such a crisis, the minds of men were naturally moved also (*e*). And, if the languor of inoccupation be the great curse of human life (*f*), it may be affirmed that at no time was there ever a greater portion of felicity diffused throughout the world.

The nations alarmed at the appearance of a comet.

THE

(*d*) His uncle.

(*e*) Batt. Nan. Hist. lib. iv. Wilson's History of King James, ann. 1619. Hume's Hist. vol. vi. octavo, p. 155.

(*f*) See L'Abbé du Bois, and Ferguson's Essay on Civil Society.

BOOK VI.

1620.

THE contest between the emperor and the prince Palatine seemed at first altogether unequal. A spirit of disaffection and resistance had gone forth throughout the whole of Ferdinand's dominions. His crowns tottered on his head, and that of Bohemia seemed already fallen. The small army under the command of Bucquoy was all that he had to oppose to the different forces of the Palatine, of count Thorn, and of Mansfeldt. A new and more terrible enemy advanced upon him from the East. The prince of Transylvania, under the auspices, and with the promise of powerful aid from the Ottoman Porte, marched rapidly into Hungary; reduced the capital; assumed the crown, with the title of king; made himself master of all that was important in the kingdom except Javarrin and Comorrah; formed a junction with count Thorn; and threw a bridge over the Danube, with a resolution to carry the war into the heart of Austria.

The cause  
of Ferdi-  
nand sup-  
ported by  
Spain.

IN this extremity the native courage of Ferdinand was supported by the treasures, the arms, and the authority of Spain. In a cause which involved at once the greatness of his family, and the support of the Catholic religion, the Spanish monarch advanced large sums of money, and levied a powerful military force. A body of eight thousand men marched from the Low Countries to reinforce the Imperial army under count Bucquoy. And Spinola, with an army of thirty thousand, composed of Italians, Spaniards, Walloons, and Irish, prepared to invade the Palatinate (g). The powerful aid of Spain encouraged the electors of Saxony and Bavaria to appear on that side which seemed now to be strongest,

(g) Batt. Nani, lib. iv. 1619. Historia de Don Felipe, &c. por Gonç. de Cespedes, lib. i. cap. 9. 11.



est, and by adhering to which they might look Book VI.  
for the highest advantages. The views of Saxo-  
ny have already been mentioned (*b*). And as to 1620.  
the duke of Bavaria, he was invited by a promise  
of receiving the estates as well as the dignity of  
his kinsman the elector Palatine. The example  
and influence of the Bavarian, the authority of  
the whole house of Austria, and the common in-  
terests of the Romish faith, united all the princes  
of the Catholic league in a resolution to support  
Ferdinand with their lives and fortunes. The  
pope, besides his spiritual benedictions, contri-  
buted a pecuniary supply; and several ecclesiast-  
ics as well as princes of Italy followed his ex-  
ample. An army was quickly raised for the de-  
fence of the ancient religion. The command  
was given to the duke of Bavaria. The protecti-  
on afforded by the Ottoman empire to Gabor, in-  
terested the king of Poland also in the prosperity  
of Ferdinand; and in an instant ten thousand  
Cossacks, fierce and savage auxiliaries, over-run  
Moravia,

(*b*) A writer of great reputation supposes that the duke of Saxony may have been actuated by a jealousy of Frederic, who of an equal was to become his superior; or, that he may have been afraid lest the princes of the house of Weymar, who were the warmest partizans of Frederic, should, by the assistance of that prince, if victorious, regain the possession of Saxony, the ancient inheritance of their family. [Pauli Piascii Chronica Gestorum in Europa singularium: apud Amelot de la Houssaie Disc. Histor.] It is of no importance to enquire whether these conjectures be well founded or no. It is often a difficult matter, it must be owned, to assign the real motives of the actions of princes, their conduct being often determined by secret, and sometimes trivial causes. As to the matter in question, I shall only observe, that I do not find any historian who is inclined to give credit to what Saxony himself affirmed: which was, that he would support the just claim of Ferdinand, in opposition to the pretensions of Frederic; because a contrary conduct would bring a stain on the Protestant religion. Batt. Nam. lib. iv. 1619.

BOOK VI. Moravia, and join the Imperial army under Bucquoy (*i*).

1620.

The conduct of England and France in the present contest,

THE eyes of all Europe were now turned to the kings of England and France: the first interested in the fortune of Frederic from the connexion of blood as well as sympathy of religion; the second bound by the strongest ties of policy and ambition to oppose the progress of a proud and hated rival. But the indolent disposition of James, his reverence for the rights of kings, an eager desire to effectuate a marriage between the second infanta and the prince of Wales, and a conceit withal that the whole world entertained a profound respect for his love of justice and great learning; these circumstances inclined him, as usual, to embrace pacific measures; and he sought to promote the greatness of the Palatine, not by the sword, but by embassies and negotiations (*k*). Lewis was neither ignorant of the interest of France, nor did he want that spirit which was necessary for pursuing it with vigour. But that prince, who was one of those modest characters that are apt to pay a deference to capacities inferior to their own, was at this time under the government of the duke of Luines. That favourite was induced, by the artifices of the Spanish ambassador, to sacrifice at once the interests of the Palatine and of France, to private ambition. The rich heiress of Pequigny and Chaunes was educated at the court of Brussels. It became the policy of Luines, by the favour of the archdukes, to pave the way for a marriage between that lady and his brother Honorius. He entered into a confidential correspondence with these princes,

and

(*i*) Batt. Nan. lib. iv. 1619.

(*k*) See Hume's History of Great Britain, anno 1619.

and easily acquired their good graces by engaging to favour, in the present critical juncture, the views of the house of Austria. The veil under which he covered his secret designs from the eyes of his prince, was, that if the elector Palatine should establish himself on the throne of Bohemia, he would undoubtedly protect the Hugonots, with whom he maintained a correspondence through his uncle, the duke of Bouillon. Book VI.  
1620. An June 1620. ambassador was dispatched from France to the city of Ulm, where there was held a diet of the empire. In this assembly the Catholic and Protestant parties were present, and also deputies from corresponding states and princes. The ambassador declared the resolution of Lewis to observe an exact neutrality in the present dispute, “and expatiated on the misery and folly of war and bloodshed, between parties who were not impelled to hostilities by any cause of mutual animosity or contention. The only quarrel, he said, was between the emperor and the elector of the Palatinate. Let these princes, therefore, fight out their own battles. But if the minds of princes be too strongly agitated by the present conjuncture to embrace such moderate and pacific councils, at least let not the ravages and desolation of war be spread over all Germany. On the contrary, let them be confined within the narrowest possible bounds : and, as the kingdom of Bohemia is the only subject of contention between the parties principally concerned, so let it be the only scene of all military operations that may be undertaken in support of their respective claims by their friends and allies.” A treaty was accordingly framed in which it was settled that neither the Evangelical Union, nor the Catholic League should directly or indirectly invade or attack any electorate, principality, province, or city of the empire, Bohemia alone excepted. Treaty of  
Ulm.

THE

## BOOK VI.

1620.

THE emperor was now in a situation in which he could act with the utmost vigour. The mere good offices of England were a general subject of derision (*l*). He was secure from the attacks of France. The Protestant princes and states of Germany were animated indeed with an hearty aversion to Ferdinand; but their assembly at Nuremberg had already proved how much they were divided by political jealousies (*m*) and religious disputations (*n*), and how little reason there was to imagine they would ever unite in any effectual measures for the support of Frederic. The treaty of Ulm afforded the emperor a farther pledge of security from their attacks, and left him at liberty to pour an irresistible force into the kingdom and dependent provinces of Bohemia. Emboldened by these circumstances, he thundered forth against his rival the ban of the empire, and committed the execution of that decree to the archduke Albert, and to the dukes of Bavaria and Saxony.

The mar-  
quis of Spi-  
nola in-  
vades the  
Palatinate.  
August.

DON Lewis de Velasco being left with fifteen thousand men for the defence of the Austrian frontier towards the United Provinces, the marquis of Spinola, with a Spanish army, as has already been observed, of thirty thousand men, but these under the colours of Albert, marches directly into the Palatinate, and halts at Coblenz, at the confluence of the Rhine and the Moselle. As this invasion of Spinola was a manifest infraction of the treaty of Ulm, the princes of the Evangelical Union reproached the Catholic party with their perfidy. The elector of Mentz, adding  
mockery

(*l*) Hume's History of Great Britain, Reign of James I. anno 1619, 1620, 1621. 1622.

(*m*) Hist. della Rep. Ven. Batt. Nan. lib. iv. 1619.

(*n*) Hist. de Don Felipe, &c. por Gonç. de Cespedes, lib i, cap. 9.



mockery to breach of faith, said, that the house of Austria was not bound by that treaty, as it was not comprehended in the Catholic League (o). The princes of the Union, alarmed at the proceedings of the Austrians, and provoked at their insolence, opposed to the marquis of Spino-la an army of twenty-four thousand foot, under the command of the marquis of Anspach (p). This force was joined near Worms, on the first day of October, by two thousand horse, and four hundred musketeers, under the command of prince Henry of Nassau, and by an English regiment of infantry, conducted by Sir Horatio Vere, consisting of two thousand four hundred veterans (q). This single regiment, with some scanty supplies of money, was all that the king of England contributed to the support of his son-in-law. Nor is it probable that he would have adventured to send out even this small force against the Austrians, if he had not, from the timidity, or the facility of his nature, deemed it expedient to make a shew of corresponding to the zealous attachment of his people to both the person (r) and the cause of Frederic. The Spanish ambassador at the court of London managed so dextrously the hopes and fears of James, that for the small assistance he afforded to the Palatine he made ample compensation. At the very time the armies of Spain were battering the English, and the other friends and allies of his son-in-law, in Germany, Sir Robert Mansell, vice-admiral of England, was carrying ordinance and naval stores to the Spanish arsenals, and protection

(o) Amelot de la Houssaie, Disc. Hist.

(p) Hist. de Don Felipe III. por Gonç. de Cesp lib. 1. cap. 11.

(q) The History of King James, by Arthur Wilson, Esq.

(r) Hume's History of Great Britain, anno 1619.

BOOK VI. section to the Spanish trade and coasts from the  
 1620. rapine of the Turks (s).

WHEN the marquis of Spinola arrived at Cob-  
 lentz, he learnt that Anspach was encamped at  
 Oppenheim (t), a post, one of the most impor-  
 tant that could have been chosen either for the  
 defence or the command of the Palatinate. In or-  
 der to draw the enemy from this advantageous  
 station, and to pave the way for taking possession  
 of it himself, the Spanish general made such  
 movements and such dispositions as seemed at first  
 to indicate an intention of making an attack upon  
 Frankfort on the Main, and afterwards, to make  
 it dubious whether his design was against that city,  
 or against Worms. In the course of these opera-  
 tions he reduced the towns of Creutzenach and  
 Altzeim. The stratagem of Spinola had the in-  
 tended effect. At the earnest request of the in-  
 habitants of Worms, Anspach hastened to their  
 relief with his main army, leaving Oppenheim un-  
 der the protection of a moderate garrison. Upon  
 this Spinola, who had set his face against  
 Worms, wheeled suddenly about, and with an  
 amazing rapidity advanced to Oppenheim, which  
 he took by assault, together with great quanti-  
 ties of military stores and provisions. In this  
 important place he formed his magazines; and,  
 having strengthened it by a numerous garri-  
 son and new fortifications, threw a bridge over  
 the Rhine, and passed over into the Lower Pa-  
 latinate. In this principality he reduced upwards  
 of thirty towns and castles in the course of six  
 months (u).

September  
 27.

WHEN

(s) History of King James, by Arthur Wilson, Esq.

(t) Bat. Nan. Hist. &c. lib. iv. 1620.

(u) Gonç. de Cesp. lib. i. cap. 11. 13. Batt. Nan. lib,  
 iv. cap. 16. 20. Hist. du Regne de Louis XII.

WHEN we consider that this commander not only reduced, but kept firm possession of the greatest part of the Palatinate, in so short a time, and in the face of an army equal in numbers to his own, and, perhaps, not inferior in bravery; we cannot but conclude, either that his capacity must have been far above, or that of his adversary far below the common standard of human nature. All historians agree, that the conduct of Spinola in this, as in his other campaigns, discovered the most consummate military skill; yet their accounts of this conduct are, in several instances, materially different, and, perhaps, all of them, in many respects, wide of the truth. The evolutions of armies, their marches and counter-marches, and all the various operation of war, are not to be described with sufficient accuracy, either from the hasty and partial compilations of the day, or from a comparison of works better intitled to the name of histories. The general himself, or his confidential friends, can alone give an account of his views and designs; and, as to the vicissitudes of an engagement, they are not always known, even to the experienced officer present in the field of action. The utmost therefore that any other person can aspire to is, to illustrate the advantages of vigilance and foresight; to display the power of discipline, of habit, and of opinion, and, perhaps, to point out a few of those causes which surprise the hearts of men, and fill them with the passions of courage or of fear.

BUT, if it is impossible, by tracing the designs, to do justice to the genius of Spinola, it is an easy matter to discover that he had not a formidable rival in the marquis of Anspach. As an example has been given of the capacity of the one general, so an example shall in like manner be

BOOK VI.  
1620.

BOOK VI.

1620.  
Incapacity  
of Anspach,  
general of  
the forces  
raised by  
the princes  
of the Uni-  
on.

be given of the incapacity of the other. On the third day after the arrival of the Dutch and English troops, the marquis of Anspach marched, with an intention of surprising Altzeim, at the head of four thousand horse and six thousand foot, with a suitable train of artillery. The marquis of Spinola, unwilling that his reputation should be tarnished by suffering any of the places he had taken to fall again into the hands of the enemy (*w*), hastened to its relief. Anspach, informed of the march of Spinola, suddenly turned about to give him battle; but Spinola had by this time learned that the army he had designed to attack was greatly superior to his own in numbers; he therefore drew his cannon up to the summit of a neighbouring hill, from whence it played on the enemy's cavalry, that had begun to press him, with such success as forced them to retreat. Upon this the princes of the Union also drew their artillery up another hill, on the right hand of Spinola. There was a wide valley between the armies, and in the midst of that valley a third hill, covered with cottages and vineyards. By this hill the hostile armies were mutually concealed, and it was only from the summit of this, that the one general could review the situation and movements of the other. As soon as the princes of the Union perceived that the Spaniards were glad to fortify themselves in a strong position, they rightly concluded that the enemy were inferior to themselves in numbers and strength; and therefore resolved to attack them. It was agreed on, that the English should begin the charge. Horatio Vere had for this purpose selected eighty musketeers out of every division of the regiment. The whole army, full of ardour, stood impatient for an engagement; but the evening

(*w*) *Gonç. de Cesp. lib. i. cap. 13.*



ing approached, and the men still lay on their BOOK VI.  
arms. The English general, wearied with this 1620.  
delay, rode up the hill of vineyards, accompanied  
with the earls of Oxford and Essex, to survey the  
posture of the enemy. They were retreating in  
good order, and in deep silence. The foot mar-  
ched first, the waggons with the baggage pro-  
ceeded next, in two ranks, as a species of for-  
tification to the infantry, and the horse brought  
up the rear. In this order they marched with all  
possible speed to Oppenheim. Anspach was posted  
nearer to that city than Spinola, and it was  
in his power either to reduce that important  
place, or to force the Spaniards, under a mighty  
disadvantage, to come to an engagement. The  
earl of Essex flew to the marquis of Anspach,  
and entreated him with much emotion and impor-  
tunity to improve the important and favourable  
conjuncture. But the marquis replied hastily,  
and in an angry tone, "There is a fort between  
us and Oppenheim, and we cannot pass to that  
place without being at the mercy of the enemy's  
cannon." Sir Horatio Vere exclaimed, "And  
when shall we fight, if we shun the cannon (x)?"  
The season of winter had now arrived. It was  
uncommonly rigorous. The frost was so in-  
tense, that the English officers burnt a great ma-  
ny of their waggons: and as to the common sol-  
diers, they lay in heaps on the ground, close to-  
gether, like sheep covered with a fleece of snow.  
One would naturally imagine that the rigour of  
the season must have been severely felt by the  
Italians and Spaniards. If we may give credit,  
however, to the authority of a celebrated Spanish  
author, those inhabitants of southern climates  
VOL. III. K k bore

(x) This account of the inglorious conduct of Anspach is chiefly taken from the History of King James, by Mr. Wilson, who was an eye-witness of what he reports.

BOOK VI. bore all the severities of the campaign better  
 1620. than the Germans and the English (y).

Progress of  
 the war in  
 Bohemia.

WHILE the affairs of the emperor prospered in this manner in the Palatinate, they were still more fortunate in Bohemia. That vigilant prince had learnt that Osman, who now filled the Ottoman throne, had promised to occasion a diversion of the Austrian forces, in favour of the Palatine and Gabor, in the next spring, by invading Poland; he, therefore, urged the dukes of Bavaria and Saxony to collect their forces, to advance upon the strength of the enemy, and, by operations equally rapid and decisive, to determine the issue of the war, before time and accidents should turn the tide of fortune, and strengthen the hands of Frederic. Saxony instantly took the field with twenty-four thousand men, poured into Lusatia, laid Budissen, the capital, in ashes, and quickly reduced the whole province under the authority of the emperor. Having accomplished this object, he dispatched fourteen thousand troops into Silesia. This force reduced Glogaw, a city on the Oder, which, by opening a communication with the Baltic, secured a firm footing in a fertile and extensive country.

IN the mean time, the duke of Bavaria, at the head of twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse, marched into the Austrias. The Lower Austria immediately returned to its allegiance, and was received into the protection of the emperor. The Higher, at first, disdained to follow this example of submission. A garrison of two thousand soldiers, thrown into Lintz, the capital, by count Mansveldt, had inspired the states with a degree of confidence and resolution, which was  
 not

(y) Hist. de Don Fellippe III. &c. Por Gonç. de Cesp. lib. i. cap 12. 14.

not to be overcome by an apprehension of danger, while it was yet distant. But the near approach of Bavaria struck them so forcibly, that, although their own force was not diminished, nor that of the duke greater than they had all along suspected, they sent a message desiring conditions of peace. Bavaria, contemning their late applications, took Lintz by assault on the 4th of August, punished the chief authors of the rebellion with death, imposed on those he spared, the burthen of a strong garrison, and chastised the whole country with the ravages of war. As there was not in the whole province any castle or fortress that was able to withstand the conqueror of the capital, all the chief men either submitted to the emperor or fled into Bohemia. Having thus re-established peace, together with obedience, in Austria, Bavaria passed on, in order to join count Bucquoy, who opposed, with various fortune, the Bohemian army, whose head-quarters at this time was Egleburg (z). The count, according to orders from his prince, marched from Langlovits to Budovits. Here he was joined by the duke of Bavaria: and the two generals having had a short conference, the different armies continued their march, by different routes, towards Prague. On the 10th day of October, they both of them, whether by concert, or by accident, drew near to Pilsen. Hitherto their divided forces had reduced every place that was situated in their tracts through which they bent their courses: and the footsteps of the Cossacks were every where marked with blood. But Pilsen resisted their united power, being defended by the subtlety and refinement of Mansveldt. The count being summoned to surrender to the combined armies of his imperial majesty and the duke

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Count  
Mansveldt  
amuses the  
imperial  
generals.

K k 2

of

(z) Gonç de Cesp. lib. i. cap. x. Batt Nan. lib. 10.  
1620.

B o o k VI. of Bavaria, demanded a cessation of arms, and  
 1620. proposed a treaty of accommodation. He insinuated, in a letter which he wrote to the duke and Bucquoy, some general complaints of the injustice of fortune and of his own hard fate, which had doomed him to struggle with difficulties, and to be rewarded with ingratitude and disappointment. The commanders to whom these hints were addressed, considered them as an advance on the part of Mansveldt, to surrender the town and garrison of Pilsen, upon those conditions which politicians sometimes take the liberty of holding out to soldiers of fortune. A circumstance had taken place, which shall by and by be mentioned, that enabled them to comprehend, as they imagined, the count's meaning, and which inclined them at the same time to give easy credit to his sincerity. They did not hesitate, therefore, a moment, to transmit to Mansveldt a very friendly letter, in which they endeavoured to restore him to the interests of the house of Austria by the most liberal promises of preferment and fortune. But Ferdinand had not treasures sufficient to bend the inflexible spirit of that gallant hero; nor was it in his power to have set before his eyes so glorious an object at once of ambition and revenge, as that which he now pursued. Mansveldt, however, counterfeited a satisfaction in the assurances that had been given him: but he declined to surrender the place, and the troops he commanded, without saving his honour, by making a shew of resistance. The imperial generals perceived at last that they had been the dupes of artifice (*b*). There was no reason to despair of being able to reduce Pilsen by force of arms: but the obstinate valour of Mansveldt, it was probable would render the  
 siege


(*b*) Batt. Nan. lib. iv. 1620:



siege tedious, and, in the present crisis, every moment was precious. After being amused for thirteen days, they pushed on towards Prague, and, at Raconits, encountered with the Bohemian army, which was now conducted by the marquis of Anhalt and count Hollach, his lieutenant-general. These men were but little acquainted with military affairs; but they possessed the ear of the Palatine, who, passing by the distinguished merit of the counts Thorn and Mansveldt, bestowed his confidence where he had placed his favour. This was the circumstance which gave credit to the pretences of Mansveldt, and enabled him to impose on his adversaries at Pilsen.

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ADJOINING to Raconits, on the west, stood a hill, covered from the bottom upwards, to the middle, with a thick and intricate forest of pine and fir trees, whose close and feathered branches intertwined with one another, and reaching to the very ground, formed a shade impervious to the rays of the sun, and a retreat to wild beasts. In this natural fortress, Anhalt resolved to make a stand, and to wait the approach of the enemy. He formed a camp for the infantry on the upper part of the hill, and defended the approaches to the whole, by the cavalry, and five hundred musketeers. As it would have been dangerous to have advanced to Prague, leaving so great a force behind them, the imperialists resolved to assault the hill on all hands, and, to provoke the enemy, if possible, to an engagement. But, if, in this attempt, they should be unsuccessful, they hoped at least to derive some advantage from that spirit which is infused by an attack, and from that depression of courage, and loss of reputation which the Bohemians would suffer by declining an action. The most desperate efforts were accordingly made to dislodge the Palatine, by setting fire to the

Book VI.  1620. the vegetable rampart that protected him, and opening avenues for the ascent of the imperial troops, by the hatchet. In this attempt, many officers as well as private men fell, and Bucquoy himself was grievously wounded. On the 5th of November, Anhalt perceived the imperial army in motion. Upon this, he dispatched count Thorn with a considerable force to Prague, to strengthen the city, and to fortify the wavering minds of the inhabitants. He himself, followed soon after with the main army. He leaves his baggage behind, and, by forced marches, through unfrequented paths, across the mountains, arrives before the imperialists, at the Bohemian capital. The vast extent of that city, which was open in many places to hostile invasion, determined Anhalt to post his army on the Wisenberg (c).

Battle of  
Prague.

The Wisenberg, or White Hill, is of no great height or circumference, but, being cut and broken by crags and deep ravines, it is of difficult access, except on that side which looks towards Prague, where an inclined plane, of equal fertility and beauty, extends from its summit to the walls of the city. The lower part of this declining space was covered with a range of houses, or rather a straggling village, which formed part of the suburbs of Prague; the middlemost was an extensive park, adorned with a wood, and a royal palace, called the Star; the higher overlooked, and in many places commanded the capital. In this strong position, the Bohemian general drew up his forces, and here he determined to abide the assault of the enemy. The various projections and incurvations of the hill, improved by art, seemed to defy the boldest assailants. And that the men might not be tempted to abandon so advantageous

(c) Gonç de Cesp, lib. i. cap. 14. Batt. Nan. lib. iv. 1620.

vantageous a station, Anhalt ordered the gates of the city to be shut, and signified what he had done, to every division of the army. Having taken this precaution, he ranged his troops in order of battle, and waited the approach of the enemy (*d*). BOOK VI.  
1620.

THE imperialists, who had by this time advanced within half a league of Prague, were struck with the advantageous situation of the Bohemians, and deliberated, whether or no they should give them battle. But the advanced season would not permit them much longer to keep the field; and in the spring, thirty thousand Turks (*e*) would be added to the number of their enemies. All the friends of Ferdinand had already taken an active part in his cause, and his whole force was now in exertion. The powers, on the other hand, that formed the natural allies of Frederic, from causes that could not be permanent, stood many of them aloof, as if indifferent to his fortune, but would assuredly join in support of his cause, if the sovereign authority should be confirmed in the hands of that prince by length of time, as well as by actual possession. In many cases it was more prudent to guard against disaster than to run any great risque for the sake of victory. But in cases of rebellion there was not room for delay, for the loss of time was equal to misfortune in the field of battle (*f*). The enemy was, indeed, strongly posted; but the fate of battles depended

(*d*) Hist. de Don Felloippe III. por Gonç de Cesp lib. i. cap. 14.

(*e*) Hist. du Regne de Louis XIII. Roy de France, et des principaux Evenements arrivez pendant ce Regne dans tous les Pais du Monde.

(*f*) In discordiis civilibus nihil festinatione tutius, ubi facto magis quam consulto opus est. Nec cunctatione opus, ubi perniciosior sit quies, quam temeritas. Tacitus.

Book VI. depended on accidents, not to be foreseen by human prudence; and the steady valour of the Imperialists, was more likely to bear up under any unforeseen and adverse circumstance, than the tumultuous courage of the undisciplined Bohemians. There was yet another consideration, which, of all others, had the greatest weight in the present question. The sermons of father Dominico, a bare footed Carmelite, who assured the army that the Lord of Hosts would go forth with their standard in his own cause, had infused into the soldiers an impatient ardour to charge the heretics: so important, in those days, was the office of a military chaplain (g)! On the whole, it was resolved to storm the hill: the troops were formed in order of battle; the Imperialists on the right hand, and the Bavarians on the left. They advanced upon the enemy by the way of Stratzis, the only way that was practicable. Pursuing this course, they were obliged to march in a file over a bridge, and then, before they should arrive at the bottom of the Wisenberg, a miry valley. The younger Anhalt, son of the general, perceived the advantage to be derived from this embarrassing situation, and was all on fire to improve it. He proposed, after allowing such numbers of the Imperialists to pass the bridge as should greatly weaken the main body of the army on the other side, to attack them before they should be formed, and while struggling with the difficulties of marshy ground. This plan of young Anhalt, which was not less prudent than courageous, appeared to Hollach, the lieutenant-general, the effect of youthful impetuosity. The Imperialists were allowed to extricate themselves from their embarrassment, without any other inconvenience than what they suffered from the Bohe-

(g) Batt. Nan. lib. iv. 1620. Gonç de Cesp. lib. i. cap. 14.



Bohemian artillery. In order to avoid this, they BOOK VI. hastened their march, until the prominencies of 1620. the hill afforded them protection. Then, having put themselves in the best order that the time and the nature of the ground would admit, they pressed up the Wisenberg with deliberate valour, and made a furious attack upon the enemy. The shouting of the soldiers, the noise of trumpets and drums, and the roaring of artillery, reverberated from the inflexions and cavities of the hill, announced the commencement of the important onset, and shook the country for many leagues around with terror. Prague, as being nearer to the dreadful scene, was more sensibly struck with its horrors, and trembled in awful expectation of the eventful issue. Frederic, on whose account the contending armies profusely shed their blood, beheld from the battlements of his palace (*b*), on the one hand the spacious capital of Bohemia, and on the other the fierce engagement that was to dispose of the Bohemian crown (*i*). At the beginning of the conflict, fortune seemed to smile on the Bohemians; for young Anhalt, supported by count Slich, repulsed with great slaughter the first assault. This assault was made by count Tilly, lieutenant-general to the duke of Bavaria. But the veteran troops, which formed the strength of the Imperial army, sustained this disaster with that firmness which results from discipline, and a glorious reputation. On this occasion the wounded Bucquoy signalized his own spirit, and re-animated the hearts of the fearful. He had been carried in a litter to his tent in the camp, there to wait the event of the action. But he no sooner saw the Imperialists hardly pressed by the Bohemians, than he jumped

(*b*) In the Star Park already described.

(*i*) Batt. Nan. lib. iv. 1620. Gonç. de Cesp. lib. i. cap.

BOOK VI. ed out of his carriage, and feverish as he was, mounted the first horse he found, put himself at the head of his troops, and attacked the Hungarians with such fury, that he left near two thousand, as was computed, dead on the spot (*k*). The Walloons, commanded by William Verdu-go, next to Bucquoy, had the honour of restoring the battle. They took young Anhalt and count Slich prisoners, and having made themselves masters of a redoubt, with three pieces of cannon, turned the artillery with prodigious effect against the thick squadrons of the enemy. The panic that was struck among undisciplined troops, by this sudden reverse of fortune; the fright and confusion that had taken place among the Hungarian cavalry, from the yelling of the Cossacs; together with a steady and unremitted fire both of cannon and musquetry, in spite of the exhortations, the threats, and the example of the generals and other officers, threw the whole Bohemian army into irrecoverable disorder and terror. A general rout ensued. All was lost, but the honour of having made a brave resistance. Anhalt, having first dispatched a message to the Palatine, provided for his own safety. The regiment of count Thorn was the last that quitted the field. The Wisenberg was covered with the arms of the fugitives, and the bodies of the slain. Multitudes seeking to escape from the edge of the sword, perished in the Mulda. Five thousand Bohemians, that had been posted in the Star Park, threw down their arms, and cast themselves upon the clemency of the victors. The generals were willing to give them quarter; but the Cossacs remaining equally deaf to the orders of the commander, and to the cries of the flying victims,

(*k*) Hist. du Regne de Louis XIII. & des Evenements, &c.

tims, sheathed the sword only when the arm was weary with shedding blood (l).

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THIS important victory restored to Ferdinand the crown of Bohemia, and rendered the authority of Austria over that kingdom more absolute than ever. Whatever privileges and immunities the Bohemian states had formerly enjoyed, whether as their ancient rights, or the concessions of their kings, were, by a royal edict, abolished or revoked. The electoral dignity, and afterwards the estates of Frederic were, by the mere authority of the emperor, transferred to the duke of Bavaria. His principal adherents were proscribed; and all those rigours and severities exercised against the professors of the reformed religion, which were to be expected from a vigorous, unrelenting, and bigotted conqueror. The misfortunes that awaited the elector Palatine were singularly affecting; nor, has ever the tragic muse invented scenes more fitted to purge the minds of men with sympathetic sorrow. In the silence of the night that followed the fatal 9th of November, he fled with his wife and little children into Silesia, where he met with the common reception of unfortunate princes. His abode among a people, determined to make their peace with his mortal enemy, was as short as it was comfortless. He wandered with his family from place to place, still fondly hoping to retrieve his fortune by arms, or by negociation. In the midst of his peregrinations, two domestic events of contrary natures equally dissolved his soul into the tenderest anguish. At Brandenburg, whither he had retired from Silesia, he was reminded how much his family had suffered from his imprudent ambition, by the birth of a son (m). The same reflection

(l) Batt. Nan. lib. iv. 1620.

(m) Hist. de Regne de Louis XIII. et des Evenements principaux, &c.

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fection occurred, in all its bitterness, some years after, on a journey to Amsterdam. As he was passing over the Haerlem-mer, in a dark and tempestuous night, the light vessel in which he sailed foundered on another, against which it was driven by the fury of the wind and waves. Before the ship sunk, the Palatine, with some other passengers, made their escape to that other vessel; but the prince, his son, was unfortunately left in the foundered vessel, which they durst not approach, though they heard the cries of the boy, calling out for the help of his father. The next day, when the tempest abated, they found him frozen to the mast, which he had embraced as his last refuge (*n*). While the unfortunate Frederic was thus wrestling with adversity, his friends and allies left him, one after another, and sought to reconcile themselves to the emperor. Even the brave and active prince of Transylvania, who, after the battle of Prague, had the courage to march his troops to the frontiers of the Lower Austria, maintaining his army by the plunder of the Catholic subjects of his enemy, even he would have abandoned the common cause, and given up the interests of his ally, if he could have exchanged the crown for the viceroyalty of Hungary (*o*). Count Mansveldt alone, with a small army, which he subsisted chiefly by pillage and free quarters, still maintained the cause of Frederic; and his successful boldness encouraged duke Christian of Brunswick, and the marquis of Baden Dourlach, to appear at the head of armies on the same side. These princes were defeated by the Imperialists under count Tilly. But Mansveldt, though much inferior in force to his enemies, still maintained the war, and discovered,

Courage  
and con-  
stancy of  
count  
Mansveldt.

(*n*) History of King James, by Arthur Wilson, Esq.

(*o*) Bat. Nan. lib. iv. 1620. Gonç. de Cesp. lib. i. çap.



ed, at once, the most wonderful caution in secur- Book VI.  
ing his own troops, and the greatest valour in an- 1620.  
noying those of the enemy. For the space of  
two years, he defied, with a small flying army,  
the whole house of Austria when in the zenith of  
its power, and would probably have prolonged  
the contest to a more distant period, if the Pala-  
tine, at the instigation of the king of England,  
had not, under colour of submission to the empe-  
ror, dismissed him from his service. The count  
withdrew his army into the Low Countries, and  
there entered into the service of the United Pro-  
vinces (*p*).

At the same time that the treasures and arms  
of Spain were employed, with so much success,  
in supporting and extending the authority of Fer-  
dinand in Germany, the duke of Feria, by the  
subjection of the Valteline, consolidated the ter-  
ritories of both branches of the Austrian race in-  
to one extensive and mighty empire.

THE Valteline extends from the lake of Como, Revolt of  
the Valte-  
line.  
in Milan, winding in an easterly direction be-  
tween two ridges of lofty mountains, to the  
county of Tirol, and to the vallies of Sol and  
Munster, from which regions it is separated by the  
hills of Braulio, which may be crossed in the space  
of six or eight hours. On the north, it is bound-  
ed by the Alps, and, on the south, by the terri-  
tores of the Venetian republic. Its length is se-  
venty miles; its breadth, if we reckon from the  
summits of the enclosing mountains, forty; but,  
if from their roots, on a medium, not above six.  
It is watered by the river Adda, and being ex-  
ceedingly fertile in cattle, corn, and wine, it a-  
bounded

(*p*) Hume's History of Great Britain. Reign of James I.  
anno 1622.

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bounded in towns and villages full of people. The inhabitants of this valley are said to have been of a mild and dispassionate temper; their manners to have been uncultivated and simple; their language and customs Italian. The Valteline was in former times a part of the principality of Milan; though by this time it had fallen, through various revolutions, under the dominion of the Grisons: those republicans governed this dependent province with a rod of iron, the antipathy that naturally takes place between a conquering and conquered people, being exasperated by that of religion. They interdicted their religious rites and usages, banished the Jesuits, annihilated the jurisdiction of the secular clergy, and converted their churches into places of worship for the Protestants. Colleges were founded, and professors of divinity were brought from Geneva, at the expence of the king of England. And, as the Grisons tyrannized over the minds of this unfortunate people, so they in reality enslaved their bodies. They deprived them on various pretences of the fruits of their industry, and even of the patrimony left them by their ancestors. All those who were in the service of the leagues (*q*), might commit the greatest enormities on the Catholics with impunity. The government of the Valteline resembled that of Turkey, by Pashas and Janissaries; or the dominion which

(*q*) The civil constitution of the Grisons is a democracy. A certain number of towns and villages composed a community or corporation; several communities, a league; and three leagues, assembled by their deputies in a general diet, possessed the supreme power of the republic. The Grisons are represented by writers of those times, but Catholics, as a fierce and intractable people, venal, inconstant, and delighting in blood; and in all respects as the reverse of the simple natives of the Valteline.

which is now exercised by European merchants BOOK VI.  
over the princes of Asia (r). 1620.

ANIMATED at once by the resolution of despair, a zeal for religion, and private assurances for the most effectual support from the governor of Milan, the Catholics of the Valteline, in one day flew to arms, and surprised and massacred the unwary Protestants. The magistrates, and men of distinction and property were, as usual in all similar commotions, the chief object of their rage. Upwards of three hundred fathers of prosperous families were put to the sword; and their goods, houses, cattle, and estates, seized by the insurgents. Immediately the Catholics chose new magistrates, and, with the aid of money from Spain, erected several forts, which were also garrisoned by Spanish troops. The Grisons, assisted by the wealth of Venice, which enabled them to hire some companies of Swiss, made an effort to regain the Valteline; but were repulsed by the Catholics, supported by near five thousand Spanish foot and horse, with a train of artillery. Thus the conquest of the Palatinate by Spinola, having opened a passage for the Spaniards through Flanders into the heart of Germany; the Spanish territories in Italy being linked to those of Ferdinand by the reduction of the Valteline; and a communication having been already established between the Milanese and Spain, through the ports of Monaco and Final, on the Mediterranean; a chain seemed to be formed for holding the fairest portion of Europe in subjection to the house of Austria. Immense power of the house of Austria.

AMONG

(r) Batt. Nani, lib. iv. 1620. Gonz. de Cesp. lib. i. cap. 16.

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Rebellious  
designs of  
the duke of  
Ossuna,

AMONG the fortunate events of this year, may be ranked the preservation of Naples from the attempts of the duke of Ossuna. How soon that singular man conceived the bold design of converting his delegated into sovereign power, is uncertain. His resolution was fixed the moment he learnt that the court of Madrid intended to deprive him of his government; but it is probable that fluctuating and transient ideas of independency on that court had occupied his mind at an earlier period; for when matters were brought to a crisis, it was only by pursuing his usual tenour of conduct with unusual alacrity, that he endeavoured to accomplish the object of his lofty ambition. It appears that he entertained a hearty contempt for the feeble capacity and temper of his sovereign (s). He characterised this prince by an image very natural in the mouth of a military man. Talking of Philip, he was wont to call him, "The great drum of the monarchy;" as if he had been merely an instrument for communicating the orders of the duke of Lerma (t). This contempt of the king, and the distance of Naples from Spain, were perhaps the circumstances which first suggested to Ossuna ideas of raising himself to independent power. These ideas appear to have been uppermost in his mind, when he scornfully declined to solemnize the double marriages, and courted popularity, by distributing the money that had been collected for that purpose among a number of poor virgins.

THE means by which this duke, who passed with many for no other than an ingenious madman, endeavoured to bring about his ends were  
so

(s) Batt. Nan. lib. iii. anno 1617.

(t) Anecdotes du Ministère de Conde Duc D'Olivarez.



so refined and artful, that a brief account of them will not appear unentertaining to the reader.

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THE order of nobility, accustomed to look back, and to reverence antiquity, he reasoned, would be averse to innovation, and disposed to support the crown, which they considered as the source of their own eminence in society. He therefore endeavoured by all means to humble the nobles, and by studied insults to diminish that respect which was paid to their rank by the people. He excluded them from all places of power and trust, and even plundered them occasionally of their property. His chief friends and confidants were strangers. Wherever he found a man of courage and genius, whom want or crimes had made desperate, he received him into his bosom, and loaded him with such favours as infallibly attached him to his person. On pretence of quelling commotions, which he himself had industriously excited, he introduced a military force composed of foreigners, who were entirely devoted to his will, and who acknowledged no other master. He had also ships of war under his command, which roved the seas, not under the flag of Spain, but that of the family of Ossuna. In this manner he proposed to train up a naval force, that from habit should look up to him as the only power intitled to direct their motions.

THE prizes made by his fleet, and the plunder he ravished from the nobility, he employed in bribing the council of Spain to connive at his enormities, and in increasing his popularity, both in the army and among the great body of the people. Throughout the whole kingdom of Naples he had agents who fomented the natural malignity of the people towards their superiors, and

**BOOK VI.** assured them that the duke of Ossuna was the only person to whom they could look up for protection against the tyranny of the court, and the insolence of the nobles. He it was who would relieve them from oppressive taxes, and ease them of all their burthens. One day as he passed by a place where the officers of the revenues, in order to adjust the tax, were weighing certain articles of provision, he drew his sword with great appearance of indignation, and cut through the ropes of the scales, signifying by that expressive action, that the fruits of the earth ought to be as free as those celestial influences from whence they spring. At the same time that he was assiduous to gain the favour of the Neapolitan people, he also laboured to conciliate the friendship and to secure the support of foreign nations. This purpose he hoped to effect by doing them all the mischief in his power. For this end he left nothing unattempted that might tend to embroil the Spaniards with all their neighbours, and to render their very name hateful to the world. He endeavoured, as has already been observed, to bring the Infidels into Italy, harrassed the fleets and coasts of Venice, and committed piracies on the ships of almost all nations without distinction. In the mean time he entered into a secret correspondence with the Venetian senate, and the duke of Savoy, and assured them that all the hostilities he had committed were the effects of the most positive orders from the court of Madrid. He invited them to join with him in a design he had formed of restoring the liberty of Italy, by driving the Spaniards beyond the mountains. The republic, averse to such hazardous exploits, would not so much as hear the duke's proposal. But Charles Emanuel thought it worthy of consideration, and instantly communicated it to the court of France. In consequence of this, a person was sent

sent by the marshal Lesdiguières to learn the real situation of affairs at Naples (u).

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THE designs of Ossuna did not escape the court of Madrid. The council was unanimous that he ought immediately to be recalled: but whether he would submit to their orders they very much doubted. It was therefore resolved to attempt his removal by stratagem. Orders were instantly dispatched to the cardinal Don Gaspar de Borgia, to hasten from Rome to Naples, to take upon him the government in the room of Ossuna. The cardinal, agreeably to instructions from Madrid, having previously secured the countenance of the governor of Castel Nuovo, introduced himself into that fortress in the silence of the night; and the thunder of the cannon which welcomed the arrival of Borgia, next morning announced the disgrace of Ossuna. Defeated.

BUT the duke, even while he stood on this precipice, did not resign his power without a struggle to maintain it. He attempted, by means of his emissaries, to rouse an insurrection both of the populace and soldiers. But the possession of the castle, the constant roaring of artillery, expressive of the will and authority of Spain, the acquiescence of the nobility, and those in the civil departments of state; these circumstances operated with irresistible force both on the soldiery and the people, and prevailing over their attachment to Ossuna, maintained their reverence for that power which they had been accustomed to obey. The degraded viceroy returned by slow journies into Spain. When he went to court,

L 1 2

Philip

(u) Greg. Let. Hist. Ossun. Batt. Nan. lib. v. 1619. Anecdotes du Ministère de Conde Duc d'Olivarez.

BOOK VI. 1620. Philip withdrew his eyes from him, and turned his back. The high-spirited Ossuna, surveying the monarch with contempt, muttered to those who stood nearest him, "The king treats me not as a man but as a child." This discountenance was all the punishment that was inflicted by the meek and gentle king, on a man who had attempted to deprive him of a kingdom. But, in the first year of the succeeding reign, he was thrown into prison, where he died of a dropfy (*w*).

April 22.

THE brilliant successes of this year, which diffused through the Spanish nation a general joy, made but a feint impression, where it might naturally be imagined it would have made the greatest. So deep a melancholy had overcast the mind of the king that it could not be brightened up by the greatest national prosperity. In order to revive his spirits by a change of air and of objects, by the advice of his new ministers he set out on a journey into Portugal, accompanied with the prince and princess of Spain, the infanta Maria, several of the nobility, the gentlemen of his bed-chamber, and his confessor. The towns through which he passed testified their joy at his presence by acclamations and triumphal arches. On the feast of St. Peter he made his public entry into Lisbon. The river was covered with all kinds of vessels, which were gaudily decorated, and exhibited the greatest profusion of riches. Thirty-two triumphal arches, adorned with gold and precious stones, displayed in a manner still more pompous the wealth of the capital of Portugal. Philip, struck with so magnificent a spectacle, said, "He never knew before that he was so great

(*w*) Hist. de Don Felipe IV. por Don Gonçalo de Ces-  
pides, lib. segundo, capitulo segundo.



great a king." Having assembled the cortes, or estates of the kingdom, he received the crown, with the homage of his subjects. The king in return, agreeably to ancient custom, swore that he would preserve inviolate the rights and privileges of his people. The cortes also swore fealty to the prince, as the heir apparent. This they did in conformity to the wishes of the king. For that good prince, convinced that his end was approaching, was anxious to establish his family in peace and comfort. He remained at Lisbon for some months; but, through the infirm state of his health, did not appear much in public. On his return to Madrid he was detained for some time by a severe fit of his distemper at Casa Rubios. Having somewhat recovered he pursued his journey, and employed the short remainder of his life in the settlement of his family. The infant Don Ferdinand, his third son, at the age of ten years received a cardinal's hat, and with the approbation of the pope, was raised by proxy to the see of Toledo, the primacy of Spain, and the richest benefice in Europe.

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ON the twenty-fifth day of November the marriage was consummated between the prince and princess of Spain. And on the fourth of December the prince was introduced to the councils of state, in order to learn the importance, and how to discharge the duties of the crown. This measure the king adopted in imitation of his father's conduct with regard to himself. In imitation of the same example he left, for the use of his son, some instructions in writing (x).

IN

(x) Hist. de Don Felipe, &c. por Gonçales de Cespides, lib. i. cap. 7. 16. 18. Anecdotes du Ministère de Conde Duc d'Olivarez. Amelot de la Houssaie.

## BOOK VI.

Feb. 23,  
1621.

Illness of  
Philip.

March.

29th.

IN the month of February the king's illness returned in all its malignity. Soon after his return from the chapel he was taken with a fever, which continued with various intermissions about the space of a month. During all this time his spirits were depressed with the deepest melancholy, and he persevered, notwithstanding some encouragement from the physicians, in expressing his full assurance that he should die. He desired that the image of the Holy Virgin of Antiochia should be carried about, which was performed on Sunday the twenty-eighth, in a solemn procession, at which the counsellors of Spain and many of the other nobles assisted. In the evening of that day commandment was given to all the churches of Madrid to place the blessed sacrament upon the altars. On Monday, about four o'clock in the evening, the king grew worse than ever. He had before been seized at different times with a violent vomiting and a diarrhœa. Blisters now appeared on his limbs and other parts of his body; and the physicians feeling his pulse, said unanimously, "That they undoubtedly assented to the king in the opinion he entertained of his infirmity." He then, in the presence of his confessor, with other divines, the grandees of Spain, the presidents of the different councils, and the first lord of his bed-chamber, authorised the president of Castile to affix in his name, for his hand shook greatly, the royal signature to a codicil he dictated in addition to his testament, which he had already made at Casa Rubios. This being done, he gave orders that other presents, besides those he had already appointed, should be given to his confessor, and to his servants. After this, his physicians persuaded him to take some food; they also advised him to compose himself for sleep; but he answered, "On so long a journey, and in so short a time for performing it, I must not

not rest." He now desired, as the last action of his life, to see, to address, and to bless his children. He told the prince that he had sent for him that he might behold the vanity of crowns and tiaras, and learn to prepare for eternity. To the child Don Carlos he spoke long and in a low tone of voice. He then said aloud to the prince, "I recommend the child to your protection. It grieves me that I should leave him unprovided; but I hope that I leave him in the hands of a good and affectionate brother." Then appeared the infanta Maria, and the infant cardinal. At the approach of the infanta he burst into tears, and said, "Maria, I am full sorry that I must die before I have married thee; but this thy brother will take care of thee:" and turning about he said, "Prince, do not forsake her till you have made her an empress." He then spoke to the cardinal infant, whom he had appointed, when he should be of a fit age, to be archbishop of Toledo. He should be much grieved, he said, if he thought that he would not undertake, and faithfully discharge the duties of that sacred office. He also sent for the princess of Spain; but she fainted away as soon as she entered the king's bed-chamber, and was conducted back to her own apartment. It was not thought proper that she should make a second effort to see the dying king, as she was now in the fourth month of her pregnancy. When what had happened to the princess was reported to the king, he was melted into compassion, and greatly affected at so striking an instance of sensibility and filial love. He professed a firm belief that the princess loved him as well as any of his own children. She would lose a good father, he added, and that he had always loved her tenderly. Afterwards, giving them all his blessing,

BOOK VI. blessing, he dismissed them with many prayers for  
 1621. their happiness, both here and hereafter.

The blessed sacrament was administered to him about midnight. He received the extreme unction at two o'clock in the morning. During the whole time of his illness he made a constant confession of his sins, and implored divine mercy. He confessed to all around him that he had often been guilty of dissimulation in matters of government; he regretted his supine indolence, and blamed himself greatly for having devolved the cares of the state on his ministers; and when he reflected that he had not in all things made the will of God the rule of his government, he trembled, crying out at different times, "Oh! if it should please heaven to prolong my life, how different should my future be from my past conduct!" But in the midst of his troubled thoughts he found consolation in the mercies of God; and embracing a crucifix, he expressed his hope, that the Redeemer of the world would not leave his soul in hell, but that, after many ages of painful purification, he would receive him at last into the mansions of the blessed. At devotion so affecting the spectators burst into tears; and at that instant father Jerome of Florence came up to the bed on which the king lay. The father, unwilling to bruise a broken reed, held up to the view of the pious monarch the consolations of religion, and expatiated on the exemplary purity of his life, and that zeal which had appeared throughout the whole of his reign for the Roman catholic religion. The alternate tumults of hope and fear that had so long agitated the mind of the king, at last subsided into a gentle calm, and he died in all the tranquillity of faith, on the last day of March, in  
 the

His death.



the forty-third year of his life, and the twenty-third of his reign (y). BOOK VI.

1621.

The pliant, mild, and religious disposition of this prince would have well entitled him to the praise of *pious and good* \*, if the natural benevolence of his temper had not been controlled, in many important instances, by the bigotry, and his piety deeply tinged with the follies of superstition. His amiable and inoffensive manners would have adorned a private station; but he was averse to the trouble, and destitute of the talents for governing a great kingdom.

And character-

The disposition of the minister, upon whom, on his accession to the throne, he devolved the honours and the cares of government, was, like his own, gentle and pacific; and pacific measures were necessary in the exhausted state of the empire. But a spirit of domination had taken root in the councils of Spain; the confidents and veteran commanders of Philip II. still breathed war; war was the general voice of the nation; and, though peace was the interest of the monarchy, its predominant passion was the love of glory. The nobles had recovered in the present, a considerable share of that importance which they had lost during the two preceding reigns. And if the king was governed by the dukes of Lerma and Uzeda, these ministers were themselves obliged, in all momentous affairs, to comply with the general bent of the kingdom. The ambitious

Review of his reign.

(y) A letter from Spain touching the manner of the death of king Philip III. directed to Gondomar, the Spanish lieger ambassador here in England, A. D. 1621, found among Dr. Birch's Collection of Manuscripts in the British Museum, No. 4108. Gonçalo de Cespedes, lib. i. cap. 18.

\* FELIPPE PIO Y BUENO.

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1621.

ambitious maxims which had been impressed on the ductile mind of Philip, from his earliest infancy, the bigotry of a false religion, and the warlike temper of the nation, prevailed for many years over that love of tranquillity which distinguished both the king and his minister, and also over the interests of the nation. The war was prosecuted, but not with success. The military discipline, valour, and skill of the Spaniards were yet undiminished; but vigour and prudence were wanting in their counsels. No attention was paid to the trade and manufactures of the Netherlands, Portugal, or Spain. The chief object with administration, was to bring home in safety the treasures of America; remittances, which distance and the naval power of the enemy rendered infinitely slow and precarious, and which passed with rapidity, through a thousand channels, into the hands of their industrious enemies. The resources of war were dried up; the public finances were deficient; yet, even in this situation of affairs, plans were formed for exciting a rebellion in France; and an armament was equipped for the conquest of Ireland. The attention of the Spaniards was thus distracted by different views, and diverted from that which, while they chose to pursue it, ought to have been its only object.

THE attachment to liberty, the enthusiasm of religion, laborious industry, with public and private œconomy prevailed, but not till after a struggle of near half a century, over the wealth, the reputation, and disciplined valour of the numerous armies of Spain; and this haughty nation was obliged at last to hearken to terms of accommodation. It was indeed in a great measure owing to misconduct and want of vigour on the part of the Spanish ministers, that the war had  
not

not been attended with greater success; but they BOOK VI.  
 had judged wisely in resolving to bring it to a 1621.  
 conclusion. Nor was there any reason to doubt  
 that the truce would prove as advantageous to  
 the Spaniards as to the Dutch, if those who  
 held the reins of the Spanish government should  
 afterwards conduct themselves with that pru-  
 dence, moderation, and wise œconomy, which  
 they might have been taught by past experience.

BUT the world was yet ignorant that domestic  
 industry is preferable to extended dominion.  
 This doctrine, which is but just beginning to in-  
 fluence the cabinets of princes, in the period un-  
 der review, was scarcely thought of; nor has it  
 yet had any visible influence in the counsels of  
 Spain, after its truth has been proved by the ex-  
 perience of near three centuries. That the  
 strength of any country chiefly consists in the in-  
 dustry and number of its inhabitants, is indeed  
 a truth deducible not only from experience, but  
 from reason. A kingdom, compact and populous,  
 has a mighty advantage over one thinly inhabited  
 and of great extent. The former resembles a gar-  
 rison within the narrow limits of a well con-  
 structed fortress, which is able to resist the as-  
 saults of superior numbers without, and often to  
 make successful sallies: the latter, a forti-  
 fication on too large a scale, whose extensive works  
 cannot be defended with effect, against all the at-  
 tacks of a vigilant and active enemy. This im-  
 portant truth is illustrated in a very striking man-  
 ner, by the circumstances of the Spanish monar-  
 chy during the reign of Ferdinand of Arragon,  
 contrasted with its situation in that of Philip III.  
 In the first of these periods the dominion of  
 Spain extended over the kingdom of Naples, and  
 all the islands of the Mediterranean, from the  
 Streights of Gibraltar to the southern extremity  
 of

BOOK VI. of Italy, besides Tripoli, Bugia, Oran, Mazal-  
 quivir, and other towns on the coast of Africa.

1621.

The small kingdom of Portugal, though governed hitherto by its native princes, it was easy to foresee, would sooner or later be reduced by policy or by arms, under the power that so greatly preponderated in that peninsula, of which it formed a part. The vicissitudes of fortune had never conspired more harmoniously with the operations of nature to form a mighty and durable empire. The branches were not so ponderous, or stretched out to so great a length, as to fall off and to lacerate the parent stock; but, on the contrary, they were such as returned the nourishment they drew, with increase. The populousness, the industry, the martial spirit of Spain, rendered it at that period the most powerful monarchy in Europe, and formidable to all its neighbours. But in the reign of Philip III. the imperial power of Spain, which extended over a greater part of the globe than that of Rome in the zenith of her power, was foiled in a contest with a small territory, peopled with manufacturers and merchants.

The Spanish nation, after this mortifying defeat, sought to conceal its want of power by an increase of pomp and splendour; and to recover, and even extend its authority by intrigue and negociation. The first of these arts, in the present times, appears somewhat frivolous. It ought, however, to be considered, that in those days the ancient hospitality and magnificence still remained, and were considered as very important circumstances in government (z). As to the second,

(z) Chamberlayne mentions, as a proof of the moderation and œconomy of the elector Palatine, that when he came to England to pay his court to the princess Elizabeth, he had a small




cond, never certainly were intrigues and negoci-  
ations conducted with more address, or crowned  
with greater success. The Spanish ambassadors  
generally governed the courts at which they resided: and it was in the reign of the feeble Philip III. that those chains were forged, which for so many years alarmed the nations, and which, if they had not been burst asunder by the vigorous arm of Gustavus Adolphus, and the generals trained up to war under his standard, would have extended the authority of Austria over Europe.

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1621.

WHILE few nations from the Euxine and the Baltic to the Pyrenean mountains, escaped the calamities of war, Spain enjoyed the supreme blessing of profound peace. The success of her arms in Germany retrieved that loss of reputation which she had suffered in the Netherlands. And as it is the prerogative of military renown to dictate many circumstances of custom and fashion, the dress and manners of Spain were very generally imitated by other nations (a). The magnificence of the court was supported at an incredible expence; and the Spaniards were still esteemed the first nation in the world. This splendid face of things had an imposing air abroad; but the nation at home, oppressed with taxes, suffered for all its acquisitions and triumphs.

small train of sober well-fashioned gentlemen, servants and all not exceeding one hundred and seventy. Birch's Collection of Manuscripts in the British Museum.

(a) As it is common to say of a man of fashion, on his return from the continent, that he is very much Frenchified, so in those times travellers generally became very much Spanishified. "Mr. Rossingham, says Mr. Chamberlayne, is come home so Spanishified that I hardly knew him when he saluted me." Birch's Collection of Manuscripts in the British Museum.



# I N D E X.

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
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